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DE NATURA DEORUM

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WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF G. F. SCHOEMANN

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

AUSTIN STICKNEY

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EDITOR'S NOTE.

The text of this edition of Cicero's De Natura Deorum is substantially that of C. F. W. Müller, Leipsic, Teubner, 1878. The few changes made are noted after the Appendix, and the reasons for them are given in the Notes.

The Introduction, Summaries and Commentary are translated from G. F. Schoemann's fourth edition, Berlin, Weidmann, 1876. A few additions of the editor are enclosed in brackets.

INTRODUCTION.

CICERO'S essay on the nature of the gods is at once our most accessible and most complete original authority on the theology of the ancients: it gives us a brief outline of the views of the older thinkers and a complete exposition of the doctrines of those schools of philosophy which in later times included the greater number of educated people. The reader will perhaps be better able to understand the book after a few introductory remarks on the ancient theology and its various schools.

The philosophy of religion has to deal with the most important questions which can occupy the human mind. These regard the existence and nature of those unseen powers which are felt by man to control both his own inner and outer life, and the visible world about him. There is one answer ever ready for these questions: religion, older than any philosophy, offers a body of more or less definite conceptions which constitute the popular faith; and this faith is realized in the public worship and in the whole religious tone of the people. But in this as in all other matters there comes a time in the intellectual development of all nations when the more advanced minds feel a need, which is the beginning and end of all philosophy, the need of positive knowledge. People are no longer able to accept the traditions of religion upon mere faith; they ask for the reason of faith, for the ground of the prevailing ideas: and if religion cannot make good its claims by appeal to a higher authority, to a divine revelation, and thus raise its domain above all doubt or cavil (a thing which the religions of antiquity neither were able nor pretended to do), the necessary consequence is that reason makes an attempt to find an answer to these questions in her own way; and she then concedes the truth of the traditional faith only in so far as it coincides with or at least does not contradict her own conclusions.

This is sufficient to indicate in general the relation of the philosophy of religion to the popular religion; it would of necessity be variously modified according to the greater or less degree in which speculation had freed itself from the influence of the popular faith; to hold a quite free and independent position was never an easy matter. The faith in which a person was brought up, and which prevailed around him, necessarily exercised an influence upon philosophy; and the latter, instead of taking its own course regardless of the result it might reach, was often directed to a foregone conclusion from a desire to keep in harmony with the common faith. Although there was in antiquity no catechetical instruction, yet the universal belief operated with the same force; and implanted prejudices and modes of thought in the mind, before it could test and judge them, from which it afterwards found it difficult to break loose. Even where speculative reason was least affected by such influences the factors of the problem differed according to the ability and culture of individuals; and hence the inevitable consequence, that instead of sure and demonstrable results one reached only theories and opinions; and the confusing variety of these fully justified the most conscientious persons in concluding that it was useless to hope for any positive knowledge in these matters, and that every one must adopt such opinions as best satisfied his own reason and temperament; and we find this confession to be the result which Cicero reaches in the present essay.

The treatise consists of four parts: first, a brief sketch of the most noteworthy opinions on the subject from the beginning of philosophic speculation down to the complete development of the Epicurean and the Stoic systems; second, a detailed exposition of the Epicurean, and third, of the Stoic philosophy; fourth, a criticism of both these systems from the standpoint of the Academic scepticism.

We have to lament that the first part affords us only incomplete, often obscure, and always untrustworthy indications[1]; enough perhaps for the Epicurean to whom Cicero assigns them, but quite insufficient to give us any real insight into the development of religious philosophy and its various systems. Unfortunately we have no

[1] Compare the similar but shorter summary in the Academ. II, c. 37, where many things appear in a quite different light.

means of supplying this defect satisfactorily[1]; a few general remarks however, for which there was no room in the notes, may not be out of place here.

The earliest speculation of the Greeks, if it deserves the name, on the origin of the world and the forces that formed it coincides at least partially with the ideas which we find more or less plainly indicated in the oldest poetry of Homer and Hesiod. The primæval water of Thales may be recognized in the Homeric Oceanus, the origin of all things; and the primæval air of Anaximenes may correspond to the Hesiodic Chaos.[2] But the popular religion of the Greeks left the origin of things quite out of consideration; and, taking for granted the existence of the universe and of the gods, insisted only upon reverence to the gods as exercising the government of the world and presiding over human life, each in his own sphere and office. No one of the older philosophers thought it necessary to contradict this faith in general, although they might not have been led to it by their own speculations. They either left it to stand upon its own merits, or felt its influence so strongly as to recognize it, and so to keep religion and speculation separate. Although they criticised certain popular and mythological conceptions, and sometimes incurred opposition and persecution for so doing,[3] yet on the whole we hear very little of any aggressive contradiction on their part, or even of remarks implying indifference or disparagement. The reason is, that as there were no religious dogmas or doctrine authorized and protected by the state or the priesthood, the ritual worship was the only thing established and inviolable; this simply

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[1] It is only necessary to compare the writings of the best known investigators of the history of ancient philosophy to see how the scanty and unreliable statements of later writers, which are our only source of knowledge, have been differently understood and explained by one or another; so that the pretended results are not unfrequently very wide apart in the most important points; while very little remains that is generally accepted as true. For this reason it has been thought best not to refer in this commentary to any particular historian of ancient philosophy as a reliable guide.

[2] On the Chaos and the various explanations of it see Schöm. Opusc. Acad. II, p. 29, and 68 ff.

[3] Anaxagoras was prosecuted for infidelity, because he explained the sun to be a glowing mass of stone, and thus appeared to deny the god of the sun. Diog. L. II, 12. But this was surely not the only ground of the action. Comp. Schöm. Gr. Alterth. II[3], p. 585.

prescribed certain symbolic acts which were quite consistent with different conceptions of the gods, and might be understood and explained by different persons in different ways; so that any one, though not sharing in the prevailing belief, or even though quite breaking loose from it in his philosophical speculations, might still have adhered to the common ritual so as to avoid collision with the people or priesthood. When therefore Xenophanes declared that man had only opinions, but no positive knowledge in regard to the gods, no fault was found with him, because he did not thereby deny their existence; still less when he rejected the fables of the gods given by Homer, Hesiod, and other poets, pronouncing them ridiculous, undignified, and in part blasphemous. We are not to suppose that the priests or the people ever regarded these fables as anything more than entertaining stories or perhaps picturesque allegories, not to be taken literally; they did not consider them as real histories which the poets had received by revelation and which it was sinful not to believe.[1] Undoubtedly the fables had a real influence upon the belief of the multitude, and gave rise to very unworthy and perverted conceptions of the gods, which were only too easily taken up and held fast when the deities were imagined to be like men. The more clear-thinking minds however, though not themselves sharing these anthropomorphic conceptions, doubtless saw very well the uselessness of attempting to convince the people of their error, and were satisfied if they could succeed in clearing them of all the attendant lowness and immorality. We have, it is true, no definite information of the attitude of the older philosophers in this matter; but all that we know is quite in harmony with the view here advanced. Although Xenophanes for example and Parmenides recognized only one true god, and did not consider the popular deities as gods at all in the real sense, but only as something between god and man, they yet accommodated their language to the common usage, and designated them also as gods.[2] We have express evidence too

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[1] Particular fables might certainly for some reason or other be held in especial veneration among the people, so that any one who denied them passed among believers for a godless free-thinker. See Lucian. Philops. c. 3. But except for this the phrase, πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, had even become proverbial. Arist. Metaph. A. 2, p. 983.

[2] See Xenophanis carm. reliquiae, ed. Karsten, p. 103, and 113 ff.

that Pythagoras paid a pious reverence to the popular gods[1]; and none of the older philosophers seems to have been accused of the contrary. It is true that Socrates was reproached by his accusers with denying the gods of the people and introducing new ones; but this reproach was in fact rather a deduction drawn by themselves from certain utterances of Socrates than one which he had deserved by his actual opinions. We know on the contrary by the most credible evidence[2] that he by no means withdrew from the traditional worship of the gods, and hence did not deny their existence; although he imagined them as different from the common conception, and thought it most advisable not to touch upon the mythological fables unless occasion required.[3] Nor did the pupils of Socrates find it necessary to deny the existence of the popular deities, although Plato held that there was a higher god above them whose creatures and servants they were: and we do not find that he was attacked for despising the popular religion. His opinion of the mythological fables may be sufficiently gathered from the fact that he banishes from his ideal state the poets who originated and circulated them; although he is not at all opposed in itself to a mythological form of discourse upon divine things: indeed he often makes use of it to express figuratively what he cannot express literally. Antisthenes too assumed, like Plato. only one supreme deity, but did not hesitate to make the multitude of popular deities subordinate to him. He regarded the mythological fables, at least in part, as allegories: and expressed in the severest manner his disapproval of the conceptions of the gods which corresponded to the literal sense of the fables.[4] Aristotle took the same course[5]: and what we read of his disciples, as for example Heraclides of Pontus or Theophrastus (Cic. Nat. Deor. I, 13, 34. 35), shows only views which, though foreign to the popular religion, are still not irreconcilable with it. No more did Strato come into collision with the popular faith in accepting,

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[1] See Iamblich. vit. Pyth. 5, 100. 122. 144. 155. Comp. Cic. De Leg. II, 11.

[2] See Xenophon, Mem. I, 1, 2; II, 6, 8; IV, 3, 12; 7, 10. Anab. III, 1. 5. Plat. Phaed. p. 118 A.

[3] Comp. Plat. Phaedr. p. 229 C; Republ. III, 378 D.

[4] Julian. Orat. VII, p. 209 A; 215 C; 217 A. Clem. Alex. Strom. II, 20, 107. Comp. also Lobeck, Aglaoph, p. 159.

[5] Comp. C. Zell, De Aristotele patriarum religionum aestimatore. Heidelb. 1847.

according to Cicero and others, a blind, unconscious natural force as the beginning of things; for he might have derived the gods also from this force, just as for example the Hesiodic theogony derives them from Chaos.

The relation then between the philosophers thus far spoken of and the popular religion was, at the least, a peaceful one; although they did not expressly defend, they still did not attack it; they easily kept on good terms with it, and allowed it all the influence it could command. But the Sophists took up a hostile position; and the most noted among them, however differing in other matters, had this in common, that, as Protagoras expressed it, they made man the measure of all things; that is, they denied to the human mind the faculty of forming anything more than a subjective judgment of things, and held that objective truth was unattainable. For them therefore, least of all things, could the substance of the popular religion lay claim to pass for anything more than a subjective conception. Protagoras expressed himself thus: that whether there were gods or not, that is, whether there was any actual reality corresponding to the common religious conceptions, he did not attempt to say. Prodicus seems to have regarded the belief in the gods in the same way; he thought that mankind had revered, deified and worshipped the objects they found most beneficial and indispensable to their life, such as the sun, moon, stars, fire, rivers and the like. Others declared religion to be simply the invention of shrewd lawgivers who tried to control the passions and bridle the fierceness of men by the fear of supernatural powers.[1] Finally, others explained the supposed gods to be only men of old times, rulers and heroes, who had been deified; and they regarded the myths as distorted accounts of their doings and sufferings. This last view is called the *historic* or *pragmatic*, because it claimed to find in the myths actual events, though not free from falsification; it is also called the *Euhemeristic* view, after Euhemerus of Messana spoken of in the note to I, 42, 119, who elaborated it and applied it to almost all the popular deities, although many similar explanations of the myths had been tried before him. But Euhemerus does not seem to have set out from a distinct philosophical system or any positive views on the deity

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[1] See Cic. N. D. I, 42, 118; Plat. Leg. X, p. 889 E; Critiae fr. ap. Sext. Emp. adv. math. IX, 54. Also Polyb. VI, 56.

based upon it. The circumstance that he is spoken of as an atheist must not be taken for a proof that he entirely denied the existence of a deity; for that term was not unfrequently applied to such as only declared their disbelief in the gods of the people. Euhemerus had many followers. Among them were the *theologi*, mentioned by Cicero, III, 21, 53; from the same passage we learn that, in consequence of the many and contradictory fables that were current about each of the gods, it had been found necessary to distinguish several persons of the same name, in order to remove the contradictions. For this reason Johannes the Lydian (*De Mensibus* IV, 48) calls this view the *heroic* and *separatist* view, τὸν ἡρωικὸν καὶ μεριστικὸν λόγον; the first, because it explained the gods to be heroes of the olden time, the second, because it distinguished the fables in the manner just alluded to.

Other philosophers, antagonists of the popular belief, directed their arguments not against the existence of gods of all sorts, but only of such gods as the people imagined. To this class belong especially Democritus and Epicurus, who conceded the truth of the popular faith only to a limited extent; they held that a belief so universally diffused and so fast-rooted in the minds of men must be more than a mere illusion, that some reality must lie at the foundation of it. But further than this they did not go; they allowed no voice to the common belief in regard to the nature of the gods, to their power and influence over the world and mankind; on these points they claimed that speculation alone had a right to be heard. Accordingly Democritus explained the gods to be atomic shapes, emanations from a universal divine substance, evidently very different beings from the popular deities; yet not without influence, sometimes benevolent, sometimes hostile, upon the lives of men.[1] But Epicurus went further. His gods, atomic shapes like those of Democritus, lived in happy idleness, without the slightest influence upon the world, with no evident relations to human life; and when he spoke of a religious reverence due to the gods in view of their happiness and their majesty, he evidently did so with no real conviction; although it would be too much to say that he did not believe the existence of any gods, and only pretended to do so

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[1] See the note on I, 43, 120.

for fear of persecution. The reasons against this opinion may be found at the end of the Summary of the first book.

The Stoics maintained a very different attitude towards the popular belief; to a certain degree at least they undertook to support and defend it. They distinguished at the outset a threefold theology: the political, the mythical or poetical, and the philosophical or physical.[1] By the first they understood the religious ordinances recognized in the various states, and placed under the control of the public authority; that is, the traditional or legally established regulations about the deities to be worshipped in the state, and the manner of paying this worship. The second head comprised the fables recounted by the poets of the gods and their doings. So far as these pretended to be narratives of actual events, they were entirely rejected by the Stoics as being equally destitute of external or internal truth; that is, they neither contained any basis of fact, nor were they in harmony with the nature of the gods. Of course they thought they discovered a kernel of truth in many fables, a physical or ethical proposition under a mythical form, but certainly not in all; and they disapproved in general of the mythical form of treatment of these subjects, because few persons understood it, and the majority were misled by it into false and perverted conceptions of the gods. They thought, however, to find the key to the understanding of the most important fables in the third part, the physical or philosophic theology; this not only undertook to prove in general the existence of divine beings and a divine order and government of the world, but also recognized the deities proposed by the political theology as objects of worship; and although not representing this recognition as necessary, it at least sought to justify it as reasonable and probable. As the chief heads of this physical theology of the Stoics are contained in Cicero's second book, and are grouped together in the Summary of that book, we may refer to that for the details, adding however here a few observations.

It is customary to call the theology of the Stoics *pantheistic;* and it is so in so far that it places the deity in the world, and regards it as coextensive with and pervading all its parts. The deity of the

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1 Comp. Ps. Plutarch De plac. phil. I, 6, 8. Varro and Scævola made the same distinctions. See Augustine C. D. IV, 27; VI, 5. Comp. also Eusebius pr. evang. IV, 1, p. 138, Heinich.

Stoics is not a purely spiritual, immaterial being; it is at once matter and spirit inseparably united. But this spiritual and material essence manifested itself in the creation of the world in such a way that two modes of its activity may be distinguished. Its material essence, represented as the finest, fire-like ether, condensed itself in part to a coarser nature, and thus arose the matter of the world, the ὕλη, at first only an ἄποιος οὐσία with no definitely marked qualities[1]; this matter then divided itself in gradations into different elements, from the continual action of which each on the other, under the influence of the law implanted in them by the original divine being, a well ordered whole, the κόσμος, the universe proceeded. The universe is thus an emanation from the deity, the connection between the two still of course subsisting. We may regard it as a body, in which the deity is present as the animating soul. But we must not be misled into considering the deity only as the soul of the universe; it is rather only a part of the original deity that is embodied in the universe[2]; the deity does not itself for that cease to exist, exalted above the universe; it is not simply immanent, it is also transcendent. The divine ether mingled with no grosser stuff encircles the world that has proceeded from it; from it soul and life continually flow forth into the world, without its ever being exhausted; the grosser elements rather, out of which the corporeal world has been formed, will all gradually be dissolved by it and absorbed into it; the world returns to the deity, to come forth again from it anew.[3]

The primæval deity is conceived of as a self-conscious, thinking, willing, wise, or in other words as a personal being; but in the universe that has proceeded from it there arise, as individual manifestations of the all-pervading divine ether other beings likewise self-conscious, thinking, willing, hence personal beings; and these are of two sorts: the less perfect, laden with coarser bodies, limited to a short life, burdened with manifold weaknesses and defects, but still capable of perfection and of wisdom; these are mankind; and, secondly, the

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[1] Diog. L. VII, 134; Sext. Emp. adv. math. IX, 11.

[2] The soul of the universe is τὸ μέρος τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων. Diog. L. VII, 147. Comp. Ps. Arist. De mund. c. 6.

[3] *See note on II, 46, 118.*

more perfect beings, of purer etherial substance, without gross bodies, sinless and wise from the beginning; these are the gods (see II, 13, 35). Considered in this respect the theology of the Stoics may be characterized as a monotheism and a polytheism combined. For the one being, whence everything has proceeded, is alone God in the true sense of the word, uncreated, imperishable, and eternal. The other gods are not eternal, but created and perishable beings, that at the universal dissolution of all things will return into the primæval being whence they came. Further, in the recognition by the Stoics of different sorts of such created gods we may recognize on the one hand a logical deduction from their speculative physics, on the other only a concession to the popular faith. It followed from their physical views of the constitution of the fire-like ether, that they also had to explain the constellations, which consisted of it, to be gods. But when they accepted gods that were only deified mortals, or gods only as originators and controllers of certain human relations and moral forces, or as givers of various gifts, they evidently only followed the popular belief; and so in Cicero's account of their doctrines (II, 23, 60) we do not find, as in the case of the highest deity and of the constellations, a demonstration of the existence of these gods, but only the simple remark, that such deities were accepted by wise men not without reason. The same is the case with the gods which we may designate as natural spirits, which bear rule in various parts of the world, the earth, the sea, the fire, &c. The Stoics accepted these too, because they found the belief in them among the people, and because they felt obliged, not to reject, but rather to recognize a sort of natural revelation in the popular faith, so far as it contained nothing contradictory to reason, nothing plainly false and perverted. But it cannot be ignored, that all these deities occupied an uncertain and ambiguous position in their system of theology; and if we had fuller accounts than have actually come down to us of the views of individual Stoics, we should doubtless find not only that they had differed among themselves on this point, but that the same thinker had not always consistently held the same opinion. The Stoics were reproached by their antagonists with believing that the popular gods were such only in name, not in reality; partly because they represented them as created and perishable beings, and conceded immortality only to the one highest being, whom it is true they called

Zeus,[1] and partly because these gods according to the Stoic explanations were no persons, but things, relations, capacities, &c.[2]; hence the Stoics have been attacked as being atheists. But these two reproaches are easily seen to neutralize each other; for if these gods were for the Stoics only things, relations and capacities, and if they were only called gods by way of personification, the Stoics could not be blamed for considering them mortal; they could not of course exist longer than the world. The other reproach could only reasonably be made by those persons who acquitted the Stoics of the second (namely that the gods were only to be held as such by a figure of speech), while they recognized their belief in the personality of the gods. And in reality it is difficult to see why the Stoics, if not all, at least some or perhaps many of them might not have held that belief. The consistency of the system certainly in no wise forbade their acknowledging the existence of superhuman beings who, as servants and helpers of the supreme god, presided over the world and human life in various spheres and relations; and thus they could always without hesitation assent to the popular faith which offered them such deities. It was a contradiction with the popular faith that they conceived them to be mortal, but not one worthy of blame. The popular faith was not shocked at the idea of gods that had had a beginning; and if in spite of this it held such gods as immortal, the Stoics were on the other hand more consistent; and the whole reproach, carefully examined, amounts to no more than this, that, since immortality is necessarily included in the idea of the deity, their gods, as not being immortal, were really no gods, but only superhuman, demonic beings: but on the other hand as a compensation for this they conceived the one supreme God of a majesty truly divine.

A third reproach, which is often made against the Stoics, is that they degraded the gods by teaching that man owed to them only inferior endowments and external goods, while he could attain to wisdom and virtue by himself alone.[3] This reproach too has no sense except we concede that the gods were for the Stoics real

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[1] Plutarch. contra Stoic. c. 31, and De Stoic. repugn. c. 38.

[2] Plutarch. De Is. et Osir. c. 40 and 66–68. Amator. c. 12, 13, with Winckelmann's remark, p. 158. Comp. also the Herculanean fragment referred to below p. 15; col. II, p. 17, Peters. Cic. III, 24, 61.

[3] Plutarch. adv. Stoic. c. 32.

persons, and not simply names; and secondly it does not touch them all, nor does it touch the system at all. The only idea in harmony with the system was that the origin of all virtue and wisdom is in the one highest, the only true God. Man, whose spirit is an emanation from the divine being,[1] bears within him for this reason the capacity for virtue and wisdom; but this is much restrained and borne down by the body to which it is bound; and the task of man is to break loose from the fetters. But there was in the system of the Stoic theology no clear decision whether in this task man must rely simply on himself and his own power, that is on the power of the indwelling divine being, or whether he could have the comforting aid of friendly gods; and a person might think as he pleased on this question.[2] It is undoubtedly true that we very often find among the Stoics proud utterances, which seem to imply a presuming arrogance, a self-sufficient reliance upon one's own power, far removed not only from Christian humility, but even from the self-knowledge and modesty of the heathen; but we must not overlook the fact that such utterances always speak of the God in man, that is, of the part of the divine being that dwells in him; and that they rest only upon the consciousness of the true and higher nature of man and of its becoming attitude towards the exterior world. When the Stoic appeals to this consciousness, he does so in a sense not materially different from that in which the Christian teacher reminds men that they are the children of God and that the spirit of God dwells in them.[3] Nor must we forget another thing, that in such utterances the reference is only to the wise man, or the man in whom the ideal of human perfection is realized; an ideal which the individual rarely or never succeeds in reaching. But the Stoic Balbus (Cic. N. D. II, 66) states very plainly that in the struggle for perfection man needs the help of those higher powers that are kindly disposed towards him and are free from the imperfections and faults of human nature; and the assertion, that we must rely upon ourselves and our own powers for wisdom and virtue, and can ask and expect from the

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[1] Ἀπόσπασμα τοῦ θεοῦ: *divinae particula aurae.* Hor. Sat. II, 2, 79. Upton on Epict. I, 14, 6; II, 8, 11. Gataker on Antonin. II, 1, p. 58.

[2] Comp. Antonin. IX, 40, with Gataker's notes.

[3] This is also the opinion of Fleury in his book Saint Paul et Sénèque, I, p. 93. Comp. Upton on Epictet. I, 14, 6; II, 8, 11; 16, 42.

gods external good things only, is not made by the Stoic, but by the Academic as against the Stoic (III, 36, 87). He is wrong in representing this view as generally prevailing (as is shown in the note to that passage); but those who consider it as the only opinion held by the Stoics are no more in the right; for in the Stoic system there was nothing which clashed at all with the directly opposite view.

While the Stoic theology attempted in the manner just described partly to correct and complete, partly to explain and so support the popular religion, it encountered, in common with the irreligion of Epicurus, which in reality was little better than atheism, the opposition of the critical scepticism of the New Academy, which held any certain knowledge on any subject to be impossible, conceding only a greater or less degree of probability; and hence carried on a continual strife with the dogmatism of the other schools. Arcesilas, the founder of this later Academy, not only repeated the famous proposition of Socrates, that he knew only one thing, and that was, that he knew nothing; but he went beyond him, saying that even this, that he knew nothing, he did not know, but only surmised it.[1] He and his followers considered nothing as absolutely certain but reason and the right of using it; even this however they held could not help us to a sure knowledge of things. All thought, so they argued, can only proceed upon certain data; the only data we have are those of experience, which come from impressions on the senses; but these impressions are unreliable, they are undoubtedly often false, and there is no perfectly sure criterion whereby to distinguish the true from the false. Hence complete certainty of knowledge is impossible; we can only attain to mere opinions. These may be true, they may be false as well; and after all testing and comparing we can do no more than distinguish various grades of probability; and, since actual knowledge is beyond our reach, we must content ourselves with reasonable opinion and belief. Hence, whenever a definite opinion was advanced on any subject, they were accustemed to take the opposite side, in order to show that there was nothing which did not admit of discussion, and that it became the wise man to withhold any definite and confident judgment; *assensionem cohibere*, B. I, c. 1. — Cicero himself held this doctrine, as

[1] Cic. Acad. I, 12, 45. For Socrates, however, comp. Plat. Men., p. 98 B.

he also professes in the present book I, 5, 10–12; reserving at the same time his right, while giving up the hope of certainty, to hold the opinion, which might in any case seem the most probable. We notice that he uses this right at the end of the third book. While Velleius declares his entire agreement with the simply negative criticism which Cotta had made of the discourse of Balbus, Cicero says that for himself the positive views of Balbus seemed the more probable; and there is no reason to doubt that he thereby expressed his real opinion. For however much he recognized the want of scientific rigor in the Stoic dogmatism, and however strong he found many of the objections made by the Academic, his faith in the existence of higher beings and a divine providence and government of the world was none the less a living one. But it is not necessary to suppose that all the details of the Stoic system, all the sorts of gods they accepted, and all that they held in regard to divine apparitions and revelations were equally a part of his faith. He held only to the general truth of the existence of divine beings and the divine government of the world[1]; and as the Stoics held this too, their doctrine appears to him for this reason to come nearer to the truth than the Academic negation, which however, as Cotta plainly enough remarks, is not so much a negation of religion itself as of the reasoning advanced by the Stoics in its behalf. The Academic way of thinking is quite in harmony with a sort of Eclecticism which seems to have been the only resource for a heathen of religious and thoughtful mind in a matter like this, where the limits of human nature make absolute knowledge impossible.

The opinion, held by some, that Cicero has inserted much in the discourse of Balbus that was gathered not from his Stoic predecessors but from other quarters, seems to be not well founded. It has been remarked above that various views about the gods and divine things were found in the Stoic system without regard to consistency; and it is capable of proof that in fact the most noted Stoics held conflicting views on many points. Hence there is no sufficient reason to suppose that Cicero did not really take from some Stoic or other the whole discourse which he puts into the mouth of Balbus.

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[1] Comp. De Divin. II, 72, 148.

We cannot say with certainty who this predecessor was; but many reasons, which need not be given here in detail, point to the Rhodian Posidonius, who is spoken of in the note to I, 3, 6, and who, as Cicero says in that passage, had been his teacher; and doubtless the teacher of Balbus also, since Cotta I, 44, 123, calls him *familiaris omnium nostrum*. His work περὶ θεῶν was one of considerable extent: Diogenes Laertius, VII, 138, cites the thirteenth book; so that Cicero gave only a short extract. It is possible, though we have no evidence, that he also made use of other Stoic writings. All that he cites from Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and Panaetius, even if he had ever read them, he might have found in Posidonius; and even what he says in II, 34 of the sphere of Posidonius could have been found in the same author. He however differs from him in some particulars, as for example the size of the moon, II, 40, 103; and the whole astronomical part of § 104 appears to have been worked up independently. Of course the etymologies of the Latin names of the gods, II, 26, 27, as well as the examples from Roman history are Cicero's own, given perhaps in place of others used by Posidonius.[1] Besides in I, 44, 123 he himself cites the fifth book of Posidonius *De Natura Deorum*.

It has been conjectured that Cicero took his account of the Epicurean doctrine from a work of the Epicurean Phaedrus περὶ θεῶν which he requests the loan of in a letter to Atticus (XIII, 39)[2]; and as we find among the fragments of an Epicurean theological treatise discovered at Herculaneum a portion with which the exposition of Cicero in the first book, c. 15, 39–41, though much shorter, yet in the main coincides, the conclusion has been drawn that those fragments were a part of this treatise of Phaedrus.[3] But it is now conceded that the fragments of Herculaneum, which were published subsequently in the *Herculanensium collectio altera*, Neap. 1862, tom. II, belonged rather to a treatise of Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας. It is very probable that Cicero made use of this

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1 Comp. De Divin. II, 3, 8.

2 The Mss. have there, it is true, περισσῶν; but the emendation περὶ θεῶν seems open to no doubt.

3 Under the title Phaedri Epicurei, vulgo anonymi Herculanensis, de natura deorum fragmentum instauratum et illustratum, what was then known was published and commented upon by Chr. Petersen in the Programm zum Lectionsverzeichniss des Hamburg. Akad. Gymnasiums, 1833.

treatise, considering the coincidence of several passages above alluded to, but not quite certain; for similar notices and opinions doubtless occurred in many other Epicurean documents.[1]

The discourses assigned by Cicero to the Academic in the first book against the Epicurean doctrine, and in the third book against the Stoics, were without any doubt taken from one of the many writings of Clitomachus. There existed no less than four hundred books of this philosopher, in which he had made note of the oral teachings of his master Carneades. But not only does Cicero himself several times appeal to Carneades, but many of the arguments which he makes against the Stoics are found in the same form in Sextus Empiricus in the ninth book of the treatise against the mathematicians, *i.e.*, against the dogmatics, and they are there ascribed to Carneades. Although they are in part evidently sophistical, they are still in general well adapted to prove what Cicero makes Cotta say, that there is a great difference between religious faith and scientific knowledge; that faith rests upon something different from dialectic argument, and that whoever seeks to found it upon such runs the risk rather of weakening it. But we may well suppose that many among the ancients were reasonable enough to see with Cotta that faith itself was not overthrown by the refutation of insufficient rational grounds, and that there was such a thing as an immediate certainty of faith, independent of the strength or weakness of logical arguments.[2]

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1 This is also the opinion of the reviewer of the Herculanensia, published by Drummond and Walpole (London, 1810), in the Quarterly Review, Vol. III, No. 5, p. 15.

2 *A te enim philosopho rationem accipere debeo religionis, maioribus etiam nulla ratione reddita credere* says Cotta III, 2, 6. Now it is of course beyond all doubt that it was utterly impossible for a thinking man at that time really to hold such a position toward all the tenets of the traditional religion of the people as Cotta in this passage professes himself to hold, and that much, perhaps the most of it, was professed only for political reasons as a means to any thing but religious ends; but still it would not be just for this reason utterly to deny to the thinkers of those times any religious faith whatever, as has in fact been done. "What is more unworthy of a philosopher than to deny the existence of the gods?" says Cotta III, 17, 44; and he was certainly sincere. But the appeal to the tradition handed down from the forefathers indicates in general a consciousness that a real *knowledge* of divine things is impossible for man, and that therefore religion, which as a matter of fact was everywhere existent, must have some other source than knowledge. It is not to be wondered at

It remains now to add something in regard to the persons whom Cicero has introduced as advocates of the three schools of philosophy. We know little more of the Epicurean Velleius, probably of Lanuvium (see Orelli on I, 29, 82), than that he was tribune of the people in the year 664. In *De Orat.* III, 21, 78, Cicero calls him a *familiaris* of the famous orator L. Licinius Crassus, but himself *rudem in dicendi exercitatione*. We will not discuss the truth of the compliment that he was considered the most noted representative among the Romans of the Epicurean school. Lucretius, of whom we have a didactic poem, excellent in its way, on the Epicurean philosophy, was much younger than Velleius, but was no longer living when Cicero wrote this.

We know no more of the speaker for the Stoic school than we learn from Cicero. It seems from a fragment of the Ciceronian Hortensius (Orelli, p. 484) that he was also introduced in that treatise as one of the speakers.

C. Aurelius Cotta, the Academic, born in 630, and so eighteen

therefore that the idea sprang up, that the gods had once revealed to man somewhat about themselves and their relation to him and to the universe, more or less, according to his need of or capacity to receive such revelation. And it was so very evident that such original revelation had been in the course of time in many ways misunderstood and counterfeited, misrepresented and corrupted, now from carelessness, now from malice, that no sensible man could shut his eyes to the fact; but there was the greatest variety of views as to how far one could or must go in separating the true from the false, revelation from the devices of men, what was to be held from what to be rejected. There were believers and free-thinkers of all grades; but we can no more say that the free-thinker must necessarily and unconditionally have been destitute of faith, than that the believer necessarily believed everything. — In regard to the appeal to a revelation made to the men of old, an appeal which, more or less seriously meant, occurs innumerable times among the ancients, the reader is referred to the essay of Prof. Schoemann, "Ueber das sittlich-religiöse Verhalten der Griechen," Greifswald, 1848, p. 35. — There is no want of modern well-known and much-read delineations of the religious condition of the thinkers of those times, the authors of which take pleasure in bringing out into prominence chiefly the weaknesses and errors from which of course few were free, but who allow nothing like a really religious feeling, and are especially fond of ridiculing the Stoic religious philosophy as empty talk. This is easily explained. The writers of these descriptions stand upon much higher ground, and cannot easily recognize in others a religious frame of mind that is so far inferior to their own.

years older than Cicero, was one of those who were accused of *maiestatis* under the *Lex Varia* (see note on III, 33, 81). He went into exile; but returned to Rome with Sulla in 672, where he was made pontifex and consul in 679. In the latter office he carried a *lex tribunicia: ut tribunis plebis liceret postea alios magistratus capere, quod lege Sullae iis erat ademptum.* Ascon. in Cornel., p. 78 Or. After his consulate he went to Gaul and succeeded in establishing a claim to the honor of a triumph, which was granted him; he did not live to enjoy it, but died a few days before it was to happen. Ascon. in Pison., p. 14. He is very highly spoken of not only for a most exact knowledge of philosophy, but also as an orator; and even when a young man he had made a bold defence in court of Rutilius, his maternal uncle (see note on III, 32, 80). He was plainly in every respect a fitting representative of Cicero, who takes for himself in the conversation only the part of a quiet listener.

Cicero represents these three men as assembled on one occasion during the Latin feast at the house of Cotta, probably in one of his villas, — and as giving their various views about the nature of the gods in a conversation, where he was himself present, as he happened to be visiting Cotta at the time. The date of this supposed conversation must be placed between the year 679, the year of Cotta's consulship, and 676, in which Cicero returned from a prolonged absence in Greece, where he had busied himself particularly with philosophic studies; and these are alluded to doubtless in I, 6, 15.

The book opens with a dedication to M. Junius Brutus, afterwards the murderer of Cæsar, a man whose finished philosophical culture and writings are often mentioned with the greatest deference by Cicero, who was himself twenty-one years his senior. *Excellens omni genere laudis*, he says of him in Acad. I, 3, 12, *sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret.* He professed the doctrines of the Academy of Antiochus, for which the note to I, 3, 6 may be consulted. We have none of his works remaining; but Seneca, Consol. ad Helv. c. 9, quotes a short passage from his book *De Virtute*, and in epist. 95 something from that περὶ καθήκοντος (*de officiis*[1]); but Quintilian, X, 1, 123, says that in

[1] See Charis., p. 83; Priscian., p. 679, Putsch. — Diomedes, p. 378, ali cites the book of Brutus De Patientia.

his philosophical writings he was *egregius multoque quam in orationibus praestantior;* and further *suffecit ponderi rerum; scias eum sentire quae dicit.* Besides the books *De Natura Deorum* Cicero dedicated to him *De Finibus*, the *Tusculan Disputations*, the *Paradoxa* and the *Orator;* and called by his name the book *De Claris Oratoribus*, where Brutus is one of the speakers.

The date of writing this book may be determined, if not with entire certainty, yet with the greatest probability. That it was written before the murder of Cæsar, that is before the Ides of March, 710, follows without any doubt from the manner in which Cæsar's supremacy is spoken of in I, 4, 7; and that Cicero was occupied upon it in the summer of 709 may be inferred from the letter[1] to Atticus written in June of this year (XIII, 39, 2), where he asks him for the book of Phædrus περὶ θεῶν doubtless to make use of it in the composition of this book. — But the greater part of Cicero's philosophical works, the *Academica*, *De Finibus*, *Tusculan Disputations*, *De Divinatione*, *De Fato*, *De Senectute*, *De Officiis*, *De Amicitia*, and the *De Universo* or *Timaeus*, a translation of that of Plato, among those which are wholly or in part extant; and the *De Consolatione*, *Hortensius*, *De Gloria*, and perhaps *De Virtutibus* among those which are lost with the exception of a few fragments, were written in the short interval between the spring of 709 and the autumn of 710, in the sixty-second and sixty-third years of his life; and while we are astounded at a literary activity of such extent, we learn, partly from the prefaces to these treatises and partly from the letters to Atticus, the occasion of writing them, and Cicero's state of mind at the time. *Hortata est*, he says, N. D., I, 4, 9, *ut me ad haec conferrem, animi aegritudo, fortunae magna et gravi commota iniuria, cuius si maiorem aliquam levationem reperire potuissem non ad hanc potissimum confugissem.* This hard stroke of fortune alluded to was the death in March, 709, of his daughter Tullia, his favorite child, to whom he was most tenderly devoted, and whose loss afflicted him most deeply. He expresses his state of mind in a letter to Atticus (XII, 14, 3), written in March, 709: *Nihil de maerore minuendo scriptum ab ullo est, quod ego non legerim; sed*

[1] See J. de Gruber, Quaest. de tempore atque serie epist. Cic. Sund., 1836, p. 26, 27. — On the pa[illegible] of the letter in question comp. Orelli Onom. Cic. II, p. 218 b.

omnem consolationem vincit dolor. Quin etiam feci, quod profecto ante me nemo, ut ipse me per litteras consolarer.[1] *Affirmo tibi nullam consolationem esse talem. Totos dies scribo, non quo proficiam aliquid; sed tantisper impedior, non equidem satis,—vis enim urget,—sed relaxor tamen enitorque ad animum reficiendum.* There was no opportunity, as public affairs were at the time, for him to engage in them with dignity and success, and so obtain relief from his sorrow; and this condition of the state itself for a man like Cicero was no less a source of sadness, than his own domestic grief.

When we consider these circumstances we are little disposed to pass a strict judgment on Cicero's philosophical works, but rather to excuse many undoubted shortcomings in an old man afflicted and borne down by sadness and care. Even a philosopher by profession would hardly have been able in such a state of mind and in so short a time to write satisfactorily upon all the most difficult problems of philosophy at such length; how much less a man, who, however earnestly he had studied these subjects, was really only a dilettante; and who for the larger and better part of his life had been occupied as a statesman and an advocate with great activity and brilliant success. His philosophical writings are in fact little else than translations or extracts from Greek predecessors[2]; and we should not wonder at many misunderstandings or other traces of haste and carelessness, which have been occasionally noticed in the notes of this volume, and which have given a welcome opportunity to critics fond of emendations to show their skill. A striking case of this haste is the *hesterno die* II, 29, 73, and *nudius tertius* III, 7, 18, as if the conversation had occupied three days, whereas the beginning of the second as well as that of the third book represent it as begun and finished on one and the same day.[3] These defects must not however prevent us from a thankful recognition of Cicero's merits even as a philosophical writer. He was the first to develop the Latin

[1] This refers to the lost De Consolatione, the fragments of which are found in Orelli IV, 2, p. 489 ff.

[2] He himself once calls them ἀπόγραφα. Ad Attic. XII, ep. 52: Ἀπόγραφα *sunt; minore labore fiunt; verba tantum affero, quibus abundo.*

[3] *Nudius tertius* would be an error too with the division into three days, as in that case the discourse of Balbus, to which it refe[illegible] been made on the day immediately preceding, and not two days

language so as to make it fit for the treatment of philosophical subjects; more than any one else he promoted and made easy the pursuit of these studies for his countrymen; and finally we owe to him an acquaintance with many portions of the ancient philosophy of which we should otherwise be quite ignorant; and however disparaging the judgment of many people nowadays, no one can deny the importance of these works for the history of philosophy.

BOOK FIRST.

SUMMARY.

THE first book opens with a preface addressed to M. Brutus stating the subject of the present work, noting its importance in a theoretical and practical way, and calling attention to the great difference of opinions held upon it by thinkers from the earliest times (§§ 1–5). Cicero then excuses himself for treating a subject of this sort as against certain persons who had been surprised at his beginning to write upon philosophical subjects so late in life, and especially at his preference for the Academic philosophy; and he closes his defence with the very just remark that it is precisely on the question of the nature of the gods that this endless variety of opinions would seem to warrant the attitude of the Academics, who gave up anything like dogmatic certainty, and contented themselves with simple probability (5–14). He passes on then to the narrative of a supposed conversation upon this matter between Cotta, Velleius and Balbus, at which he was present and which forms the subject of the following books.

Velleius the Epicurean commences his discourse with a few preliminary remarks against Plato and the Stoics, whose views about the deity as creator of the world and about the divinity of the universe he ridicules as absurd and arbitrary (18–24), and then passes on to a critical summary of all the opinions advanced from the days of Thales down to the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (25–41)[1]; a summary which, however superficial and unsatisfactory as well in the relation of the opinions themselves as in the reasons adduced against

[1] We know from the Hercul. Fragm. (see Introd., p. 15) and from Lucret. I, 635–920 that the Epicureans were accustomed to commence the exposition of their own doctrine with a criticism of other systems of natural philosophy.

them, is still not without value for the history of philosophy, because no fuller compilation of this sort has come down to us from antiquity. — After a cursory glance at the myths of the poets and the fantastic notions of some foreign nations (42, 43) there follows the exposition of the doctrine of Epicurus, as being the first satisfactory solution after so many fruitless attempts.

Epicurus starts from the natural and universal consciousness of god as the only sure and irrefragable proof of the existence of the gods. This very consciousness too testifies to their happiness and immortality; from which it further follows, that they neither are occupied about anything nor interfere at all with other beings; they are disturbed by no affections such as love or hate; and so because of the sublimity and excellence of their nature they may be objects of reverence, but never of fear (44, 45). In regard to their form and other matters the data of natural consciousness taken with reasonable inferences lead to the following conclusions: first, that the gods have human forms, because nobody has ever conceived them under any other, none other is more beautiful and more worthy of the gods, and none other is ever found united with reason (46, 47): second, that they have not a coarse material body like an earthly one, cognizable by the senses, but that their bodies consist of an infinitely finer substance which is only quasi body and quasi blood, perceptible not by the senses but by the mind, which is continually and directly affected by impressions (*imagines*) which flow forth from the gods (48, 49). Upon further reflection, to which they prompt the human mind, we arrive at the conception of the gods as happy and immortal beings, in conformity with the law of isonomy or of equal proportion[1]; this law forces us to the conclusion that, as there exists an infinite number of destroying forces, there must also be an infi-

[1] This law of isonomy we find mentioned only in Cicero; other writers say nothing of it even when occasion seemed to require it, as, *e.g.*, Sext. Emp. adv. Math. IX, 46. It reminds one of the law of equilibrium of the elements, spoken of by Origen, ctr. Cels. IV, 63: *τὸ ἰσοστάσιον τῶν στοιχείων ἀπὸ τῆς προνοίας γίνεται οὐκ' ἐπιτρεπούσης πλεονεκτεῖν τὸ ἕν, ἵνα μὴ ὁ κόσμος φθαρῇ.* Comp. Plutarch, Def. orac. c. 34; Heraclid., p. 444 Gal. This doctrine was surely older than Epicurus, see Ps. Arist. De mundo c. 5; and his isonomy evidently resembles this much more than it resembles the Platonic doctrine, Phaed., p. 70, E: *γίγνεται πάντα οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐνάντια*, with which it is compared by Wyttenbach in the Disputat. before Plato's Phaedo, p. XXXVII.

nite number of conserving forces; and in like manner that for the great number of mortal beings there must be an equal number of immortal beings; and we can imagine only the gods as corresponding to this conception (50).[1] But if with the Stoics we suppose the universe itself to be God, or if we accept the existence in the universe of a God that governs it, we only inflict upon the deity a burden and a care, which is in plain contradiction with the idea of happiness (51, 52). Nor is there any need of a divine ruler or creator of the world, since it has arisen from atoms by the force of nature; and not only one, but innumerable worlds have come, are coming and will continue to come into being in the same manner (53, 54). The Stoic doctrine inflicts upon men rulers, of whom they must be in continual dread; it leads to a belief in a necessary fatality, in soothsaying and the like; from which the doctrine of Epicurus makes them free, and inspires them with reverence for the gods without any fear (55, 56).

After this exposition of the Epicurean philosophy Cotta commences his discourse in refutation of it. He opens, after a few compliments to Velleius, with the declaration, in conformity with the principles of his school, that he is much more capable of detecting what is false, than of ascertaining what is true; and that he finds himself, with respect to the question in debate, in the same position with the poet Simonides, namely, that the longer he thinks on the subject, the more obscure it seems to him (57–60). He is very far from disputing the existence of the gods; he believes in it heartily; but if it be a question of substituting for this faith a knowledge based upon logical proof, he cannot allow the arguments adduced by Velleius to be convincing. For the circumstance adduced by Velleius, that all men believe in the existence of gods, is neither a proof of that existence, nor itself correct as a matter of fact (61–64). Nor is he any more satisfied with what was said of the essence and

[1] The reversing of the order of these two propositions in Cicero has led to the misunderstanding that the gods are to be considered as the conserving forces; which of course would be in direct contradiction with the view of Epicurus; for this reason Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. III, 1, p. 240, n. 1, regards the phrase about the conserving and destroying forces as an erroneous addition of Cicero's. But Cicero merely intended, after giving the contrast between mortal and immortal, to add that of the destroying and conserving forces, which really underlies the other.

nature of the gods. The doctrine of atoms, as being the original elements of all things, is silly and untenable; but even granting it to be true, and so supposing the gods to have arisen from atoms, their immortality would be in contradiction with it (65–68). But in order to be able to maintain this immortality Epicurus takes his usual course when he wishes to escape the consequences of his own principles; he flies to other arbitrary and inconceivable propositions. The gods, says he, are not *corporeal*, but only *quasi corporeal* beings.[1] But this *quasi corporeality* is a word devoid of sense, conveying no idea even to Epicurus and his disciples (69–75). But let this pass, if we will, the case is no better for the assertion that the gods have human forms. The reasons given by the Epicureans in support of this are next refuted one after another; and especially the assertion, that no person can imagine the gods under any other form, is rejected as practically false, since many represent them under the figures of beasts (76–82). But it is quite unworthy of a philosopher to appeal to representations of that sort. A person might with equal justice also maintain that the gods really bear the names that are traditionally used to denote them; and the foolishness of this is directly apparent, when we observe that the same gods are differently called among different nations.[2]

If now we may not attribute to the gods either the human form, as we have proved, nor in deference to Epicurus any other form, it would not be venturing too much to deny their existence entirely; yet the Epicureans do not venture this for fear not only of men but also of the gods themselves (83–86). But if the assertion is made that reason can exist only in union with the human form, because we have no experience of it in any other shape, we may answer that it is quite unphilosophical to maintain that a thing of which we have no experience may not for all that have existence (87, 88).

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[1] When Cotta states that Epicurus assumes this finer bodily substance, the *quasi corpus* of the gods, only for the purpose of explaining their immortality, it is certainly either misunderstanding or intentional misrepresentation. The immortality could only be explained according to Epicurus by the law of isonomy; at the same time he might add that the finer corporeal substance of the gods was in itself less liable to dissolution and corruption than the coarser bodies of other things. — For another misrepresentation, that Epicurus explained the immortality from the infinite multitude of atoms, see note to c. 39, 109.

[2] The answer Epicurus might have made is not difficult to discern; comp. the letter to Herodotus in Diog. L. X, 75. 76.

Moreover Epicurus ought properly to have said, not that the gods had the form of men, but that men had the form of gods, because the gods, as being immortal, must have existed before men.[1] Or else he must have assumed that, when the human race came into being, chance which brought the atoms together made such a wonderful hit that men sprang up similar to the gods; and it would not be worth the trouble to argue against this (89, 90). But furthermore, the human form would be quite useless to the gods, because they have not the same necessities and occupations to which the human organization is adapted (91–94). And if the human form is still insisted upon for the gods, because without it they cannot possess reason, and hence cannot be happy, the objection must be repeated that it is idle to maintain that reason can only exist in union with the human form because we have never seen it joined with any other, and on the other hand not to see how absurd it is to attribute to the gods limbs and organs for which they can have no possible use, being according to Epicurus entirely without activity of any sort; a view, be it observed, which strips the gods of that very thing which in reality is essential to any happiness (95–102). Suppose we grant that the gods have the human form; where do they live? Do they ever change their abode? And why? Have they any impulses at all? Do they make any use of their reason? Lastly, on what ground are they called immortal and happy? — The only answer the Epicureans have for all these questions is to talk

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[1] The Academic here takes "immortal" (*aeterni*) as importing "without beginning" as well as "without end." But Epicurus only spoke of the life of the gods as being endless and imperishable, which was also the popular belief; he considered the gods not as without beginning, but as having come into being. In order, if not to prove, at least to render this immortality possible and credible, he had recourse to the law of isonomy, which required imperishable as the counterpart to perishable beings. Admitting the gods however to have had a beginning, he was not at all obliged to assume that their existence was prior to that of the human race. Moreover the assumption that the gods had the human form did not necessarily involve the other, that their form was imitated from it, but only that it was similar to the human form. This similarity he maintained to be a fact of universal consciousness, in virtue of the πρόληψις resulting from the impressions coming to us from the gods; he added other reasons only as cumulative arguments. When his adversaries regarded this similarity as a wonderful freak of chance, he hardly needed to mind it; for, so long as the *fact* was established, he could not be expected to explain the *reason*.

about impressions which flow to us from the gods; and these impressions, they say, received not by the senses, but by the mind, give rise in it to the conception of a happy and immortal being (103–105). Impressions of this sort however, which are simply creatures of the imagination, are more properly called dreams and fancies, and the whole theory is idle talk (106–108). If the immortality of the gods is to be deduced from the law of isonomy, we have just as good a right to conclude that there must be immortal men, because there are mortal men, and men living in the water, because there are men living on land.[1] Finally it remains unexplained, how these impressions can arise from the atoms, and the immortal gods in this way therefore are completely inexplicable (109, 110). The case is just as bad in regard to the happiness of the gods. For this cannot exist without virtue, and virtue without action is inconceivable. If with the Epicureans we place happiness in sensual enjoyment, this is itself inconceivable in the case of such gods (111, 112). There remain then only freedom from pain and the consciousness of eternal, never-ending comfort. But this is beset with difficulties; for we cannot understand how with the continual stream of atoms flowing in upon them, and taking form again flowing forth from them, the gods can have any certainty of never being annihilated. So then the Epicurean god is no more happy than he is immortal. When Epicurus speaks of piety and reverence for the gods, those are only phrases with no basis of truth; for nobody can feel reverence for such gods as his (113–116). And when he boasts of freeing men from superstition, that is all very easy if at the same time you substantially abolish the belief in the gods; the same boast may be made by those who deny the existence of any gods (117–119). Democritus too, from whom Epicurus borrowed the greater part of his doctrine, gives no satisfactory teaching about the gods, although he allows them at least to exercise a benevolent or a harmful influence on men; but Epicurus annihilates all religion out and out, and Posidonius is quite right in saying that Epicurus really did not

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[1] Epicurus might answer here, that the idea of "man" is one derived only from our experience, and as such necessarily excludes the attribute of immortality and of life in the water. Beings that might be immortal, or live in the water, even if they resembled men, could not for this reason be included under the term "man."

believe in any gods, but only made a pretence of doing so, in order to avoid unpopularity (120–124).

This is the summary of the first book; a few observations on the Academic's criticism of the theology of Epicurus have been already made in the notes; but it may not be amiss to weigh it a little more carefully. Any person possessing a moderate acquaintance with the history of ancient philosophy and the contests of the various schools knows that the fighting was not always done with fair weapons, but that misrepresentation and unjust deductions from the adversaries' propositions were not uncommon. There is no want of this in Cotta's discourse. We must recognize the reproach as well founded that the Epicurean theology undermined and destroyed all religion worthy of the name; and when Epicurus notwithstanding this talked of pious reverence for the gods because of their essential excellence, we may at least doubt whether he was really in earnest. So far as we can see from the remains of his writings or those of his followers, the idea of εὐσέβεια was limited simply to a belief in the immortality and perfect happiness of the gods, and the rejection of all such conceptions as were inconsistent with it; and these included not only the mythological fables and many perverted and contradictory notions of the common crowd, but the teachings of other philosophers as well, who ascribed to the gods the government of the world and a care for earthly and human affairs; for Epicurus thought that this would give the gods an occupation so troublesome, burdensome and vexatious, that such a thing as happiness would be for them impossible. If the Epicureans did not entirely withdraw from the traditional rites of religion, they did so chiefly in order to give no offence, which might perhaps have brought them into danger (Plutarch, *Non posse suav. vivi* etc., c. 21); they did not disdain even to hold the priestly offices (Lucian, conviv. s. Lapith., c. 9); and it is quite credible, as Cicero assures us (c. 30, 85), that many of them, however free-thinking they may have been in theory, were yet in practice exceedingly superstitious. Similar contradictions between theory and practice have always been common in this matter.[1]

[1] In regard to Epicurus personally we may confidently assume that in spite of all breaking away from religion in his philosophical speculations he still had a leaning to it at heart, for there are many signs of it in his letters and in

The other reproach made against Epicurus, that he did not in reality believe at all in the existence of the gods, plausible as it is, we may reject as unfounded. It is quite true that there was no place for the gods in his atomistic physics; and if he had contented himself simply with explaining the origin of the world and natural phenomena, he might or must have passed over the gods in silence, as in fact he really does in the letter to Herodotus (Diog. L., X, 45 ff.) which contains a short outline of his physics; it is only at the end that he characterizes the notion of a government of the world by happy and immortal beings as inadmissible. He wished however to explain psychological phenomena, the facts presented by the mind itself; and finding the belief in the gods a κοινὴ ἔννοια or πρόληψις (see note on c. 16, 43), that is, a conception generally prevalent, and, as it seemed, one naturally suggested, he found himself obliged to enter upon the subject. But his system recognized no empty and purely subjective pictures of the fancy; every conception of the mind must necessarily have come to it from outside, and that in such a manner, that the atomic pictures affected the soul either mediately through the senses, or immediately without their intervention. He could not then explain the conception of the gods as an empty figment of the fancy; it must have been due to the action of atomic pictures upon the soul; and as the gods plainly are not perceived with the physical senses, it resulted that the soul must be directly affected by those pictures. But he was precluded from explaining these as coming up by chance (for such pictures there were) because of their continued uniform repetition; this was explicable only on the supposition that they proceeded from an object having real existence. Hence the gods must have a real existence. Furthermore since the κοινὴ ἔννοια represented the gods as happy and immortal, and this conception was warranted by the law of isonomy, they must then in reality be so. Furthermore, because they not only differed from all other worldly beings in their immortality, but also because of their happiness they could not possibly have anything to do with the world and the cares for worldly things,

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other writings: his last directions in regard to the ἐναγίσματα (Diog. L.,X, 18) shows very well that he had not such unlimited confidence in his philosophical doctrines as to consider the traditional customs of religion quite unreasonable. Comp. Schömann, Gr. Alterth. II[3], p. 582.

it was quite consistent to assign them a separate abode in the *intermundia* (see note on c. 8, 18). Epicurus probably did not express himself further on their manner of life in the intermundia, but simply ascribed to them the undisturbed enjoyment of the highest happiness, without entering into details; for he was shrewd enough to see that it was impossible to know anything about it, and that everybody must be allowed to fancy it as it seemed to him most probable, with the limitation of course that the conception did not conflict with their happiness and immortality.

His opponents especially ridiculed his theory of the *quasi corporeality* of the gods, which was really undeserving of it (see note on c. 18, 49). The bodily likeness of the gods to men, which Epicurus assumed for the reasons indicated by Velleius, was considered by them as ridiculous on the ground that the gods, in the utter quiet and inactivity of their lives, would have no use for the organs and members of the human body; as if Epicurus had really meant by quiet and inactivity an absolutely immovable torpidity (67–102), and not rather a simple freedom from everything like labor and trouble, which was quite compatible with a life spent in pleasures and enjoyments, only of other and more refined sorts than the earthly and human pleasures; compatible too with virtues, though of course not quite the same as those springing from earthly and human relations, but rather those corresponding to the conditions of the divine existence. Again when his opponents ridiculed Epicurus on the one hand for setting up male and female deities, including naturally the sexual relations between them[1]; and on the other for making them all alike, and hence unable to distinguish one another (80–84), it is evident that one objection contradicts the other, and one of the two must be false. The truth probably is this: Epicurus taught that by means of the impressions or pictures which come from the gods to the soul of man we acquire only a general conception of gods similar to men, not one of individual distinguishable divine personalities; this does not however exclude the possibility of their actual existence; and when he spoke of sexual and other

[1] Objections similar to those brought by Cotta against the bodily nature of the gods of Epicurus have long ago suggested themselves to Christian theologians against the bodily nature of men after the resurrection from the dead. The reader may, if he desires, consult Strauss Christl. Glaubenslehre, Th. II, Absch. III, c. 1, § 103.

differences among the gods, he must have conceded these only as not impossible and inconceivable, but certainly he did not assert them to be certain. The objection which Cotta makes to Velleius (82–100), that this or that deity always presented himself to him under a definite form and with definite attributes, might have been easily answered by saying that all this might of course present itself to his mind; but it was only the result of seeing every day about him statues and pictures which passed for representations of the gods, but which he himself was far from considering as anything more than pictures of fancy, which had no claim whatever to truth.

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1 CUM multae res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc explicatae sint, tum perdifficilis, Brute, quod tu minime ignoras, et perobscura quaestio est de natura deorum, quae et ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima est et ad moderandam religionem necessaria. De qua tam variae sunt doctissimorum hominum tamque discrepantes sententiae, ut magno argumento esse debeat causam et principium philosophiae esse inscientiam, prudenterque Academicos a rebus incertis adsensionem cohibuisse. Quid est enim temeritate turpius? aut quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut, quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum, sine ulla dubitatione defendere?
2 Velut in hac quaestione plerique, quod maxime veri simile est, et quo omnes duce natura venimus, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Qui vero deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varietate et dissensione, ut eorum molestum sit dinumerare sententias. Nam et de figuris deorum et de locis atque sedibus et actione vitae multa dicuntur, deque his summa philosophorum dissensione certatur; quod vero maxi-

me rem causamque continet, utrum nihil agant, nihil moliantur,
omni curatione et administratione rerum vacent, an contra ab
iis et a principio omnia facta et constituta sint et ad infinitum
tempus regantur atque moveantur, in primis magna dissensio
est, eaque nisi diiudicatur, in summo errore necesse est homi-
nes atque in maximarum rerum ignoratione versari. Sunt enim 2
philosophi et fuerunt, qui omnino nullam habere censerent 3
rerum humanarum procurationem deos. Quorum si vera sen-
tentia est, quae potest esse pietas, quae sanctitas, quae religio?
Haec enim omnia pure atque caste tribuenda deorum numini
ita sunt, si animadvertuntur ab iis, et si est aliquid a deis inmor-
talibus hominum generi tributum. Sin autem dei neque possunt
nos iuvare nec volunt nec omnino curant nec, quid agamus,
animadvertunt, nec est, quod ab iis ad hominum vitam perma-
nare possit, quid est quod ullos deis inmortalibus cultus, hono-
res, preces adhibeamus? In specie autem fictae simulationis,
sicut reliquae virtutes, item pietas inesse non potest, cum qua
simul sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse est, quibus sublatis
perturbatio vitae sequitur et magna confusio; atque haud scio 4
an pietate adversos deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis
humani et una excellentissima virtus, iustitia, tollatur. Sunt
autem alii philosophi, et ii quidem magni atque nobiles, qui
deorum mente atque ratione omnem mundum administrari et
regi censeant, neque vero id solum, sed etiam ab isdem homi-
num vitae consuli et provideri; nam et fruges et reliqua, quae
terra pariat, et tempestates ac temporum varietates caelique
mutationes, quibus omnia, quae terra gignat, maturata pube-
scant, a dis inmortalibus tribui generi humano putant multaque,
quae dicentur in his libris, colligunt, quae talia sunt, ut ea ipsa
dei inmortales ad usum hominum fabricati paene videantur.
Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines
non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem. Res enim nulla 5
est, de qua tantopere non solum indocti, sed etiam docti dis-
sentiant; quorum opiniones cum tam variae sint tamque inter
se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest, ut earum nulla,

3 alterum certe non potest, ut plus una vera sit. Qua quidem in causa et benivolos obiurgatores placare et invidos vituperatores confutare possumus, ut alteros reprehendisse paeniteat, alteri didicisse se gaudeant; nam qui admonent
6 amice, docendi sunt, qui inimice insectantur, repellendi. Multum autem fluxisse video de libris nostris, quos compluris brevi tempore edidimus, variumque sermonem partim admirantium, unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium extitisset, partim, quid quaque de re certi haberemus, scire cupientium. Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quae lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertaeque disciplinae et iam pridem relictae patrocinium necopinatum a nobis esse susceptum. Nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore aetatis in eo studio operam curamque consumpsimus et, cum minime videbamur, tum maxime philosophabamur, quod et orationes declarant refertae philosophorum sententiis et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus,
7 Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus. Et si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse, quae ratio et doctrina prae-
4 scripserit. Sin autem quis requirit, quae causa nos inpulerit, ut haec tam sero litteris mandaremus, nihil est, quod expedire tam facile possimus. Nam cum otio langueremus, et is esset rei publicae status, ut eam unius consilio atque cura gubernari necesse esset, primum ipsius rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tam gravis tamque
8 praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri; eoque me minus instituti mei paenitet, quod facile sentio, quam multorum non modo discendi, sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. Complures enim Graecis institutionibus eruditi ea, quae didicerant, cum civibus suis communicare non poterant, quod illa, quae a Graecis accepissent, Latine dici posse diffiderent. Quo in

genere tantum profecisse videmur, ut a Graecis ne verborum
quidem copia vinceremur. Hortata etiam est, ut me ad haec 9
conferrem, animi aegritudo fortunae magna et gravi commota
iniuria; cuius si maiorem aliquam levationem reperire potu-
issem, non ad hanc potissimum confugissem; ea vero ipsa
nulla ratione melius frui potui, quam si me non modo ad
legendos libros, sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertrac-
tandam dedissem. Omnes autem eius partes atque omnia
membra tum facillume noscuntur, cum totae quaestiones scri-
bendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio
seriesque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa et omnes inter se aptae
conligataeque videantur. Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque 5 10
de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt, quam necesse est;
non enim tam auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta
quaerenda sunt. Quin etiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere
volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur; desinunt
enim suum iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum, quod ab eo,
quem probant, iudicatum vident. Nec vero probare soleo id,
quod de Pythagoreis accepimus, quos ferunt, si quid adfirmarent
in disputando, cum ex eis quaereretur, quare ita esset, respondere
solitos: 'Ipse dixit'. 'Ipse' autem erat Pythagoras. Tan-
tum opinio praeiudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret
auctoritas. Qui autem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disci- 11
plinam secutos, iis quattuor Academicis libris satis responsum
videtur. Nec vero desertarum relictarumque rerum patroci-
nium suscepimus; non enim hominum interitu sententiae
quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris fortasse desiderant; ut
haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque
rem aperte iudicandi profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila,
confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem; quam
nunc prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intellego.
Quod non Academiae vitio, sed tarditate hominum arbitror
contigisse. Nam si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum
est, quanto maius omnis? quod facere iis necesse est, quibus
propositum est veri reperiendi causa et contra omnis philoso-

12 phos et pro omnibus dicere. Cuius rei tantae tamque difficilis facultatem consecutum esse me non profiteor, secutum esse prae me fero. Nec tamen fieri potest, ut, qui hac ratione philosophentur, ii nihil habeant, quod sequantur. Dictum est omnino de hac re alio loco diligentius, sed, quia nimis indociles quidam tardique sunt, admonendi videntur saepius. Non enim sumus ii, quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii, qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine, ut in iis nulla insit certa iudicandi et adsentiendi nota. Ex quo exstitit illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et inlustrem, iis sapientis vita regeretur.

6 13 Sed iam, ut omni me invidia liberem, ponam in medio sententias philosophorum de natura deorum. Quo quidem loco convocandi omnes videntur, qui, quae sit earum vera, iudicent. Tum demum mihi procax Academia videbitur, si aut consenserint omnes, aut erit inventus aliquis, qui, quid verum sit, invenerit. Itaque mihi libet exclamare, ut *est* in Synephebis:

> Pró deum, populárium omnium, *ómnium* adulescéntium
> Clámo, postulo, óbsecro, oro, plóro atque inploró fidem,

non levissuma de re, ut queritur ille 'in civitate fieri facinora capitalia':

> ab amico amante argentum accipere meretrix non vult,

14 sed ut adsint, cognoscant, animadvertant, quid de religione, pietate, sanctitate, caerimoniis, fide, iure iurando, quid de templis, delubris sacrificiisque sollemnibus, quid de ipsis auspiciis, quibus nos praesumus, existimandum sit; haec enim omnia ad hanc de dis inmortalibus quaestionem referenda sunt. Profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliquid certi habere arbitrantur, addu-

bitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxuma re tanta
dissensio. Quod cum saepe alias, tum maxime animadverti, 15
cum apud C. Cottam, familiarem meum, accurate sane et dili-
genter de dis inmortalibus disputatum est. Nam cum feriis
Latinis ad eum ipsius rogatu arcessituque venissem, offendi
eum sedentem in exedra et cum C. Velleio senatore dispu-
tantem, ad quem tum Epicurei primas ex nostris hominibus
deferebant. Aderat etiam Q. Lucilius Balbus, qui tantos pro-
gressus habebat in Stoicis, ut cum excellentibus in eo genere
Graecis compararetur. Tum, ut me Cotta vidit, Peroportune,
inquit, venis; oritur enim mihi magna de re altercatio cum
Velleio, cui pro tuo studio non est alienum te interesse. Atque 7
mihi quoque videor, inquam, venisse, ut dicis, oportune. 16
Tres enim trium disciplinarum principes convenistis. M. au-
tem Piso si adesset, nullius philosophiae earum quidem, quae
in honore sunt, vacaret locus. Tum Cotta: Si, inquit, liber
Antiochi nostri, qui ab eo nuper ad hunc Balbum missus est,
vera loquitur, nihil est, quod Pisonem, familiarem tuum, desi-
deres; Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re concinere
videntur, verbis discrepare; quo de libro, Balbe, velim scire
quid sentias. Egone? inquit ille. Miror Antiochum, homi-
nem in primis acutum, non vidisse interesse plurimum inter
Stoicos, qui honesta a commodis non nomine, sed genere toto
diiungerent, et Peripateticos, qui honesta commiscerent cum
commodis, ut ea inter se magnitudine et quasi gradibus, non
genere differrent. Haec enim est non verborum parva, sed
rerum permagna dissensio. Verum hoc alias; nunc, quod 17
coepimus, si videtur. Mihi vero, inquit Cotta, videtur. Sed
ut hic, qui intervenit, (me intuens), ne ignoret, quae res agatur,
de natura agebamus deorum, quae cum mihi videretur perob-
scura, ut semper videri solet, Epicuri ex Velleio sciscitabar
sententiam. Quam ob rem, inquit, Vellei, nisi molestum est,
repete, quae coeperas. Repetam vero, quamquam non mihi,
sed tibi hic venit adiutor; ambo enim, inquit adridens, ab
eodem Philone nihil scire didicistis. Tum ego: Quid didiceri-

mus, Cotta viderit, tu autem nolo existimes me adiutorem huic
venisse, sed auditorem, et quidem aequum, libero iudicio, nulla
eius modi adstrictum necessitate, ut mihi, velim nolim, sit certa
quaedam tuenda sententia.

8 18 Tum Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens,
quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex
deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset,
Audite, inquit, non futtilis commenticiasque sententias, non
opificem aedificatoremque mundi, Platonis de Timaeo deum,
nec anum fatidicam, Stoicorum *πρόνοιαν*, quam Latine licet
providentiam dicere, neque vero mundum ipsum animo et
sensibus praeditum, rotundum, ardentem, volubilem deum, por-
tenta et miracula non disserentium philosophorum, sed somni-
19 antium. Quibus enim oculis [animi] intueri potuit vester
Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a deo atque
aedificari mundum facit? quae molitio, quae ferramenta, qui
vectes, quae machinae, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt?
quem ad modum autem oboedire et parere voluntati architecti
aër, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt? unde vero ortae illae quinque
formae, ex quibus reliqua formantur, apte cadentes ad animum
afficiendum pariendosque sensus? Longum est ad omnia,
quae talia sunt, ut optata magis quam inventa videantur; sed
20 illa palmaria, quod, qui non modo natum mundum intro-
duxerit, sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore
sempiternum. Hunc censes primis, ut dicitur, labris gustasse
physiologiam, id est naturae rationem, qui quicquam, quod
ortum sit, putet aeternum esse posse? Quae est enim coag-
mentatio non dissolubilis? aut quid est, cuius principium ali-
quod sit, nihil sit extremum? Pronoea vero vestra, Lucili, si
est *eadem*, eadem requiro, quae paulo ante, ministros, machi-
nas, omnem totius operis dissignationem atque apparatum; sin
alia est, cur mortalem fecerit mundum, non, quem ad modum
9 21 Platonicus deus, sempiternum. Ab utroque autem sciscitor,
cur mundi aedificatores repente exstiterint, innumerabilia sae-
cla dormierint; non enim, si mundus nullus erat, saecla non

erant. Saecla nunc dico non ea, quae dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ea sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternitas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum metiebatur; spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit, intellegi *non* potest, quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliquod, nullum cum tempus esset. Isto igitur tam inmenso spatio 22 quaero, Balbe, cur Pronoea vestra cessaverit. Laboremne fugiebat? At iste nec attingit deum nec erat ullus, cum omnes naturae numini divino, caelum, ignes, terrae, maria, parerent. Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret deus mundum signis et luminibus tamquam aedilis ornare? Si, ut deus ipse melius habitaret, antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris tamquam in gurgustio habitaverat. Post autem varietatene eum delectari putamus, qua caelum et terras exornatas videmus? Quae ista potest esse oblectatio deo? quae si esset, non ea tam diu carere potuisset. An haec, ut fere dicitis, hominum causa a deo con- 23 stituta sunt? Sapientiumne? Propter paucos igitur tanta est facta rerum molitio. An stultorum? At primum causa non fuit, cur de inprobis bene mereretur; deinde quid est adsecutus? cum omnes stulti sint sine dubio miserrimi, maxime quod stulti sunt; miserius enim stultitia quid possumus dicere? deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut ea sapientes commodorum conpensatione leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praesentia. Qui vero mundum ipsum ani- **10** mantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt, animi natura intellegentis in quam figuram cadere posset; de quo dicam equidem paulo post; nunc autem hactenus: admi- 24 rabor eorum tarditatem, qui animantem inmortalem et eundem beatum rotundum esse velint, quod ea forma neget ullam esse pulchriorem Plato. At mihi vel cylindri vel quadrati vel coni vel pyramidis videtur esse formosior. Quae vero vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo? Nempe ut ea celeritate contorqueatur, cui par nulla ne cogitari quidem possit; in qua non video ubinam mens constans et vita beata possit insistere. Quodque in nostro

corpore si minima ex parte sic afficiatur, molestum sit, cur hoc idem non habeatur molestum in deo? Terra enim profecto, quoniam mundi pars est, pars est etiam dei. Atqui terrae maxumas regiones inhabitabilis atque incultas videmus, quod pars earum adpulsu solis exarserit, pars obriguerit nive pruinaque longinquo solis abscessu; quae, si mundus est deus, quoniam mundi partes sunt, dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda sunt.

25 Atque haec quidem vestra, Lucili. Qualia vero vetera sint, ab ultimo repetam superiorum. Thales enim Milesius, qui primus de talibus rebus quaesivit, aquam dixit esse initium rerum, deum autem eam mentem, quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret. Si di possunt esse sine sensu et mente, cur aquae *mentem, menti autem cur aquam* adiunxit, si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore? Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientis occidentisque, eosque innumerabilis esse mundos. Sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intellegere qui
26 possumus? Post Anaximenes aëra deum statuit, eumque gigni esseque inmensum et infinitum et semper in motu; quasi aut aër sine ulla forma deus esse possit, cum praesertim deum non modo aliqua, sed pulcherrima specie deceat esse, aut non
11 omne, quod ortum sit, mortalitas consequatur. Inde Anaxagoras, qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discriptionem et modum mentis infinitae vi ac ratione dissignari et confici voluit; in quo non vidit neque motum sensui iunctum et continentem in infinito ullum esse posse neque sensum omnino, quo non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret. Deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, erit aliquid interius, ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem
27 interius mente? cingatur igitur corpore externo. Quod quoniam non placet, aperta simplexque mens nulla re adiuncta, qua sentire possit, fugere intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur. Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo, qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus inmortalitatem dare. Nam Py-

thagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem
intentum et commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non
vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerari
deum et, cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingeret,
tum dei partem esse miseram; quod fieri non potest. Cur 28
autem quicquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset deus? quo
modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infixus
aut infusus esset in mundo? Tum Xenophanes, qui mente
adiuncta omne praeterea, quod esset infinitum, deum voluit
esse, de ipsa mente item reprehenditur, ut ceteri, de infinitate
autem vehementius, in qua nihil neque sentiens neque coniunc-
tum potest esse. Nam Parmenides quidem commenticium
quiddam coronae simile efficit (*στεφάνην* appellat) continente
ardore lucis orbem, qui cingat caelum, quem appellat deum; in
quo neque figuram divinam neque sensum quisquam suspicari
potest; multaque eiusdem *modi* monstra, quippe qui bellum,
qui discordiam, qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis eiusdem ad
deum revocet, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel
vetustate delentur; eademque de sideribus, quae reprehensa in
alio iam in hoc omittantur. Empedocles autem multa alia **12** 29
peccans in deorum opinione turpissume labitur. Quattuor
enim naturas, ex quibus omnia constare censet, divinas esse
vult; quas et nasci et extingui perspicuum est et sensu omni
carere. Nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de deis
habere quod liqueat, sint, non sint qualesve sint, quicquam
videtur de natura deorum suspicari. Quid? Democritus, qui
tum imagines earumque circumitus in deorum numero refert,
tum illam naturam, quae imagines fundat ac mittat, tum scien-
tiam intellegentiamque nostram, nonne in maximo errore versa-
tur? cum idem omnino, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat,
neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne deum omnino ita
tollit, ut nullam opinionem eius reliquam faciat? Quid? aër,
quo Diogenes Apolloniates utitur deo, quem sensum habere
potest aut quam formam dei? Iam de Platonis inconstantia 30
longum est dicere, qui in Timaeo patrem huius mundi nominari

neget posse, in Legum autem libris, quid sit omnino deus,
anquiri oportere non censeat. Quod vero sine corpore ullo
deum vult esse, ut Graeci dicunt, ἀσώματον, id quale esse
possit, intellegi non potest; careat enim sensu necesse est,
careat etiam prudentia, careat voluptate; quae omnia una cum
deorum notione comprehendimus. Idem et in Timaeo dicit
et in Legibus et mundum deum esse et caelum et astra et
terram et animos et eos, quos maiorum institutis accepimus;
quae et per se sunt falsa perspicue et inter se vehementer
31 repugnantia. Atque etiam Xenophon paucioribus verbis eadem
fere peccat; facit enim in iis, quae a Socrate dicta rettulit,
Socratem disputantem formam dei quaeri non oportere, eun-
demque et solem et animum deum dicere, et modo unum, tum
autem plures deos; quae sunt isdem in erratis fere, quibus ea,
13 32 quae de Platone diximus. Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo
libro, qui physicus inscribitur, popularis deos multos, naturalem
unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum. Nec multo
secus Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim
quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evel-
33 lere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum. Aristotelesque in
tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone
non dissentiens; modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem,
modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam
praeficit mundo eique eas partis tribuit, ut replicatione quadam
mundi motum regat atque tueatur, tum caeli ardorem deum
dicit esse non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio
loco ipse designarit deum. Quo modo autem caeli divinus ille
sensus in celeritate tanta conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot
di, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? cum autem sine cor-
pore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam pru-
dentia. Quo porro modo deus moveri carens corpore aut quo
34 modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest? Nec
vero eius condiscipulus Xenocrates in hoc genere prudentior,
cuius in libris, qui sunt de natura deorum, nulla species divina
describitur; deos enim octo esse dicit, quinque eos, qui in

stellis vagis nominantur, unum, qui ex omnibus sideribus, quae
infixa caelo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus
deus, septimum solem adiungit octavamque lunam ; qui quo sensu
beati esse possint, intellegi non potest. Ex eadem Platonis
schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros et
modo mundum, tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus
etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit sensuque deum privat et eius
formam mutabilem esse vult eodemque in libro rursus terram et
caelum refert in deos. Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia fe- 35
renda est ; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo
caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus. Nec audien-
dus eius auditor Strato, is qui physicus appellatur, qui omnem
vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quae causas gignendi,
augendi, minuendi habeat, sed careat omni sensu et figura.
Zeno autem, ut iam ad vestros, Balbe, veniam, naturalem legem 14 36
divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem
prohibentemque contraria. Quam legem quo modo efficiat ani-
mantem, intellegere non possumus ; deum autem animantem
certe volumus esse. Atque hic idem alio loco aethera deum
dicit, si intellegi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis
occurrit neque in precibus neque in optatis neque in votis ; aliis
autem libris rationem quandam per omnem naturam rerum per-
tinentem vi divina esse adfectam putat. Idem astris hoc idem
tribuit, tum annis, mensibus annorumque mutationibus. Cum
vero Hesiodi theogoniam [id est originem deorum] interpreta-
tur, tollit omnino usitatas perceptasque cognitiones deorum ;
neque enim Iovem neque Iunonem neque Vestam neque quem-
quam, qui ita appelletur, in deorum habet numero, sed rebus
inanimis atque mutis per quandam significationem haec docet
tributa nomina. Cuius discipuli Aristonis non minus magno in 37
errore sententia est, qui neque formam dei intellegi posse cen-
seat neque in deis sensum esse dicat dubitetque omnino, deus
animans necne sit. Cleanthes autem, qui Zenonem audivit una
cum eo, quem proxime nominavi, tum ipsum mundum deum
dicit esse, tum totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc

nomen, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cingentem atque conplexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum iudicat; idemque quasi delirans in iis libris, quos scripsit contra voluptatem, tum fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divinitatem omnem tribuit astris, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinius. Ita fit, ut deus ille, quem mente noscimus atque in animi notione tamquam in vestigio volumus reponere, nusquam prorsus appareat.

15 38 At Persaeus, eiusdem Zenonis auditor, eos *dicit* esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem diceret, illa inventa esse deorum, sed ipsa divina. Quo quid absurdius, quam aut res sordidas atque deformis deorum honore adficere aut homines iam morte deletos reponere in deos, quorum omnis cultus esset futurus in luctu?

39 Iam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum somniorum vaferrumus habetur interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum, atque ita ignotorum, ut eos ne coniectura quidem informare possimus, cum mens nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere; ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et eius animi fusionem universam, tum eius ipsius principatum, qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universitatemque omnia continentem, tum fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum, quem ante dixi, aethera, tum ea, quae natura fluerent atque manarent, ut et aquam et terram et aëra, solem, lunam, sidera universitatemque rerum, qua omnia continerentur, atque
40 etiam homines eos, qui inmortalitatem essent consecuti. Idemque disputat aethera esse eum, quem homines Iovem appellarent, quique aër per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse, quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. Idemque etiam legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse eandemque fatalem necessitatem

appellat, sempiternam rerum futurarum veritatem; quorum nihil
tale est, ut in eo vis divina inesse videatur. Et haec quidem in 41
primo libro de natura deorum; in secundo autem volt Orphei,
Musaei, Hesiodi Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea, quae
ipse primo libro de deis inmortalibus dixerat, ut etiam veterrimi
poëtae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videan-
tur. Quem Diogenes Babylonius consequens in eo libro, qui
inscribitur de Minerva, partum Iovis ortumque virginis ad phy-
siologiam traducens diiungit a fabula.

Exposui fere non philosophorum iudicia, sed delirantium 16 42
somnia. Nec enim multo absurdiora sunt ea, quae poëtarum
vocibus fusa ipsa suavitate nocuerunt, qui et ira inflammatos
et libidine furentis induxerunt deos feceruntque, ut eorum bella,
proelia, pugnas, vulnera videremus, odia praeterea, discidia,
discordias, ortus, interitus, querellas, lamentationes, effusas in
omni intemperantia libidines, adulteria, vincula, cum humano
genere concubitus mortalisque ex inmortali procreatos. Cum 43
poëtarum autem errore coniungere licet portenta magorum
Aegyptiorumque in eodem genere dementiam, tum etiam vulgi
opiniones, quae in maxima inconstantia veritatis ignoratione
versantur. Ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere
dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero, de
quibus haec quaestio est, habere debeat. Solus enim vidit
primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem
impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est enim gens aut quod genus
hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quan-
dam deorum? quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, id est an-
teceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec
intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. Cuius
rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de regula
et iudicio volumine accepimus. Quod igitur fundamentum 17 44
huius quaestionis est, id praeclare iactum videtis. Cum enim
non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta
maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intellegi necesse
est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cogni-

tiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est; esse igitur deos confitendum est. Quod quoniam fere constat inter omnis non philosophos solum, sed etiam indoctos, fateamur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse *πρόληψιν* appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo
45 nominarat) — hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et inmortales putemus. Quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus, ut eos aeternos et beatos haberemus. Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum aeternumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod, quae talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia. Si nihil aliud quaereremus, nisi ut deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum; nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem iustam, quicquid excellit), et metus omnis a vi atque ira deorum pulsus esset; intellegitur enim a beata inmortalique natura et iram et gratiam segregari; quibus remotis nullos a superis impendere metus. Sed ad hanc confirmandam opinionem anquirit animus et formam et vitae actionem mentisque agitationem in deo.

18 46 Ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet, partim ratio docet. Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum; quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones: ratio hoc idem ipsa
47 declarat. Nam cum praestantissumam naturam, vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur eandem esse pulcherrimam, quae compositio membrorum, quae conformatio liniamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest esse pulchrior? Vos quidem, Lucili, soletis (nam Cotta meus modo hoc, modo illud), cum artificium effingitis fabricamque divinam, quam sint omnia in hominis figura non modo ad usum, verum

etiam ad venustatem apta, describere. Quodsi omnium ani- 48
mantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est,
ea figura profecto est, quae pulcherrima sit omnium; quoniam-
que deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute
nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare nec ratio usquam
inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos confiten-
dum est. Nec tamen ea species corpus est, sed quasi corpus, 49
nec habet sanguinem, sed quasi sanguinem. Haec quamquam **19**
et inventa sunt acutius et dicta subtilius ab Epicuro, quam ut
quivis ea possit agnoscere, tamen fretus intellegentia vestra dis-
sero brevius, quam causa desiderat. Epicurus autem, qui res
occultas et penitus abditas non modo viderit animo, sed etiam
sic tractet, ut manu, docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut
primum non sensu, sed mente cernatur; nec soliditate quadam
nec ad numerum, ut ea, quae ille propter firmitatem *στερέμνια*
appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis,
cum infinita simillumarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus
individuis existat et ad nos adfluat; tum maximis voluptatibus in
eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intellegen-
tiam capere, quae sit et beata natura et aeterna. Summa vero 50
vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima
est, in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam, ut omnia om-
nibus paribus paria respondeant. Hanc *ἰσονομίαν* appellat
Epicurus, id est aequabilem tributionem. Ex hac igitur illud
efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse inmortalium non
minorem, et si, quae interimant, innumerabilia sint, etiam ea,
quae conservent, infinita esse debere. Et quaerere a nobis,
Balbe, soletis, quae vita deorum sit, quaeque ab iis degatur aetas.
Ea videlicet, qua nihil beatius, nihil omnibus bonis affluentius 51
cogitari potest. Nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est in-
plicatus, nulla opera molitur, sua sapientia et virtute gaudet,
habet exploratum fore se semper cum in maximis, tum in aeter-
nis voluptatibus. Hunc deum rite beatum dixerimus, vestrum **20** 52
vero laboriosissimum. Sive enim ipse mundus deus est, quid
potest esse minus quietum quam nullo puncto temporis inter-

misso versari circum axem caeli admirabili celeritate? nisi qui-
etum autem nihil beatum est; sive in ipso mundo deus
inest aliquis, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum,
mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conser-
vet, terras et maria contemplans hominum commoda vitasque
53 tueatur, ne ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis! Nos
autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacatione
munerum ponimus. Docuit enim nos idem, qui cetera, natura
effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, tamque eam
rem esse facilem, quam vos effici negatis sine divina posse sol-
lertia, ut innumerabilis natura mundos effectura sit, efficiat,
effecerit. Quod quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine
aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poëtae, cum explicare
54 argumenti exitum non potestis, confugitis ad deum; cuius ope-
ram profecto non desideraretis, si inmensam et interminatam in
omnis partis magnitudinem regionum videretis, in quam se ini-
ciens animus et intendens ita late longeque peregrinatur, ut nul-
lam tamen oram ultimi videat, in qua possit insistere. In hac
igitur inmensitate latitudinum, longitudinum, altitudinum infinita
vis innumerabilium volitat atomorum, quae interiecto inani co-
haerescunt tamen inter se et aliae alias adprehendentes con-
tinuantur; ex quo efficiuntur eae rerum formae et figurae, quas
vos effici posse sine follibus et incudibus non putatis. Itaque
inposuistis in cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem
dies et noctes timeremus. Quis enim non timeat omnia provi-
dentem et cogitantem et animadvertentem et omnia ad se per-
55 tinere putantem curiosum et plenum negotii deum? Hinc
vobis extitit primum illa fatalis necessitas, quam εἱμαρμένην dicitis,
ut, quicquid accidat, id ex aeterna veritate causarumque con-
tinuatione fluxisse dicatis. Quanti autem haec philosophia
aestimanda est, cui tamquam aniculis, et iis quidem indoctis,
fato fieri videantur omnia? Sequitur μαντικὴ vestra, quae
Latine divinatio dicitur, qua tanta inbueremur superstitione,
si vos audire vellemus, ut haruspices, augures, harioli, vates,
56 coniectores nobis essent colendi. His terroribus ab Epicuro

soluti et in libertatem vindicati nec metuimus eos, quos intel-
legimus nec sibi fingere ullam molestiam nec alteri quaerere, et
pie sancteque colimus naturam excellentem atque praestantem.
Sed elatus studio vereor ne longior fuerim. Erat autem difficile
rem tantam tamque praeclaram inchoatam relinquere; quam-
quam non tam dicendi ratio mihi habenda fuit quam audiendi.

Tum Cotta comiter, ut solebat: Atqui, inquit, Vellei, nisi tu 21 57
aliquid dixisses, nihil sane ex me quidem audire potuisses.
Mihi enim non tam facile in mentem venire solet, quare verum
sit aliquid, quam quare falsum; idque cum saepe, tum, cum te
audirem, paulo ante contigit. Roges me, qualem naturam deo-
rum esse ducam, nihil fortasse respondeam; quaeras, putemne
talem esse, qualis modo a te sit exposita, nihil dicam mihi videri
minus. Sed ante quam adgrediar ad ea, quae a te disputata
sunt, de te ipso dicam quid sentiam. Saepe enim de familiari 58
illo tuo videor audisse, cum te togatis omnibus sine dubio ante-
ferret et paucos tecum Epicureos e Graecia compararet, sed,
quod ab eo te mirifice diligi intellegebam, arbitrabar illum prop-
ter benivolentiam uberius id dicere. Ego autem, etsi vereor
laudare praesentem, iudico tamen de re obscura atque difficili a
te dictum esse dilucide, neque sententiis solum copiose, sed
verbis etiam ornatius, quam solent vestri. Zenonem, quem 59
Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum
Athenis essem, audiebam frequenter, et quidem ipso auctore Phi-
lone, credo, ut facilius iudicarem, quam illa bene refellerentur,
cum a principe Epicureorum accepissem, quem ad modum
dicerentur. Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo, ut tu,
distincte, graviter, ornate. Sed quod in illo mihi usu saepe
venit, idem modo, cum te audirem, accidebat, ut moleste ferrem
tantum ingenium (bona venia me audies) in tam leves, ne dicam
in tam ineptas sententias incidisse. Nec ego nunc ipse aliquid 60
adferam melius. Ut enim modo dixi, omnibus fere in rebus,
sed maxime in physicis, quid non sit, citius, quam quid sit, dix-
erim. Roges me, quid aut quale sit deus, auctore utar Simo- 22
nide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero,

deliberandi sibi unum diem postulavit; cum idem ex eo postridie quaereret, biduum petivit; cum saepius duplicaret numerum dierum admiransque Hiero requireret, cur ita faceret, 'Quia, quanto diutius considero', inquit, 'tanto mihi res videtur obscurior'. Sed Simoniden arbitror (non enim poëta solum suavis, verum etiam ceteroqui doctus sapiensque traditur), quia multa venirent in mentem acuta atque subtilia, dubitantem, quid eorum esset verissimum, de-
61 sperasse omnem veritatem. Epicurus vero tuus (nam cum illo malo disserere quam tecum) quid dicit, quod non modo philosophia dignum esset, sed mediocri prudentia?

Quaeritur primum in ea quaestione, quae est de natura deorum, sintne di necne sint. Difficile est negare. Credo, si in contione quaeratur, sed in huius modi sermone et consessu facillimum. Itaque ego ipse pontifex, qui caerimonias religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitror, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi mihi non opinione solum, sed etiam ad veritatem plane velim. Multa enim occurrunt, quae
62 conturbent, ut interdum nulli esse videantur. Sed vide, quam tecum agam liberaliter; quae communia sunt vobis cum ceteris philosophis, non attingam, ut hoc ipsum; placet enim omnibus fere mihique ipsi in primis deos esse. Itaque non pugno; rationem tamen eam, quae a te adfertur, non satis firmam puto.
23 Quod enim omnium gentium generumque hominibus ita videretur, id satis magnum argumentum esse dixisti, cur esse deos confiteremur. Quod cum leve per se, tum etiam falsum est. Primum enim unde tibi notae sunt opiniones nationum? Equidem arbitror multas esse gentes sic inmanitate efferatas, ut apud
63 eas nulla suspicio deorum sit. Quid? Diagoras, ἄθεος qui dictus est, posteaque Theodorus nonne aperte deorum naturam sustulerunt? Nam Abderites quidem Protagoras, cuius a te modo mentio facta est, sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisset: 'De divis, neque ut sint neque ut non sint, habeo dicere', Atheniensium iussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus librique eius in

contione combusti. Ex quo equidem existimo tardiores ad
hanc sententiam profitendam multos esse factos, quippe cum
poenam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset. Quid de sacri-
legis, quid de impiis periurisque dicemus?

Tubulus si Lucius umquam,
Si Lupus aut Carbo, Neptuni filius,

ut ait Lucilius, putasset esse deos, tam periurus aut tam in-
purus fuisset? Non est igitur tam explorata ista ratio ad id, 64
quod vultis, confirmandum, quam videtur. Sed quia commune
hoc est argumentum aliorum etiam philosophorum, omittam hoc
tempore; ad vestra propria venire malo.

Concedo esse deos; doce me igitur, unde sint, ubi sint, 65
quales sint corpore, animo, vita; haec enim scire desidero.
Abuteris ad omnia atomorum regno et licentia; hinc, quodcum-
que in solum venit, ut dicitur, effingis atque efficis. Quae pri-
mum nullae sunt. Nihil est enim † quod vacet corpore; cor-
poribus autem omnis obsidetur locus; ita nullum inane, nihil
esse individuum potest. Haec ego nunc physicorum oracula 24 66
fundo, vera an falsa, nescio, sed veri tamen similiora quam ves-
tra. Ista enim flagitia Democriti sive etiam ante Leucippi, esse
corpuscula quaedam levia, alia aspera, rotunda alia, partim
autem angulata, hamata quaedam et quasi adunca, ex his effec-
tum esse caelum atque terram nulla cogente natura, sed con-
cursu quodam fortuito, hanc tu opinionem, C. Vellei, usque ad
hanc aetatem perduxisti, priusque te quis de omni vitae statu
quam de ista auctoritate deiecerit; ante enim iudicasti Epicu-
reum te esse oportere, quam ista cognovisti. Ita necesse fuit
aut haec flagitia concipere animo aut susceptae philosophiae
nomen amittere. Quid enim mereas, ut Epicureus esse desinas? 67
Nihil equidem, inquis, ut rationem vitae beatae veritatemque
deseram. Ista igitur est veritas? Nam de vita beata nihil re-
pugno, quam tu ne in deo quidem esse censes, nisi plane otio
langueat. Sed ubi est veritas? In mundis, credo, innumera-
bilibus omnibus minimis temporum punctis aliis nascentibus,

aliis cadentibus. An in individuis corpusculis tam praeclara opera nulla moderante natura, nulla ratione fingentibus? Sed oblitus liberalitatis meae, qua tecum paulo ante uti coeperam, plura complector. Concedam igitur ex individuis constare 68 omnia. Quid ad rem? deorum enim natura quaeritur. Sint sane ex atomis; non igitur aeterni. Quod enim ex atomis, id natum aliquando est; si natum, nulli dei ante quam nati; et si ortus est deorum, interitus sit necesse est, ut tu paulo ante de Platonis mundo disputabas. Ubi igitur illud vestrum beatum et aeternum? quibus duobus verbis significatis deum; quod cum efficere vultis, in dumeta conrepitis. Ita enim dicebas, non corpus esse in deo, sed quasi corpus, nec sanguinem, sed tamquam sanguinem.

25 69 Hoc persaepe facitis, ut, cum aliquid non veri simile dicatis et effugere reprehensionem velitis, adferatis aliquid, quod omnino ne fieri quidem possit, ut satius fuerit illud ipsum, de quo ambigebatur, concedere quam tam inpudenter resistere. Velut Epicurus cum videret, si atomi ferrentur in locum inferiorem suopte pondere, nihil fore in nostra potestate, quod esset earum motus certus et necessarius, invenit, quo modo necessitatem effugeret, quod videlicet Democritum fugerat; ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitate derecto deorsus feratur, declinare paulu- 70 lum. Hoc dicere turpius est quam illud, quod vult, non posse defendere. Idem facit contra dialecticos; a quibus cum traditum sit in omnibus diiunctionibus, in quibus 'aut etiam aut non' poneretur, alterum utrum esse verum, pertimuit, ne, si concessum esset huius modi aliquid: 'Aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus', alterutrum fieret necessarium, totum hoc 'aut etiam aut non' negavit esse necessarium; quo quid dici potuit obtusius? Urguebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quae sensibus viderentur, Zenon autem non nulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. Timuit Epicurus, ne, si unum visum esset falsum, nullum esset verum: omnis sensus veri nuntios dixit esse. Nihil horum nimis callide; graviorem enim plagam accipiebat, ut leviorem repelleret.

Idem facit in natura deorum; dum individuorum corporum 71
concretionem fugit, ne interitus et dissipatio consequatur, negat
esse corpus deorum, sed tamquam corpus, nec sanguinem, sed
tamquam sanguinem. Mirabile videtur, quod non rideat haru- 26
spex, cum haruspicem viderit; hoc mirabilius, quod vos inter
vos risum tenere possitis. 'Non est corpus, sed quasi corpus.'
Hoc intellegerem quale esset, si in ceris fingeretur aut fictilibus
figuris; in deo quid sit 'quasi corpus' aut 'quasi sanguis',
intellegere non possum; ne tu quidem, Vellei, sed non vis
fateri. Ista enim a vobis quasi dictata redduntur, quae Epi- 72
curus oscitans halucinatus est, cum quidem gloriaretur, ut
videmus in scriptis, se magistrum habuisse nullum. Quod ei
non praedicanti tamen facile equidem crederem, sicut mali
aedificii domino glorianti se architectum non habuisse; nihil
enim olet ex Academia, nihil ex Lycio, nihil ne e puerilibus
quidem disciplinis. Xenocraten audire potuit, quem virum, di
inmortales! et sunt qui putent audisse; ipse non vult; credo
plus nemini. Pamphilum quendam, Platonis auditorem, ait a
se Sami auditum; ibi enim adulescens habitabat cum patre et
fratribus, quod in eam pater eius Neocles agripeta venerat; sed
cum agellus eum non satis aleret, ut opinor, ludi magister fuit.
Sed hunc Platonicum mirifice contemnit Epicurus; ita metuit, 73
ne quid umquam didicisse videatur. In Nausiphane Democri-
teo tenetur; quem cum a se non neget auditum, vexat tamen
omnibus contumeliis. Atqui si haec Democritea non audisset,
quid audierat? quid est in physicis Epicuri non a Democrito?
Nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut quod paulo ante de incli-
natione atomorum dixi, tamen pleraque dicit eadem, atomos,
inane, imagines, infinitatem locorum innumerabilitatemque mun-
dorum, eorum ortus, interitus, omnia fere, quibus naturae ratio
continetur. Nunc istuc 'quasi corpus' et 'quasi sanguinem'
quid intellegis? Ego enim te scire ista melius quam me non 74
fateor solum, sed etiam facile patior; cum quidem semel dicta
sunt, quid est, quod Velleius intellegere possit, Cotta non possit?
Itaque corpus quid sit, sanguis quid sit, intellego, quasi corpus

et quasi sanguis quid sit, nullo prorsus modo intellego. Neque
tu me celas, ut Pythagoras solebat alienos, nec consulto dicis
occulte tamquam Heraclitus, sed (quod inter nos liceat) ne tu
27 75 quidem intellegis. Illud video pugnare te, species ut quaedam
sit deorum, quae nihil concreti habeat, nihil solidi, nihil ex-
pressi, nihil eminentis, sitque pura, levis, perlucida. Dicemus
igitur idem, quod in Venere Coa: corpus illud non est, sed
simile corporis, nec ille fusus et candore mixtus rubor sanguis
est, sed quaedam sanguinis similitudo; sic in Epicureo deo
non res, sed similitudines rerum esse. Fac id, quod ne intel-
legi quidem potest, mihi esse persuasum; cedo mihi istorum
76 adumbratorum deorum liniamenta atque formas. Non deest
hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis humanas esse
formas deorum; primum quod ita sit informatum anticipatum-
que mentibus nostris, ut homini, cum de deo cogitet, forma
occurrat humana; deinde quod, quoniam rebus omnibus excel-
lat natura divina, forma quoque esse pulcherrima debeat, nec
esse humana ullam pulchriorem; tertiam rationem adfertis,
77 quod nulla alia figura domicilium mentis esse possit. Primum
igitur quidque considera quale sit; arripere enim mihi vide-
mini quasi vestro iure rem nullo modo probabilem. Omnino
quis tam caecus in contemplandis rebus umquam fuit, ut non
videret species istas hominum conlatas in deos aut consilio
quodam sapientium, quo facilius animos imperitorum ad deo-
rum cultum a vitae pravitate converterent, aut superstitione, ut
essent simulacra, quae venerantes deos ipsos se adire crede-
rent? Auxerunt autem haec eadem poëtae, pictores, opifices;
erat enim non facile agentis aliquid et molientis deos in aliarum
formarum imitatione servare. Accessit etiam ista opinio for-
tasse, quod homini homine pulchrius nihil videbatur. Sed tu
hoc, physice, non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix et quasi sui
sit lena natura? An putas ullam esse terra marique beluam,
quae non sui generis belua maxime delectetur? Quod ni ita
esset, cur non gestiret taurus equae contrectatione, equus vac-
cae? An tu aquilam aut leonem aut delphinum ullam ante-

ferre censes figuram suae? Quid igitur mirum, si hoc eodem modo homini natura praescripsit, ut nihil pulchrius quam hominem putaret[, eam esse causam, cur deos hominum similis putaremus]?

Quid censes? si ratio esset in beluis, non suo quasque generi 78
plurimum tributuras fuisse? At mehercule ego (dicam enim, 28
ut sentio) quamvis amem ipse me, tamen non audeo dicere pulchriorem esse me, quam ille fuerit taurus, qui vexit Europam. Non enim hoc loco de ingeniis aut de orationibus nostris, sed de specie figuraque quaeritur. Quodsi fingere nobis et iungere formas velimus, qualis ille maritimus Triton pingitur, natantibus invehens beluis adiunctis humano corpori, nolis esse. Difficili in loco versor. Est enim vis tanta naturae, ut homo nemo velit nisi hominis similis esse. Et quidem formica formi- 79
cae. Sed tamen cuius hominis? quotus enim quisque formosus est? Athenis cum essem, e gregibus epheborum vix singuli reperiebantur. Video, quid adriseris, sed ita tamen se res habet. Deinde nobis, qui concedentibus philosophis antiquis adulescentulis delectamur, etiam vitia saepe iucunda sunt. Naevus in articulo pueri delectat Alcaeum. At est corporis macula naevus. Illi tamen hoc lumen videbatur. Q. Catulus, huius collegae et familiaris nostri pater, dilexit municipem tuum Roscium, in quem etiam illud est eius:

Constiteram exorientem Auroram forte salutans,
Cum subito a laeva Roscius exoritur.
Pace mihi liceat, caelestes, dicere vestra,
Mortalis visust pulchrior esse deo.

Huic deo pulchrior; at erat, sicuti hodie est, perversissimis oculis. Quid refert, si hoc ipsum salsum illi et venustum videbatur? Redeo ad deos.

Ecquos, si non tam strabones, at paetulos esse arbitramur? 29 80
ecquos naevum habere? ecquos silos, flaccos, frontones, capitones, quae sunt in nobis? an omnia emendata in illis? Detur

id vobis; num etiam una est omnium facies? nam si plures,
aliam esse alia pulchriorem necesse est. Igitur aliquis non pul-
cherrimus deus. Si una omnium facies est, florere in caelo
Academiam necesse est; si enim nihil inter deum et deum
81 differt, nulla est apud deos cognitio, nulla perceptio. Quid, si
etiam, Vellei, falsum illud omnino est, nullam aliam nobis de
deo cogitantibus speciem nisi hominis occurrere? tamenne ista
tam absurda defendes? Nobis fortasse sic occurrit, ut dicis; a
parvis enim Iovem, Iunonem, Minervam, Neptunum, Vulca-
num, Apollinem reliquosque deos ea facie novimus, qua pic-
tores fictoresque voluerunt, neque solum facie, sed etiam ornatu,
aetate, vestitu; at non Aegyptii nec Syri nec fere cuncta bar-
baria; firmiores enim videas apud eos opiniones esse de bestiis
quibusdam quam apud nos de sanctissimis templis et simulacris
82 deorum. Etenim fana multa spoliata et simulacra deorum de
locis sanctissimis ablata videmus a nostris; at vero ne fando
quidem auditum est crocodilum aut ibin aut faelem violatum
ab Aegyptio. Quid igitur censes? Apim illum, sanctum Aegyp-
tiorum bovem, nonne deum videri Aegyptiis? Tam hercle
quam tibi illam vestram Sospitam, quam tu numquam ne in
somnis quidem vides nisi cum pelle caprina, cum hasta, cum
scutulo, cum calceolis repandis. At non est talis Argia nec
Romana Iuno. Ergo alia species Iunonis Argivis, alia Lanu-
vinis, *alia nobis.* Et quidem alia nobis Capitolini, alia Afris
83 Hammonis Iovis. Non pudet igitur physicum, id est specula-
torem venatoremque naturae, ab animis consuetudine inbutis
petere testimonium veritatis? Isto enim modo dicere licebit
Iovem semper barbatum, Apollinem semper inberbem, caesios
oculos Minervae, caeruleos esse Neptuni. Et quidem lauda-
mus Athenis Volcanum eum, quem fecit Alcamenes, in quo
stante atque vestito leviter apparet claudicatio non deformis.
Claudum igitur habebimus deum, quoniam de Volcano sic
accepimus. Age et his vocabulis esse deos facimus, quibus a
84 nobis nominantur? At primum, quot hominum linguae, tot
nomina deorum. Non enim, ut tu Velleius, quocumque vene-

ris, sic idem in Italia Volcanus, idem in Hispania. Deinde nominum non magnus numerus ne in pontificiis quidem nostris, deorum autem innumerabilis. An sine nominibus sunt? Istud quidem ita vobis dicere necesse est; quid enim attinet, cum una facies sit, plura esse nomina? Quam bellum erat, Vellei, confiteri potius nescire, quod nescires, quam ista effutientem nauseare atque ipsum sibi displicere! An tu mei similem putas esse aut tui deum? Profecto non putas. Quid ergo? solem dicam aut lunam aut caelum deum? Ergo etiam beatum? Quibus fruentem voluptatibus? Et sapientem? Qui potest esse in eius modi trunco sapientia? Haec vestra sunt. Si igitur nec 85
humano *visu*, quod docui, nec tali aliquo, quod tibi ita persuasum est, quid dubitas negare deos esse? Non audes. Sapienter id quidem, etsi hoc loco non populum metuis, sed ipsos deos. Novi ego Epicureos omnia sigilla venerantes; quamquam video non nullis videri Epicurum, ne in offensionem Atheniensium caderet, verbis reliquisse deos, re sustulisse. Itaque in illis selectis eius brevibusque sententiis, quas appellatis κυρίας δόξας, haec, ut opinor, prima sententia est: 'Quod beatum et inmortale est, id nec habet nec exhibet cuiquam negotium.' In hac ita exposita sententia sunt qui existiment, **31**
quod ille inscitia plane loquendi fecerat, fecisse consulto; de homine minime vafro male existimant. Dubium est enim, 86
utrum dicat aliquid beatum esse et inmortale an, si quid sit. Non animadvertunt hic eum ambigue locutum esse, sed multis aliis locis et illum et Metrodorum tam aperte quam paulo ante te. Ille vero deos esse putat, nec quemquam vidi, qui magis ea, quae timenda esse negaret, timeret, mortem dico et deos. Quibus mediocres homines non ita valde moventur, his ille clamat omnium mortalium mentes esse perterritas. Tot milia latrocinantur morte proposita, alii omnia, quae possunt, fana conpilant. Credo, aut illos mortis timor terret aut hos religionis.

Sed quoniam non audes (iam enim cum ipso Epicuro lo- 87
quar) negare esse deos, quid est, quod te inpediat aut solem

aut mundum aut mentem aliquam sempiternam in deorum numero ponere? 'Numquam vidi', inquit, 'animam rationis consiliique participem in ulla alia nisi humana figura'. Quid? solis numquidnam aut lunae aut quinque errantium siderum simile vidisti? Sol duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus definiens motum cursus annuos conficit; huius hanc lustrationem eiusdem incensa radiis menstruo spatio luna complet; quinque autem stellae eundem orbem tenentes, aliae propius a terris, aliae remotius, ab isdem principiis dispa-
88 ribus temporibus eadem spatia conficiunt. Num quid tale, Epicure, vidisti? Ne sit igitur sol, ne luna, ne stellae, quoniam nihil esse potest, nisi quod attigimus aut vidimus; quid? deum ipsum numne vidisti? Cur igitur credis esse? Omnia tollamus ergo, quae aut historia nobis aut ratio nova adfert. Ita fit, ut mediterranei mare esse non credant. Quae sunt tantae animi angustiae? Ut, si Seriphi natus esses nec umquam egressus ex insula, in qua lepusculos vulpeculasque saepe vidisses, non crederes leones et pantheras esse, cum tibi, quales essent, diceretur; si vero de elephanto quis diceret, etiam
89 rideri te putares. Et tu quidem, Vellei, non vestro more, sed dialecticorum, quae funditus gens vestra non novit, argumenta sententiae conclusisti: Beatos esse deos sumpsisti. Concedi-
82 mus. Beatum autem sine virtute neminem esse posse. Id quoque damus, et libenter quidem. Virtutem autem sine ratione constare non posse. Conveniat id quoque necesse est. Adiungis: nec rationem esse nisi in hominis figura. Quem tibi hoc daturum putas? si enim ita esset, quid opus erat te gradatim istuc pervenire? sumpsisses tuo iure. Quid autem est istuc gradatim? nam a beatis ad virtutem, a virtute ad rationem video te venisse gradibus; a ratione ad humanam figuram quo modo accedis? Praecipitare istuc quidem est, non descendere.
90 Nec vero intellego, cur maluerit Epicurus deos hominum similes dicere quam homines deorum. Quaeres, quid intersit; si enim hoc illi simile sit, esse illud huic. Video; sed hoc dico, non ab hominibus formae figuram venisse ad deos; di enim

semper fuerunt, nati numquam sunt, siquidem aeterni sunt futuri; at homines nati; ante igitur humana forma quam homines ea, qua erant forma di inmortales. Non ergo illorum humana forma, sed nostra divina dicenda est. Verum hoc quidem, ut voletis; illud quaero, quae fuerit tanta fortuna (nihil enim ratione in rerum natura factum esse vultis), sed tamen quis iste tantus casus? unde tam felix concursus atomorum, 91 ut repente homines deorum forma nascerentur? Seminane deorum decidisse de caelo putamus in terras, et sic homines patrum similes extitisse? Vellem diceretis; deorum cognationem agnoscerem non invitus. Nihil tale dicitis, sed casu esse factum, ut essemus similes deorum. Et nunc argumenta quaerenda sunt, quibus hoc refellatur? Utinam tam facile vera invenire possim quam falsa convincere! Etenim enumerasti **33** memoriter et copiose, ut mihi quidem admirari luberet in homine esse Romano tantam scientiam, usque a Thale Milesio de deorum natura philosophorum sententias. Omnesne tibi illi 92 delirare visi sunt, qui sine manibus et pedibus constare deum posse decreverint? Ne hoc quidem vos movet considerantis, quae sit utilitas quaeque oportunitas in homine membrorum, ut iudicetis membris humanis deos non egere? Quid enim pedibus opus est sine ingressu? quid manibus, si nihil conprehendendum est? quid reliqua discriptione omnium corporis partium, in qua nihil inane, nihil sine causa, nihil supervacaneum est? Itaque nulla ars imitari sollertiam naturae potest. Habebit igitur linguam deus et non loquetur, dentes, palatum, fauces nullum ad usum, quaeque procreationis causa natura corpori adfinxit, ea frustra habebit deus, nec externa magis quam interiora, cor, pulmones, iecur, cetera, quae detracta utilitate quid habent venustatis? quandoquidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem voltis. Istisne fidentes somniis non 93 modo Epicurus et Metrodorus et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram, Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt, sed meretricula etiam Leontium contra Theophrastum scribere ausa est? scito illa quidem sermone et Attico, sed tamen. Tantum Epicuri

hortus habuit licentiae. Et soletis queri; Zeno quidem etiam litigabat. Quid dicam Albucium? Nam Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius; sed stomachabatur senex, si quid asperius dixeram, cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phaedoni Socratico turpissime male dixerit, Metrodori, sodalis sui, fratrem, Timocraten, quia nescio quid in philosophia dissentiret, totis voluminibus conciderit, in Democritum ipsum, quem secutus est, fuerit ingratus, Nausiphanen, magistrum
34 suum, a quo *non* nihil didicerat, tam male acceperit. Zeno quidem non eos solum, qui tum erant, Apollodorum, Silum, ceteros, figebat maledictis, sed Socraten ipsum, parentem philosophiae, Latino verbo utens scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat,
94 Chrysippum numquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat; tu ipse paulo ante cum tamquam senatum philosophorum recitares, summos viros desipere, delirare, dementis esse dicebas. Quorum si nemo verum vidit de natura deorum, verendum est, ne nulla sit omnino. Nam ista, quae vos dicitis, sunt tota commenticia, vix digna lucubratione anicularum; non enim sentitis, quam multa vobis suscipienda sint, si inpetraritis, ut concedamus eandem hominum esse et deorum figuram. Omnis cultus et curatio corporis erit eadem adhibenda deo, quae adhibetur homini, ingressus, cursus, accubitio, inclinatio, sessio, conpre-
95 hensio, ad extremum etiam sermo et oratio; nam quod et maris deos et feminas esse dicitis, quid sequatur, videtis. Equidem mirari satis non possum, unde ad istas opiniones vester ille princeps venerit. Sed clamare non desinitis retinendum hoc esse, deus ut beatus inmortalisque sit. Quid autem obstat, quo minus sit beatus, si non sit bipes? aut ista, sive beatitas sive beatitudo dicenda est (utrumque omnino durum, sed usu mollienda nobis verba sunt), verum ea, quaecumque est, cur aut in solem illum aut in hunc mundum aut in aliquam mentem aeternam figura membrisque corporis va-
96 cuam cadere non potest? Nihil aliud dicis nisi: 'Numquam vidi solem aut mundum beatum.' Quid? mundum praeter [illegible] umquamne vidisti? Negabis. Cur igitur non sescenta

milia esse mundorum, sed innumerabilia ausus es dicere? Ratio docuit. Ergo hoc te ratio non docebit, cum praestantissima natura quaeratur, eaque beata et aeterna, quae sola divina natura est, ut inmortalitate vincamur ab ea natura, sic animi praestantia vinci, atque ut animi, item corporis? Cur igitur, cum ceteris rebus inferiores simus, forma pares sumus? ad similitudinem enim deorum propius accedebat humana virtus quam figura. An quicquam tam puerile dici potest (ut 35 97
eundem locum diutius urgeam), quam si ea genera beluarum, quae in rubro mari Indiave gignantur, nulla esse dicamus? Atqui ne curiosissimi quidem homines exquirendo audire tam multa possunt, quam sunt multa, quae terra, mari, paludibus, fluminibus exsistunt; quae negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus? Ipsa vero quam nihil ad rem pertinet, quae vos delectat maxime, similitudo! Quid? canis nonne similis lupo? atque, ut Ennius,

Simia quam similis, turpissuma bestia, nobis!

at mores in utroque dispares. Elephanto beluarum nulla prudentior; at figura quae vastior? De bestiis loquor; quid? 98
inter ipsos homines nonne et simillimis formis dispares mores et moribus *simillimis* figura dissimilis? Etenim si semel, Vellei, suscipimus genus hoc argumenti, attende, quo serpat. Tu enim sumebas nisi in hominis figura rationem inesse non posse; sumet alius nisi in terrestri, nisi in eo, qui natus sit, nisi in eo, qui adoleverit, nisi in eo, qui didicerit, nisi in eo, qui ex animo constet et corpore caduco et infirmo, postremo nisi in homine atque mortali. Quodsi in omnibus his rebus obsistis, quid est, quod te forma una conturbet? His enim omnibus, quae proposui, adiunctis in homine rationem esse et mentem videbas; quibus detractis deum tamen nosse te dicis, modo liniamenta maneant. Hoc est non considerare, sed quasi sortiri, quid loquare. Nisi 99
forte ne hoc quidem attendis, non modo in homine, sed etiam in arbore, quicquid supervacaneum sit aut usum non habeat, obstare. Quam molestum est uno digito plus habere! Quid

ita? Quia nec ad speciem nec ad usum alium quinque desiderant. Tuus autem deus non digito uno redundat, sed capite, collo, cervicibus, lateribus, alvo, tergo, poplitibus, manibus, pedibus, feminibus, cruribus. Si, ut inmortalis sit, quid haec ad vitam membra pertinent? quid ipsa facies? Magis illa, cerebrum, cor, pulmones, iecur; haec enim sunt domicilia vitae; oris quidem
36 100 habitus ad vitae firmitatem nihil pertinet. Et eos vituperabas, qui ex operibus magnificis atque praeclaris, cum ipsum mundum, cum eius membra, caelum, terras, maria, cumque horum insignia, solem, lunam stellasque, vidissent, cumque temporum maturitates, mutationes vicissitudinesque cognovissent, suspicati essent aliquam excellentem esse praestantemque naturam, quae haec effecisset, moveret, regeret, gubernaret. Qui etiamsi aberrant coniectura, video tamen, quid sequantur; tu quod opus tandem magnum et egregium habes, quod effectum divina mente videatur, ex quo esse deos suspicere? Habebam, inquis, in animo insitam informationem quandam dei. Et barbati quidem Iovis, galeatae Minervae; num igitur esse
101 talis putas? Quanto melius haec vulgus imperitorum, qui non membra solum hominis deo tribuant, sed usum etiam membrorum. Dant enim arcum, sagittas, hastam, clipeum, fuscinam, fulmen, et si, actiones quae sint deorum, non vident, nihil agentem tamen deum non queunt cogitare. Ipsi, qui inridentur, Aegyptii nullam beluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem, quam ex ea caperent, consecraverunt; velut ibes maximam vim serpentium conficiunt, cum sint aves excelsae, cruribus rigidis, corneo proceroque rostro; avertunt pestem ab Aegypto, cum volucris anguis ex vastitate Libyae vento Africo invectas interficiunt atque consumunt; ex quo fit, ut illae nec morsu vivae noceant nec odore mortuae. Possum de ichneumonum utilitate, de crocodilorum, de faelium dicere, sed nolo esse longus. Ita concludam, tamen beluas a barbaris propter beneficium consecratas, vestrorum deorum non modo benefi-
102 cium nullum extare, sed ne factum quidem omnino. Nihil habet, inquit, negotii. Profecto Epicurus quasi pueri delicati

nihil cessatione melius existimat. At ipsi tamen pueri, etiam **37** cum cessant, exercitatione aliqua ludicra delectantur; deum sic feriatum volumus cessatione torpere, ut, si se commoverit, vereamur, ne beatus esse non possit? Haec oratio non modo deos spoliat motu et actione divina, sed etiam homines inertis efficit, siquidem agens aliquid ne deus quidem esse beatus potest.

Verum sit sane, ut vultis, deus effigies hominis et imago; 103 quod eius est domicilium? quae sedes? qui locus? quae deinde actio vitae? quibus rebus, id quod vultis, beatus est? utatur enim suis bonis oportet *et* fruatur, qui beatus futurus est. Nam locus quidem iis etiam naturis, quae sine animis sunt, suus est cuique proprius, ut terra infimum teneat, hanc inundet aqua, superior *aëri*, aetheriis ignibus altissima ora reddatur. Bestiarum autem terrenae sunt aliae, partim aquatiles, aliae quasi ancipites in utraque sede viventes; sunt quaedam etiam, quae igne nasci putentur appareantque in ardentibus fornacibus saepe volitantes. Quaero igitur, vester deus primum ubi habitet, 104 deinde quae causa eum loco moveat, si modo movetur aliquando, porro, cum hoc proprium sit animantium, ut aliquid adpetant, quod sit naturae accommodatum, deus quid appetat, ad quam denique rem motu mentis ac ratione utatur, postremo quo modo beatus sit, quo modo aeternus. Quicquid enim horum attigeris, ulcus est. Ita male instituta ratio exitum reperire non potest. Sic enim dicebas, speciem dei percipi 105 cogitatione, non sensu, nec esse in ea ullam soliditatem, neque eandem ad numerum permanere, eamque esse eius visionem, ut similitudine et transitione cernatur, neque deficiat umquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio, ex eoque fieri, ut in haec intenta mens nostra beatam illam naturam et sempiternam putet. Hoc, per ipsos deos, de quibus loquimur, quale tandem est? **38** Nam si tantum modo ad cogitationem valent nec habent ullam soliditatem nec eminentiam, quid interest, utrum de Hippocentauro an de deo cogitemus? omnem enim talem conformationem animi ceteri philosophi motum inanem vocant, vos

106 autem adventum in animos et introitum imaginum dicitis. Ut Ti. Gracchum cum videor contionantem in Capitolio videre de M. Octavio deferentem sitellam, tum eum motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem et Gracchi et Octavii imagines remanere, quae, in Capitolium cum pervenerim, tum ad animum meum referantur; hoc idem fieri in deo, cuius crebra facie pellantur
107 animi, ex quo esse beati atque aeterni intellegantur. Fac imagines esse, quibus pulsentur animi; species dumtaxat obicitur quaedam; num etiam, cur ea beata sit, cur aeterna? Quae autem istae imagines vestrae aut unde? A Demòcrito omnino haec licentia; sed et ille reprehensus a multis est, nec vos exitum reperitis, totaque res vacillat et claudicat. Nam quid est, quod minus probari possit, *quam* omnium in me incidere imagines, Homeri, Archilochi, Romuli, Numae, Pythagorae, Platonis, nec ea forma, qua illi fuerunt? Quo modo illi ergo? et quorum imagines? Orpheum poëtam docet Aristoteles numquam fuisse, et hoc Orphicum carmen Pythagorei ferunt cuiusdam fuisse Cercopis. At Orpheus, id est imago
108 eius, ut vos vultis, in animum meum saepe incurrit. Quid, quod eiusdem hominis in meum aliae, aliae in tuum? quid, quod earum rerum, quae numquam omnino fuerunt neque esse potuerunt, ut Scyllae, ut Chimaerae? quid, quod hominum, locorum, urbium earum, quas numquam vidimus? quid, quod, simul ac mihi collibitum est, praesto est imago? quid, quod etiam ad dormientem veniunt invocatae? Tota res, Vellei, nugatoria est. Vos autem non modo oculis imagines, sed etiam animis inculcatis. Tanta est inpunitas garriendi. At quam
39 109 licenter! Fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur. Puderet me dicere non intellegere, si vos ipsi intellegeretis, qui ista defenditis. Quo modo enim probas continenter imagines ferri? aut, si continenter, quo modo aeternae? Innumerabilitas, inquis, suppeditat atomorum. Num eadem ergo ista faciet, ut sint omnia sempiterna? Confugis ad aequilibritatem (sic enim ἰσονομίαν, si placet, appellemus) et ais, quoniam sit natura mortalis, inmortalem etiam esse

oportere. Isto modo, quoniam homines mortales sunt, sint
aliqui inmortales, et quoniam nascuntur in terra, nascantur in
aqua. — Et quia sunt quae interimant, sint quae conservent. —
Sint sane, sed ea conservent, quae sunt; deos istos esse non
sentio. Omnis tamen ista rerum effigies ex individuis quo 110
modo corporibus oritur? quae etiamsi essent, quae nulla sunt,
pellere se ipsa et agitari inter se concursu fortasse possent,
formare, figurare, colorare, animare non possent. Nullo igitur
modo inmortalem deum efficitis. Videamus nunc de beato. 40
Sine virtute certe nullo modo; virtus autem actuosa, et deus
vester nihil agens; expers virtutis igitur; ita ne beatus quidem.
Quae ergo vita? Suppeditatio, inquis, bonorum nullo malorum 111
interventu. Quorum tandem bonorum? Voluptatum, credo,
nempe ad corpus pertinentium; nullam enim novistis nisi pro-
fectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem.
Non arbitror te, Vellei, similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum,
quos ***non*** pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus ille testatur
se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum, quod sit seiunctum a
delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens
persequitur omnis nominatim. Quem cibum igitur aut quas 112
potiones aut quas vocum aut florum varietates aut quos tactus,
quos odores adhibebis ad deos, ut eos perfundas voluptatibus?
Et poëtae quidem [nectar ambrosiam] epulas conparant et aut
Iuventatem aut Ganymedem pocula ministrantem, tu autem, Epi-
cure, quid facies? Neque enim, unde habeat ista deus tuus, vi-
deo, nec quo modo utatur. Locupletior igitur hominum natura
ad beate vivendum est quam deorum, quod pluribus generibus
fruitur voluptatum. At has leviores ducis voluptates, quibus 113
quasi titillatio (Epicuri enim hoc verbum est) adhibetur sensibus.
Quousque ludis? Nam etiam Philo noster ferre non poterat
aspernari Epicureos mollis et delicatas voluptates; summa enim
memoria pronuntiabat plurimas Epicuri sententias iis ipsis verbis,
quibus erant scriptae; Metrodori vero, qui est Epicuri collega
sapientiae, multa inpudentiora recitabat; accusat enim Timo-
cratem, fratrem suum, Metrodorus, quod dubitet omnia, quae

ad beatam vitam pertineant, ventre metiri, neque id semel dicit, sed saepius. Adnuere te video; nota enim tibi sunt; proferrem libros, si negares. Neque nunc reprehendo, quod ad voluptatem omnia referantur (alia est ea quaestio), sed doceo deos vestros esse voluptatis expertes, ita vestro iudicio ne beatos
41 114 quidem. At dolore vacant. Satin est id ad illam abundantem bonis vitam beatissimam? Cogitat, inquiunt, adsidue beatum esse se; habet enim nihil aliud, quod agitet in mente. Conprehende igitur animo et propone ante oculos deum nihil aliud in omni aeternitate nisi 'Mihi pulchre est' et 'Ego beatus sum' cogitantem. Nec tamen video, quo modo non vereatur iste deus beatus, ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sempiterna, cumque ex ipso imagines semper affluant. Ita nec beatus est vester deus nec aeternus.

115 At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus. At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut *Ti.* Coruncanium aut P. Scaevolam, pontifices maximos, te audire dicas, non eum, qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem nec manibus, ut Xerses, sed rationibus deorum inmortalium templa et aras everterit. Quid est enim, cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dei non modo homines non colant, sed omnino
116 nihil curent, nihil agant? At est eorum eximia quaedam praestansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam allicere sapientem. An quicquam eximium potest esse in ea natura, quae sua voluptate laetans nihil nec actura sit umquam neque agat neque egerit? quae porro pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acceperis? aut quid omnino, cuius nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest? Est enim pietas iustitia adversum deos; cum quibus quid potest nobis esse iuris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas? Sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum; qui quam ob rem colendi sint, non intellego, nullo nec accepto ab iis nec sperato bono.

42 117 Quid est autem, quod deos veneremur propter admirationem eius naturae, in qua egregium nihil videamus? Nam supersti-

tione, quod gloriari soletis, facile est liberari, cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum; nisi forte Diagoram aut Theodorum, qui omnino deos esse negabant, censes superstitiosos esse potuisse. Ego ne Protagoram quidem, cui neutrum licuerit, nec esse deos nec non esse. Horum enim sententiae omnium non modo superstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis deorum, sed etiam religionem, quae deorum cultu pio continetur. Quid? ii, qui 118
dixerunt totam de dis inmortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret, nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt? Quid? Prodicus Cius, qui ea, quae prodessent hominum vitae, deorum in numero habita esse dixit, quam tandem religionem reliquit? Quid? qui aut fortis aut 119
claros aut potentis viros tradunt post mortem ad deos pervenisse, eosque esse ipsos, quos nos colere, precari venerarique soleamus, nonne expertes sunt religionum omnium? quae ratio maxime tractata ab Euhemero est, quem noster et interpretatus et secutus est praeter ceteros Ennius. Ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturae demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem an penitus totam sustulisse? Omitto Eleusinem sanctam illam et augustam,

Ubi ínitiantur géntes orarum últimae,

praetereo Samothraciam eaque, quae Lemni

Noctúrno aditu occultá coluntur,
Silvéstribus saepibus dénsa.

Quibus explicatis ad rationemque revocatis rerum magis natura cognoscitur quam deorum.

Mihi quidem etiam Democritus, vir magnus in primis, cuius 43
fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos inrigavit, nutare videtur in na- 120
tura deorum. Tum enim censet imagines divinitate praeditas inesse in universitate rerum, tum principia mentis, quae sint in eodem universo, deos esse dicit, tum animantes imagines, quae vel prodesse nobis soleant vel nocere, tum ingentis quasdam imagines tantasque, ut universum mundum conplectantur ex-

trinsecus; quae quidem omnia sunt patria Democriti quam
121 Democrito digniora. Quis enim istas imagines conprehendere animo potest? quis admirari? quis aut cultu aut religione dignas iudicare? Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus religionem, cum dis inmortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit. Cum enim optimam et praestantissimam naturam dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in deo gratiam; tollit id, quod maxime proprium est optimae praestantissimaeque naturae. Quid enim melius aut quid praestantius bonitate et beneficentia? Qua cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo nec deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari, neminem diligi vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines a deis, sed ipsi dei
44 inter se ab aliis alii neglegantur. Quanto Stoici melius, qui a vobis reprehenduntur! Censent autem sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos. Nihil est enim virtute amabilius; quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis diligetur.
122 Vos autem quid mali datis, cum *in* inbecillitate gratificationem et benivolentiam ponitis! Ut enim omittam vim et naturam deorum, ne homines quidem censetis, nisi inbecilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse? Nulla est caritas naturalis inter bonos? Carum ipsum verbum est amoris, ex quo amicitiae nomen est ductum; quam si ad fructum nostrum referemus, non ad illius commoda, quem diligemus, non erit ista amicitia, sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum. Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo, quod fructus ex iis capiuntur, hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est. Quanto igitur magis deorum, qui nulla re egentes et inter se diligunt et hominibus consulunt! Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur, quid precamur deos? cur sacris pontifices, cur auspiciis augures praesunt? quid optamus a deis inmortalibus? quid
123 vovemus? At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. Quae enim potest esse sanctitas, si dei humana non curant? quae autem animans natura nihil curans? Verius est igitur nimirum illud, quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius

disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de deis inmortalibus dixerit, invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse. Neque enim tam desipiens fuisset, ut homunculi similem deum fingeret, liniamentis dumtaxat extremis, non habitu solido, membris hominis praeditum omnibus, usu membrorum ne minimo quidem, exilem quendam atque perlucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem, nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem, nihil agentem. Quae natura primum nulla esse potest, idque videns Epicurus re tollit, oratione relinquit deos; deinde, si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla 124
gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam 'propitius sit'? Esse enim propitius potest nemini, quoniam, ut dicitis, omnis in inbecillitate est et gratia et caritas.

BOOK SECOND.

SUMMARY.

COTTA having finished the refutation of the Epicurean theology, Balbus begins his exposition of the Stoic doctrine. He divides his discourse (§ 3), after the traditional custom of the Stoics, into four parts: 1. proof of the existence of the gods; 2. explanation of their nature and of their various sorts; 3. proof that the world is governed by them; 4. proof that in particular they have a care for mankind. The Stoics considered this fourth proposition necessary, because a divine government of the world is quite conceivable, which might order the whole according to general laws, bestowing at the same time no especial care on men; still less interfering in particular cases in their behalf, vouchsafing revelations, giving them support and aid, all of which the Stoics admitted in conformity with the popular belief. — The existence of the gods is proved from several points of view. The universality of the belief among all men is first mentioned, and the confirmation it receives, partly from individual apparitions of divine beings, partly from the revelations of the gods through divination and auspices (4–12). Next follows a statement of the reasons assigned by Cleanthes for this universal belief in the gods; first, the revelations of future events; second, the consideration of the many blessings which the order of the universe secures to man; third, the impression made by the grand, mighty and terrible phenomena of nature; fourth, the contemplation of the wonderful order and beauty of the heavenly bodies and their motions, which has led men to recognize the existence of ordering and governing beings (13–15).[1] Then follows Chrysippus's

[1] Aristotle had already explained in a similar manner the origin of the belief in the gods; first, ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων, among which he reck-

justification of the belief in the gods, thus concisely stated: as it is certain that the universe and its everlasting order have not been produced by human power and human wisdom, so is it equally certain that the being which did produce them is higher than man. But beings higher than man must be gods; we can conceive nothing else higher than man, because man alone is endowed with reason, and reason is the highest possible endowment. If then there exists anything higher than men (and to deny it would be the most foolish presumption), it follows that there must be gods (16). This argument, which, as may be seen, takes for granted the idea of the gods as superhuman intelligent beings and is only directed to show that such beings must of necessity exist, is then somewhat further developed. It would be foolish to think that the universe was intended to be an abode for men alone and not for higher beings as well. — Human reason itself, limited and incomplete as it is, presupposes the existence of a more complete and hence a divine reason from which it is derived. Just as everything which pertains to the bodily organization of man is derived from elements existing in the world, so must the best in man, the thinking spirit, be derived from a thinking being existing in the world; and it would be absurd were we to ascribe to the universe everything except the highest and best (17, 18). Finally, the wise order of the world, the connection and interpenetration of all its parts lead necessarily to the recognition of a divine spirit governing and holding together the whole (19). Some short propositions of Zeno follow summing up in syllogistic forms the essentials of the foregoing argument (20–22). Next comes a detailed deduction from the speculative physics of the Stoics, the preceding proofs having all been drawn from the point of view of the ordinary human reason. All vegetable and animal life in the universe depends upon heat; for individual motion and activity can only dwell in what is endowed with heat; life is only a definite, uniform mode of activity, which proceeds from the principle of heat existing in all living bodies, and this principle is thus seen to pervade the whole universe (23, 24). This general prevalence is further evident from the fact that we find heat in all

oned dreams and revelations; second, ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων, from the contemplation of the heavens and the heavenly phenomena. See Sext. Empir. adv. Phys. I, 20.

four of the chief forms of matter, the so-called four elements, earth, water, air and fire. Hence heat is to be regarded as the living principle of the whole universe (25–28). But this principle must be conceived as possessing consciousness and reason. For since there exists in all not simple, but composite natural bodies a superior governing power (ἡγεμονικόν), to which all the rest are subordinate, so there must be a superior governing power in the universe; and since some subordinate parts of the universe are endowed with reason, the superior parts must also be so endowed; hence the universe and this all-pervading, all-animating principle must be endowed with reason, and the universe, since it is penetrated and animated by this principle, must be a being endowed with reason, divine and possessing in full divine power (29, 30). This principle is then, as has been said, heat,[1] but a heat much purer, much more

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[1] The principle of heat in general, *totum hoc genus igneum* as it is called in § 25, or *calidum illud atque igneum* (§ 28), although operating in all the three elements, earth, water and air, yet exists independently of them as *quarta pars mundi* or as a fourth element in the *aether* (§ 27). The common earthly fire, *hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector consumptorque omnium* (§ 41), appears on the contrary not as a separate element, but only as a variation or inferior form of the other. According to Cicero then three grades are to be distinguished of this *genus igneum;* first, the *ardor caelestis, qui aether vel caelum nominatur* (§ 41); second, the vital heat in animals and plants, *ignis corporeus* (§ 41), or *hic noster calor, quo haec quae nota nobis sunt retinentur et vigent* (§ 30); third, the common fire which only burns, destroys, dissolves, *confector, et consumptor omnium* (§ 41). In other authors, as Stobaeus, Ecl. I, 36, p. 538, only two sorts are distinguished, πῦρ τεχνικόν and πῦρ ἄτεχνον, the latter being common fire, the former the two other sorts which Cicero distinguishes, which in fact possess in common the animating and preserving power. The Peripatetics blamed the Stoics for using the one term πῦρ of the heavenly ether and of common fire, though others had done the same before them; they themselves rather regarded the ether as a separate existence, a fifth element in addition to the four common ones. See Cic. Acad. I, 11, 39; Ps. Arist. de mund. c. 2, 5, with the citations of Kapp, p. 28; and Ideler, note on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 335. When, moreover, the Stoics laid down the proposition that no fire can exist without replenishing as universally valid, so that it might be applied to the original fire from which all things have proceeded, they certainly laid themselves open to the attacks of their opponents: and we find that the Academic in Bk. III, 14, 37, makes use of this to prove that the original fire (or the primæval deity of the Stoics) cannot be eternal. We must suppose that the Stoics really limited the proposition only to the varieties of

powerful than that which exists in earthly things and which produces life and consciousness in men and animals, and so all the more sensitive, conscious and thinking. And since it derives its spring of action not from something external but from itself; and since whatever is the source of its own activity is, as Plato teaches, soul; the principle of heat is to be regarded as the soul of the universe, and the universe as a being possessing a soul (31, 32): it is at the same time a reasonable and wise being, because the universe must surely be better than the individual beings which it contains; while if it were not reasonable and wise, it would follow that man by the possession of reason would thereby have the preeminence over the universe (32). — A further proof of the existence of the deity is drawn from the observed gradation of beings, the higher succeeding the lower, the more perfect the more imperfect; the sensitive animal, moved by instincts and desires, standing above the plant which merely grows and nourishes itself, and man endowed with reason standing above the animal. In like manner there must be above man a higher grade of beings who are possessed of reason in the highest fullness, which in man is only incomplete. This grade is that of the deity, hence of the universe which is the deity and whose perfection cannot, like that of subordinate natures, be diminished by any limitations or defects whatever (33–36). To strengthen this argument the absurdity and impossibility of the contrary supposition is pointed out; as also the necessity that the universe, as the all-embracing all must be perfect in every respect, hence reasonable and wise, and hence God (37–39).

After the divinity of the universe has thus been shown, there follows the proof that the heavenly bodies are also gods. As these consist entirely of the finest ether *i.e.* the warm principle of fire, they must consequently be living, sensitive and thinking beings. This is true first of the sun, the ethery, fiery nature of which cannot be doubted (40, 41); the other heavenly bodies are also of the substance of ether, hence sensitive and thinking (42). This however follows also from the order and regularity of their motions,

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fire derived from the original fire, as they exist in the heavenly bodies and in earthly things. Anything more definite than this we are unable to ascertain from our sources of information.

which are to be regarded as purely voluntary, depending on a systematic choice, and hence as a proof of their divinity (43, 44).

Thus far we have been concerned with the proof of the *existence* of the gods; next follows the second part, or the question as to their *nature*. This has already been partially answered in the first part; for having proved the existence of an animating and conserving principle of fire in the universe, and having attributed to it consciousness and reason and also divinity, we have substantially shown that the deity is such an all-pervading, animating, conserving, reasoning principle of fire; furthermore that the universe, as being filled and animated by this principle, is itself to be called God.[1] In beginning, therefore, with the proposition that the universe is God, and in putting it upon the ground that according to universal natural consciousness the deity must be a living being, and the most perfect one, and that nothing answers to this idea better than the universe itself, Balbus only repeats what he had already said under the previous head. He adds to this a hit at the Epicureans who ridiculed this spherical deity (for the Stoics as well as the majority of people believed in the spherical form of the world, while the Epicureans doubted it) (46–48); hence the reasons for this shape of the universe and of the heavenly bodies as well are derived from the movements of the heavens and the stars (49–53); and the argument for the divinity of the heavenly bodies, drawn from the regularity of their movements, is incidentally repeated (54–56). Balbus now makes use of these propositions to establish the Stoic definition of nature given by Zeno, that it is a sort of heat possessing creative energy and working in an intelligent and methodical manner; or in other words the animating and thinking principle of heat before referred to. This nature, so far as it is operative in the universe, may be called the soul of the universe

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[1] Diog. L. VII, 137: *λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτόν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν, ὃς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς διακοσμήσεως κατὰ χρόνων ποιὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν*; (it is therefore the primæval creative being, which makes all other beings to proceed from its own fullness and again receives them back into itself). *Καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.* Comp. Stobaeus, Ecl. I, pp. 324 and 444.

or providence, as being the intelligent force everywhere aiming at adaptation, permanence and beauty (57, 58).

Besides the gods whose existence has thus far been proved, namely the universe and the heavenly bodies, wise men, continues Balbus, have for good reasons accepted many others. Desirable and useful things have been regarded as gifts of divine persons and so have been named after the givers; as, for instance, wine and grain are called Liber and Ceres: so also virtues and relations of great importance, which were referred to especial divine influence, like Truth, Virtue, Honor, Unity, Freedom &c. (59–61). Famous men have been deified for their achievements (62). Finally the forces of nature have been personified and natural phenomena clothed in allegories; and this has given rise to a great number of gods and fables relating to them (62–70). It would be in the highest degree foolish to interpret these literally and to believe them; a sensible person will rather take them in their true sense, and regard those gods as nothing more than manifestations of the divine being working in different parts of the universe, to whom we should pay reverence with a true and honest heart.

Next follows the third part or the proof that the world is governed by the divine providence. It may be said that this also has been in some degree anticipated in the preceding portion; since the creative and sustaining power, omnipresent in the world, was there represented as the universal soul and providence, endowed with reason, ordering and governing everything with a definite purpose (57, 58); but the Stoics thought it necessary to prove this point independently of the others, though it obliged them to repeat much that had been said before. The proof is of three sorts. First, if we once concede the existence of gods, we must also conceive of them as rulers of the world; because, if they were not so, they would not deserve to be called gods at all. For it follows from the true general idea of gods that they are subject to no other being external to themselves; that they are wise, mutually bound to a common, intelligent, systematic activity, and that they must direct this activity to the highest and most important object, which is the government of the world (75–80). — The second argument is drawn from the order of the universe, and the correspondence of its parts. All single objects and parts of the world are subject to *Nature*, by which we are to understand no blind and unconscious force, but one

possessing intelligence and working with the highest skill and wisdom. The sum total of the universe too is subject to such a force (81–86). But no one who contemplates the world with its arrangement can doubt that the nature which governs it all is really in the highest degree intelligent and wise; he will be compelled rather to recognize a being which manages and governs it wisely (87–90).— The third argument is closely connected with the second, being based upon the contemplation of the heavens and the heavenly bodies in their wonderful order, harmony and beauty (91–129); of the different plants and beasts constituted and endowed with so wondrous adaptation (121); of the manifold productions of the earth conducing to the well-being of various creatures; and of many other things of the same sort which are given at great length (122–132). Cicero omits, however, at the end to draw the definite conclusion that there must be a divine providence which governs the world. He assumes rather as a matter of course that all this is the work of the gods; and draws simply the conclusion that the gods could only have created the world for the sake of thinking, reasoning beings, that is, for themselves and for mankind (122); this is directly followed by the proof of the especial care of the gods for men. The argument consists of a minute description of the wise arrangement and adaptation of the human body (134–149), and the facilities it gives men for procuring their pleasures and satisfying their wants (150–152); especial weight is laid upon reason, which distinguishes man from all other earthly beings, and which enables him to contemplate the heavens and attain to knowledge of the gods; from this come piety and all the other virtues which make man so like the gods that they excel him in hardly anything but immortality. All this cannot possibly be the result of chance.

Balbus here nominally begins the fourth part or the proof that men enjoy the particular care of the gods, although what has just preceded might with equal propriety have been arranged under this head. It was, however, so closely connected with the third part that it was drawn into that portion of the discussion. Balbus shows here, in addition, that the whole arrangement of the world, from the heavenly bodies and the succession of the seasons and weather resulting from their motion to the earth with its manifold products, is evidently intended for the advantage of man (154–162). Finally the revelation made to men by the various species of divina-

tion, which was used in the beginning of the argument to prove the existence of the gods, is again introduced here to show the divine care for men (162, 163)[1]; this care is shown to be bestowed not only upon the human race in general but upon separate portions and upon individuals who, when distinguished for excellence above their fellows, have owed it chiefly to the help of the favoring gods (164–167). In conclusion Balbus exhorts Cotta to devote his dialectic skill and eloquence rather to the defence of these views than to the destruction of the belief in the gods (168).

[1] As this point is only briefly touched upon here, Cicero has treated it at length in the book De Divinatione, where his brother Quintus gives the Stoic view and he himself the Academic.

1 QUAE cum Cotta dixisset, tum Velleius: Ne ego, inquit,
1 incautus, qui cum Academico et eodem rhetore congredi
conatus sim! Nam neque indisertum Academicum pertimuissem nec sine ista philosophia rhetorem quamvis eloquentem; neque enim flumine conturbor inanium verborum nec subtilitate sententiarum, si orationis est siccitas. Tu autem, Cotta, utraque re valuisti; corona tibi et iudices defuerunt. Sed ad ista alias,
2 nunc Lucilium, si ipsi commodum est, audiamus. Tum Balbus: Eundem equidem malim audire Cottam, dum, qua eloquentia falsos deos sustulit, eadem veros inducat. Est enim et philosophi et pontificis et Cottae de dis inmortalibus habere non errantem et vagam, ut Academici, sed, ut nostri, stabilem certamque sententiam. Nam contra Epicurum satis superque dictum est. Sed aveo audire, tu ipse, Cotta, quid sentias. An, inquit, oblitus es, quid initio dixerim, facilius me, talibus praesertim de rebus, quid non sentirem, quam quid sentirem,
3 posse dicere? Quodsi haberem aliquid, quod liqueret, tamen te vicissim audire vellem, cum ipse tam multa dixissem. Tum

Balbus: Geram tibi morem et agam quam brevissume potero; etenim convictis Epicuri erroribus longa de mea disputatione detracta oratio est. Omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis inmortalibus quaestionem in partis quattuor. Primum docent esse deos, deinde quales sint, tum mundum ab iis administrari, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. Nos autem hoc sermone, quae priora duo sunt, sumamus; tertium et quartum, quia maiora sunt, puto esse in aliud tempus differenda. Minime vero, inquit Cotta; nam et otiosi sumus et iis de rebus agimus, quae sunt etiam negotiis anteponendae.

Tum Lucilius: Ne egere quidem videtur, inquit, oratione 2 4
prima pars. Quid enim potest esse tam apertum tamque perspicuum, cum caelum suspeximus caelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis, quo haec regantur? Quod ni ita esset, qui potuisset adsensu omnium dicere Ennius:

> Áspice hoc sublíme candens, quem ínvocant omnés Iovem,

illum vero et Iovem et dominatorem rerum et omnia nutu regentem et, ut idem Ennius,

> patrem divumque hominumque

et praesentem ac praepotentem deum? Quod qui dubitet, haud sane intellego, cur non idem, sol sit an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Qui enim est hoc illo evidentius? Quod nisi cognitum 5
conprehensumque animis haberemus, non tam stabilis opinio permaneret nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis nec una cum saeclis aetatibusque hominum inveterari potuisset. Etenim videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse. Quis enim Hippocentaurum fuisse aut Chimaeram putat? quaeve anus tam excors inveniri potest, quae illa, quae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat? Opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat. Itaque et in nostro populo et in ceteris deorum cultus

religionumque sanctitates exsistunt in dies maiores atque
6 meliores, idque evenit non temere nec casu, sed quod et praesentes saepe di vim suam declarant, ut et apud Regillum bello Latinorum, cum A. Postumius dictator cum Octavio Mamilio Tusculano proelio dimicaret, in nostra acie Castor et Pollux ex equis pugnare visi sunt, et recentiore memoria iidem Tyndaridae Persem victum nuntiaverunt. P. enim Vatinius, avus huius adulescentis, cum e praefectura Reatina Romam venienti noctu duo iuvenes cum equis albis dixissent regem Persem illo die captum, senatui nuntiavit; et primo quasi temere de re publica locutus in carcerem coniectus est, post a Paulo litteris allatis cum idem dies constitisset, et agro a senatu et vacatione donatus est. Atque etiam cum ad fluvium Sagram Crotoniatas Locri maximo proelio devicissent, eo ipso die auditam esse eam pugnam ludis Olympiae memoriae proditum est. Saepe Faunorum voces exauditae, saepe visae formae deorum quemvis non aut hebetem aut impium deos praesentes esse
8 7 confiteri coëgerunt. Praedictiones vero et praesensiones rerum futurarum quid aliud declarant nisi hominibus ea ostendi, monstrari, portendi, praedici? ex quo illa ostenta, monstra, portenta, prodigia dicuntur. Quodsi ea ficta credimus licentia fabularum, Mopsum, Tiresiam, Amphiaraum, Calchantem, Helenum, quos tamen augures ne ipsae quidem fabulae adscivissent, si res omnino repudiaret, ne domesticis quidem exemplis docti numen deorum conprobabimus? Nihil nos P. Claudii bello Punico primo temeritas movebit? qui etiam per iocum deos inridens, cum cavea liberati pulli non pascerentur, mergi eos in aquam iussit, ut biberent, quoniam esse nollent. Qui risus classe devicta multas ipsi lacrimas, magnam populo Romano cladem attulit. Quid? collega eius Iunius eodem bello nonne tempestate classem amisit, cum auspiciis non paruisset? Itaque Claudius a populo condemnatus est, Iunius
8 necem sibi ipse conscivit. C. Flaminium Coelius religione neglecta cecidisse apud Trasumenum scribit cum magno rei publicae vulnere. Quorum exitio intellegi potest eorum

imperiis rem publicam amplificatam, qui religionibus paruissent.
Et si conferre volumus nostra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut
pares aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione, id est cultu
deorum, multo superiores. An Atti Navii lituus ille, quo ad 9
investigandum suem regiones vineae terminavit, contemnendus
est? Crederem, nisi eius augurio rex Hostilius maxima bella
gessisset. Sed neglegentia nobilitatis augurii disciplina omissa
veritas auspiciorum spreta est, species tantum retenta. Itaque
maximae rei publicae partes, in his bella, quibus rei publicae
salus continetur, nullis auspiciis administrantur, nulla peremnia
servantur, nulla ex acuminibus, nulla, *cum* viri vocantur, ex quo
in procinctu testamenta perierunt. Tum enim bella gerere
nostri duces incipiunt, cum auspicia posuerunt. At vero apud 10
maiores tanta religionis vis fuit, ut quidam imperatores etiam se
ipsos dis inmortalibus capite velato verbis certis pro re publica
devoverent. Multa ex Sibyllinis vaticinationibus, multa ex
haruspicum responsis commemorare possum, quibus ea con-
firmentur, quae dubia nemini debent esse. Atqui et nostrorum 4
augurum et Etruscorum haruspicum disciplinam P. Scipione C.
Figulo consulibus res ipsa probavit; quos cum Ti. Gracchus
consul iterum crearet, primus rogator, ut eos rettulit, ibidem est
repente mortuus. Gracchus cum comitia nihilo minus peregis-
set remque illam in religionem populo venisse sentiret, ad
senatum rettulit. Senatus, quos ad soleret, referendum censuit.
Haruspices introducti responderunt non fuisse iustum comi-
tiorum rogatorem. Tum Gracchus, ut e patre audiebam, 11
incensus ira: 'Itane vero? ego non iustus, qui et
consul rogavi et auspicato? an vos Tusci ac bar-
bari auspiciorum populi Romani ius tenetis et
interpretes esse comitiorum potestis?' Itaque tum
illos exire iussit. Post autem e provincia litteras ad collegium
misit se, cum legeret libros, recordatum esse vitio sibi taber-
naculum captum fuisse [hortos Scipionis], quod, cum pomerium
postea intrasset habendi senatus causa, in redeundo, cum idem
pomerium transiret, auspicari esset oblitus; itaque vitio creatos

consules esse. Augures rem ad senatum; senatus, ut abdicarent consules; abdicaverunt. Quae quaerimus exempla maiora? Vir sapientissimus atque haud sciam an omnium praestantissimus peccatum suum, quod celari posset, confiteri maluit quam haerere in re publica religionem, consules summum imperium statim deponere quam id tenere punctum temporis contra
12 religionem. Magna augurum auctoritas; quid? haruspicum ars nonne divina? Haec *et* innumerabilia ex eodem genere qui videat, nonne cogatur confiteri deos esse? Quorum enim interpretes sunt, eos ipsos esse certe necesse est; deorum autem interpretes sunt; deos igitur esse fateamur. At fortasse non omnia eveniunt, quae praedicta sunt. Ne aegri quidem quia non omnes convalescunt, idcirco ars nulla medicina est. Signa ostenduntur a dis rerum futurarum. In his si qui erraverunt, non deorum natura, sed hominum coniectura peccavit. Itaque inter omnis omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse
5 13 deos. Quales sint, varium est, esse nemo negat. Cleanthes quidem noster quattuor de causis dixit in animis hominum informatas deorum esse notiones. Primam posuit eam, de qua modo dixi, quae orta esset ex praesensione rerum futurarum; alteram, quam ceperimus ex magnitudine commodorum, quae percipiuntur caeli temperatione, fecunditate terrarum aliarumque
14 commoditatum conplurium copia; tertiam, quae terreret animos fulminibus, tempestatibus, nimbis, nivibus, grandinibus, vastitate, pestilentia, terrae motibus et saepe fremitibus lapideisque imbribus et guttis imbrium quasi cruentis, tum labibus aut repentinis terrarum hiatibus, tum praeter naturam hominum pecudumque portentis, tum facibus visis caelestibus, tum stellis iis, quas Graeci cometas, nostri cincinnatas vocant, quae nuper bello Octaviano magnarum fuerunt calamitatum praenuntiae, tum sole geminato, quod, ut e patre audivi, Tuditano et Aquilio consulibus evenerat, quo quidem anno P. Africanus sol alter extinctus est, quibus exterriti homines vim quandam esse
15 caelestem et divinam suspicati sunt; quartam causam esse,

eamque vel maximam, aequabilitatem motus conversionum*que* caeli, solis, lunae siderumque omnium distinctionem, varietatem, pulchritudinem, ordinem, quarum rerum aspectus ipse satis indicaret non esse ea fortuita. Ut, si quis in domum aliquam aut in gymnasium aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem, modum, disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri iudicare, sed esse aliquem intellegat, qui praesit et cui pareatur, multo magis in tantis motionibus tantisque vicissitudinibus, tam multarum rerum atque tantarum ordinibus, in quibus nihil umquam inmensa et infinita vetustas mentita sit, statuat necesse est ab aliqua mente tantos naturae motus gubernari. Chrysippus quidem, quamquam est acerrimo in- **6** 16
genio, tamen ea dicit, ut ab ipsa natura didicisse, non ut ipse repperisse videatur. 'Si enim', inquit, 'est aliquid in rerum natura, quod hominis mens, quod ratio, quod vis, quod potestas humana efficere non possit, est certe id, quod illud efficit, homine melius; atqui res caelestes omnesque eae, quarum est ordo sempiternus, ab homine confici non possunt; est igitur id, *a* quo illa conficiuntur, homine melius. Id autem quid potius dixeris quam deum? Etenim si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in eo enim solo est ratio, qua nihil potest esse praestantius. Esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet, desipientis adrogantiae est; ergo est aliquid melius; est igitur profecto deus.' An vero, si domum magnam pulchramque videris, 17
non possis adduci, ut, etiamsi dominum non videas, muribus illam et mustelis aedificatam putes? tantum ergo ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum caelestium, tantam vim et magnitudinem maris atque terrarum si tuum ac non deorum inmortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videare? An ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse meliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassis-

simus circumfundat aër? ut ob eam ipsam causam, quod etiam quibusdam regionibus atque urbibus contingere videmus, hebetiora ut sint hominum ingenia propter caeli pleniorem naturam, hoc idem generi humano evenerit, quod in terra, hoc
18 est in crassissima regione mundi, conlocati sint. Et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam mentem, et eam quidem acriorem et divinam, existimare debemus. 'Unde enim hanc homo arripuit?' ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates. Quin et umorem et calorem, qui est fusus in corpore, et terrenam ipsam viscerum soliditatem, animum denique illum spirabilem, si quis quaerat, unde habeamus, apparet, quod aliud a terra sumpsimus, aliud ab umore, aliud ab igni, aliud ab aëre
7 eo, quem spiritu ducimus. Illud autem, quod vincit haec omnia, rationem dico et, si placet pluribus verbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam, ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus? An cetera mundus habebit omnia, hoc unum, quod plurimi est, non habebit? Atqui certe nihil omnium rerum melius est mundo, nihil praestabilius, nihil pulchrius, nec solum nihil est, sed ne cogitari quidem quicquam melius potest. Et si ratione et sapientia nihil est melius, necesse est haec
19 inesse in eo, quod optimum esse concedimus. Quid vero? tanta rerum consentiens, conspirans, continuata cognatio quem non coget ea, quae dicuntur a me, conprobare? Possetne uno tempore florere, dein vicissim horrere terra? aut tot rebus ipsis se inmutantibus solis accessus discessusque solstitiis brumisque cognosci? aut aestus maritimi fretorumque angustiae ortu aut obitu lunae commoveri? aut una totius caeli conversione cursus astrorum dispares conservari? Haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno
20 divino et continuato spiritu continerentur. Atque haec cum uberius disputantur et fusius, ut mihi est in animo facere, facilius effugiunt Academicorum calumniam; cum autem, ut Zeno solebat, brevius angustiusque concluduntur, tum apertiora sunt ad reprendendum. Nam ut profluens amnis aut vix aut nullo modo, conclusa autem aqua facile conrumpitur, sic

orationis flumine reprensoris convicia diluuntur, angustia autem conclusae orationis non facile se ipsa tutatur. Haec enim, quae dilatantur a nobis, Zeno sic premebat: 'Quod ratione 8 21 utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur.' Similiter effici potest sapientem esse mundum, similiter beatum, similiter aeternum; omnia enim haec meliora sunt quam ea, quae sunt iis carentia, nec mundo quicquam melius; ex quo efficietur esse mundum deum. Idemque hoc modo: 'Nullius sensu carentis 22 pars aliqua potest esse sentiens; mundi autem partes sentientes sunt; non igitur caret sensu mundus.' Pergit idem et urguet angustius: 'Nihil', inquit, 'quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantem conpotemque rationis; mundus autem generat animantis compotesque rationis; animans est igitur mundus composque rationis.' Idemque similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem conclusit hoc modo: 'Si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiae nascerentur, num dubitares, quin inesset in oliva tibicinii quaedam scientia? Quid, si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes? idem scilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque iudicetur, cum ex se procreet animantis atque sapientis?'

Sed quoniam coepi secus agere, atque initio dixeram 9 23 (negaram enim hanc primam partem egere oratione, quod esset omnibus perspicuum deos esse), tamen id ipsum rationibus physicis confirmare volo. Sic enim res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescant, contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent nec crescere. Nam omne, quod est calidum et igneum, cietur et agitur motu suo; quod autem alitur et crescit, motu quodam utitur certo et aequabili; qui

quam diu remanet in nobis, tam diu sensus et vita remanet; refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et extinguimur.

24 Quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam argumentis docet, quanta vis insit caloris in omni corpore: negat enim esse ullum cibum tam gravem, quin is nocte et die concoquatur; cuius etiam in reliquiis inest calor iis, quas natura respuerit. Iam vero venae et arteriae micare non desinunt quasi quodam igneo motu, animadversumque saepe est, cum cor animantis alicuius evolsum ita mobiliter palpitaret, ut imitaretur igneam celeritatem. Omne igitur, quod vivit, sive animal sive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem. Ex quo intellegi debet eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem

25 mundum pertinentem. Atque id facilius cernemus toto genere hoc igneo, quod tranat omnia, subtilius explicato. Omnes igitur partes mundi (tangam autem maximas) calore fultae sustinentur. Quod primum in terrena natura perspici potest. Nam et lapidum conflictu atque tritu elici ignem videmus et recenti fossione terram fumare calentem, atque etiam ex puteis iugibus aquam calidam trahi, et id maxime fieri temporibus hibernis, quod magna vis terrae cavernis contineatur caloris eaque hieme sit densior ob eamque causam calorem insitum in

10 26 terris contineat artius. Longa est oratio multaeque rationes, quibus doceri possit omnia, quae terra concipiat semina, quaeque ipsa ex se generata stirpibus infixa contineat, ea temperatione caloris et oriri et augescere. Atque aquae etiam admixtum esse calorem primum ipse liquor aquae declarat et fusio, quae neque conglaciaret frigoribus neque nive pruinaque concresceret, nisi eadem se admixto calore liquefacta et dilapsa diffunderet. Itaque et aquilonibus reliquisque frigoribus adstrictus durescit umor, et idem vicissim mollitur tepefactus et tabescit calore. Atque etiam maria agitata ventis ita tepescunt, ut intellegi facile possit in tantis illis umoribus esse inclusum calorem. Nec enim ille externus et adventicius habendus est tepor, sed ex intimis maris partibus agitatione excitatus, quod nostris quoque corporibus contingit, cum motu atque exercita-

tione recalescunt. Ipse vero aër, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers caloris; ille vero et multo quidem 27 calore admixtus est; ipse enim oritur ex respiratione aquarum; earum enim quasi vapor quidam aër habendus est; is autem existit motu eius caloris, qui aquis continetur. Quam similitudinem cernere possumus in iis aquis, quae ecfervescunt subditis ignibus. Iam vero reliqua quarta pars mundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est et ceteris naturis omnibus salutarem inpertit et vitalem calorem. Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes 28 mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari, eoque magis, quod intellegi debet calidum illud atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis et causa gignendi, a quo et animantia omnia et ea, quorum stirpes terra continentur, et nasci sit necesse et augescere.

Natura est igitur, quae contineat mundum omnem eumque 11 29 tueatur, et ea quidem non sine sensu atque ratione; omnem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit neque simplex, sed cum alio iuncta atque conexa, habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis, unde oriantur rerum adpetitus. In arborum autem et earum rerum, quae gignuntur e terra, radicibus inesse principatus putatur. Principatum autem id dico, quod Graeci ἡγεμονικόν vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest nec debet esse praestantius. Ita necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturae principatus, esse omnium optimum omniumque rerum potestate dominatuque dignissimum. Videmus 30 autem in partibus mundi (nihil est enim in omni mundo, quod non pars universi sit) inesse sensum atque rationem. In ea parte igitur, in qua mundi inest principatus, haec inesse necesse est, et acriora quidem atque maiora. Quocirca sapientem esse mundum necesse est, naturamque eam, quae res omnes conplexa teneat, perfectione rationis excellere, eoque deum esse mundum, omnemque vim mundi natura divina contineri. Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior, perlucidior mo-

biliorque *est* multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commo-
vendos quam hic noster calor, quo haec, quae nota nobis sunt,
31 retinentur et vigent. Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines
bestiaeque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac
sentiant, mundum esse sine sensu, qui integro et libero et puro
eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur, prae-
sertim cum is ardor, qui est mundi, non agitatus ab alio neque
externo pulsu, sed per se ipse ac sua sponte moveatur. Nam
quid potest esse mundo valentius, quod pellat atque moveat
12 32 calorem eum, quo ille teneatur? Audiamus enim Platonem
quasi quendam deum philosophorum; cui duo placet esse
motus, unum suum, alterum externum, esse autem divinius,
quod ipsum ex se sua sponte moveatur, quam quod pulsu
agitetur alieno. Hunc autem motum in solis animis esse ponit,
ab hisque principium motus esse ductum putat. Quapropter,
quoniam ex mundi ardore motus omnis oritur, is autem ardor
non alieno inpulsu, sed sua sponte movetur, animus sit necesse
est; ex quo efficitur animantem esse mundum. Atque ex hoc
quoque intellegi poterit in eo inesse intellegentiam, quod certe
est mundus melior quam ulla natura. Ut enim nulla pars est
corporis nostri, quae non minoris sit, quam nosmet ipsi sumus,
sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem
aliquam universi. Quod si ita est, sapiens sit mundus necesse
est. Nam ni ita esset, hominem, qui est mundi pars, quoniam
rationis est particeps, pluris esse quam mundum omnem opor-
33 teret. Atque etiam, si a primis inchoatisque naturis ad ultimas
perfectasque volumus procedere, ad deorum naturam per-
veniamus necesse est. Primum enim animadvertimus a natura
sustineri ea, quae gignantur e terra, quibus natura nihil tribuit
34 amplius, quam ut ea alendo atque augendo tueretur. Bestiis
autem sensum et motum dedit et cum quodam adpetitu acces-
sum ad res salutares, a pestiferis recessum; hoc homini am-
plius, quod addidit rationem, qua regerentur animi adpetitus,
13 qui tum remitterentur, tum continerentur. Quartus autem
gradus est et altissimus eorum, qui natura boni sapientesque

gignuntur, quibus a principio innascitur ratio recta constansque, quae supra hominem putanda est deoque tribuenda, id est mundo, in quo necesse est perfectam illam atque absolutam inesse rationem. Neque enim dici potest in ulla rerum insti- 35
tutione non esse aliquid extremum atque perfectum. Ut enim in vite, ut in pecude, nisi quae vis obstitit, videmus naturam suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenire, atque ut pictura et fabrica ceteraeque artes habent quendam absoluti operis effectum, sic in omni natura, ac multo etiam magis, necesse est absolvi aliquid ac perfici. Etenim ceteris naturis multa externa, quo minus perficiantur, possunt obsistere, universam autem naturam nulla res potest impedire, propterea quod omnis naturas ipsa cohibet et continet. Quocirca necesse est esse quartum illum et altissimum gradum, quo nulla vis possit accedere. Is autem est gradus, in quo rerum omnium natura poni- 36
tur; quae quoniam talis est, ut et praesit omnibus et eam nulla res possit inpedire, necesse est intellegentem esse mundum et quidem etiam sapientem. Quid autem est inscitius quam eam naturam, quae omnis res sit conplexa, non optumam dici, aut, cum sit optuma, non primum animantem esse, deinde rationis et consilii compotem, postremo sapientem? Qui enim potest aliter esse optuma? Neque enim, si stirpium similis sit aut etiam bestiarum, optuma putanda sit potius quam deterruma, nec vero, si rationis particeps sit nec sit tamen a principio sapiens, non sit deterior mundi potius quam humana condicio; homo enim sapiens fieri potest, mundus autem si in aeterno praeteriti temporis spatio fuit insipiens, numquam profecto sapientiam consequetur; ita erit homine deterior. Quod quoniam absurdum est, et sapiens a principio mundus et deus habendus est. Neque enim est quicquam aliud praeter mun- 37
dum, cui nihil absit, quodque undique aptum atque perfectum expletumque sit omnibus suis numeris et partibus. Scite enim **14**
Chrysippus, ut clipei causa involucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges atque fructus, quos terra gignit, animantium causa,

animantes autem hominum, ut equum vehendi causa, arandi bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem. Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo
38 perfectus, sed est quaedam particula perfecti. Sed mundus quoniam omnia conplexus est neque est quicquam, quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est. Qui igitur potest ei deesse id, quod est optimum? nihil autem est mente et ratione melius; ergo haec mundo deesse non possunt. Bene igitur idem Chrysippus, qui similitudines adiungens omnia in perfectis et maturis docet esse meliora, ut in equo quam in eculeo, in cane quam in catulo, in viro quam in puero, item, quod in omni mundo optimum sit, id in perfecto aliquo atque absoluto esse
39 debere; est autem nihil mundo perfectius, nihil virtute melius; igitur mundi est propria virtus. Nec vero hominis natura perfecta est, et efficitur tamen in homine virtus; quanto igitur in mundo facilius! est ergo in eo virtus; sapiens est igitur et propterea deus.

15 Atque hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem divinitas, quae ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris parte gignuntur, neque ulla praeterea sunt admixta natura totaque sunt calida atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime et
40 animantia esse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur. Atque ea quidem tota esse ignea duorum sensuum testimonio confirmari Cleanthes putat, tactus et oculorum. Nam solis et candor inlustrior est quam ullius ignis, quippe qui *in* inmenso mundo tam longe lateque conluceat, et is eius tactus est, non ut tepefaciat solum, sed etiam saepe comburat, quorum neutrum faceret, nisi esset igneus. 'Ergo', inquit, 'cum sol igneus sit Oceanique alatur umoribus, quia nullus ignis sine pastu aliquo posset permanere, necesse est aut ei similis sit igni, quem adhibemus ad usum atque victum, aut ei, qui corporibus animantium con-
41 tinetur. Atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor omnium, idemque, quocumque invasit, cuncta disturbat ac dissipat; contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia conservat, alit, auget, sustinet sensuque adficit.'

Negat ergo esse dubium, horum ignium sol utri similis sit, cum
is quoque efficiat, ut omnia floreant et in suo quaeque genere
pubescant. Quare cum solis ignis similis eorum ignium sit, qui
sunt in corporibus animantium, solem quoque animantem esse
oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae oriantur in ardore caelesti,
qui aether vel caelum nominatur. Cum igitur aliorum animan- 42
tium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aëre aliorum, absur-
dum esse Aristoteli videtur in ea parte, quae sit ad gignenda
animantia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare. Sidera autem
aetherium locum obtinent; qui quoniam tenuissimus est et
semper agitatur et viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gigna-
tur, id et sensu acerrimo et mobilitate celerrima esse. Quare
cum in aethere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum
inesse et intellegentiam, ex quo efficitur in deorum numero
astra esse ducenda. Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad **16**
intellegendum aptiora eorum, qui terras incolant eas, in quibus
aër sit purus ac tenuis, quam illorum, qui utantur crasso caelo
atque concreto. Quin etiam cibo quo utare, interesse aliquid 43
ad mentis aciem putant. Probabile est igitur praestantem intel-
legentiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem mundi
incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo ex-
tenuatis alantur. Sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam
maxume declarat ordo eorum atque constantia (nihil est enim,
quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio), in quo
nihil est temerarium, nihil varium, nihil fortuitum. Ordo autem
siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque naturam signifi-
cat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae amica
varietati constantiam respuit. Sequitur ergo, ut ipsa sua sponte,
suo sensu ac divinitate moveantur. Nec vero Aristoteles non 44
laudandus est in eo, quod omnia, quae moventur, aut natura
moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate; moveri autem solem et
lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem natura moverentur, haec
aut pondere deorsum aut levitate [in] sublime ferri, quorum
neutrum astris contingeret, propterea quod eorum motus in
orbem circumque ferretur. Nec vero dici potest vi quadam

maiore fieri, ut contra naturam astra moveantur; quae enim potest maior esse? Restat igitur, ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius. Quae qui videat, non indocte solum, verum etiam impie faciat, si deos esse neget. Nec sane multum interest, utrum id neget an eos omni procuratione atque actione privet; mihi enim, qui nihil agit, esse omnino non videtur. Esse igitur deos ita perspicuum est, ut, id qui neget, vix eum sanae mentis existimem.

17 45 Restat, ut, qualis eorum natura sit, consideremus; in quo nihil est difficilius quam a consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere. Ea difficultas induxit et vulgo inperitos et similes philosophos inperitorum, ut nisi figuris hominum constitutis nihil possent de dis inmortalibus cogitare; cuius opinionis levitas confutata a Cotta non desiderat orationem meam. Sed cum talem esse deum certa notione animi praesentiamus, primum ut sit animans, deinde ut in omni natura nihil eo sit praestantius, ad hanc praesensionem notionemque nostram nihil video quod potius accommodem, quam ut primum hunc ipsum mundum, quo nihil excellentius fieri potest, animantem esse et deum
46 iudicem. Hic quam volet Epicurus iocetur, homo non aptissimus ad iocandum minimeque resipiens patriam, et dicat se non posse intellegere, qualis sit volubilis et rotundus deus, tamen ex hoc, quod etiam ipse probat, numquam me movebit. Placet enim illi esse deos, quia necesse sit praestantem esse aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius. Mundo autem certe nihil est melius. Nec dubium, quin, quod animans sit habeatque sensum et rationem et mentem, id sit melius quam id, quod
47 his careat. Ita efficitur animantem, sensus, mentis, rationis mundum esse compotem; qua ratione deum esse mundum concluditur. Sed haec paulo post facilius cognoscentur ex iis rebus ipsis, quas mundus efficit.

18 Interea, Vellei, noli, quaeso, prae te ferre vos plane expertes esse doctrinae. Conum tibi ais et cylindrum et pyramidem pulchriorem quam sphaeram videri. Novum etiam oculorum iudicium habetis. Sed sint ista pulchriora dumtaxat aspectu,

quod mihi tamen ipsum non videtur; quid enim pulchrius ea
figura, quae sola omnis alias figuras complexa continet, quae-
que nihil asperitatis habere, nihil offensionis potest, nihil incisum
angulis, nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens, nihil lacunosum? cumque
duae formae praestantes sint, ex solidis globus (sic enim σφαῖραν
interpretari placet), ex planis autem circulus aut orbis, qui κύκλος
Graece dicitur, his duabus formis contingit solis, ut omnes earum
partes sint inter se simillumae a medioque tantundem absit extre-
mum, quo nihil fieri potest aptius. Sed si haec non videtis, quia 48
numquam eruditum illum pulverem attigistis, ne hoc quidem phy-
sici intellegere potuistis, hanc aequabilitatem motus constantiam-
que ordinum in alia figura non potuisse servari? Itaque nihil
potest esse indoctius, quam quod a vobis adfirmari solet. Nec
enim hunc ipsum mundum pro certo rotundum esse dicitis;
nam posse fieri, ut sit alia figura, innumerabilesque mundos alios
aliarum esse formarum. Quae, si, bis bina quot essent, didi- 49
cisset Epicurus, certe non diceret; sed dum palato, quid sit
optimum, iudicat, 'caeli palatum', ut ait Ennius, non sus-
pexit. Nam cum duo sint genera siderum, quorum alterum **19**
spatiis inmutabilibus ab ortu ad occasum commeans nullum
umquam cursus sui vestigium inflectat, alterum autem continuas
conversiones duas isdem spatiis cursibusque conficiat, ex utra-
que re et mundi volubilitas, quae nisi in globosa forma esse non
posset, et stellarum rotundi ambitus cognoscuntur. Primusque
sol, qui astrorum tenet principatum, ita movetur, ut, cum terras
larga luce compleverit, easdem modo his, modo illis ex partibus
opacet; ipsa enim umbra terrae soli officiens noctem efficit;
nocturnorum autem spatiorum eadem est aequabilitas, quae
diurnorum; eiusdemque solis tum accessus modici, tum reces-
sus et frigoris et caloris modum temperant; circumitus enim
solis orbium v et lx et ccc quarta fere diei parte addita conver-
sionem conficiunt annuam, inflectens autem sol cursum tum ad
septentriones, tum ad meridiem aestates et hiemes efficit et
ea duo tempora, quorum alterum hiemi senescenti adiunctum
est, alterum aestati. Ita ex quattuor temporum mutationibus

omnium, quae terra marique gignuntur, initia causaeque ducuntur.
50 Iam solis annuos cursus spatiis menstruis luna consequitur, cuius tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem, digressus autem longissimus quisque plenissimum. Neque solum eius species ac forma mutatur tum crescendo, tum defectibus in initia recurrendo, sed etiam regio, quae tum est aquilonia, tum australis. *Inde* in lunae quoque cursu est et brumae quaedam et solstitii similitudo, multaque ab ea manant et fluunt, quibus et animantes alantur augescantque et pubescant maturitatemque
20 adsequantur, quae oriuntur e terra. Maxume vero sunt ad-
51 mirabiles motus earum quinque stellarum, quae falso vocantur errantes. Nihil enim errat, quod in omni aeternitate conservat progressus et regressus reliquosque motus constantis et ratos. Quod eo est admirabilius in his stellis, quas dicimus, quia tum occultantur, tum rursus aperiuntur, tum adeunt, tum recedunt, tum antecedunt, tum autem subsequuntur, tum celerius moventur, tum tardius, tum omnino ne moventur quidem, sed ad quoddam tempus insistunt. Quarum ex disparibus motionibus magnum annum mathematici nominaverunt, qui tum efficitur, cum solis et lunae et quinque errantium ad eandem inter se comparationem confectis omnium spatiis est facta conversio.
52 Quae quam longa sit, magna quaestio est, esse vero certam et definitam necesse est. Nam ea, quae Saturni stella dicitur Φαίνωνque a Graecis nominatur, quae a terra abest plurimum, XXX fere annis cursum suum conficit, in quo cursu multa mirabiliter efficiens tum antecedendo, tum retardando, tum vespertinis temporibus delitiscendo, tum matutinis rursum se aperiendo, nihil inmutat sempiternis saeclorum aetatibus, quin eadem isdem temporibus efficiat. Infra autem hanc propius a terra Iovis stella fertur, quae Φαέθων dicitur, eaque eundem XII signorum orbem annis XII conficit easdemque, quas Saturni stella,
53 efficit in cursu varietates. Huic autem proximum inferiorem orbem tenet Πυρόεις, quae stella Martis appellatur, eaque IIII et XX mensibus VI, ut opinor, diebus minus eundem lustrat orbem, quem duae superiores. Infra hanc autem stella Mercurii est;

ea Στίλβων appellatur a Graecis; quae anno fere vertente signi-
ferum lustrat orbem neque a sole longius umquam unius signi
intervallo discedit tum antevertens, tum subsequens. Infima
est quinque errantium terraeque proxima stella Veneris, quae
Φωσφόρος Graece, Lucifer Latine dicitur, cum antegreditur
solem, cum subsequitur autem, Ἕσπερος; ea cursum anno con-
ficit et latitudinem lustrans signiferi orbis et longitudinem, quod
idem faciunt stellae superiores, neque umquam ab sole duorum
signorum intervallo longius discedit tum antecedens, tum sub-
sequens. Hanc igitur in stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam 21 54
variis cursibus in omni aeternitate convenientiam temporum non
possum intellegere sine mente, ratione, consilio. Quae cum in
sideribus inesse videamus, non possumus ea ipsa non in deorum
numero reponere. Nec vero eae stellae, quae inerrantes vocan-
tur, non significant eandem mentem atque prudentiam, quarum
est cotidiana conveniens constansque conversio, nec habent
aetherios cursus neque caelo inhaerentes, ut plerique dicunt
physicae rationis ignari. Non est enim aetheris ea natura, ut vi
sua stellas conplexa contorqueat; nam tenuis ac perlucens et
aequabili calore suffusus aether non satis aptus ad stellas conti-
nendas videtur. Habent igitur suam sphaeram stellae iner- 55
rantes ab aetheria coniunctione secretam et liberam. Earum
autem perennes cursus atque perpetui cum admirabili incredi-
bilique constantia declarant in his vim et mentem esse divinam,
ut, haec ipsa qui non sentiat deorum vim habere, is nihil om-
nino sensurus esse videatur. Nulla igitur in caelo nec fortuna 56
nec temeritas nec erratio nec vanitas inest contraque omnis
ordo, veritas, ratio, constantia; quaeque his vacant ementita et
falsa plenaque erroris, ea circum terras infra lunam, quae
omnium ultima est, in terrisque versantur. Caelestium ergo
admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua con-
servatio et salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat,
is ipse mentis expers habendus est. Haud ergo, ut opinor, 57
erravero, si a principe investigandae veritatis huius disputationis
principium duxero.

22 Zeno igitur naturam ita definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum, ad gignendum progredientem via. Censet enim artis maxume proprium esse creare et gignere; quodque in operibus nostrarum artium manus efficiat, id multo artificiosius naturam efficere, id est, ut dixi, ignem artificiosum, magistrum artium reliquarum. Atque hac quidem ratione omnis natura artificiosa est, quod habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur.
58 Ipsius vero mundi, qui omnia conplexu suo coërcet et continet, natura non artificiosa solum, sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum oportunitatumque omnium. Atque ut ceterae naturae suis seminibus quaeque gignuntur, augescunt, continentur, sic natura mundi omnis motus habet voluntarios conatusque et adpetitiones, quas ὁρμάς Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet, ut nosmet ipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus. Talis igitur mens mundi cum sit ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim πρόνοια dicitur), haec potissimum providet et in his maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxume autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit atque omnis ornatus.

23 59 Dictum est de universo mundo, dictum etiam est de sideribus, ut iam prope modum appareat multitudo nec cessantium deorum nec ea, quae agant, molientium cum labore operoso ac molesto. Non enim venis et nervis et ossibus continentur nec iis escis aut potionibus vescuntur, ut aut nimis acres aut nimis concretos umores conligant, nec iis corporibus sunt, ut casus aut ictus extimescant aut morbos metuant ex defetigatione membrorum; quae verens Epicurus monogrammos deos et nihil
60 agentes commentus est. Illi autem pulcherrima forma praediti purissimaque in regione caeli collocati ita feruntur moderanturque cursus, ut ad omnia conservanda et tuenda consensisse videantur.

Multae autem aliae naturae deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum non sine causa et a Graeciae sapientissimis et a maiori-

bus nostris constitutae nominataeque sunt. Quicquid enim magnam utilitatem generi adferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur. Itaque tum illud, quod erat a deo natum, nomine ipsius dei nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Cererem appellamus, vinum autem Liberum, ex quo illud Terentii:

Sine Cerere et Libero frigét Venus,

tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest maior aliqua, sic appellatur, 61 ut ea ipsa nominetur deus, ut Fides, ut Mens, quas in Capitolio dedicatas videmus proxime a M. Aemilio Scauro; ante autem ab *A.* Atilio Calatino erat Fides consecrata. Vides Virtutis templum, vides Honoris a M. Marcello renovatum, quod multis ante annis erat bello Ligustico a Q. Maximo dedicatum. Quid Opis? quid Salutis? quid Concordiae, Libertatis, Victoriae? quarum omnium rerum quia vis erat tanta, ut sine deo regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit. Quo ex genere Cupidinis et Voluptatis et Lubentinae Veneris vocabula consecrata sunt, vitiosarum rerum neque naturalium; quamquam Velleius aliter existimat; sed tamen ea ipsa vitia naturam vehementius saepe pulsant. Utilitatum igitur magnitudine constituti sunt ei 62 di, qui utilitates quasque gignebant. Atque his quidem nominibus, quae paulo ante dicta sunt, quae vis sit in quoque declaratur deo.

Suscepit autem vita hominum consuetudoque communis, ut **24** beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate tollerent. Hinc Hercules, hinc Castor et Pollux, hinc Aesculapius, hinc Liber etiam (hunc dico Liberum Semela natum, non eum, quem nostri maiores auguste sancteque [Liberum] cum Cerere et Libera consecraverunt, quod quale sit, ex mysteriis intellegi potest. Sed quod ex nobis natos 'liberos' appellamus, idcirco Cerere nati nominati sunt Liber et Libera, quod in Libera servant, in Libero non item), hinc etiam Romulus, quem quidem eundem esse Quirinum putant; quorum cum remanerent animi atque aeternitate fruerentur, rite di sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et aeterni.

63 Alia quoque ex ratione, et quidem physica, magna fluxit multitudo deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poëtis suppeditaverunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt. Atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo pluribus verbis explicatus est. Nam vetus haec opinio Graeciam opplevit exsectum Caelum a filio Saturno, 64 vinctum autem Saturnum ipsum a filio Iove. Physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas; caelestem enim altissimam aetheriamque naturam, id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae con-25 iunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum. Saturnum autem eum esse voluerunt, qui cursum et conversionem spatiorum ac temporum contineret, qui deus Graece id ipsum nomen habet; *Κρόνος* enim dicitur, qui est idem *χρόνος*, id est spatium temporis. Saturnus autem est appellatus, quod saturaretur annis; ex se enim natos comesse fingitur solitus, quia consumit aetas temporum spatia annisque praeteritis insaturabiliter expletur, vinctus autem a Iove, ne inmoderatos cursus haberet, atque ut eum siderum vinclis alligaret. Sed ipse Iuppiter, id est 'iuvans pater', quem conversis casibus appellamus a iuvando Iovem, a poëtis 'pater divomque hominumque' dicitur, a maioribus autem nostris 'optumus maxumus', et quidem ante 'optumus', id est beneficentissimus, quam 'maxumus', quia maius est certeque gratius prodesse omnibus quam opes magnas habere — hunc
65 igitur Ennius, ut supra dixi, nuncupat ita dicens:

Áspice hoc sublíme candens, quem ínvocant
omnés Iovem,

planius quam alio loco idem:

Cuí, quod in me est, éxsecrabor hóc, quod
lucet, quícquid est;

hunc etiam augures nostri, cum dicunt 'Iove fulgente, tonante'; dicunt enim 'caelo fulgente, tonante'. Euripides autem, ut multa praeclare, sic hoc breviter:

Vidés sublime fúsum, inmoderatum aéthera,
Qui térram tenero círcumiectu ampléctitur:
Hunc súmmum habeto dívum, hunc perhibetó Iovem.

Aër autem, ut Stoici disputant, interiectus inter mare et caelum 26 66 Iunonis nomine consecratur, quae est soror et coniunx Iovis, quod ei similitudo est aetheris et cum eo summa coniunctio. Effeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius. Sed Iunonem a iuvando credo nominatam. Aqua restabat et terra, ut essent ex fabulis tria regna divisa. Datum est igitur Neptuno, alteri Iovis, ut volunt, fratri, maritimum omne regnum, nomenque productum, ut Portunus a portu, sic Neptunus a nando paulum primis litteris immutatis. Terrena autem vis omnis atque natura Diti patri dedicata est, qui Dives, ut apud Graecos Πλούτων, quia et recidunt omnia in terras et oriuntur e terris. Cui *nuptam dicunt* Proserpinam, quod Graecorum nomen est; ea enim est, quae Περσεφόνη Graece nominatur, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a matre fingunt. Mater autem est a gerendis frugibus Ceres 67 tamquam 'Geres', casuque prima littera itidem immutata, ut a Graecis; nam ab illis quoque Δημήτηρ quasi Γημήτηρ nominata est. Iam qui magna verteret, Mavors, Minerva autem, quae vel minueret vel minaretur. Cumque in omnibus rebus vim habe- 27 rent maxumam prima et extrema, principem in sacrificando Ianum esse voluerunt, quod ab eundo nomen est ductum, ex quo transitiones perviae 'iani' foresque in liminibus profanarum aedium 'ianuae' nominantur. Nam Vestae nomen a Graecis; ea est enim, quae ab illis Ἑστία dicitur. Vis autem eius ad aras et focos pertinet. Itaque in ea dea, quod est rerum custos intumarum, omnis et precatio et sacrificatio extrema est. Nec 68 longe absunt ab hac vi di Penates sive a penu ducto nomine (est enim omne, quo vescuntur homines, penus) sive ab eo, quod penitus insident; ex quo etiam 'penetrales' a poëtis vocantur. Iam Apollinis nomen est Graecum, quem Solem esse

volunt. Dianam autem et Lunam eandem esse putant, cum Sol dictus sit, vel quia solus ex omnibus sideribus est tantus vel quia, cum est exortus, obscuratis omnibus solus apparet, Luna a lucendo nominata sit; eadem est enim Lucina. Itaque, ut apud Graecos Dianam, eamque Luciferam, sic apud nostros Iunonem Lucinam in pariendo invocant; quae eadem Diana 'omnivaga' dicitur, non a venando, sed quod in septem nume-
69 ratur tamquam vagantibus. Diana dicta, quia noctu quasi diem efficeret. Adhibetur autem ad partus, quod ii maturescunt aut septem non numquam aut, ut plerumque, novem lunae cursibus, qui quia mensa spatia conficiunt, 'menses' nominantur. Concinneque, ut multa, Timaeus, qui cum in historia dixisset, qua nocte natus Alexander esset, eadem Dianae Ephesiae templum deflagravisse, adiunxit minime id esse mirandum, quod Diana, cum in partu Olympiadis adesse voluisset, afuisset domo. Quae autem dea ad res omnes veniret, Venerem nostri nominaverunt, atque ex ea potius 'venustas' quam 'Venus' ex venustate.

28 70 Videtisne igitur, ut a physicis rebus bene atque utiliter inventis tracta ratio sit ad commenticios et fictos deos? quae res genuit falsas opiniones erroresque turbulentos et superstitiones paene aniles. Et formae enim nobis deorum et aetates et vestitus ornatusque noti sunt, genera praeterea, coniugia, cognationes omniaque traducta ad similitudinem inbecillitatis humanae; nam et perturbatis animis inducuntur; accepimus enim deorum cupiditates, aegritudines, iracundias; nec vero, ut fabulae ferunt, bellis proeliisque caruerunt, nec solum, ut apud Homerum, cum duo exercitus contrarios alii dei ex alia parte defenderent, sed etiam, ut cum Titanis, ut cum Gigantibus, sua propria bella gesserunt. Haec et dicuntur et creduntur stultissime et plena
71 sunt futtilitatis summaeque levitatis. Sed tamen his fabulis spretis ac repudiatis deus pertinens per naturam cuiusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intellegi qui qualesque sint, quoque eos nomine consuetudo nuncupaverit, hoc eos et venerari et colere debemus. Cultus

autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura, integra, incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur. Non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt. Nam qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant, 72 ut sibi sui liberi superstites essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati, quod nomen patuit postea latius; qui autem omnia, quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent et tamquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi ex relegendo, ut elegantes ex eligendo, ex diligendo diligentes, ex intellegendo intellegentes. His enim in verbis omnibus inest vis legendi eadem, quae in religioso. Ita factum est in superstitioso et religioso alterum vitii nomen, alterum laudis. Ac mihi videor satis et esse deos, et quales essent, ostendisse.

Proximum est, ut doceam deorum providentia mundum ad- **29** 73
ministrari. Magnus sane locus est et a vestris, Cotta, vexatus, ac nimirum vobiscum omne certamen est. Nam vobis, Vellei, minus notum est, quem ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis, vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. Velut a te ipso hesterno die dictum est anum fatidicam πρόνοιαν a Stoicis induci, id est providentiam. Quod eo errore dixisti, quia existumas ab iis providentiam fingi quasi quandam deam singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat; sed id praecise dicitur. Ut, si quis dicat Atheniensium 74 rem publicam consilio regi, desit illud 'Areopagi', sic, cum dicimus providentia mundum administrari, deesse arbitrato 'deorum'; plene autem et perfecte sic dici existimato: providentia deorum mundum administrari. Ita salem istum, quo caret vestra natio, *in* inridendis nobis nolitote consumere, et mehercle, si me audiatis, ne experiamini quidem; non decet, non datum est, non potestis. Nec vero hoc in te convenit, unum moribus domesticis ac nostrorum hominum urbanitate limatum, sed cum in reliquos vestros, tum in eum maxime, qui ista peperit, hominem sine arte, sine litteris, insultantem in omnes, sine acumine ullo, sine auctoritate, sine lepore. Dico **30** 75

igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes et initio constitutas esse et omni tempore administrari; eamque disputationem tris in partes nostri fere dividunt, quarum prima pars est, quae ducitur ab ea ratione, quae docet esse deos; quo concesso confitendum est eorum consilio mundum administrari. Secunda est autem, quae docet omnes res subiectas esse naturae sentienti, ab eaque omnia pulcherrume geri; quo constituto sequitur ab animantibus principiis ea esse generata. Tertius est locus, qui ducitur ex admiratione rerum caelestium atque terrestrium.

76 Primum igitur aut negandum est esse deos, quod et Democritus simulacra et Epicurus imagines inducens quodam pacto negat, aut, qui deos esse concedant, iis fatendum est eos aliquid agere, idque praeclarum; nihil est autem praeclarius mundi administratione; deorum igitur consilio administratur. Quod si aliter est, aliquid profecto sit necesse est melius et maiore vi praeditum quam deus, quale id cumque est, sive inanima natura sive necessitas vi magna incitata haec pulcherrima opera
77 efficiens, quae videmus. Non est igitur natura deorum praepotens neque excellens, siquidem ea subiecta est ei vel necessitati vel naturae, qua caelum, maria, terrae regantur; nihil est autem praestantius deo; ab eo igitur mundum necesse est regi. Nulli igitur est naturae oboediens aut subiectus deus, omnem ergo regit ipse naturam. Etenim si concedimus intellegentes esse deos, concedimus etiam providentes, et rerum quidem maxumarum. Ergo utrum ignorant, quae res maxumae sint, quoque eae modo tractandae et tuendae, an vim non habent, qua tantas res sustineant et gerant? At et ignoratio rerum aliena naturae deorum est, et sustinendi muneris propter inbecillitatem difficultas minime cadit in maiestatem deorum. Ex quo efficitur id, quod volumus, deorum pro-
31 78 videntia mundum administrari. Atqui necesse est, cum sint di, si modo sunt, ut profecto sunt, animantis esse, nec solum animantis, sed etiam rationis compotes inter seque quasi civili conciliatione et societate coniunctos, unum mundum ut commu-

nem rem publicam atque urbem aliquam regentis. Sequitur, ut 79
eadem sit in iis, quae humano in genere, ratio, eadem veritas utrobique sit eademque lex, quae est recti praeceptio pravique depulsio. Ex quo intellegitur prudentiam quoque et mentem a deis ad homines pervenisse, ob eamque causam maiorum institutis mens, fides, virtus, concordia consecratae et publice dedicatae sunt. Quae qui convenit penes deos esse negare, cum eorum augusta et sancta simulacra veneremur? Quodsi inest in hominum genere mens, fides, virtus, concordia, unde haec in terram nisi ab superis defluere potuerunt? Cumque sint in nobis consilium, ratio, prudentia, necesse est deos haec ipsa habere maiora, nec habere solum, sed etiam iis uti in maxumis et optumis rebus; nihil autem nec maius nec melius mundo; 80
necesse est ergo eum deorum consilio et providentia administrari. Postremo cum satis docuerimus hos esse deos, quorum insignem vim et inlustrem faciem videremus, solem dico et lunam et vagas stellas et inerrantes et caelum et mundum ipsum et earum rerum vim, quae inessent in omni mundo cum magno usu et commoditate generis humani, efficitur omnia regi divina mente atque prudentia. Ac de prima quidem parte satis dictum est.

Sequitur, ut doceam omnia subiecta esse naturae, eaque ab 32 81
ea pulcherrime geri. Sed quid sit ipsa natura, explicandum est ante breviter, quo facilius id, quod docere volumus, intellegi possit. Namque alii naturam esse censent vim quandam sine ratione cientem motus in corporibus necessarios, alii autem vim participem rationis atque ordinis tamquam via progredientem declarantemque, quid cuiusque rei causa efficiat, quid sequatur, cuius sollertiam nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex consequi possit imitando; seminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id, quamquam sit perexiguum, tamen, si inciderit in concipientem conprendentemque naturam nanctumque sit materiam, qua ali augerique possit, ita fingat et efficiat in suo quidque genere, partim ut tantum modo per stirpes alantur suas, partim ut moveri etiam et sentire et appetere possint et ex sese similia sui gignere. Sunt autem, qui omnia naturae nomine appellent, 82

ut Epicurus, qui ita dividit: omnium, quae sint, naturam esse corpora et inane, quaeque his accidant. Sed nos cum dicimus natura constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glaebam aut fragmentum lapidis aut aliquid eius modi nulla cohaerendi natura, sed ut arborem, ut animal, in quibus nulla temeritas, sed ordo apparet et artis quaedam similitudo.

33 83 Quodsi ea, quae a terra stirpibus continentur, arte naturae vivunt et vigent, profecto ipsa terra eadem vi continetur [arte naturae], quippe quae gravidata seminibus omnia pariat et fundat ex sese, stirpes amplexa alat et augeat ipsaque alatur vicissim a superis externisque naturis. Eiusdemque exspirationibus et aër alitur et aether et omnia supera. Ita, si terra natura tenetur et viget, eadem ratio in reliquo mundo est; stirpes enim terrae inhaerent; animantes autem adspiratione aëris sustinentur, ipseque aër nobiscum videt, nobiscum audit, nobiscum sonat; nihil enim eorum sine eo fieri potest; quin etiam movetur nobiscum; quacumque enim imus, qua-
84 cumque movemur, videtur quasi locum dare et cedere. Quaeque in medium locum mundi, qui est infimus, et quae a medio in superum quaeque conversione rotunda circum medium feruntur, ea continentem mundi efficiunt unamque naturam. Et cum quattuor genera sint corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata natura est. Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre aether, deinde retrorsum vicissim ex aethere aër, inde aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic naturis his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursus deorsus, ultro citro commeantibus mundi par-
85 tium coniunctio continetur. Quae aut sempiterna sit necesse est hoc eodem ornatu, quem videmus, aut certe perdiuturna, permanens ad longinquum et inmensum paene tempus. Quorum utrumvis ut sit, sequitur natura mundum administrari. Quae enim classium navigatio aut quae instructio exercitus aut, rursus ut ea, quae natura efficit, conferamus, quae procreatio vitis aut arboris, quae porro animantis figura conformatioque membrorum tantam naturae sollertiam significat, quantam ipse mundus? Aut igitur nihil est, quod sentiente natura regatur,

aut mundum regi confitendum est. Etenim, qui reliquas natu- 86
ras omnes earumque semina contineat, qui potest ipse non
natura administrari? ut, si qui dentes et pubertatem natura
dicat existere, ipsum autem hominem, cui ea existant, non con-
stare natura, non intellegat ea, quae ecferant aliquid ex sese,
perfectiores habere naturas quam ea, quae ex iis ecferantur.

Omnium autem rerum, quae natura administrantur, seminator **34**
et sator et parens, ut ita dicam, atque educator et altor est
mundus omniaque sicut membra et partes suas nutricatur et
continet. Quodsi mundi partes natura administrantur, necesse
est mundum ipsum natura administrari, cuius quidem admini-
stratio nihil habet in se, quod reprehendi possit; ex iis enim
naturis, quae erant, quod effici optimum potuit, effectum est.
Doceat ergo aliquis potuisse melius. Sed nemo umquam doce- 87
bit, et si quis corrigere aliquid volet, aut deterius faciet aut id,
quod fieri non potuerit, desiderabit. Quodsi omnes mundi par-
tes ita constitutae sunt, ut neque ad usum meliores potuerint
esse neque ad speciem pulchriores, videamus, utrum ea fortui-
tane sint an eo statu, quo cohaerere nullo modo potuerint nisi
sensu moderante divinaque providentia. Si igitur meliora sunt
ea, quae natura, quam illa, quae arte perfecta sunt, nec ars
efficit quicquam sine ratione, ne natura quidem rationis expers
est habenda. Qui igitur convenit, signum aut tabulam pictam
cum aspexeris, scire adhibitam esse artem, cumque procul cur-
sum navigii videris, non dubitare, quin id ratione atque arte
moveatur, aut, cum solarium vel discriptum vel ex aqua contem-
plere, intellegere declarari horas arte, non casu, mundum autem,
qui et has ipsas artes et earum artifices et cuncta conplectatur,
consilii et rationis esse expertem putare? Quodsi in Scythiam 88
aut in Britanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc, quam nuper
familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae conversiones
idem efficiunt in sole et in luna et in quinque stellis errantibus,
quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus, quis in illa
barbaria dubitet, quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione? Hi **35**
autem dubitant de mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia,

casune ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliqua an ratione ac mente divina, et Archimedem arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis sphaerae conversionibus quam naturam in efficiendis, praesertim cum multis partibus sint illa perfecta quam haec simulata
89 sollertius. Atqui ille apud Accium pastor, qui navem numquam ante vidisset, ut procul divinum et novum vehiculum Argonautarum e monte conspexit, primo admirans et perterritus hoc modo loquitur:

Tánta moles lábitur
Fremibúnda ex alto ingénti sonitu ét spíritu.
Prae se úndas volvit, vértices vi súscitat,
Ruít prolapsa, pélagus respergít, reflat.
Ita dum ínterruptum crédas nimbum vólvier,
Dum quód sublime véntis expulsúm rapi
Saxum aút procellis, vél globosos túrbines
Exístere ictos úndis concursántibus,
Nisi quás terrestris póntus strages cónciet,
Aut fórte Triton fúscina everténs specus
Subtér radices pénitus undanti ín freto
Molem éx profundo sáxeam ad caelum éruit.

Dubitat primo, quae sit ea natura, quam cernit ignotam, idemque iuvenibus visis auditoque nautico cantu:

† Sicut inciti atque álacres rostris pérfremunt
Delphíni † item alia multa Silvaní melo
Consímilem ad aures cántum et auditúm refert.

90 Ergo ut hic primo aspectu inanimum quiddam sensuque vacuum se putat cernere, post autem signis certioribus, quale sit id, de quo dubitaverat, incipit suspicari, sic philosophi debuerunt, si forte eos primus aspectus mundi conturbaverat, postea, cum vidissent motus eius finitos et aequabiles omniaque ratis ordinibus moderata inmutabilique constantia, intellegere inesse aliquem non solum habitatorem in hac caelesti ac divina domo, sed etiam rectorem et moderatorem et tamquam architectum

tanti operis tantique muneris. Nunc autem mihi videntur ne **36**
suspicari quidem, quanta sit admirabilitas caelestium rerum atque terrestrium.

Principio enim terra sita in media parte mundi circumfusa 91
undique est hac animali spirabilique natura, cui nomen est aër, Graecum illud quidem, sed perceptum iam tamen usu a nostris; tritum est enim pro Latino. Hunc rursus amplectitur inmensus aether, qui constat ex altissimis ignibus. Mutuemur hoc quoque verbum, dicaturque tam 'aether' Latine, quam dicitur aër, etsi interpretatur Pacuvius:

Hóc, quod memoro, nóstri caelum, Gráii perhibent aéthera;

quasi vero non Graius hoc dicat. At Latine loquitur. Si quidem nos non quasi Graece loquentem audiamus. Docet idem alio loco:

Graiúgena de istoc áperit ipsa óratio.

Sed ad maiora redeamus. Ex aethere igitur innumerabiles 92
flammae siderum existunt, quorum est princeps sol omnia clarissima luce conlustrans, multis partibus maior atque amplior quam terra universa, deinde reliqua sidera magnitudinibus inmensis. Atque hi tanti ignes tamque multi non modo nihil nocent terris rebusque terrestribus, sed ita prosunt, ut, si mota loco sint, conflagrare terras necesse sit a tantis ardoribus moderatione et temperatione sublata.

Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam, qui sibi persuadeat cor- **37** 93
pora quaedam solida atque individua vi et gravitate ferri, mundumque effici ornatissimum et pulcherrimum ex eorum corporum concursione fortuita? Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intellego, cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formae litterarum vel aureae vel qualeslibet aliquo coiciantur, posse ex iis in terram excussis annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effici; quod nescio an ne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. Isti autem quem ad modum adseverant 94

ex corpusculis non calore, non qualitate aliqua, quam ποιότητα Graeci vocant, non sensu praeditis, sed concurrentibus temere atque casu mundum esse perfectum, vel innumerabiles potius in omni puncto temporis alios nasci, alios interire? Quodsi mundum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non potest? quae sunt minus operosa et multo quidem faciliora. Certe ita temere de mundo effutiunt, ut mihi quidem numquam hunc admirabilem caeli ornatum, qui locus est proximus, suspexisse videantur.
95 Praeclare ergo Aristoteles: 'Si essent', inquit, 'qui sub terra semper habitavissent bonis et inlustribus domiciliis, quae essent ornata signis atque picturis instructaque rebus iis omnibus, quibus abundant ii, qui beati putantur, nec tamen exissent umquam supra terram, accepissent autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in haec loca, quae nos incolimus, atque exire potuissent: cum repente terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem ventorumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magnitudinem pulchritudinemque, tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent, quod is diem efficeret toto caelo luce diffusa; cum autem terras nox opacasset, tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque luminum varietatem tum crescentis, tum senescentis eorumque omnium ortus et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos inmutabilesque cursus; quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum esse
38 96 arbitrarentur.' Atque haec quidem ille. Nos autem tenebras cogitemus tantas, quantae quondam eruptione Aetnae-

orum ignium finitimas regiones obscuravisse dicuntur, ut per biduum nemo hominem homo agnosceret, cum autem tertio die sol inluxisset, tum ut revixisse sibi viderentur. Quodsi hoc idem ex aeternis tenebris contingeret, ut subito lucem aspiceremus, quaenam species caeli videretur? Sed adsiduitate cotidiana et consuetudine oculorum adsuescunt animi neque admirantur neque requirunt rationes earum rerum, quas semper vident, proinde quasi novitas nos magis quam magnitudo rerum debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare. Quis enim hunc homi- 97
nem dixerit, qui cum tam certos caeli motus, tam ratos astrorum ordines tamque inter se omnia conexa et apta viderit, neget in his ullam inesse rationem eaque casu fieri dicat, quae quanto consilio gerantur, nullo consilio adsequi possumus? An, cum machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut sphaeram, ut horas, ut alia permulta, non dubitamus, quin illa opera sint rationis; cum autem impetum caeli cum admirabili celeritate moveri vertique videamus constantissime conficientem vicissitudines anniversarias cum summa salute et conservatione rerum omnium, dubitamus, quin ea non solum ratione fiant, sed etiam excellenti divinaque ratione? licet enim iam remota subtilitate 98
disputandi oculis quodam modo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum earum, quas divina providentia dicimus constitutas.

Ac principio terra universa cernatur, locata in media sede **39**
mundi, solida et globosa et undique ipsa in sese nutibus suis conglobata, vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus, quorum omnium incredibilis multitudo insatiabili varietate distinguitur. Adde huc fontium gelidas perennitates, liquores perlucidos amnium, riparum vestitus viridissimos, speluncarum concavas altitudines, saxorum asperitates, inpendentium montium altitudines inmensitatesque camporum; adde etiam reconditas auri argentique venas infinitamque vim marmoris. Quae vero et 99
quam varia genera bestiarum vel cicurum vel ferarum! qui volucrium lapsus atque cantus! qui pecudum pastus! quae vita silvestrium! Quid iam de hominum genere dicam? qui quasi cultores terrae constituti non patiuntur eam nec inmanitate

beluarum efferari nec stirpium asperitate vastari, quorumque
operibus agri, insulae litoraque collucent distincta tectis et urbi-
bus. Quae si, ut animis, sic oculis videre possemus, nemo
100 cunctam intuens terram de divina ratione dubitaret. At vero
quanta maris est pulchritudo ! quae species universi ! quae mul-
titudo et varietas insularum ! quae amoenitates orarum ac
litorum ! quot genera quamque disparia partim submersarum,
partim fluitantium et innantium beluarum, partim ad saxa nativis
testis inhaerentium ! Ipsum autem mare sic terram appetens
litoribus alludit, ut una ex duabus naturis conflata videatur.
101 Exin mari finitumus aër die et nocte distinguitur, isque tum
fusus et extenuatus sublime fertur, tum autem concretus in
nubes cogitur umoremque colligens terram auget imbribus, tum
effluens huc et illuc ventos efficit. Idem annuas frigorum et
calorum facit varietates, idemque et volatus alitum sustinet et
40 spiritu ductus alit et sustentat animantes. Restat ultimus et a
domiciliis nostris altissimus omnia cingens et coërcens caeli
complexus, qui idem aether vocatur, extrema ora et determi-
natio mundi, in quo cum admirabilitate maxima igneae formae
102 cursus ordinatos definiunt. E quibus sol, cuius magnitudine
multis partibus terra superatur, circum eam ipsam volvitur, isque
oriens et occidens diem noctemque conficit et modo accedens,
tum autem recedens binas in singulis annis reversiones ab ex-
tremo contrarias facit, quarum in intervallo tum quasi tristitia
quadam contrahit terram, tum vicissim laetificat, ut cum caelo
103 hilarata videatur. Luna autem, quae est, ut ostendunt mathe-
matici, maior quam dimidia pars terrae, isdem spatiis vagatur,
quibus sol, sed tum congrediens cum sole, tum digrediens et
eam lucem, quam a sole accepit, mittit in terras et varias ipsa
lucis mutationes habet, atque etiam tum subiecta atque opposita
soli radios eius et lumen obscurat, tum ipsa incidens in umbram
terrae, cum est e regione solis, interpositu interiectuque terrae
repente deficit. Isdemque spatiis eae stellae, quas vagas dici-
mus, circum terram feruntur eodemque modo oriuntur et occi-
dunt, quarum motus tum incitantur, tum retardantur, saepe

etiam insistunt. Quo spectaculo nihil potest admirabilius esse, 104
nihil pulchrius. Sequitur stellarum inerrantium maxima multi-
tudo, quarum ita discripta distinctio est, ut ex notarum figu-
rarum similitudine nomina invenerint. Atque hoc loco me 41
intuens: Utar, inquit, carminibus Aratiis, quae a te admodum
adulescentulo conversa ita me delectant, quia Latina sunt, ut
multa ex iis memoria teneam. Ergo, ut oculis adsidue videmus,
sine ulla mutatione aut varietate

> Cetera labuntur celeri caelestia motu
> Cum caeloque simul noctesque diesque feruntur,

quorum contemplatione nullius expleri potest animus naturae 105
constantiam videre cupientis.

> Extremusque adeo duplici de cardine vertex
> Dicitur esse polus.

Hunc circum Arctoe duae feruntur numquam occidentes.

> Ex his altera apud Graios Cynosura vocatur,
> Altera dicitur esse Helice,

cuius quidem clarissimas stellas totis noctibus cernimus,

> Quas nostri Septem soliti vocitare Triones.

Paribusque stellis similiter distinctis eundem caeli verticem 106
lustrat parva Cynosura:

> Hac fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto.
> Sed prior illa magis stellis distincta refulget
> Et late prima confestim a nocte videtur,
> Haec vero parva est, sed nautis usus in hac est;
> Nam cursu interiore brevi convertitur orbe.

Et quo sit earum stellarum admirabilior aspectus, 42

> Has inter, veluti rapido cum gurgite flumen,
> Torvus Draco serpit subter superaque revolvens
> Sese conficiensque sinus e corpore flexos.

107 Eius cum totius est praeclara species, *tum* in primis aspicienda est figura capitis atque ardor oculorum:

> Huic non una modo caput ornans stella relucet,
> Verum tempora sunt duplici fulgore notata,
> E trucibusque oculis duo fervida lumina flagrant,
> Atque uno mentum radianti sidere lucet;
> Obstipum caput at tereti cervice reflexum
> Obtutum in cauda maioris figere dicas.

108 Et reliquum quidem corpus Draconis totis noctibus cernimus:

> Hoc caput hic paulum sese subito aequore condit,
> Ortus ubi atque obitus partem admiscetur in unam.

Id autem caput

> Attingens defessa velut maerentis imago
> Vertitur,

quam quidem Graeci

> Engonasin vocitant, genibus quia nixa feratur.
> Hic illa eximio posita est fulgore Corona.

Atque haec quidem a tergo, propter caput autem Anguitenens,

> 109 Quem claro perhibent Ophiuchum nomine Graii.
> Hic pressu duplici palmarum continet Anguem,
> Atque eius ipse manet religatus corpore torto;
> Namque virum medium serpens sub pectora cingit.
> Ille tamen nitens graviter vestigia ponit
> Atque oculos urguet pedibus pectusque Nepaï.

Septentriones autem sequitur

Arctophylax, vulgo qui dicitur esse Bootes,
Quod quasi temoni adiunctam prae se quatit Arctum.

Dein, quae sequuntur. Huic enim Booti 110

subter praecordia fixa videtur
Stella micans radiis, Arcturus nomine claro,

cuius *pedibus* subiecta fertur

Spicum inlustre tenens splendenti corpore Virgo.

Atque ita dimetata signa sunt, ut in tantis discriptionibus di- 43
vina sollertia appareat:

Et natos Geminos invises sub caput Arcti.
Subiectus mediae est Cancer, pedibusque tenetur
Magnus Leo tremulam quatiens e corpore flammam.

Auriga

Sub laeva Geminorum obductus parte feretur.
Adversum caput huic Helicae truculenta tuetur.
At Capra laevum umerum clara obtinet.

Tum, quae sequuntur:

Verum haec est magno atque inlustri praedita signo,
Contra Haedi exiguum iaciunt mortalibus ignem.

Cuius sub pedibus

Corniger est valido conixus corpore Taurus.

Eius caput stellis conspersum est frequentibus: 111

Has Graeci stellas Hyadas vocitare suërunt,

[a pluendo; ὕειν enim est pluere] nostri imperite Suculas, quasi a subus essent, non ab imbribus nominatae. Minorem

autem Septentrionem Cepheus passis palmis a tergo subsequitur:

> Namque ipsum ad tergum Cynosurae vertitur Arcti.

Hunc antecedit

> Obscura specie stellarum Cassiepia.
> Hanc autem inlustri versatur corpore propter
> Andromeda aufugiens aspectum maesta parentis.
> Huic Equus ille iubam quatiens fulgore micanti
> Summum contingit caput alvo, stellaque iungens
> Una tenet duplices communi lumine formas
> Aeternum ex astris cupiens conectere nodum.
> Exin contortis Aries cum cornibus haeret;

quem propter

> Pisces, quorum alter paulum praelabitur ante
> Et magis horriferis aquilonis tangitur auris.

44 112 Ad pedes Andromedae Perseus describitur,

> Quem summa ab regione aquilonis flamina pulsant.
> Cuius propter laevum genus omni ex parte locatas
> Parvas Vergilias tenui cum luce videbis.
> Inde Fides posita et leviter convexa videtur.
> Inde est ales Avis lato sub tegmine caeli.

Capiti autem Equi proxima est Aquarii dextra totusque deinceps Aquarius.

> Tum gelidum valido de pectore frigus anhelans
> Corpore semifero magno Capricornus in orbe;
> Quem cum perpetuo vestivit lumine Titan,
> Brumali flectens contorquet tempore currum.

Hinc autem aspicitur, 113

Ut sese ostendens emergit Scorpios alte
Posteriore trahens plexum vi corporis arcum,
Quem propter nitens pinnis convolvitur Ales.
At propter se Aquila ardenti cum corpore portat.

Deinde Delphinus,

Exinde Orion obliquo corpore nitens.

Quem subsequens 114

Fervidus ille Canis stellarum luce refulget.

Post Lepus subsequitur

Curriculum numquam defesso corpore sedans.
At Canis ad caudam serpens prolabitur Argo....
Hanc Aries tegit et squamoso corpore Pisces
Fluminis inlustri tangentem corpore ripas.

Quem longe serpentem et manantem aspicies

proceraque Vincla videbis,
Quae retinent Pisces caudarum a parte locata....
Inde Nepae cernes propter fulgentis acumen
Aram, quam flatu permulcet spiritus austri.

Propterque Centaurus

Cedit Equi partis properans subiungere Chelis.
Hic dextram porgens, quadrupes qua vasta tenetur,
Tendit et inlustrem truculentus cedit ad Aram;
Hic sese infernis e partibus erigit Hydra,

cuius longe corpus est fusum,

In medioque sinu fulgens Cratera relucet.
Extremam nitens plumato corpore Corvus
Rostro tundit, et hic Geminis est ille sub ipsis
Ante Canem, Προκύων Graio qui nomine fertur.

115 Haec omnis discriptio siderum atque hic tantus caeli ornatus ex corporibus huc et illuc casu et temere cursantibus potuisse effici cuiquam sano videri potest? aut vero alia quae natura mentis et rationis expers haec efficere potuit? quae non modo ut fierent ratione eguerunt, sed intellegi qualia sint sine summa ratione non possunt.

45 Nec vero haec solum admirabilia, sed nihil maius, quam quod ita stabilis est mundus atque ita cohaeret ad permanendum, ut nihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius. Omnes enim partes eius undique medium locum capessentes nituntur aequaliter. Maxime autem corpora inter se iuncta permanent, cum quasi quodam vinculo circumdato colligantur; quod facit ea natura, quae per omnem mundum omnia mente et ratione conficiens funditur et ad medium rapit et convertit extrema. 116 Quocirca, si mundus globosus est ob eamque causam omnes eius partes undique aequabiles ipsae per se atque inter se continentur, contingere idem terrae necesse est, ut omnibus eius partibus in medium vergentibus (id autem medium infimum in sphaera est) nihil interrumpat, quo labefactari possit tanta contentio gravitatis et ponderum. Eademque ratione mare, cum supra terram sit, medium tamen terrae locum expetens conglobatur undique aequabiliter neque redundat umquam neque 117 effunditur. Huic autem continens aër fertur ille quidem levitate sublime, sed tamen in omnes partes se ipse fundit; itaque et mari continuatus et iunctus est et natura fertur ad caelum, cuius tenuitate et calore temperatus vitalem et salutarem spiritum praebet animantibus. Quem complexa summa pars caeli, quae aetheria dicitur, et suum retinet ardorem tenuem et nulla admixtione concretum et cum aëris extremitate coniungitur. **46** In aethere autem astra volvuntur, quae se et nisu suo conglobata continent et forma ipsa figuraque sua momenta sustentant; sunt enim rotunda, quibus formis, ut ante dixisse videor, minime 118 noceri potest. Sunt autem stellae natura flammeae; quocirca terrae, maris, aquarum vaporibus aluntur iis, qui a sole ex agris tepefactis et ex aquis excitantur, quibus altae renovataeque

stellae atque omnis aether refundunt eadem et rursum trahunt
indidem, nihil ut fere intereat aut admodum paululum, quod
astrorum ignis et aetheris flamma consumit. Ex quo eventu-
rum nostri putant id, de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut
ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret, cum umore consumpto
neque terra ali posset nec remearet aër, cuius ortus aqua omni
exhausta esse non posset; ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a
quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret atque idem
ornatus oreretur. Nolo in stellarum ratione multus vobis 119
videri, maximeque earum, quae errare dicuntur; quarum tan-
tus est concentus ex dissimillimis motibus, ut, cum summa
Saturni refrigeret, media Martis incendat, his interiecta Iovis
inlustret et temperet infraque Martem duae Soli oboediant,
ipse Sol mundum omnem sua luce compleat ab eoque Luna
inluminata graviditates et partus adferat maturitatesque gig-
nendi. Quae copulatio rerum et quasi consentiens ad mundi
incolumitatem coagmentatio naturae quem non movet, hunc
horum nihil umquam reputavisse certo scio.

Age, ut a caelestibus rebus ad terrestres veniamus, quid est in 47 120
his, in quo non naturae ratio intellegentis appareat? Principio
eorum, quae gignuntur e terra, stirpes et stabilitatem dant iis,
quae sustinent, et e terra sucum trahunt, quo alantur ea,
quae radicibus continentur, obducunturque libro aut cortice
trunci, quo sint a frigoribus et caloribus tutiores. Iam vero
vites sic claviculis adminicula tamquam manibus adprehendunt
atque ita se erigunt, ut animantes. Quin etiam a caulibus, si
propter sati sint, ut a pestiferis et nocentibus refugere dicuntur
nec eos ulla ex parte contingere. Animantium vero quanta 121
varietas est, quanta ad eam rem vis, ut in suo quaeque genere
permaneat! Quarum aliae coriis tectae sunt, aliae villis vesti-
tae, aliae spinis hirsutae; pluma alias, alias squama videmus
obductas, alias esse cornibus armatas, alias habere effugia pin-
narum. Pastum autem animantibus large et copiose natura
eum, qui cuique aptus erat, comparavit. Enumerare possum,
ad eum pastum capessendum conficiendumque quae sit in

figuris animantium et quam sollers subtilisque discriptio partium
quamque admirabilis fabrica membrorum. Omnia enim, quae
quidem intus inclusa sunt, ita nata atque ita locata sunt, ut
nihil eorum supervacaneum sit, nihil ad vitam retinendam non
122 necessarium. Dedit autem eadem natura beluis et sensum et
appetitum, ut altero conatum haberent ad naturales pastus ca-
pessendos, altero secernerent pestifera a salutaribus. Iam vero
alia animalia gradiendo, alia serpendo ad pastum accedunt, alia
volando, alia nando, cibumque partim oris hiatu et dentibus
ipsis capessunt, partim unguium tenacitate arripiunt, partim
aduncitate rostrorum, alia sugunt, alia carpunt, alia vorant,
alia mandunt; atque etiam aliorum ea est humilitas, ut cibum
123 terrestrem rostris facile contingant; quae autem altiora sunt, ut
anseres, ut cygni, ut grues, ut cameli, adiuvantur proceritate
collorum; manus etiam data elephanto est, quia propter magni-
48 tudinem corporis difficiles aditus habebat ad pastum. At qui-
bus bestiis erat is cibus, ut aliis [generis] bestiis vescerentur,
aut vires natura dedit aut celeritatem. Data est quibusdam
etiam machinatio quaedam atque sollertia, ut in araneolis aliae
quasi rete texunt, ut, si quid inhaeserit, conficiant, aliae autem
ex inopinato observant et, si quid incidit, arripiunt idque con-
sumunt. Pina vero (sic enim Graece dicitur) duabus grandi-
bus patula conchis cum parva squilla quasi societatem coit
comparandi cibi, itaque, cum pisciculi parvi in concham hian-
tem innataverunt, tum admonita squillae morsu pina comprimit
conchas. Sic dissimillimis bestiolis communiter cibus quaeritur.
124 In quo admirandum est, congressune aliquo inter se an iam
inde ab ortu natura ipsa congregatae sint. Est etiam admiratio
non nulla in bestiis aquatilibus iis, quae gignuntur in terra; veluti
crocodili fluviatilesque testudines quaedamque serpentes ortae
extra aquam, simul ac primum niti possunt, aquam persequun-
tur. Quin etiam anitum ova gallinis saepe supponimus; e
quibus pulli orti primo aluntur ab iis ut a matribus, a quibus
exclusi fotique sunt, deinde eas relinquunt et effugiunt se-
quentes, cum primum aquam quasi naturalem domum videre

potuerunt. Tantam ingenuit animantibus conservandi sui natura custodiam. Legi etiam scriptum esse avem quandam, quae 49 platalea nominaretur; eam sibi cibum quaerere advolantem ad eas avis, quae se in mari mergerent; quae cum emersissent piscemque cepissent, usque eo premere earum capita mordicus, dum illae captum amitterent, in quod ipsa invaderet. Eademque haec avis scribitur conchis se solere complere, easque cum stomachi calore concoxerit, evomere atque ita eligere ex iis, quae sunt esculenta. Ranae autem marinae dicuntur obruere 125 sese harena solere et moveri prope aquam, ad quas quasi ad escam pisces cum accesserint, confici a ranis atque consumi. Miluo est quoddam bellum quasi naturale cum corvo; ergo alter alterius ubicumque nanctus est ova frangit. Illud vero ab Aristotele animadversum, a quo pleraque, quis potest non mirari? grues cum loca calidiora petentes maria transmittant, trianguli efficere formam; eius autem summo angulo aër ab iis adversus pellitur, deinde sensim ab utroque latere, tamquam remis, ita pinnis cursus avium levatur. Basis autem trianguli, quem efficiunt grues, ea tamquam a puppi ventis adiuvatur, eaeque in tergo praevolantium colla et capita reponunt; quod quia ipse dux facere non potest, quia non habet, ubi nitatur, revolat, ut ipse quoque quiescat; in eius locum succedit ex iis, quae adquierunt, eaque vicissitudo in omni cursu conservatur. Multa eius modi proferre possum, sed genus ipsum videtis. 126 Iam vero illa etiam notiora, quanto se opere custodiant bestiae, ut in pastu circumspectent, ut in cubilibus delitiscant. Atque 50 illa mirabilia, quod (ea quae nuper, id est paucis ante saeclis, medicorum ingeniis reperta sunt) vomitione canes, purgantes autem alvos ibes Aegyptiae curantur. Auditum est pantheras, quae in barbaria venenata carne caperentur, remedium quoddam habere, quo cum essent usae, non morerentur; capras autem in Creta feras, cum essent confixae venenatis sagittis, herbam quaerere, quae dictamnus vocaretur, quam cum gustavissent, sagittas excidere dicunt e corpore. Cervaeque paulo 127 ante partum perpurgant se quadam herbula, quae seselis dicitur.

Iam illa cernimus, ut contra vim et metum suis se armis quae-
que defendant, cornibus tauri, apri dentibus, morsu leones;
aliae fuga se, aliae occultatione tutantur, atramenti effusione
sepiae, torpore torpedines, multae etiam insectantis odoris into-
lerabili foeditate depellunt.

51 Ut vero perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura
est a providentia deorum, ut semper essent et bestiarum genera
et arborum omniumque rerum, quae a terra stirpibus contine-
rentur. Quae quidem omnia eam vim seminis habent in se, ut
ex uno plura generentur; idque semen inclusum est in intuma
parte earum bacarum, quae ex quaque stirpe funduntur, isdem-
que seminibus et homines adfatim vescuntur et terrae eiusdem
128 generis stirpium renovatione conplentur. Quid loquar, quanta
ratio in bestiis ad perpetuam conservationem earum generis
appareat? Nam primum aliae mares, aliae feminae sunt, quod
perpetuitatis causa machinata natura est, deinde partes corporis
et ad procreandum et ad concipiendum aptissimae, et in mare
et in femina commiscendorum corporum mirae libidines. Cum
autem in locis semen insedit, rapit omnem fere cibum ad sese
eoque saeptum fingit animal; quod cum ex utero elapsum ex-
cidit, in iis animantibus, quae lacte aluntur, omnis fere cibus
matrum lactescere incipit, eaque, quae paulo ante nata sunt,
sine magistro duce natura mammas appetunt earumque ubertate
saturantur. Atque ut intellegamus nihil horum esse fortuitum,
et haec omnia esse opera providae sollertisque naturae, quae
multiplices fetus procreant, ut sues, ut canes, iis mammarum
data est multitudo; quas easdem paucas habent eae bestiae,
129 quae pauca gignunt. Quid dicam, quantus amor bestiarum sit
in educandis custodiendisque iis, quae procreaverunt, usque ad
eum finem, dum possint se ipsa defendere? etsi pisces, ut aiunt,
ova cum genuerunt, relinquunt; facile enim illa aqua et susti-
52 nentur et fetum fundunt. Testudines autem et crocodilos
dicunt, cum in terra partum ediderint, obruere ova, deinde
discedere; ita et nascuntur et educantur ipsa per sese. Iam
gallinae avesque reliquae et quietum requirunt ad pariendum

locum et cubilia sibi nidosque construunt eosque quam possunt mollissume substernunt, ut quam facillume ova serventur; e quibus pullos cum excuderunt, ita tuentur, ut et pinnis foveant, ne frigore laedantur, et, si est calor a sole, se opponant. Cum autem pulli pinnulis uti possunt, tum volatus eorum matres prosequuntur, reliqua cura liberantur. Accedit ad non nullorum 130
animantium et earum rerum, quas terra gignit, conservationem et salutem hominum etiam sollertia et diligentia. Nam multae et pecudes et stirpes sunt, quae sine procuratione hominum salvae esse non possunt. Magnae etiam oportunitates ad cultum hominum atque abundantiam aliae aliis in locis reperiuntur. Aegyptum Nilus inrigat et, cum tota aestate obrutam oppletamque tenuit, tum recedit mollitosque et oblimatos agros ad serendum relinquit. Mesopotamiam fertilem efficit Euphrates, in quam quot annos quasi novos agros invehit. Indus vero, qui est omnium fluminum maximus, non aqua solum agros laetificat et mitigat, sed eos etiam conserit; magnam enim vim seminum secum frumenti similium dicitur deportare. Multaque alia in 131
aliis locis commemorabilia proferre possum, multos fertiles agros alios aliorum fructuum. Sed illa quanta benignitas naturae, 53
quod tam multa ad vescendum, tam varia et tam iucunda gignit, neque ea uno tempore anni, ut semper et novitate delectemur et copia! Quam tempestivos autem dedit, quam salutares non modo hominum, sed etiam pecudum generi, iis denique omnibus, quae oriuntur e terra, ventos Etesias! quorum flatu nimii temperantur calores; ab isdem etiam maritimi cursus celeres et certi deriguntur. Multa praetereunda sunt [et tamen multa dicuntur]. Enumerari enim non possunt fluminum oportuni- 132
tates, aestus maritimi [multum] accedentes et recedentes, montes vestiti atque silvestres, salinae ab ora maritima remotissimae, medicamentorum salutarium plenissimae terrae, utilitates denique innumerabiles ad victum et ad vitam necessariae. Iam diei noctisque vicissitudo conservat animantes tribuens aliud agendi tempus, aliud quiescendi. Sic undique omni ratione concluditur mente consilioque divino omnia in hoc mundo ad

salutem omnium conservationemque admirabiliter administrari.
133 Hic quaeret quispiam, cuiusnam causa tantarum rerum mo-
litio facta sit; arborumne et herbarum? quae quamquam sine
sensu sunt, tamen a natura sustinentur. At id quidem absur-
dum est. An bestiarum? Nihilo probabilius deos mutarum et
nihil intellegentium causa tantum laborasse. Quorum igitur
causa quis dixerit effectum esse mundum? Eorum scilicet
animantium, quae ratione utuntur. Hi sunt di et homines,
quibus profecto nihil est melius; ratio est enim, quae praestet
omnibus. Ita fit credibile deorum et hominum causa factum
54 esse mundum quaeque in eo [mundo] sint omnia. Faciliusque
intellegetur a dis inmortalibus hominibus esse provisum, si erit
tota hominis fabricatio perspecta omnisque humanae naturae
134 figura atque perfectio. Nam cum tribus rebus animantium vita
teneatur, cibo, potione, spiritu, ad haec omnia percipienda os
est aptissimum, quod adiunctis naribus spiritu augetur. Denti-
bus autem in ore constructis manditur atque [ab iis] extenuatur
et molitur cibus. Eorum adversi acuti morsu dividunt escas,
intimi autem conficiunt, qui genuini vocantur, quae confectio
135 etiam a lingua adiuvari videtur. Linguam autem ad radices
eius haerens excipit stomachus, quo primum inlabuntur ea, quae
accepta sunt ore. Is utraque ex parte tosillas attingens palato
extremo atque intimo terminatur. Atque is agitatione et moti-
bus linguae cum depulsum et quasi detrusum cibum accepit,
depellit. Ipsius autem partes eae, quae sunt infra quam id,
quod devoratur, dilatantur, quae autem supra, contrahuntur.
136 Sed cum aspera arteria (sic enim a medicis appellatur) ostium
habeat adiunctum linguae radicibus paulo supra, quam ad
linguam stomachus adnectitur, eaque ad pulmones usque perti-
neat excipiatque animam, eam quae ducta est spiritu, eandem-
que a pulmonibus respiret et reddat, tegitur quodam quasi
operculo, quod ob eam causam datum est, ne, si quid in eam
cibi forte incidisset, spiritus impediretur. Sed cum alvi natura
subiecta stomacho cibi et potionis sit receptaculum, pulmones
autem et cor extrinsecus spiritum ducant, in alvo multa sunt

mirabiliter effecta, quae constat fere e nervis. Est autem mul-
tiplex et tortuosa arcetque et continet, sive illud aridum est sive
umidum, quod recepit, ut id mutari et concoqui possit, eaque
tum astringitur, tum relaxatur atque omne, quod accepit, cogit
et confundit, ut facile et calore, quem multum habet, et terendo
cibo et praeterea spiritu omnia cocta atque confecta in reliquum
corpus dividantur. In pulmonibus autem inest raritas quaedam 55
et adsimilis spongiis mollitudo ad hauriendum spiritum aptis-
sima, qui tum se contrahunt adspirantes, tum in respiratu dila-
tant, ut frequenter ducatur cibus animalis, quo maxime aluntur
animantes. Ex intestinis autem secretus a reliquo cibo sucus is, 137
quo alimur, permanat ad iecur per quasdam a medio intestino
usque ad portas iecoris (sic enim appellantur) ductas et derec-
tas vias, quae pertinent ad iecur eique adhaerent. Atque inde
aliae *alio* pertinentes sunt, per quas cadit cibus a iecore dilap-
sus. Ab eo cibo cum est secreta bilis eique umores, qui e
renibus profunduntur, reliqua se in sanguinem vertunt ad
easdemque portas iecoris confluunt, ad quas omnes eius viae
pertinent; per quas lapsus cibus in hoc ipso loco in eam venam,
quae cava appellatur, confunditur perque eam ad cor confectus
iam coctusque perlabitur, a corde autem in totum corpus dis-
tribuitur per venas admodum multas in omnes partes corporis
pertinentes. Quem ad modum autem reliquiae cibi depellantur 138
tum astringentibus se intestinis, tum relaxantibus, haud sane
difficile dictu est, sed tamen praetereundum est, ne quid habeat
iniucunditatis oratio. Illa potius explicetur incredibilis fabrica
naturae: Nam quae spiritu in pulmones anima ducitur, ea ca-
lescit primum ipso ab spiritu, deinde contagione pulmonum,
ex eaque pars redditur respirando, pars concipitur cordis parte
quadam, quem ventriculum cordis appellant, cui similis alter
adiunctus est, in quem sanguis a iecore per venam illam cavam
influit. Eoque modo ex his partibus et sanguis per venas in
omne corpus diffunditur et spiritus per arterias. Utraeque autem
crebrae multaeque toto corpore intextae vim quandam incredi-
bilem artificiosi operis divinique testantur. Quid dicam de 139

ossibus? quae subiecta corpori mirabiles commissuras habent et ad stabilitatem aptas et ad artus finiendos adcommodatas et ad motum et ad omnem corporis actionem. Huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continentur, eorumque inplicationem corpore toto pertinentem, qui sicut venae et arteriae a corde tracti et pro-
56 140 fecti in corpus omne ducuntur. Ad hanc providentiam naturae tam diligentem tamque sollertem adiungi multa possunt, e quibus intellegatur, quantae res hominibus [a dis] quamque eximiae tributae sint. Quae primum eos humo excitatos celsos et erectos constituit, ut deorum cognitionem caelum intuentes capere possent. Sunt enim ex terra homines non ut incolae atque habitatores, sed quasi spectatores superarum rerum atque caelestium, quarum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. Sensus autem interpretes ac nuntii rerum in capite tamquam in arce mirifice ad usus necessarios et facti et conlocati sunt. Nam oculi tamquam speculatores altissimum locum obtinent, ex quo plurima conspicientes fungantur suo
141 munere; et aures, cum sonum percipere debeant, qui natura [in] sublime fertur, recte in altis corporum partibus collocatae sunt; itemque nares et, quod omnis odor ad supera fertur, recte sursum sunt et, quod cibi et potionis iudicium magnum earum est, non sine causa vicinitatem oris secutae sunt. Iam gustatus, qui sentire eorum, quibus vescimur, genera debet, habitat in ea parte oris, qua esculentis et potulentis iter natura patefecit. Tactus autem toto corpore aequabiliter fusus est, ut omnes ictus omnesque minimos et frigoris et caloris adpulsus sentire possimus. Atque ut in aedificiis architecti avertunt ab oculis naribusque dominorum ea, quae profluentia necessario taetri essent aliquid habitura, sic natura res similis procul amandavit a sensi-
57 142 bus. Quis vero opifex praeter naturam, qua nihil potest esse callidius, tantam sollertiam persequi potuisset in sensibus? quae primum oculos membranis tenuissimis vestivit et saepsit; quas primum perlucidas fecit, ut per eas cerni posset, firmas autem, ut continerentur; sed lubricos oculos fecit et mobiles, ut et declinarent, si quid noceret, et aspectum, quo vellent, facile con-

verterent; aciesque ipsa, qua cernimus, quae pupula vocatur,
ita parva est, ut ea, quae nocere possint, facile vitet, palpebrae-
que, quae sunt tegmenta oculorum, mollissimae tactu, ne laede-
rent aciem, aptissime factae et ad claudendas pupulas, ne quid
incideret, et ad aperiendas, idque providit ut identidem fieri
posset cum maxima celeritate. Munitaeque sunt palpebrae 143
tamquam vallo pilorum, quibus et apertis oculis, si quid inci-
deret, repelleretur, et somno coniventibus, cum oculis ad cer-
nendum non egeremus, ut ii tamquam involuti quiescerent. La-
tent praeterea utiliter et excelsis undique partibus saepiuntur.
Primum enim superiora superciliis obducta sudorem a capite et
fronte defluentem repellunt; genae deinde ab inferiore parte
tutantur subiectae leniterque eminentes; nasusque ita locatus
est, ut quasi murus oculis interiectus esse videatur. Auditus 144
autem semper patet; eius enim sensu etiam dormientes ege-
mus; a quo cum sonus est acceptus, etiam e somno excitamur.
Flexuosum iter habet, ne quid intrare possit, si simplex et de-
rectum pateret; provisum etiam, ut, si qua minima bestiola
conaretur inrumpere, in sordibus aurium tamquam in visco in-
haeresceret. Extra autem eminent quae appellantur aures et
tegendi causa factae tutandique sensus, et ne adiectae voces
laberentur atque errarent, prius quam sensus ab iis pulsus esset.
Sed duros et quasi corneolos habent introitus multisque cum
flexibus, quod his naturis relatus amplificatur sonus; quocirca
et in fidibus testudine resonatur aut cornu, et ex tortuosis locis
et inclusis *soni* referuntur ampliores. Similiter nares, quae sem- 145
per propter necessarias utilitates patent, contractiores habent
introitus, ne quid in eas, quod noceat, possit pervadere, umo-
remque semper habent ad pulverem multaque alia depellenda
non inutilem. Gustatus praeclare saeptus est; ore enim con-
tinetur et ad usum apte et ad incolumitatis custodiam. Omnis-
que sensus hominum multo antecellit sensibus bestiarum.
Primum enim oculi in iis artibus, quarum iudicium est oculo- 58
rum, in pictis, fictis caelatisque formis, in corporum etiam mo-
tione atque gestu multa cernunt subtilius; colorum etiam et

figurarum . . . ., tum venustatem atque ordinem et, ut ita dicam, decentiam oculi iudicant, atque etiam alia maiora. Nam et virtutes et vitia cognoscunt; iratum propitium, laetantem dolentem, fortem ignavum, audacem timidumque cognoscunt.
146 Auriumque item est admirabile quoddam artificiosumque iudicium, quo iudicatur et in vocis et in tibiarum nervorumque cantibus varietas sonorum, intervalla, distinctio et vocis genera permulta, canorum fuscum, leve asperum, grave acutum, flexibile durum, quae hominum solum auribus iudicantur. Nariumque item et gustandi pariter et tangendi magna iudicia sunt. Ad quos sensus capiendos et perfruendos plures etiam, quam vellem, artes repertae sunt. Perspicuum est enim, quo conpositiones unguentorum, quo ciborum conditiones, quo corporum lenocinia processerint.

59 147 Iam vero animum ipsum mentemque hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam qui non divina cura perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere. De quo dum disputarem, tuam mihi dari vellem, Cotta, eloquentiam. Quo enim tu illa modo diceres! quanta primum intellegentia, deinde consequentium rerum cum primis coniunctio et conprehensio esset in nobis; ex quo videlicet, quid ex quibusque rebus efficiatur, idque ratione concludimus singulasque res definimus circumscripteque complectimur; ex quo scientia intellegitur quam vim habeat quali*sque* sit, qua ne in deo quidem est res ulla praestantior. Quanta vero illa sunt, quae vos Academici infirmatis et tollitis, quod et sensibus et animo ea, quae extra sunt, percipi-
148 mus atque conprendimus! ex quibus conlatis inter se et conparatis artes quoque efficimus partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectationem necessarias. Iam vero domina rerum, ut vos soletis dicere, eloquendi vis, quam est praeclara quamque divina! quae primum efficit, ut et ea, quae ignoramus, discere et ea, quae scimus, alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes conprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus, haec nos iuris, legum,

urbium societate devinxit, haec a vita inmani et fera segregavit. Ad usum autem orationis incredibile est, si diligenter attenderis, 149 quanta opera machinata natura sit. Primum enim a pulmonibus arteria usque ad os intimum pertinet, per quam vox principium a mente ducens percipitur et funditur; deinde in ore sita lingua est finita dentibus; ea vocem inmoderate profusam fingit et terminat atque sonos vocis distinctos et pressos efficit, cum et ad dentes et ad alias partes pellit oris. Itaque plectri similem linguam nostri solent dicere, chordarum dentes, nares cornibus iis, qui ad nervos resonant in cantibus.

Quam vero aptas quamque multarum artium ministras manus 60 150 natura homini dedit! Digitorum enim contractio facilis facilisque porrectio propter molles commissuras et artus nullo in motu laborat. Itaque ad pingendum, ad fingendum, ad scalpendum, ad nervorum eliciendos sonos ac tibiarum apta manus est admotione digitorum. Atque haec oblectationis; illa necessitatis, cultus dico agrorum extructionesque tectorum, tegumenta corporum vel texta vel suta omnemque fabricam aeris et ferri; ex quo intellegitur ad inventa animo, percepta sensibus adhibitis opificum manibus omnia nos consecutos, ut tecti, ut vestiti, ut salvi esse possemus, urbes, muros, domicilia, delubra haberemus. Iam vero operibus hominum, id est manibus, cibi etiam 151 varietas invenitur et copia. Nam et agri multa efferunt manu quaesita, quae vel statim consumantur vel mandentur condita vetustati, et praeterea vescimur bestiis et terrenis et aquatilibus et volantibus partim capiendo, partim alendo. Efficimus etiam domitu nostro quadripedum vectiones, quorum celeritas atque vis nobis ipsis adfert vim et celeritatem. Nos onera quibusdam bestiis, nos iuga inponimus, nos elephantorum acutissumis sensibus, nos sagacitate canum ad utilitatem nostram abutimur, nos e terrae cavernis ferrum eligimus, rem ad colendos agros necessariam, nos aeris, argenti, auri venas penitus abditas invenimus et ad usum aptas et ad ornatum decoras, arborum autem consectione omnique materia et culta et silvestri partim ad calficiendum corpus igni adhibito et ad mitigandum cibum utimur,

partim ad aedificandum, ut tectis saepti frigora caloresque pella-
152 mus. Magnos vero usus adfert ad navigia facienda, quorum
cursibus subpeditantur omnes undique ad vitam copiae; quas-
que res violentissimas natura genuit, earum moderationem nos
soli habemus, maris atque ventorum, propter nauticarum rerum
scientiam plurimisque maritimis rebus fruimur atque utimur.
Terrenorum item commodorum omnis est in homine dominatus.
Nos campis, nos montibus fruimur, nostri sunt amnes, nostri
lacus, nos fruges serimus, nos arbores, nos aquarum inductioni-
bus terris fecunditatem damus, nos flumina arcemus, derigimus,
avertimus, nostris denique manibus in rerum natura quasi alte-
ram naturam efficere conamur.

61
153 Quid vero? hominum ratio non in caelum usque penetravit?
Soli enim ex animantibus nos astrorum ortus, obitus cursusque
cognovimus, ab hominum genere finitus est dies, mensis, annus,
defectiones solis et lunae cognitae praedictaeque in omne pos-
terum tempus, quae, quantae, quando futurae sint. Quae con-
tuens animus accedit ad cognitionem deorum, e qua oritur
pietas, cui coniuncta iustitia est reliquaeque virtutes, e quibus
vita beata existit par et similis deorum, nulla alia re nisi inmor-
talitate, quae nihil ad bene vivendum pertinet, cedens caelesti-
bus. Quibus rebus expositis satis docuisse videor, hominis
natura quanto omnis anteiret animantes. Ex quo debet intel-
legi nec figuram situmque membrorum nec ingenii mentisque
154 vim talem effici potuisse fortuna. Restat, ut doceam atque
aliquando perorem omnia, quae sint in hoc mundo, quibus
utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata.

62 Principio ipse mundus deorum hominumque causa factus est,
quaeque in eo sunt, ea parata ad fructum hominum et inventa
sunt. Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque homi-
num domus aut urbs utrorumque. Soli enim ratione utentes
iure ac lege vivunt. Ut igitur Athenas et Lacedaemonem Atheni-
ensium Lacedaemoniorumque causa putandum est conditas esse,
omniaque, quae sint in his urbibus, eorum populorum recte esse
dicuntur, sic, quaecumque sunt in omni mundo, deorum atque

hominum putanda sunt. Iam vero circumitus solis et lunae 155
reliquorumque siderum, quamquam etiam ad mundi cohaeren-
tiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus praebent;
nulla est enim insatiabilior species, nulla pulchrior et ad ratio-
nem sollertiamque praestantior; eorum enim cursus dimetati
maturitates temporum et varietates mutationesque cognovimus;
quae si hominibus solis nota sunt, hominum facta esse causa
iudicandum est. Terra vero feta frugibus et vario leguminum 156
genere, quae cum maxuma largitate fundit, ea ferarumne an
hominum causa gignere videtur? Quid de vitibus olivetisque
dicam? quarum uberrumi laetissumique fructus nihil omnino ad
bestias pertinent. Neque enim serendi neque colendi nec tem-
pestive demetendi percipiendique fructus neque condendi ac
reponendi ulla pecudum scientia est, earumque omnium rerum
hominum est et usus et cura. Ut fides igitur et tibias eorum 63 157
causa factas dicendum est, qui illis uti possent, sic ea, quae dixi,
iis solis confitendum est esse parata, qui utuntur, nec, si quae
bestiae furantur aliquid ex iis aut rapiunt, illarum quoque causa
ea nata esse dicemus. Neque enim homines murum aut formi-
carum causa frumentum condunt, sed coniugum et liberorum et
familiarum suarum. Itaque bestiae furtim, ut dixi, fruuntur,
domini palam et libere. Hominum igitur causa eas rerum 158
copias comparatas fatendum est, nisi forte tanta ubertas et vari-
etas pomorum eorumque iucundus non gustatus solum, sed
odoratus etiam et aspectus dubitationem adfert, quin hominibus
solis ea natura donaverit. Tantumque abest, ut haec bestiarum
etiam causa parata sint, ut ipsas bestias hominum gratia genera-
tas esse videamus. Quid enim oves aliud adferunt, nisi ut
earum villis confectis atque contextis homines vestiantur? quae
quidem neque ali neque sustentari neque ullum fructum edere
ex se sine cultu hominum et curatione potuissent. Canum vero
tam fida custodia tamque amans dominorum adulatio tantum-
que odium in externos et tam incredibilis ad investigandum
sagacitas narium, tanta alacritas in venando quid significat aliud
nisi se ad hominum commoditates esse generatos? Quid de 159

bubus loquar? quorum ipsa terga declarant non esse se ad onus accipiendum figurata; cervices autem natae ad iugum, tum vires umerorum et latitudines ad aratra [ex]trahenda. Quibus, cum terrae subigerentur fissione glebarum, ab illo aureo genere, ut poëtae loquuntur, vis nulla umquam adferebatur.

Ferrea tum vero proles exorta repente est
Ausaque funestum prima est fabricarier ensem
Et gustare manu vinctum domitumque iuvencum.

Tanta putabatur utilitas percipi e bubus, ut eorum visceribus
64 vesci scelus haberetur. Longum est mulorum persequi utilitates et asinorum, quae certe ad hominum usum paratae
160 sunt. Sus vero quid habet praeter escam? cui quidem, ne putesceret, animam ipsam pro sale datam dicit esse Chrysippus; qua pecude, quod erat ad vescendum hominibus apta, nihil genuit natura fecundius. Quid multitudinem suavitatemque piscium dicam? quid avium? ex quibus tanta percipitur voluptas, ut interdum Pronoea nostra Epicurea fuisse videatur. Atque eae ne caperentur quidem nisi hominum ratione atque sollertia; quamquam avis quasdam, et alites et oscines, ut nostri augures
161 appellant, rerum augurandarum causa esse natas putamus. Iam vero immanes et feras beluas nanciscimur venando, ut et vescamur iis et exerceamur in venando ad similitudinem bellicae disciplinae et utamur domitis et condocefactis, ut elephantis, multaque ex earum corporibus remedia morbis et vulneribus eligamus, sicut ex quibusdam stirpibus et herbis, quarum utilitates longinqui temporis usu et periclitatione percepimus. Totam licet animis tamquam oculis lustrare terram mariaque omnia; cernes iam spatia frugifera atque inmensa camporum vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus, tum incredi-
162 bili cursus maritimos celeritate. Nec vero supra terram, sed etiam in intumis eius tenebris plurimarum rerum latet utilitas, quae ad usum hominum orta ab hominibus solis invenitur.

65 Illud vero, quod uterque vestrum arripiet fortasse ad repren-

dendum, Cotta, quia Carneades lubenter in Stoicos invehebatur,
Velleius, quia nihil tam inridet Epicurus quam praedictionem
rerum futurarum, mihi videtur vel maxume confirmare deorum
providentia consuli rebus humanis. Est enim profecto divina-
tio, quae multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparet cum [in] pri-
vatis tum maxume publicis. Multa cernunt haruspices, multa 163
augures provident, multa oraclis declarantur, multa vaticina-
tionibus, multa somniis, multa portentis, quibus cognitis multae
saepe res *ex* hominum sententia atque utilitate partae, multa
etiam pericula depulsa sunt. Haec igitur sive vis sive ars sive
natura ad scientiam rerum futurarum homini profecto est nec
alii cuiquam a dis inmortalibus data. Quae si singula vos forte
non movent, universa certe tamen inter se conexa atque con-
iuncta movere debebunt.

Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis 164
a dis inmortalibus consuli et provideri solet. Licet enim con-
trahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad
pauciores, postremo deducere ad singulos. Nam si omnibus 66
hominibus, qui ubique sunt quacumque in ora ac parte terra-
rum ab huiusce terrae, quam nos incolimus, continuatione
distantium, deos consulere censemus ob eas causas, quas ante
diximus, his quoque hominibus consulunt, qui has nobiscum
terras ab oriente ad occidentem colunt. Sin autem *his* consu- 165
lunt, qui quasi magnam quandam insulam incolunt, quam nos
orbem terrae vocamus, etiam illis consulunt, qui partes eius
insulae tenent, Europam, Asiam, Africam. Ergo et earum
partes diligunt, ut Romam, Athenas, Spartam, Rhodum, et
earum urbium separatim ab universis singulos diligunt, ut Pyrrhi
bello Curium, Fabricium, Coruncanium, primo Punico Calati-
num, Duellium, Metellum, Lutatium, secundo Maxumum, Mar-
cellum, Africanum, post hos Paulum, Gracchum, Catonem
patrumve memoria Scipionem, Laelium; multosque praeterea
et nostra civitas et Graecia tulit singulares viros, quorum nemi-
nem nisi iuvante deo talem fuisse credendum est. Quae ratio 166
poëtas maxumeque Homerum inpulit, ut principibus heroum,

Ulixi, Diomedi, Agamemnoni, Achilli, certos deos discriminum et periculorum comites adiungeret. Praeterea ipsorum deorum saepe praesentiae, quales supra commemoravi, declarant ab iis et civitatibus et singulis hominibus consuli; quod quidem intellegitur etiam significationibus rerum futurarum, quae tum dormientibus, tum vigilantibus portenduntur. Multa praeterea ostentis, multa extis admonemur multisque rebus aliis, quas
167 diuturnus usus ita notavit, ut artem divinationis efficeret. Nemo igitur vir magnus sine aliquo adflatu divino umquam fuit. Nec vero *id* ita refellendum est, ut, si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit, aut si quid e vitae commodis casus abstulerit, eum, cui quid horum acciderit, aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo iudicemus. Magna di curant, parva neglegunt. Magnis autem viris prosperae semper omnes res, siquidem satis a nostris et a principe philosophiae Socrate dictum est de ubertatibus virtutis et copiis.

67 168 Haec mihi fere in mentem veniebant, quae dicenda putarem de natura deorum. Tu autem, Cotta, si me audias, eandem causam agas teque et principem civem et pontificem esse cogites et, quoniam in utramque partem vobis licet disputare, hanc potius sumas eamque facultatem disserendi, quam tibi a rhetoricis exercitationibus acceptam amplificavit Academia, potius huc conferas. Mala enim et impia consuetudo est contra deos disputandi, sive ex animo id fit sive simulate.

BOOK THIRD.

SUMMARY.

BEFORE giving his objections to the doctrines of the Stoics as expounded by Balbus Cotta expressly defends himself against the suspicion of not believing the religious faith handed down from former times. He believes it, he says, thoroughly; but to him religion is only a matter of faith, not of knowledge, and his objections are directed solely against the attempt of the Stoic to change this faith into knowledge by means of rational proof. He cannot allow any conclusive force to the arguments adduced by Balbus (§§ 1–5). He then commences the discussion in detail, and first takes up the proofs for the existence of the gods. Balbus had said that, properly speaking, no proofs of it were necessary, and yet had attempted to give them; in reality however he had only made the matter more doubtful. He had appealed to the popular belief, without really agreeing with that belief himself; moreover such an appeal cannot pass, says Cotta, for a scientific argument (6–10). The pretended instances of apparitions of the gods, and all that Balbus had said about revelation by the auspices, can make no claim to certainty or to be received as valid proof (11–15). This is sufficient to refute the first part of Cleanthes's argument which is also based on revelation. The second part, which appealed to the impression made by the gigantic phenomena of nature, is met by the remark that, although the common people regard these as the operations of divine beings, it by no means follows that they really are such (16, 17). The two remaining parts are reserved for the portion of the argument on the divine providence; this however is no longer extant. For this portion is also reserved the discussion of the arguments of Chrysippus, of the syllogisms of Zeno and the

propositions of physics in regard to the creative principle of heat, the soul of the universe, the divinity of the world and the heavenly bodies (18).

All that Balbus had said about the nature of the gods is considered by Cotta as rather adapted to make even their existence doubtful. Balbus had argued that the universe must be God because there exists nothing more perfect than the universe. But even if this were true, it does not necessarily follow from its perfection that the universe is endowed with a soul, with reason, with wisdom, nor that it is God (21–23). Nor can the regularity of the motions of the heavenly bodies be cited as proof that they are divine; if so, we should have to consider the ebb and flow of the tide and even intermittent fever as gods by reason of their regular recurrence. The further deduction of Balbus, that, since the universe is not the work of human power or human wisdom, there must exist beings of a higher sort than men, and hence gods, rests on an arbitrary and erroneous view of what is higher, and upon a confusion of reason and natural force (25, 26). That too is a prejudice, that the human reasonable soul must derive from a reasonable soul already existing in the world. It is, says Cotta, a result of the force of nature, just as the harmonious complex of the universe is, and no gods are necessary to explain this (27, 28). — Next follows the argument of Carneades, that no bodily, no living and sensitive being can be eternal and immortal (29–35), and the proof that the principle of fire or heat, which the Stoics regard as living and as the source of all life, cannot be immortal, inasmuch as according to their notion it needs replenishing (35–37). — Cotta omits the further deduction from this, which follows of itself: for if there is nothing which is immortal, and if immortality is an essential predicate of the deity, there can be no gods. Finally he says that the idea of deity excludes the idea of virtue, which only comports with human relations; while again on the other hand a god is inconceivable without virtue (38, 39).

But granting too that the universe is God, how can we justify the assumption of several gods? And suppose we let pass also the divinity of the heavenly bodies; to consider eatable things as gods is an evident absurdity; and how gods can be made out of men is quite inconceivable (40–42). If we are to learn from popular belief and tradition whom to recognise as God, we shall have all sorts,

even the most monstrous and most ridiculous gods (43–50). If the heavenly bodies are gods, there is no reason for not considering the rainbows, clouds and winds as gods; if earth and sea pass for gods, so must rivers and springs; in short there is no limit (51, 52). The learned inquirers think they have found out that all the chief gods of the popular belief were only men of olden time who have not actually become gods but are only imagined to be so by the deluded people. Such a view, Cotta thinks, must necessarily be rejected in the interest of religion itself[1]; but the Stoics, by their allegorical explanation of these pretended gods and the stories about them, have, instead of rejecting them, rather given them a sort of respectability (53–60). Still all their views are easily refuted. Some of the beings explained to be gods are evidently impersonal things, qualities and relations; and all the rest after the Stoic explanations, instead of gods, become mere forces of nature.

Next came in the original the third part or the refutation of the proposition that the world is governed by the divine providence; but the whole of this part is lost.[2] A large portion of the fourth part is also no longer extant, which was devoted to showing that the gods had no especial care for men. The remaining portion (§ 66) relates to Balbus's eulogy of reason as the most excellent gift of the gods to men (Bk. II, c. 61). Cotta

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[1] For this rejection of Euhemerism see note on 23, 60. Cotta is here evidently guilty of an inconsistency. For if in the interest of religion, in order not to take from the common people the gods in whom they believed, he rejected the Euhemeristic humanizing of them, the same interest would necessarily have deterred him also from interfering with any one of the deities worshipped by the people which he has really done in many instances in what has preceded. It would seem that this inconsistency is due to Cicero alone, and that the real Academic philosophers by no means disdained to make use of Euhemerism as a weapon against the popular religion; just as at a subsequent period the Christian opponents of polytheism were fond of doing. And that Cicero himself did not refuse to acknowledge a justification for Euhemerism is seen from Tusc. I, 13, 28, and V, 3, 8.

[2] We say nothing on the question whether this part was designedly destroyed, because it might endanger faith and piety. Arnobius (III, 7) testifies that in reality many even among the heathen were scandalized at this book of Cicero's, and thought it ought to be destroyed; and according to Lactantius (D. I. II, 3, 2) Cotta said in the third book: *non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis exstingueret.*

attempts to show on the contrary that reason, since it is so often turned to evil purposes and brings so much harm, cannot by any possibility be regarded as a divine gift; for we cannot suppose either that the gods would have given to men a hurtful gift or that they could not have prevented or foreseen the evil use which mankind would make of it (66–78). Gods who really wished well to mankind ought rather to have made them good and wise; or if not this, they ought at least to have had a care for those who are good and wise (79, 80). But this is no more the case than the other; the best men often fare the worst, and the worst the best; experience gives no proof whatever of a divine justice, which rewards virtue and punishes vice; and this would afford encouragement to crime, were it not for conscience, which, regardless of the deity, furnishes to mankind a support and guide (81–85). But no evidence of divine government is discernible here; and the pretext that the gods concern themselves with human affairs only in general, not with trifles, is inadmissible, because the cases in which the absence of divine justice is felt are by no means all trifles of no importance (86). The general belief regards precisely the external gifts of fortune, not the internal ones such as virtue and wisdom, as coming from the gods; and thus the good fortune, which bad men enjoy, is a proof against the divine government of the world (87, 88). Isolated instances, in which the good meet with success, are of no weight against the majority of cases where the contrary happens; and it is no excuse to say either that the gods do not concern themselves with every individual case or that they are ignorant (89, 90). And to say that the gods visit the punishment of evil deeds, if not on the evil-doers themselves, at least upon their children and descendants is to attribute to them the greatest injustice. But suffering and misfortune come not from any god, but from men themselves. The deity does not protect us against it, even where it should justly do so, if, as the Stoics say, it has the power to do what it wills. So then the deity is ignorant of what it can do, or it has no concern for mankind, or it is incapable of judging what is good (91, 92). The Stoics contradict themselves, says Cotta, when they say that the gods do not concern themselves with details, and at the same time maintain that dreams come from the gods, and urge everybody to pray to the deity, for in that case the deity must hear the prayers of individuals.

Cotta closes with the assurance that the aim of his whole discourse is not to deny the existence of the gods, but only to show how difficult it is to arrive at any distinct knowledge about them. Cicero adds however that, although Velleius pronounces the existence of Cotta true and convincing, he himself is inclined to consider the views of Balbus as more probable.

QUAE cum Balbus dixisset, tum adridens Cotta: Sero, 1
inquit, mihi, Balbe, praecipis, quid defendam. Ego 1
enim te disputante, quid contra dicerem, mecum ipse meditabar, neque tam refellendi tui causa quam ea, quae minus intellegebam, requirendi. Cum autem suo cuique iudicio sit
utendum, difficile factu est me id sentire, quod tu velis. Hic 2
Velleius: Nescis, inquit, quanta cum exspectatione, Cotta, sim te auditurus. Iucundus enim Balbo nostro sermo tuus contra Epicurum fuit; praebebo igitur ego me tibi vicissim attentum contra Stoicos auditorem. Spero enim te, ut soles, bene para-
tum venire. Tum Cotta: Sic mehercule, inquit, Vellei; neque 3
enim mihi par ratio cum Lucilio est ac tecum fuit. Qui tandem? inquit ille. Quia mihi videtur Epicurus vester de dis inmortalibus non magnopere pugnare; tantum modo negare deos esse non audet, ne quid invidiae subeat aut criminis. Cum vero deos nihil agere, nihil curare confirmat membrisque humanis esse praeditos, sed eorum membrorum usum nullum habere, ludere videtur satisque putare, si dixerit esse quandam
beatam naturam et aeternam. A Balbo autem animadvertisti, 4
credo, quam multa dicta sint quamque, etiamsi minus vera, tamen apta inter se et cohaerentia. Itaque cogito, ut dixi, non tam refellere eius orationem quam ea, quae minus intellexi, requirere. Quare, Balbe, tibi permitto, responderene mihi malis de singulis rebus quaerenti ex te ea, quae parum accepi, an universam audire orationem meam. Tum Balbus: Ego vero,

si quid explanari tibi voles, respondere malo; sin me interro-
gare non tam intellegendi causa quam refellendi, utrum voles,
faciam, vel ad singula, quae requires, statim respondebo vel,
5 cum peroraris, ad omnia. Tum Cotta: Optime, inquit. Quam
2 ob rem sic agamus, ut nos ipsa ducet oratio. Sed ante quam
de re, pauca de me. Non enim mediocriter moveor auctoritate
tua, Balbe, orationeque ea, quae me in perorando cohortabatur,
ut meminissem me et Cottam esse et pontificem; quod eo,
credo, valebat, ut opiniones, quas a maioribus accepimus de dis
inmortalibus, sacra, caerimonias religionesque defenderem. Ego
vero eas defendam semper semperque defendi, nec me ex ea
opinione, quam a maioribus accepi de cultu deorum inmorta-
lium, ullius umquam oratio aut docti aut indocti movebit. Sed
cum de religione agitur, Ti. Coruncanium, P. Scipionem,
P. Scaevolam, pontifices maximos, non Zenonem aut Cleanthen
aut Chrysippum sequor habeoque C. Laelium augurem eun-
demque sapientem, quem potius audiam dicentem de religione
in illa oratione nobili quam quemquam principem Stoicorum.
Cumque omnis populi Romani religio in sacra et in auspicia
divisa sit, tertium adiunctum sit, si quid praedictionis causa ex
portentis et monstris Sibyllae interpretes haruspicesve monue-
runt, harum ego religionum nullam umquam contemnendam
putavi mihique ita persuasi, Romulum auspiciis, Numam sacris
constitutis fundamenta iecisse nostrae civitatis, quae numquam
profecto sine summa placatione deorum inmortalium tanta esse
6 potuisset. Habes, Balbe, quid Cotta, quid pontifex sentiat;
fac nunc ego intellegam, tu quid sentias. A te enim philosopho
rationem accipere debeo religionis, maioribus autem nostris
3 etiam nulla ratione reddita credere. Tum Balbus: Quam igitur
a me rationem, inquit, Cotta, desideras? Et ille: Quadriper-
tita, inquit, fuit divisio tua, primum ut velles docere deos esse,
deinde quales essent, tum ab iis mundum regi, postremo con-
sulere eos rebus humanis. Haec, si recte memini, partitio fuit.
Rectissume, inquit Balbus; sed expecto, quid requiras.
7 Tum Cotta: Primum quidque videamus, inquit; et, si id est

primum, quod inter omnis nisi admodum impios convenit, mihi quidem ex animo excuti non potest, esse deos, id tamen ipsum, quod mihi persuasum est auctoritate maiorum, cur ita sit, nihil tu me doces. Quid est, inquit Balbus, si tibi persuasum est, cur a me velis discere? Tum Cotta: Quia sic adgredior, inquit, ad hanc disputationem, quasi nihil umquam audierim de dis inmortalibus, nihil cogitaverim; rudem me et integrum discipulum accipe et ea, quae requiro, doce. Dic igitur, inquit, quid 8
requiras. Egone? primum illud, cur, quod in ista partitione ne egere quidem oratione dixisses, quod esset perspicuum et inter omnis constaret, de eo ipso tam multa dixeris. Quia te quoque, inquit, animadverti, Cotta, saepe, cum in foro diceres, quam plurimis posses argumentis onerare iudicem, si modo eam facultatem tibi daret causa. Atque hoc idem et philosophi faciunt et ego, ut potui, feci. Tu autem, qui id quaeris, similiter facis, ac si me roges, cur te duobus contuear oculis et non altero coniveam, cum idem uno adsequi possim. Tum Cotta: Quam 4 9
simile istud sit, inquit, tu videris. Nam ego neque in causis, si quid est evidens, de quo inter omnis conveniat, argumentari soleo; perspicuitas enim argumentatione elevatur; nec, si id facerem in causis forensibus, idem facerem in hac subtilitate sermonis. Cur coniveres autem altero oculo, causa non esset, cum idem obtutus esset amborum, et cum rerum natura, quam tu sapientem esse vis, duo lumina ab animo ad oculos perforata nos habere voluisset. Sed quia non confidebas tam esse id perspicuum, quam tu velles, propterea multis argumentis deos esse docere voluisti. Mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse. Sed tu auctoritates contemnis, ratione pugnas. Patere igitur rationem meam cum tua ratione 10
contendere. Adfers haec omnia argumenta, cur di sint, remque mea sententia minime dubiam argumentando dubiam facis. Mandavi enim memoriae non numerum solum, sed etiam ordinem argumentorum tuorum. Primum fuit, cum caelum suspexissemus, statim nos intellegere esse aliquod numen, quo haec regantur. Ex hoc illud etiam:

Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant
omnes Iovem.

11 Quasi vero quisquam nostrum istum potius quam Capitolinum
Iovem appellet aut hoc perspicuum sit constetque inter omnis,
eos esse deos, quos tibi Velleius multique praeterea ne animantis
quidem esse concedant. Grave etiam argumentum tibi vide-
batur, quod opinio de dis inmortalibus et omnium esset et
cotidie cresceret. Placet igitur tantas res opinione stultorum
5 iudicari, vobis praesertim, qui illos insanos esse dicatis? At
enim praesentis videmus deos, ut apud Regillum Postumius, in
Salaria Vatinius; nescio quid etiam de Locrorum apud Sagram
proelio. Quos igitur tu Tyndaridas appellabas, id est homines
homine natos, et quos Homerus, qui recens ab illorum aetate
fuit, sepultos esse dicit Lacedaemone, eos tu cantheriis albis
nullis calonibus ob viam Vatinio venisse existimas et victoriam
populi Romani Vatinio potius, homini rustico, quam M. Catoni,
qui tum erat princeps, nuntiavisse? Ergo et illud in silice,
quod hodie apparet apud Regillum tamquam vestigium ungulae,
12 Castoris equi credis esse? Nonne mavis illud credere, quod
probari potest, animos praeclarorum hominum, quales isti Tyn-
daridae fuerunt, divinos esse et aeternos, quam eos, qui semel
cremati essent, equitare et in acie pugnare potuisse? aut, si hoc
fieri potuisse dicis, doceas oportet, quo modo, nec fabellas
13 aniles proferas. Tum Lucilius: An tibi, inquit, fabellae viden-
tur? Nonne *ab* A. Postumio aedem Castori et Polluci in foro
dedicatam, nonne senatus consultum de Vatinio vides? Nam de
Sagra Graecorum etiam est volgare proverbium, qui, quae adfir-
mant, certiora esse dicunt quam illa, quae apud Sagram. His
igitur auctoribus nonne debes moveri? Tum Cotta: Rumoribus,
inquit, mecum pugnas, Balbe, ego autem a te rationes requiro...

6 14 Sequuntur, quae futura sunt. Effugere enim nemo id potest,
quod futurum est. Saepe autem ne utile quidem est scire, quid
futurum sit; miserum est enim nihil proficientem angi nec
habere ne spei quidem extremum et tamen commune solacium,
praesertim cum vos iidem fato fieri dicatis omnia, quod autem

semper ex omni aeternitate verum fuerit, id esse fatum. Quid
igitur iuvat aut quid adfert ad cavendum scire aliquid futurum,
cum id certe futurum sit? Unde porro ista divinatio? Quis
invenit fissum iecoris? quis cornicis cantum notavit, quis sortis?
quibus ego credo, nec possum Atti Navii, quem commemorabas,
lituum contemnere. Sed qui ista intellecta sint, a philosophis
debeo discere, praesertim cum plurimis de rebus divini isti men-
tiantur. At medici quoque (ita enim dicebas) saepe falluntur. 15
Quid simile medicina, cuius ego rationem video, et divinatio,
quae unde oriatur, non intellego? Tu autem etiam Deciorum
devotionibus placatos deos esse censes. Quae fuit eorum tanta
iniquitas, ut placari populo Romano non possent, nisi viri tales
occidissent? Consilium illud imperatorium fuit, quod Graeci
στρατήγημα appellant, sed eorum imperatorum, qui patriae con-
sulerent, vitae non parcerent; rebantur enim fore ut exercitus
imperatorem equo incitato se in hostem inmittentem perseque-
retur, id quod evenit. Nam Fauni vocem equidem numquam
audivi; tibi, si audivisse te dicis, credam, etsi Faunus omnino
quid sit nescio. Non igitur adhuc, quantum quidem in te est, 7
Balbe, intellego deos esse, quos equidem credo esse; sed nihil
docent Stoici. Nam Cleanthes, ut dicebas, quattuor modis 16
formatas in animis hominum putat deorum esse notiones. Unus
is modus est, de quo satis dixi, qui est susceptus ex praesen-
sione rerum futurarum, alter ex perturbationibus tempestatum
et reliquis motibus, tertius ex commoditate rerum, quas percipi-
mus, et copia, quartus ex astrorum ordine caelique constantia.
De praesensione diximus. De perturbationibus caelestibus et
maritimis et terrenis non possumus dicere, cum ea fiant, non
esse multos, qui illa metuant et a dis inmortalibus fieri existu-
ment; sed non id quaeritur, sintne aliqui, qui deos esse putent; 17
di utrum sint necne sint, quaeritur. Nam reliquae causae, quas
Cleanthes adfert, quarum una est de commodorum, quae capi-
mus, copia, altera de temporum ordine caelique constantia, tum
tractabuntur a nobis, cum disputabimus de providentia deorum,
de qua plurima a te, Balbe, dicta sunt; eodemque illa etiam 18

differemus, quod Chrysippum dicere aiebas, quoniam esset aliquid in rerum natura, quod ab homine effici non posset, esse aliquid homine melius, quaeque in domo pulchra cum pulchritudine mundi comparabas, et cum totius mundi convenientiam consensumque adferebas, Zenonisque brevis et acutulas conclusiones in eam partem sermonis, quam modo dixi, differemus; eodemque tempore illa omnia, quae a te, physice, dicta sunt de vi ignea deque eo calore, ex quo omnia generari dicebas, loco suo quaerentur, omniaque, quae a te nudius tertius dicta sunt, cum docere velles deos esse, quare et mundus universus et sol et luna et stellae sensum ac mentem haberent, in idem
19 tempus reservabo. A te autem idem illud etiam atque etiam
8 quaeram, quibus rationibus tibi persuadeas deos esse. Tum Balbus: Equidem attulisse rationes mihi videor, sed eas tu ita refellis, ut, cum me interrogaturus esse videare et ego me ad respondendum compararim, repente avertas orationem nec des respondendi locum. Itaque maximae res tacitae praeterierunt, de divinatione, de fato, quibus de quaestionibus tu quidem strictim, nostri autem multa solent dicere, sed ab hac ea quaestione, quae nunc in manibus est, separantur. Quare, si videtur, noli agere confuse, ut hoc explicemus hac disputatione, quod quaeritur.

20 Optime, inquit Cotta. Itaque quoniam quattuor in partes totam quaestionem divisisti de primaque diximus, consideremus secundam; quae mihi talis videtur fuisse, ut, cum ostendere velles, quales di essent, ostenderes nullos esse. A consuetudine enim oculorum animum abducere difficillimum dicebas, sed, cum deo nihil praestantius esset, non dubitabas, quin mundus esset deus, quo nihil in rerum natura melius esset. Modo possemus eum animantem cogitare vel potius, ut cetera oculis, sic
21 animo hoc cernere! Sed cum mundo negas quicquam esse melius, quid dicis melius? Si pulchrius, adsentior; si aptius ad utilitates nostras, id quoque adsentior; sin autem id dicis, nihil esse mundo sapientius, nullo modo prorsus adsentior, non quod difficile sit mentem ab oculis sevocare, sed quo magis sevoco,

eo minus id, quod tu vis, possum mente comprehendere. Nihil 9
est mundo melius in rerum natura. Ne in terris quidem urbe nostra; num igitur idcirco in urbe esse rationem, cogitationem, mentem putas? aut, quoniam non sit, num idcirco existimas formicam anteponendam esse huic pulcherrumae urbi, quod in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria? Videre oportet, Balbe, quid tibi concedatur, non te ipsum, quod velis, sumere. Istum enim locum 22
totum illa vetus Zenonis brevis et, ut tibi videbatur, acuta conclusio dilatavit. Zeno enim ita concludit: 'Quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non utitur; nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur.' Hoc si placet, 23
iam efficies, ut mundus optime librum legere videatur. Zenonis enim vestigiis hoc modo rationem poteris concludere: 'Quod litteratum est, id est melius, quam quod non est litteratum; nihil autem mundo melius; litteratus igitur est mundus.' Isto modo etiam disertus et quidem mathematicus, musicus, omni denique doctrina eruditus, postremo philosophus [erit mundus]. Saepe dixti nihil fieri nisi ex eo, nec illam vim esse naturae, ut sui dissimilia posset effingere; concedam non modo animantem et sapientem esse mundum, sed fidicinem etiam et tubicinem, quoniam earum quoque artium homines ex eo procreantur? Nihil igitur adfert pater iste Stoicorum, quare mundum ratione uti putemus, ne cur animantem quidem esse. Non est igitur mundus deus, et tamen nihil est eo melius; nihil est enim eo pulchrius, nihil salutarius nobis, nihil ornatius aspectu motuque constantius. Quodsi mundus universus non est deus, ne stellae quidem, quas tu innumerabilis in deorum numero reponebas, quarum te cursus aequabiles aeternique delectabant, nec mehercule iniuria; sunt enim admirabili incredibilique constantia.
Sed non omnia, Balbe, quae cursus certos et constantis habent, 24
ea deo potius tribuenda sunt quam naturae. Quid Chalcidico 10
Euripo in motu identidem reciprocando putas fieri posse constantius? quid freto Siciliensi? quid Oceani fervore illis in locis,

Europam Libyamque rapax ubi dividit unda?

Quid? aestus maritimi vel Hispanienses vel Britannici eorumque certis temporibus vel accessus vel recessus sine deo fieri non possunt? Vide, quaeso, si omnis motus omniaque, quae certis temporibus ordinem suum conservant, divina dicimus, ne tertianas quoque febres et quartanas divinas esse dicendum sit, quarum reversione et motu quid potest esse constantius? Sed
25 omnium talium rerum ratio reddenda est. Quod vos cum facere non potestis, tamquam in aram confugitis ad deum.

Et Chrysippus tibi acute dicere videbatur, homo sine dubio versutus et callidus (versutos eos appello, quorum celeriter mens versatur, callidos autem, quorum, tamquam manus opere, sic animus usu concalluit); is igitur: 'Si aliquid est', inquit, 'quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit, melior est homine; homo autem haec, quae in mundo sunt, efficere non potest; qui potuit igitur, is praestat homini; homini autem praestare quis possit nisi deus? est igitur deus.' Haec omnia
26 in eodem, quo illa Zenonis, errore versantur. Quid enim sit melius, quid praestabilius, quid inter naturam et rationem intersit, non distinguitur. Idemque, si dei non sint, negat esse in omni natura quicquam homine melius; id autem putare quemquam hominem, nihil homine esse melius, summae adrogantiae censet esse. Sit sane adrogantis pluris se putare quam mundum; at illud non modo non adrogantis, sed potius prudentis, intellegere se habere sensum et rationem, haec eadem Orionem et Caniculam non habere. Et: 'Si domus pulchra sit, intellegamus eam dominis', inquit, 'aedificatam esse, non muribus; sic igitur mundum deorum domum existimare debemus.' Ita prorsus existimarem, si illum aedificatum esse, non (quem ad modum docebo) a natura conformatum putarem.

11 27 At enim quaerit apud Xenophontem Socrates, unde animum arripuerimus, si nullus fuerit in mundo. Et ego quaero, unde orationem, unde numeros, unde cantus; nisi vero loqui solem cum luna putamus, cum propius accesserit, aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras existimat. Naturae ista sunt, Balbe, naturae non artificiose ambulantis, ut ait Zeno, (quod

quidem quale sit, iam videbimus) sed omnia cientis et agitantis
motibus et mutationibus suis. Itaque illa mihi placebat oratio 28
de convenientia consensuque naturae, quam quasi cognatione
continuata conspirare dicebas. Illud non probabam, quod
negabas id accidere potuisse, nisi ea uno divino spiritu contine-
rentur. Illa vero cohaerent et permanent naturae viribus, non
deorum, estque in ea iste quasi consensus, quam *συμπάθειαν*
Graeci vocant; sed ea, quo sua sponte maior est, eo minus
divina ratione fieri existimanda est.

Illa autem, quae Carneades adferebat, quem ad modum dis- **12** 29
solvitis? si nullum corpus inmortale sit, nullum esse corpus
sempiternum; corpus autem inmortale nullum esse, ne indivi-
duum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit. Cumque
omne animal patibilem naturam habeat, nullum est eorum, quod
effugiat accipiendi aliquid extrinsecus, id est quasi ferendi et
patiendi, necessitatem, et, si omne animal tale est, inmortale
nullum est. Ergo itidem, si omne animal secari ac dividi po-
test, nullum est eorum individuum, nullum aeternum; atqui
omne animal ad accipiendam vim externam et ferundam para-
tum est; mortale igitur omne animal et dissolubile et dividuum
sit necesse est. Ut enim, si omnis cera commutabilis esset, 30
nihil esset cereum, quod commutari non posset, item nihil
argenteum, nihil aëneum, si commutabilis esset natura argenti
et aeris: similiter igitur, si omnia [quae sunt], e quibus cuncta
constant, mutabilia sunt, nullum corpus esse potest non muta-
bile; mutabilia autem sunt illa, ex quibus omnia constant, ut
vobis videtur; omne igitur corpus mutabile est. At si esset
corpus aliquod inmortale, non esset omne mutabile; ita effici-
tur, ut omne corpus mortale sit. Etenim omne corpus aut aqua
aut aër aut ignis aut terra est aut id, quod est concretum ex his
aut ex aliqua parte eorum; horum autem nihil est, quin inte-
reat. Nam et terrenum omne dividitur, et umor ita mollis est, 31
ut facile premi conlidique possit; ignis vero et aër omni pulsu
facillime pellitur naturaque cedens est maxume et dissupabilis.
Praetereaque omnia haec tum intereunt, cum in naturam aliam

convertuntur, quod fit, cum terra in aquam se vertit, et cum ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre aether, cumque eadem vicissim retro commeant. Quodsi ea intereunt, e quibus constat omne ani-
13 32 mal, nullum est animal sempiternum. Et ut haec omittamus, tamen animal nullum inveniri potest, quod neque natum umquam sit et semper sit futurum. Omne enim animal sensus habet; sentit igitur et calida et frigida et dulcia et amara nec potest ullo sensu iucunda accipere, non accipere contraria; si igitur voluptatis sensum capit, doloris etiam capit; quod autem dolorem accipit, id accipiat etiam interitum necesse est; omne
33 igitur animal confitendum est esse mortale. Praeterea, si quid est, quod nec voluptatem sentiat nec dolorem, id animal esse non potest; sin autem quid animal est, id illa necesse est sentiat; et, quod ea sentit, non potest esse aeternum, et omne animal sentit; nullum igitur animal aeternum est. Praeterea nullum potest esse animal, in quo non et adpetitio sit et declinatio naturalis; appetuntur autem, quae secundum naturam sunt, declinantur contraria; et omne animal adpetit quaedam et fugit a quibusdam; quod autem refugit, id contra naturam est; et, quod est contra naturam, id habet vim interimendi;
34 omne ergo animal intereat necesse est. Innumerabilia sunt, ex quibus effici cogique possit nihil esse, quod sensum habeat, quin id intereat; etenim ea ipsa, quae sentiuntur, ut frigus, ut calor, ut voluptas, ut dolor, ut cetera, cum amplificata sunt, interimunt; nec ullum animal est sine sensu; nullum igitur
14 animal aeternum est. Etenim aut simplex est natura animantis, ut vel terrena sit vel ignea vel animalis vel umida (quod quale sit, ne intellegi quidem potest), aut concreta ex pluribus naturis, quarum suum quaeque locum habeat, quo naturae vi feratur, alia infimum, alia summum, alia medium. Haec ad quoddam tempus cohaerere possunt, semper autem nullo modo possunt; necesse est enim in suum quaeque locum natura rapiatur. Nullum igitur animal est sempiternum.

85 Sed omnia vestri, Balbe, solent ad igneam vim referre Heraclitum, ut opinor, sequentes, quem ipsum non omnes interpre-

tantur uno modo; qui quoniam quid diceret intellegi noluit,
omittamus; vos autem ita dicitis, omnem vim esse igneam,
itaque et animantis, cum calor defecerit, tum interire, et in
omni natura rerum id vivere, id vigere, quod caleat. Ego
autem non intellego, quo modo calore extincto corpora intere-
ant, non intereant umore aut spiritu amisso, praesertim cum
intereant etiam nimio calore. Quam ob rem id quidem com- 36
mune est de calido; verum tamen videamus exitum. Ita voltis,
opinor, nihil esse animal intrinsecus in natura atque mundo
praeter ignem. Qui magis quam praeter animam, unde ani-
mantium quoque constet animus, ex quo animal dicitur? Quo
modo autem hoc, quasi concedatur, sumitis, nihil esse animum
nisi ignem? probabilius enim videtur tale quiddam esse ani-
mum, ut sit ex igni atque anima temperatum. Quodsi ignis ex
sese ipse animal est nulla se alia admiscente natura, quoniam is,
cum inest in corporibus nostris, efficit, ut sentiamus, non potest
ipse esse sine sensu. Rursus eadem dici possunt: Quidquid
est enim, quod sensum habeat, id necesse est sentiat et volup-
tatem et dolorem; ad quem autem dolor veniat, ad eundem
etiam interitum venire. Ita fit, ut ne ignem quidem efficere
possitis aeternum. Quid enim? non eisdem vobis placet om- 37
nem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere ullo modo posse,
nisi alatur? ali autem solem, lunam, reliqua astra aquis, alia
dulcibus, alia marinis? Eamque causam Cleanthes adfert, cur
se sol referat nec longius progrediatur solstitiali orbi itemque
brumali, ne longius discedat a cibo. Hoc totum quale sit,
mox; nunc autem concludatur illud: quod interire possit, id
aeternum non esse natura; ignem autem interiturum esse, nisi
alatur; non esse igitur natura ignem sempiternum.

Qualem autem deum intellegere nos possumus nulla virtute 15 38
praeditum? Quid enim? prudentiamne deo tribuemus, quae
constat ex scientia rerum bonarum et malarum et nec bonarum
nec malarum? Cui mali nihil est nec esse potest, quid huic
opus est dilectu bonorum et malorum? quid autem ratione?
quid intellegentia? quibus utimur ad eam rem, ut apertis ob-

scura adsequamur; at obscurum deo nihil potest esse. Nam iustitia, quae suum cuique distribuit, quid pertinet ad deos? hominum enim societas et communitas, ut vos dicitis, iustitiam procreavit. Temperantia autem constat ex praetermittendis voluptatibus corporis, cui si locus in caelo est, est etiam voluptatibus. Nam fortis deus intellegi qui potest? in dolore? an in
39 labore? an in periculo? quorum deum nihil attingit. Nec ratione igitur utentem nec virtute ulla praeditum deum intellegere qui possumus? Nec vero volgi atque imperitorum inscitiam despicere possum, cum ea considero, quae dicuntur a Stoicis; sunt enim illa imperitorum: piscem Syri venerantur, omne fere genus bestiarum Aegyptii consecraverunt; iam vero in Graecia multos habent ex hominibus deos, Alabandum Alabandis, Tenedii Tennen, Leucotheam, quae fuit Ino, et eius Palaemonem filium cuncta Graecia, Herculem, Aesculapium, Tyndaridas; Romulum nostri aliosque compluris, quos quasi
16 40 novos et adscripticios cives in caelum receptos putant. Haec igitur indocti; quid vos philosophi? qui meliora? Omitto illa; sunt enim praeclara: sit sane deus ipse mundus. Hoc credo illud esse

sublime candens, quem invocant omnés Iovem.

Quare igitur pluris adiungimus deos? quanta autem est eorum multitudo! Mihi quidem sane multi videntur. Singulas enim stellas numeras deos eosque aut beluarum nomine appellas, ut Capram, ut Nepam, ut Taurum, ut Leonem, aut rerum inani-
41 marum, ut Argo, ut Aram, ut Coronam. Sed ut haec concedantur, reliqua qui tandem non modo concedi, sed omnino intellegi possunt? Cum fruges Cererem, vinum Liberum dicimus, genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato, sed ecquem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, deum credat esse? Nam quos ab hominibus pervenisse dicis ad deos, tu reddes rationem, quem ad modum id fieri potuerit aut cur fieri desierit, et ego discam libenter. Quo modo nunc quidem est, non video, quo pacto ille, cui 'in monte Oetaeo illatae

lampades fuerint', ut ait Accius, 'in domum aeternam patris' ex illo ardore pervenerit; quem tamen Homerus apud inferos conveniri facit ab Ulixe, sicut ceteros, qui excesserant vita. Quamquam, quem potissimum Herculem colamus, scire 42 sane velim; pluris enim tradunt nobis ii, qui interiores scrutantur et reconditas litteras, antiquissimum Iove natum, sed item Iove antiquissimo; nam Ioves quoque pluris in priscis Graecorum litteris invenimus. Ex eo igitur et Lysithoë est is Hercules, quem concertavisse cum Apolline de tripode accepimus. Alter traditur Nilo natus Aegyptius, quem aiunt Phrygias litteras conscripsisse. Tertius est ex Idaeis Digitis, cui inferias adferunt. Quartus Iovis est *et* Asteriae, Latonae sororis, qui Tyri maxime colitur, cuius Karthaginem filiam ferunt. Quintus in India, qui Belus dicitur. Sextus hic ex Alcmena, quem Iuppiter genuit, sed tertius Iuppiter, quoniam, ut iam docebo, pluris Ioves etiam accepimus.

Quando enim me in hunc locum deduxit oratio, docebo 17 43 meliora me didicisse de colendis dis inmortalibus iure pontificio et more maiorum capedunculis iis, quas Numa nobis reliquit, de quibus in illa aureola oratiuncula dicit Laelius, quam rationibus Stoicorum. Si enim vos sequar, dic, quid ei respondeam, qui me sic roget: Si di sunt, suntne etiam Nymphae deae? si Nymphae, Panisci etiam et Satyri? Hi autem non sunt; ne Nymphae [deae] quidem igitur? At earum templa sunt publice vota et dedicata. Ne ceteri quidem ergo di, quorum templa sunt dedicata? Age porro, Iovem et Neptunum deum numeras; ergo etiam Orcus, frater eorum, deus, et illi, qui fluere apud inferos dicuntur, Acheron, Cocytus, Pyriphlegethon, tum Charon, tum Cerberus di putandi. At id quidem repudiandum. 44 Ne Orcus quidem igitur. Quid dicitis ergo de fratribus? Haec Carneades aiebat, non ut deos tolleret (quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?), sed ut Stoicos nihil de dis explicare convinceret; itaque insequebatur. Quid enim? aiebat, si hi fratres sunt in numero deorum, num de patre eorum Saturn negari potest, quem volgo maxime colunt ad occidentem?

si est deus, patrem quoque eius Caelum esse deum confitendum est. Quod si ita est, Caeli quoque parentes di habendi sunt, Aether et Dies, eorumque fratres et sorores, qui a genealogis antiquis sic nominantur, Amor, Dolus, Metus, Labor, Invidentia, Fatum, Senectus, Mors, Tenebrae, Miseria, Querella, Gratia, Fraus, Pertinacia, Parcae, Hesperides, Somnia, quos omnis Erebo et Nocte natos ferunt. Aut igitur haec monstra pro-
18 45 banda sunt aut prima illa tollenda. Quid? Apollinem, Volcanum, Mercurium, ceteros deos esse dices, de Hercule, Aesculapio, Libero, Castore, Polluce dubitatis? At hi quidem coluntur aeque atque illi, apud quosdam etiam multo magis. Ergo hi dei sunt habendi mortalibus nati matribus? Quid? Aristaeus, qui olivae dicitur inventor, Apollinis filius, Theseus Neptuni, reliqui, quorum patres di, non erunt in deorum numero? Quid, quorum matres? Opinor, etiam magis. Ut enim iure civili, qui est matre libera, liber est, item iure naturae, qui dea matre est, deus sit necesse est. Itaque Achillem Astypalaeenses insulani sanctissume colunt; qui si deus est, et Orpheus et Rhesus di sunt, Musa matre nati, nisi forte maritumae nuptiae terrenis anteponuntur. Si hi di non sunt, quia nus-
46 quam coluntur, quo modo illi sunt? Vide igitur, ne virtutibus hominum isti honores habeantur, non immortalitatibus; quod tu quoque, Balbe, visus es dicere. Quo modo autem potes, si Latonam deam putas, Hecatam non putare, quae matre Asteria est, sorore Latonae? An haec quoque dea est? vidimus enim eius aras delubraque in Graecia. Sin haec dea est, cur non Eumenides, quarum et Athenis fanum est et apud nos, ut ego interpretor, lucus Furinae, deae sunt, speculatrices, credo,
47 et vindices facinorum et sceleris. Quodsi tales dei sunt, ut rebus humanis intersint, Natio quoque dea putanda est, cui, cum fana circumimus in agro Ardeati, rem divinam facere solemus; quae quia partus matronarum tueatur, a nascentibus Natio nominata est. Ea si dea est, di omnes illi, qui commemorabantur a te, Honos, Fides, Mens, Concordia, ergo etiam Spes, Moneta omniaque, quae cogitatione nobismet

ipsi possumus fingere. Quod si veri simile non est, ne illud
quidem est, haec unde fluxerunt. Quid autem dicis, si di sunt 19
illi, quos colimus et accepimus, cur non eodem in genere Sera-
pim Isimque numeremus? quod si facimus, cur barbarorum
deos repudiemus? Boves igitur et equos, ibis, accipitres, aspi-
das, crocodilos, pisces, canes, lupos, faelis, multas praeterea
beluas in deorum numerum reponemus. Quae si reiciamus,
illa quoque, unde haec nata sunt, reiciemus. Quid deinde? 48
Ino dea ducetur et Λευκοθέα a Graecis, a nobis Matuta dicetur,
cum sit Cadmi filia, Circe autem et Pasiphae et Aeeta e Per-
seide, Oceani filia, nati, patre Sole, in deorum numero non
habebuntur? quamquam Circen quoque coloni nostri Circeien-
ses religiose colunt. Ergo hanc deam duces? quid Medeae
respondebis, quae duobus avis, Sole et Oceano, Aeeta patre,
matre Idyia procreata est? quid huius Absyrto fratri, qui est
apud Pacuvium Aegialeus? sed illud nomen veterum litteris
usitatius. Qui si di non sunt, vereor, quid agat Ino; haec
enim omnia ex eodem fonte fluxerunt. An Amphiaraus erit 49
deus et Trophonius? Nostri quidem publicani, cum essent
agri in Boeotia deorum inmortalium excepti lege censoria,
negabant inmortalis esse ullos, qui aliquando homines fuissent.
Sed si sunt hi di, est certe Erechtheus, cuius Athenis et delu-
brum vidimus et sacerdotem. Quem si deum facimus, quid aut
de Codro dubitare possumus aut de ceteris, qui pugnantes pro
patriae libertate ceciderunt? quod si probabile non est, ne illa
quidem superiora, unde haec manant, probanda sunt. Atque 50
in plerisque civitatibus intellegi potest augendae virtutis gratia,
quo libentius rei publicae causa periculum adiret optimus quis-
que, virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium
consecratam. Ob eam enim ipsam causam Erechtheus Athenis
filiaeque eius in numero deorum sunt; itemque † Leonaticum
est delubrum Athenis, quod Leocorion nominatur. Alaban-
denses quidem sanctius Alabandum colunt, a quo est urbs illa
condita, quam quemquam nobilium deorum; apud quos non
inurbane Stratonicus, ut multa, cum quidam ei molestus Ala-

bandum deum esse confirmaret, Herculem negaret: 'Ergo', 20 51 inquit, 'mihi Alabandus, tibi Hercules sit iratus!'" Illa autem, Balbe, quae tu a caelo astrisque ducebas, quam longe serpant, non vides? Solem deum esse Lunamque, quorum alterum Apollinem Graeci, alteram Dianam putant. Quodsi Luna dea est, ergo etiam Lucifer ceteraeque errantes numerum deorum obtinebunt; igitur etiam inerrantes. Cur autem Arqui species non in deorum numero reponatur? est enim pulcher; et ob eam causam, quia speciem habeat admirabilem, Thaumante dicitur *Iris* esse nata. Cuius si divina natura est, quid facies nubibus? Arcus enim ipse e nubibus efficitur quodam modo coloratis; quarum una etiam Centauros peperisse dicitur. Quodsi nubes rettuleris in deos, referendae certe erunt tempestates, quae populi Romani ritibus consecratae sunt. Ergo imbres, nimbi, procellae, turbines dei putandi. Nostri quidem duces mare
52 ingredientes inmolare hostiam fluctibus consuerunt. Iam si est Ceres a gerendo (ita enim dicebas), terra ipsa dea est et ita habetur; quae est enim alia Tellus? Sin terra, mare etiam, quem Neptunum esse dicebas; ergo et flumina et fontes. Itaque et Fontis delubrum Maso ex Corsica dedicavit, et in augurum precatione Tiberinum, Spinonem, Almonem, Nodinum, alia propinquorum fluminum nomina videmus. Ergo hoc aut in inmensum serpet, aut nihil horum recipiemus, nec illa infinita ratio superstitionis probabitur. Nihil ergo horum probandum est.

21 53 Dicamus igitur, Balbe, oportet contra illos etiam, qui hos deos ex hominum genere in caelum translatos non re, sed opinione esse dicunt, quos auguste omnes sancteque veneramur. Principio Ioves tres numerant ii, qui theologi nominantur, ex quibus primum et secundum natos in Arcadia, alterum patre Aethere, ex quo etiam Proserpinam natam ferunt et Liberum, alterum patre Caelo, qui genuisse Minervam dicitur, quam principem et inventricem belli ferunt, tertium Cretensem, Saturni filium, cuius in illa insula sepulcrum ostenditur. Διόσκουροι etiam apud Graios multis modis nominantur. Primi tres, qui appellantur Anaces Athenis, ex rege Iove anti-

quissimo et Proserpina nati, Tritopatreus, Eubuleus, Dionysus, secundi Iove tertio nati et Leda, Castor et Pollux, tertii dicuntur a non nullis Alco et Melampus et Tmolus, Atrei filii, qui Pelope natus fuit. Iam Musae primae quattuor Iove altero natae, Thel- 54
xinoë, Aoede, Arche, Melete, secundae Iove tertio et Mnemosyne procreatae novem, tertiae Piero natae et Antiopa, quas Pieridas et Pierias solent poëtae appellare, isdem nominibus et eodem numero, quo proximae superiores. Cumque tu Solem, quia solus esset, appellatum esse dicas, Soles ipsi quam multi a theologis proferuntur! Unus eorum Iove natus, nepos Aetheris, alter Hyperione, tertius Volcano, Nili filio, cuius urbem Aegyptii volunt esse eam, quae Heliopolis appellatur, quartus is, quem heroicis temporibus Acantho Rhodi peperisse dicitur, . . . Ialysi, Camiri, Lindi, Rhodi, quintus, qui Colchis fertur Aeetam et Circam procreavisse. Volcani item complures, primus Caelo 22 55
natus, ex quo et Minerva Apollinem eum, cuius in tutela Athenas antiqui historici esse voluerunt, secundus Nilo natus, Phthas, ut Aegyptii appellant, quem custodem esse Aegypti volunt, tertius ex tertio Iove et Iunone, qui Lemni fabricae traditur praefuisse, quartus Memalio natus, qui tenuit insulas propter Siciliam, quae Volcaniae nominabantur. Mercurius unus Caelo 56
patre, Die matre natus, cuius obscenius excitata natura traditur, quod aspectu Proserpinae commotus sit, alter Valentis et Coronidis filius, is qui sub terris habetur idem Trophonius, tertius Iove tertio natus et Maia, ex quo et Penelopa Pana natum ferunt, quartus Nilo patre, quem Aegyptii nefas habent nominare, quintus, quem colunt Pheneatae, qui Argum dicitur interemisse ob eamque causam Aegyptum profugisse atque Aegyptiis leges et litteras tradidisse. Hunc Aegyptii Theuth appellant, eodemque nomine anni primus mensis apud eos vocatur. Aesculapiorum primus Apollinis, quem Arcades colunt, 57
qui specillum invenisse primusque volnus dicitur obligavisse, secundus secundi Mercurii frater; is fulmine percussus dicitur humatus esse Cynosuris; tertius Arsippi et Arsinoae, qui primus purgationem alvi dentisque evolsionem, ut ferunt, invenit, cuius

in Arcadia non longe a Lusio flumine sepulcrum et lucus osten-
23 ditur. Apollinum antiquissimus is, quem paulo antea e Vulcano natum esse dixi, custodem Athenarum, alter Corybantis filius, natus in Creta, cuius de illa insula cum Iove ipso certamen fuisse traditur, tertius Iove tertio natus et Latona, quem ex Hyperboreis Delphos ferunt advenisse, quartus in Arcadia, quem Arcades Νόμιον appellant, quod ab eo se leges ferunt accepisse.
58 Dianae item plures, prima Iovis et Proserpinae, quae pinnatum Cupidinem genuisse dicitur, secunda notior, quam Iove tertio et Latona natam accepimus, tertiae pater Upis traditur, Glauce mater; eam saepe Graeci Upim paterno nomine appellant. Dionysos multos habemus, primum Iove et Proserpina natum, secundum Nilo, qui Nysam dicitur interemisse, tertium Cabiro patre, eumque regem Asiae praefuisse dicunt, cui Sabazia sunt instituta, quartum Iove et Luna, cui sacra Orphica putantur confici, quintum Niso natum et Thyone, a quo Trieterides con-
59 stitutae putantur. Venus prima Caelo et Die nata, cuius Elide delubrum vidimus, altera spuma procreata, ex qua et Mercurio Cupidinem secundum natum accepimus, tertia Iove nata et Diona, quae nupsit Volcano, sed ex ea et Marte natus Anteros dicitur, quarta Syria Cyproque concepta, quae Astarte vocatur, quam Adonidi nupsisse proditum est. Minerva prima, quam Apollinis matrem supra diximus, secunda orta Nilo, quam Aegyptii Saitae colunt, tertia illa, quam a Iove generatam supra diximus, quarta Iove nata et Coryphe, Oceani filia, quam Arcades Κορίαν nominant et quadrigarum inventricem ferunt, quinta Pallantis, quae patrem dicitur interemisse virginitatem
60 suam violare conantem, cui pinnarum talaria adfigunt. Cupido primus Mercurio et Diana prima natus dicitur, secundus Mercurio et Venere secunda, tertius, qui idem est Anteros, Marte et Venere tertia. Atque haec quidem aliaque eius modi ex vetere Graeciae fama collecta sunt, quibus intellegis resistendum esse, ne perturbentur religiones. Vestri autem non modo haec non refellunt, verum etiam confirmant interpretando, quorsum quidque pertineat. Sed eo iam, unde huc digressi sumus, revertamur.

Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad haec refel- 24 61
lenda? Nam mentem, fidem, spem, virtutem, honorem, victo-
riam, salutem, concordiam ceteraque eius modi rerum vim
habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobismet insunt
ipsis, ut mens, ut spes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia, aut
optandae nobis sunt, ut honos, ut salus, ut victoria; quarum
rerum utilitatem video, video etiam consecrata simulacra; quare
autem in iis vis deorum insit, tum intellegam, cum cognovero.
Quo in genere vel maxime est Fortuna numeranda, quam nemo
ab inconstantia et temeritate seiunget, quae digna certe non
sunt deo. Iam vero quid vos illa delectat explicatio fabularum 62
et enodatio nominum? Exsectum a filio Caelum, vinctum
itidem a filio Saturnum, haec et alia generis eiusdem ita defen-
ditis, ut ii, qui ista finxerunt, non modo non insani, sed etiam
fuisse sapientes videantur. In enodandis autem nominibus,
quod miserandum sit, laboratis. Saturnus, quia se saturat annis,
Mavors, quia magna vertit, Minerva, quia minuit aut quia mina-
tur, Venus, quia venit ad omnia, Ceres a gerendo. Quam
periculosa consuetudo! In multis enim nominibus haerebitis.
Quid Veiovi facies, quid Volcano? quamquam, quoniam Nep-
tunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen, quod non
possis una littera explicare unde ductum sit; in quo quidem
magis tu mihi natare visus es quam ipse Neptunus. Magnam 63
molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno, post
Cleanthes, deinde Chrysippus, commenticiarum fabularum red-
dere rationem, vocabulorum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit,
causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profecto confitemini,
longe aliter se rem habere, atque hominum opinio sit; eos
enim, qui di appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deo-
rum. Qui tantus error fuit, ut perniciosis etiam rebus non *modo* 25
nomen deorum tribueretur, sed etiam sacra constituerentur.
Febris enim fanum in Palatio et *Orbonae ad* aedem Larum et
aram Malae Fortunae Esquiliis consecratam videmus. Omnis 64
igitur talis a philosophia pellatur error, ut, cum de dis inmortali-
bus disputemus, dicamus indigna iis; de quibus habeo ipse

quod sentiam, non habeo autem quod tibi adsentiar. Neptunum esse dicis animum cum intellegentia per mare pertinentem, idem de Cerere. Istam autem intellegentiam aut maris aut terrae non modo comprehendere animo, sed ne suspicione quidem possum attingere. Itaque aliunde mihi quaerendum est, ut et esse deos, et quales sint di, discere possim; qualis tu eos esse vis . . .

65 Videamus ea, quae sequuntur, primum deorumne providentia mundus regatur, deinde consulantne di rebus humanis. Haec enim mihi ex tua partitione restant duo; de quibus, si vobis videtur, accuratius disserendum puto. Mihi vero, inquit Velleius, valde videtur; nam et maiora expecto et iis, quae dicta sunt, vehementer adsentior. Tum Balbus: Interpellare te, inquit, Cotta, nolo, sed sumemus tempus aliud; efficiam profecto, ut fateare. Sed . . .

Néquaquam istuc ístac ibit; mágna inest certátio.
Nám ut ego illi súpplicarem tánta blandiloquéntia?

26 66 Parumne ratiocinari videtur et sibi ipsa nefariam pestem machinari? Illud vero quam callida ratione!

Quí volt esse, quód volt, ita dat sé res, ut operám dabit.

Qui est versus omnium seminator malorum.

Ílle traversa ménte mi hodie trádidit repágula,
Quíbus ego iram omném recludam atque ílli perniciém dabo,
Míhi maerores, ílli luctum, exítium illi, exiliúm mihi.

Hanc videlicet rationem, quam vos divino beneficio homini
67 solum tributam dicitis, bestiae non habent. Videsne igitur,

quanto munere deorum simus adfecti? Atque eadem Medea patrem patriamque fugiens:

postquám pater
Ádpropinquat iámque paene ut cónprehendatúr parat,
Púerum interea obtrúncat membraque árticulatim dívidit
Pérque agros passím dispergit córpus; id ea grátia,
Út, dum nati díssipatos ártus captarét parens,
Ípsa interea effúgeret, illum ut maéror tardarét sequi,
Síbi salutem ut fámiliari páreret parricídio.

Huic ut scelus, sic ne ratio quidem defuit. Quid? ille funestas 68
epulas fratri conparans nonne versat huc et illuc cogitatione rationem?

Maiór mihi moles, máius miscendúmst malum,
Qui illíus acerbum cór contundam et cónprimam.

Nec tamen ille ipse est praetereundus, 27

Qui nón sat habuit cóniugem inlexe ín stuprum,

de quo recte et verissume loquitur Atreus:

. . . quod re in súmma summum esse árbitror
Períclum, matres coínquinari régias,
Contáminari stírpem ac miscerí genus.

At id ipsum quam callide, qui regnum adulterio quaereret:

Adde, inquit, húc, quod mihi porténto caelestúm pater
Prodígium misit, régni stabilimén mei,
Agnum ínter pecudes aúrea clarúm coma
Quondám Thyestem clépere ausum esse é regia,
Qua in re ádiutricem cóniugem cepít sibi.

69 Videturne summa inprobitate usus non sine summa esse ratione? Nec vero scaena solum referta est his sceleribus, sed multo vita communis paene maioribus. Sentit domus unius cuiusque, sentit forum, sentit curia, campus, socii, provinciae, ut, quem ad modum ratione recte fiat, sic ratione peccetur, alterumque et a paucis et raro, alterum et saepe et a plurimis, ut satius fuerit nullam omnino nobis a dis inmortalibus datam esse rationem quam tanta cum pernicie datam. Ut vinum aegrotis, quia prodest raro, nocet saepissime, melius est non adhibere omnino quam spe dubiae salutis in apertam perniciem incurrere, sic haud scio an melius fuerit humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera est multis, admodum paucis salutaris, non dari omnino quam tam munifice et tam large dari.
70 Quam ob rem si mens voluntasque divina idcirco consuluit hominibus, quod iis est largita rationem, iis solis consuluit, quos bona ratione donavit, quos videmus, si modo ulli sunt, esse perpaucos. Non placet autem paucis a dis inmortalibus esse consultum; sequitur ergo, ut nemini consultum sit.

28 Huic loco sic soletis occurrere: non idcirco non optume nobis a dis esse provisum, quod multi eorum beneficio perverse uterentur; etiam patrimoniis multos male uti, nec ob eam causam eos beneficium a patribus nullum habere. Quisquamne istuc negat? aut quae est in collatione ista similitudo? Nec enim Herculi nocere Deianira voluit, cum ei tunicam sanguine Centauri tinctam dedit, nec prodesse Pheraeo Iasoni is, qui gladio vomicam eius aperuit, quam sanare medici non potuerant. Multi enim et, cum obesse vellent, profuerunt et, cum prodesse, obfuerunt. Ita non fit ex eo, quod datur, ut voluntas eius, qui dederit, appareat, nec, si is, qui accepit, bene utitur,
71 idcirco is, qui dedit, amice dedit. Quae enim libido, quae avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto aut sine animi motu et cogitatione, id est ratione, perficitur? Nam omnis opinio ratio est, et quidem bona ratio, si vera, mala autem, si falsa est opinio. Sed a deo tantum rationem habe-

mus, si modo habemus, bonam autem rationem aut non bonam a nobis. Non enim, ut patrimonium relinquitur, sic ratio est homini beneficio deorum data. Quid enim potius hominibus dedissent, si iis nocere voluissent? Iniustitiae autem, intemperantiae, timiditatis quae semina essent, si his vitiis ratio non subesset? Medea modo et Atreus commemorabantur a nobis, **29**
heroicae personae, inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes. Quid? levitates comicae parumne semper in ra- **72**
tione versantur? parumne subtiliter disputat ille in Eunucho?

> Quid ígitur faciam?......
> Exclúsit, revocat; rédeam? non, si me óbsecret.

Ille vero in Synephebis Academicorum more contra communem opinionem non dubitat pugnare ratione, qui 'in amore summo summaque inopia suave esse' dicit

> Paréntem habere avárum, inlepidum, in líberos
> Diffícilem, qui te néc amet nec studeát tui.

Atque huic incredibili sententiae ratiunculas suggerit: **73**

> Aut tu íllum fructu fállas aut per lítteras
> Avértas aliquod nómen aut per sérvolum
> Percútias pavidum, póstremo a parcó patre
> Quod súmas, quanto díssipes libéntius!

Idemque facilem et liberalem patrem incommodum esse amanti filio disputat,

> Quem néque quo pacto fállam nec quid inde aúferam
> Nec quém dolum ad eum aut máchinam commóliar,
> Scio quícquam; ita omnes méos dolos, fallácias,
> Praestrígias praestrínxit commoditás patris.

Quid ergo? isti doli, quid? machinae, quid? fallaciae praestrigiaeque num sine ratione esse potuerunt? O praeclarum munus deorum! ut Phormio possit dicere:

> Cédo senem; iam instrúcta sunt mi in córde
> consilia ómnia.

80 74 Sed exeamus e theatro, veniamus in forum. Sessum it praetor. Quid ut iudicetur? Qui tabularium incenderit. Quod facinus occultius? Id se Q. Sosius, splendidus eques Romanus ex agro Piceno, fecisse confessus est. Qui transscripserit tabulas publicas. Id quoque L. Alenus fecit, cum chirographum sex primorum imitatus est. Quid hoc homine sollertius? Cognosce alias quaestiones, auri Tolossani, coniurationis Iugurthinae; repete superiora, Tubuli de pecunia capta ob rem iudicandam, posteriora, de incestu rogatione Peducaea, tum haec cotidiana, sicae, veneni, peculatus, testamentorum etiam lege nova quaestiones. Inde illa actio: OPE CONSILIOQUE TUO FURTUM AIO FACTUM ESSE, inde tot iudicia de fide mala, tutelae, mandati, pro socio, fiduciae, reliqua, quae ex empto aut vendito aut conducto aut locato contra fidem fiunt, inde iudicium publicum rei privatae lege Plaetoria, inde everriculum malitiarum omnium, iudicium de dolo malo, quod C. Aquillius, familiaris noster, protulit; quem dolum idem Aquillius tum teneri putat, cum aliud sit simulatum, aliud
75 actum. Hanc igitur tantam a dis inmortalibus arbitramur malorum sementim esse factam? Si enim rationem hominibus di dederunt, malitiam dederunt; est enim malitia versuta et fallax ratio nocendi; iidem etiam di fraudem dederunt, facinus ceteraque, quorum nihil nec suscipi sine ratione nec effici potest. 'Utinam' igitur, ut illa anus optat,

> ne in nemore Pélio secúribus
> Caesae áccidissent ábiegnae ad terrám trabes,

sic istam calliditatem hominibus di ne dedissent! qua perpauci bene utuntur, qui tamen ipsi saepe a male utentibus opprimuntur, innumerabiles autem improbe utuntur, ut donum hoc divi-

num rationis et consilii ad fraudem hominibus, non ad bonitatem
impertitum esse videatur.

Sed urgetis identidem hominum esse istam culpam, non deo- 81 76
rum; ut si medicus gravitatem morbi, gubernator vim tempes-
tatis accuset; etsi hi quidem homunculi, sed tamen ridiculi.
Quis enim te adhibuisset, dixerit quispiam, si ista non essent?
Contra deum licet disputare liberius. In hominum vitiis ais esse
culpam. Eam dedisses hominibus rationem, quae vitia culpam-
que excluderet. Ubi igitur locus fuit errori deorum? Nam
patrimonia spe bene tradendi relinquimus, qua possumus falli;
deus falli qui potuit? An ut Sol, in currum cum Phaëthontem
filium sustulit, aut Neptunus, cum Theseus Hippolytum perdidit,
cum ter optandi a Neptuno patre habuisset potestatem? Poëta- 77
rum ista sunt, nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum
auctores, non fabularum. Atque hi tamen ipsi di poëtici si
scissent perniciosa fore illa filiis, peccasse in beneficio puta-
rentur. Et, si verum est, quod Aristo Chius dicere solebat,
nocere audientibus philosophos iis, qui bene dicta male inter-
pretarentur (posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis
schola exire), prorsus, si, qui audierunt, vitiosi essent dicessuri,
quod perverse philosophorum disputationem interpretarentur,
tacere praestaret philosophis quam iis, qui se audissent, nocere.
Sic, si homines rationem bono consilio a dis inmortalibus datam 78
in fraudem malitiamque convertunt, non dari illam quam dari
humano generi melius fuit. Ut, si medicus sciat eum aegrotum,
qui iussus sit vinum sumere, meracius sumpturum statimque
periturum, magna sit in culpa, sic vestra ista providentia repre-
hendenda, quae rationem dederit iis, quos scierit ea perverse et
inprobe usuros. Nisi forte dicitis eam nescisse. Utinam qui-
dem! Sed non audebitis. Non enim ignoro, quanti eius nomen
putetis.

Sed hic quidem locus concludi iam potest. Nam si stultitia 82 79
consensu omnium philosophorum maius est malum, quam si
omnia mala et fortunae et corporis ex altera parte ponantur,
sapientiam autem nemo adsequitur, in summis malis omnes

sumus, quibus vos optume consultum a dis inmortalibus dicitis. Nam ut nihil interest, utrum nemo valeat, an nemo possit valere, sic non intellego, quid intersit, utrum nemo sit sapiens, an nemo esse possit. Ac nos quidem nimis multa de re apertissuma. Telamo autem uno versu locum totum conficit, cur di homines neglegant:

> Nám si curent, béne bonis sit, mále malis;
> quod núnc abest.

Debebant illi quidem omnis bonos efficere, siquidem homi-
80 num generi consulebant. Sin id minus, bonis quidem certe consulere debebant. Cur igitur duo Scipiones, fortissimos et optimos viros, in Hispania Poenus oppressit? cur Maximus extulit filium consularem? cur Marcellum Hannibal interemit? cur Paulum Cannae sustulerunt? cur Poenorum crudelitati Reguli corpus est praebitum? cur Africanum domestici parietes non texerunt? Sed haec vetera et alia permulta; propiora videamus. Cur avunculus meus, vir innocentissumus idemque doctissumus, P. Rutilius, in exilio est? cur sodalis meus interfectus domi suae, Drusus? cur temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen ante simulacrum Vestae pontifex maximus est Q. Scaevola trucidatus? cur ante etiam tot civitatis principes a Cinna interempti? cur omnium perfidiosissimus, C. Marius, Q. Catulum, praestantissuma dignitate virum, mori potuit iubere?
81 Dies deficiat, si velim numerare, quibus bonis male evenerit, nec minus, si commemorem, quibus improbis optime. Cur enim Marius tam feliciter septimum consul domi suae senex est mortuus? cur omnium crudelissimus tam diu Cinna regnavit?
83 At dedit poenas. Prohiberi melius fuit impedirique, ne tot summos viros interficeret, quam ipsum aliquando poenas dare. Summo cruciatu supplicioque Q. Varius, homo importunissumus, periit; si, quia Drusum ferro, Metellum veneno sustulerat, illos conservari melius fuit quam poenas sceleris Varium pendere. Duodequadraginta annos Dionysius tyrannus fuit opu-
82 lentissumae et beatissumae civitatis; quam multos ante hunc

in ipso Graeciae flore Pisistratus! At Phalaris, at Apollodorus
poenas sustulit. Multis quidem ante cruciatis et necatis. Et
praedones multi saepe poenas dant, nec tamen possumus dicere
non pluris captivos acerbe quam praedones necatos. Ana-
xarchum Democriteum a Cyprio tyranno excarnificatum accepi-
mus, Zenonem Eleae in tormentis necatum. Quid dicam de
Socrate, cuius morti inlacrimari soleo Platonem legens? Vi-
desne igitur deorum iudicio, si vident res humanas, discrimen
esse sublatum? Diogenes quidem Cynicus dicere solebat Har- 34 83
palum, qui temporibus illis praedo felix habebatur, contra deos
testimonium dicere, quod in illa fortuna tam diu viveret. Di-
onysius, de quo ante dixi, cum fanum Proserpinae Locris
expilavisset, navigabat Syracusas; isque cum secundissumo
vento cursum teneret, ridens 'Videtisne', inquit, 'amici,
quam bona a dis inmortalibus navigatio sacrilegis
detur?' Idque homo acutus cum bene planeque percepisset,
in eadem sententia perseverabat. Qui cum ad Peloponnesum
classem appulisset et in fanum venisset Iovis Olympii, aureum
ei detraxit amiculum grandi pondere, quo Iovem ornarat e
manubiis Karthaginiensium tyrannus Gelo, atque in eo etiam
cavillatus est aestate grave esse aureum amiculum, hieme frigi-
dum, eique laneum pallium iniecit, cum id esse aptum ad omne
anni tempus diceret. Idemque Aesculapii Epidauri barbam
auream demi iussit; neque enim convenire barbatum esse
filium, cum in omnibus fanis pater inberbis esset. Etiam men- 84
sas argenteas de omnibus delubris iussit auferri, in quibus cum
more veteris Graeciae inscriptum esset BONORUM DEORUM, uti
se eorum bonitate velle dicebat. Idem Victoriolas aureas et
pateras coronasque, quae simulacrorum porrectis manibus susti-
nebantur, sine dubitatione tollebat eaque se accipere, non
auferre dicebat; esse enim stultitiam, a quibus bona precare-
mur, ab iis porrigentibus et dantibus nolle sumere. Eundemque
ferunt haec, quae dixi, sublata de fanis in forum protulisse et
per praeconem vendidisse exactaque pecunia edixisse, ut, quod
quisque a sacris haberet, id ante diem certam in suum quidque

fanum referret. Ita ad impietatem in deos in homines adiun-
85 xit iniuriam. Hunc igitur nec Olympius Iuppiter fulmine per-
cussit nec Aesculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem
interemit, atque in suo lectulo mortuus in [tyrannidis] rogum
inlatus est eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus erat nanc-
tus, quasi iustam et legitimam hereditatis loco filio tradidit.
85 Invita in hoc loco versatur oratio; videtur enim auctoritatem
adferre peccandi; recte videretur, nisi et virtutis et vitiorum
sine ulla divina ratione grave ipsius conscientiae pondus esset,
qua sublata iacent omnia. Ut enim nec domus nec res publica
ratione quadam et disciplina dissignata videatur, si in ea nec
recte factis praemia extent ulla nec supplicia peccatis, sic
mundi divina [in homines] moderatio profecto nulla est, si in
ea discrimen nullum est bonorum et malorum.

86 At enim minora di neglegunt neque agellos singulorum nec
viticulas persequuntur nec, si uredo aut grando quippiam nocuit,
id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; ne in regnis quidem reges omnia
minima curant; sic enim dicitis. Quasi ego paulo ante de
fundo Formiano P. Rutilii sim questus, non de amissa salute.
36 Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent, externas com-
moditates, vineta, segetes, oliveta, ubertatem frugum et fruc-
tuum, omnem denique commoditatem prosperitatemque vitae a
dis se habere; virtutem autem nemo umquam acceptam deo
87 rettulit. Nimirum recte; propter virtutem enim iure laudamur
et in virtute recte gloriamur; quod non contingeret, si id donum
a deo, non a nobis haberemus. At vero aut honoribus aucti
aut re familiari, aut si aliud quippiam nacti sumus fortuiti boni
aut depulimus mali, tum dis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostrae
laudi adsumptum arbitramur. Num quis, quod bonus vir esset,
gratias dis egit umquam? at quod dives, quod honoratus, quod
incolumis. Iovemque optumum et maxumum ob eas res appel-
lant, non quod nos iustos, temperatos, sapientes efficiat, sed
88 quod salvos, incolumis, opulentos, copiosos. Neque Herculi
quisquam decumam vovit umquam, si sapiens factus esset.
Quamquam Pythagoras cum in geometria quiddam novi inve-

nisset, Musis bovem immolasse dicitur; sed id quidem non credo, quoniam ille ne Apollini quidem Delio hostiam immolare voluit, ne aram sanguine aspergeret. Ad rem autem ut redeam, iudicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam. Quamvis licet Menti delubra et Virtuti et Fidei consecremus, tamen haec in nobis ipsis sita videmus; Spei, Salutis, Opis, Victoriae facultas a dis expetenda est. Inproborum igitur prosperitates secundaeque res redarguunt, ut Diogenes dicebat, vim omnem deorum ac potestatem. At non numquam bonos exitus habent boni. 37 89
Eos quidem arripimus attribuimusque sine ulla ratione dis inmortalibus. At Diagoras cum Samothracam venisset, ἄθεος ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus 'Tu, qui deos putas humana neglegere, nonne animadvertis ex tot tabulis pictis, quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugerint in portumque salvi pervenerint?', 'Ita fit', inquit; 'illi enim nusquam picti sunt, qui naufragia fecerunt in marique perierunt.' Idemque, cum ei naviganti vectores adversa tempestate timidi et perterriti dicerent non iniuria sibi illud accidere, qui illum in eandem navem recepissent, ostendit eis in eodem cursu multas alias laborantis quaesivitque, num etiam in iis navibus Diagoram vehi crederent. Sic enim res se habet, ut ad prosperam adversamve fortunam, qualis sis aut quem ad modum vixeris, nihil intersit.
Non animadvertunt, inquit, omnia di, ne reges quidem. Quid 90
est simile? Reges enim si scientes praetermittunt, magna culpa est; at deo ne excusatio quidem est inscientiae. Quem vos 38
praeclare defenditis, cum dicitis eam vim deorum esse, ut, etiamsi quis morte poenas sceleris effugerit, expetantur eae poenae a liberis, a nepotibus, a posteris. O miram aequitatem deorum! Ferretne civitas ulla latorem istius modi legis, ut condemnaretur filius aut nepos, si pater aut avus deliquisset?

Quinám Tantalidarum internecioni modus
Parétur? aut quaenam úmquam ob mortem
Mýrtili

Poenís luendis dábitur satias súpplici?

91 Utrum poëtae Stoicos depravarint, an Stoici poëtis dederint
auctoritatem, non facile dixerim; portenta enim ab utrisque et
flagitia dicuntur. Neque enim, quem Hipponactis iambus lae-
serat, aut qui erat Archilochi versu volneratus, a deo inmissum
dolorem, non conceptum a se ipso continebat, nec, cum Aegisthi
libidinem aut cum Paridis videmus, a deo causam requirimus,
cum culpae paene vocem audiamus, nec ego multorum aegro-
rum salutem non ab Hippocrate potius quam ab Aesculapio
datam iudico, nec Lacedaemoniorum disciplinam dicam um-
quam ab Apolline potius Spartae quam a Lycurgo datam. Cri-
tolaus, inquam, evertit Corinthum, Karthaginem Hasdrubal. Hi
duo illos oculos orae maritumae effoderunt, non iratus aliqui,
92 quem omnino irasci posse negatis, deus. At subvenire certe
89 potuit et conservare urbis tantas atque talis; vos enim ipsi
dicere soletis nihil esse, quod deus efficere non possit, et qui-
dem sine labore ullo; ut enim hominum membra nulla conten-
tione mente ipsa ac voluntate moveantur, sic numine deorum
omnia fingi, moveri mutarique posse. Neque id dicitis super-
stitiose atque aniliter, sed physica constantique ratione; mate-
riam enim rerum, ex qua et in qua omnia sint, totam esse
flexibilem et commutabilem, ut nihil sit, quod non ex ea quam-
vis subito fingi convertique possit; eius autem universae fictri-
cem et moderatricem divinam esse providentiam; hanc igitur,
quocumque se moveat, efficere posse, quicquid velit. Itaque
aut nescit, quid possit, aut neglegit res humanas aut, quid sit
93 optimum, non potest iudicare. Non curat singulos homines.
Non mirum; ne civitates quidem. Non eas? ne nationes
quidem et gentes. Quodsi has etiam contemnet, quid mirum
est omne ab ea genus humanum esse contemptum? Sed quo
modo iidem dicitis non omnia deos persequi, iidem voltis a dis
inmortalibus hominibus dispertiri ac dividi somnia? Idcirco
haec tecum, quia vestra est de somniorum veritate sententia.
Atque iidem etiam vota suscipi dicitis oportere. Nempe singuli

vovent, audit igitur mens divina etiam de singulis. Videtis ergo
non esse eam tam occupatam, quam putabatis? Fac esse dis-
tentam, caelum versantem, terram tuentem, maria moderantem;
cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur? cur non
rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos praeficit, qui a te, Balbe,
innumerabiles explicati sunt? Haec fere dicere habui de natura
deorum, non ut eam tollerem, sed ut intellegeretis, quam esset
obscura et quam difficilis explicatus haberet.

Quae cum dixisset, Cotta finem. Lucilius autem: Vehemen- 40 94
tius, inquit, Cotta, tu quidem invectus es in eam Stoicorum
rationem, quae de providentia deorum ab illis sanctissume et
providentissume constituta est. Sed quoniam advesperascit,
dabis nobis diem aliquem, ut contra ista dicamus. Est enim
mihi tecum pro aris et focis certamen et pro deorum templis
atque delubris proque urbis muris, quos vos, pontifices, sanctos
esse dicitis diligentiusque urbem religione quam ipsis moenibus
cingitis; quae deseri a me, dum quidem spirare potero, nefas
iudico. Tum Cotta: Ego vero et opto redargui me, Balbe, et 95
ea, quae disputavi, disserere malui quam iudicare et facile me
a te vinci posse certo scio. Quippe, inquit Velleius, qui etiam
somnia putet ad nos mitti ab Iove, quae ipsa tamen tam levia
non sunt, quam est Stoicorum de natura deorum oratio. Haec
cum essent dicta, ita discessimus, ut Velleio Cottae disputatio
verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse pro-
pensior.

FRAGMENTA

EX LIBRO DE NATURA DEORUM TERTIO.

1. *Lactant. inst. div. II, 3, 2: Intellegebat Cicero falsa esse, quae homines adorarent. Nam cum multa dixisset, quae ad eversionem religionum valerent, ait tamen* non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis exstinguat.

2. *Lactant. inst. div. II, 8, 10: Cicero de natura deorum disputans sic ait:* Primum igitur non est probabile eam materiam rerum, unde orta sunt omnia, esse divina providentia effectam, sed habere et habuisse vim et naturam suam. Ut igitur faber, cum quid aedificaturus est, non ipse facit materiam, sed ea utitur, quae sit parata, fictorque item cera, sic isti providentiae divinae materiam praesto esse oportuit, non quam ipse faceret, sed quam haberet paratam. Quodsi non est a deo materia facta, ne terra quidem et aqua et aër et ignis a deo factus est.

3. *Maii vett. interpr. Virg. p. 45, ed. Med. apud Ciceronem de natura deorum II, ubi de Cleomene Lacedaemonio . . .*

[4. *Diomedes I, p. 313, 10, Keil. Cicero de deorum natura tertio:* homines omnibus bestiis antecedunt. (*Vid de off. I, 30, 105.*)]

EX LIBRIS INCERTIS.

5. *Serv. ad Verg. Aen. III, 284: Tullius in libro de natura deorum* tria milia annorum *dixit* magnum annum tenere.

[6. *Serv. ad Verg. Aen. III, 600: Cicero* spiritabile *dixit in libris de deorum natura.* (*Vid. N. D. II, 6, 18.*)]

[7. *Serv. ad Verg. Aen. VI, 894: Per portam corneam oculi significantur, qui et* cornei *sunt et duriores ceteris membris; nam frigus non sentiunt, sicut etiam Cicero dixit in libris de natura deorum.* (*Vid. N. D. II, 57, 144.*)]

NOTES.

BOOK FIRST.

32. 4. **ad agnitionem animi.** Through knowledge of God the 1
mind gains more knowledge of itself, inasmuch as it participates in the 1
divine essence; knowledge of God and knowledge of one's self are correlative. Comp. Tusc. V, 25, 70: *Ut ipsa se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat.* — De Legg. I, 8, 25: *ut is agnoscat deum, qui unde ortus sit quasi recordetur ac noscat.* Hence too the study of this subject is *ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima,* because it leads to a worthy and admirable result in a knowledge of one's self.

ad moderandam religionem, because only a right understanding of the divine nature can give the proper balance and direction to our worship. Compare below II, 61, 153.

32. 5. **De qua.** The relative refers not to *religionem,* but to the more remote *quaestio.*

32. 8. **inscientiam.** The variety and contradictions in the opinions about the divine nature, a consequence of the *ignorance* which has incited men to philosophize and to form so various opinions on the subject, might serve as a weighty proof, *magnum argumentum,* for the general proposition, that *all* philosophical investigation, that is, the striving after knowledge, has its foundation and starting point in *ignorance.* Arist. Met. 1, 2: *διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν.* In the same vein Plato, Theaet., p. 155 D, says that *θαυμάζειν,* that is the wonder at what is unexplained and the resulting desire to understand it, is *ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας.* [Justin Martyr, Cohort. ad Graecos, c. 5: Εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτους (*Platonem et Aristotelem*) μὴ συμφωνοῦντας ἀλλήλοις εὕροιμεν, ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι καὶ τὴν τούτων ἄγνοιαν γινώσκειν σαφῶς.] — Instead of *debeat debeant* would be better; or else *id* should be inserted after *ut.* — In some Mss. the copula before *principium* is wanting, others have *id est* instead, and many critics have considered *principium* itself as a spurious addition. [The text here is hopelessly corrupt, and none of the proposed emendations give a satisfactory sense. It is true that men set out from ignorance to think or philosophize on any subject whatever, but, as Aristotle and Plato say, it is the desire to escape from that ignorance and to attain knowledge that

induces them to think: moreover their reaching contradictory conclusions on a given point does not *prove* that they started from such ignorance, any more than their reaching identical conclusions would prove that they started from knowledge. Cicero might properly have said that the difference of opinions on the subject in question would go far to show that the *result* (not the *beginning*) of all philosophy was ignorance; and hence that the attitude of the Academics was a wise one. Or, if we strike out *causam . . . inscientiam* with the *que* after *prudenter* (and this is the reading of one Ms. according to Ursinus ed. Moser, p. 6), the sense is: that the difference of opinions on the subject in question goes far to show that the Academics were wise in withholding assent from things that were really not to be understood.]

32. 8. [**prudenter . . . cohibuisse.** The verb in phrases like this is really contained in the adverb; "the Academics were prudent in withholding their assent" &c. De Fin. IV, 23, 63: *Illi igitur antiqui non tam acute optabiliorem illam vitam putant.*] — **Academicos.** See Introduction, p. 13.

32. 9. [**temeritate** here indicates haphazard action, based upon no rational grounds, *in rebus incertis;* so **temerarium** in the next sentence. Cf. N. D. II, 32, 82: *nulla temeritas, sed ordo;* Div. II, 41, 85: *temeritas et casus, non ratio nec consilium.* Cicero calls it *temerarium aut falsum sentire, aut . . . defendere.*]

2 32. 13. [**Velut,** "as for example," introduces an instance of the *tam variae tamque discrepantes sententiae.* — **quod** and **quo** refer to the proposition **deos esse** which follows.]

32. 15. **Protagoras, Diagoras, Theodorus:** See below notes to 12, 29 and 23, 63.

33. 1. **rem causamque.** The more general is defined by the more special term; for *causa est res quae habet in se controversiam* (De Invent. I, 6, 8).

33. 5. **in summo errore.** *Error* is not always synonymous with the English "error"; it often means simply the wavering and uncertainty which comes from ignorance of what is right. Thus *errare* is often used as equivalent to *ambigere, incertum esse,* as Plaut. Mil. Glor. III, 1, 197: *erro, quam insistas viam.* Senec. Agam. 144: *ubi animus errat, optimum est casum sequi.* Compare De Offic. II, 2, 7: *non sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore, nec habeat umquam quid sequatur.* And below II, 1, 2: *non errantem et vagam, sed stabilem certamque sententiam.*

2 33. 8. **Quorum si vera.** If the gods have no care for human affairs,
8 *then men* cannot cherish towards them feelings expressed by **pietas,**

sanctitas, religio. *Pietas* is pure, dutiful feeling towards those with whom we stand in intimate connection, our relatives, colleagues in office, our superiors; especially then towards the gods as our governors and benefactors. In 41, 116, it is described as *iustitia adversum deos;* and in the same place *sanctitas* is called *scientia colendorum deorum;* (see also the note). *Sanctitas* is properly irreproachable behavior towards the gods; *religio* the recognition of the duty by which we feel ourselves bound (De Invent. II, 53, 161: *quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caerimoniamque adfert*); and to this idea the derivation from *religare* given by Lactantius IV, 28 appears to correspond better than that of Cicero, from *relegere*, given below II, 28, 72.

33. 10. [**tribuenda . . . ita sunt, si**—"are to be given on the assumption that—"]

33. 16. **fictae simulationis.** Of course any *simulatio* is *ficta;* which does not however prevent Cicero from emphasizing the idea by the added epitheton.—Moreover the remark has particular reference to the Epicureans, who, although disbelieving in a divine power that governs the world, yet endeavored to keep up an appearance of divine reverence. See below, ch. 17, 45; 21, 56; and on the other side, 41, 115.

33. 20. **fides . . . iustitia tollatur.** Cicero also points out the con- 4
nection between the duties towards men and the duties towards God in II, 61, 153; but a passage cited by Lactantius V, 8 from the De Legibus refers to the ground of this connection, namely, that the consciousness that all men are of the same (divine) race and are in the same way the object of the divine love and care must produce among them too a mutual regard and love. So in De Offic. III, 6, 28 disregard of one's duties to his fellow-men is brought forward as a proof of impiety towards the gods. Compare also below II, 61, 153 and Gataker on Antonin. II, 1, p. 43. Wyttenbach has observed not without reason that the clause beginning *atque haud scio* would be in a more proper place before the preceding *quibus sublatis.* In its present position it seems only an afterthought, to make an application of the preceding general observation to the living together of men in society. A radical criticism might be disposed to throw aside the whole clause as an interpolation; one less severe to substitute *namque* for *atque.* [But is not the clause *haud scio an* a reinforcement of the preceding? Cicero has just said that, if *sanctitas* and *religio* are taken away, great trouble ensues in common life; but if you take away *pietas adversus deos*, loyalty towards the gods, it would be almost impossible for men to live together in society.]

33. 22. **alii philosophi,** especially the Stoics.

33. 25. [**reliqua, quae terra pariat—omnia, quae terra gignat.**

The Latin seems to have had no single word to express the vegetable kingdom. Cicero uses several circumlocutions; II, 33, 83: *ea quae a terra stirpibus continentur;* II, 10, 28: *ea quorum stirpes terra continentur;* De Fin. IV, 5, 13: *res eae quae gignuntur e terra;* N. D. II, 13, 36: *stirpes* alone; Sallust Jug. 70, 6: *gignentia.* See Nägelsbach, Lateinische Stilistik, § 36, 1, 2.]

33. 29. **quae dicentur in his libris.** See II, 62, 156 seqq. — **ea ipsa,** these things exactly as they are.

33. 30. **fabricati paene,** i.e. *paene fabrili opera effecisse,* with artistic plan and care.

33. 31. **Carneades** of Cyrene, head of the Academy at Athens about the middle of the second century B.C. His negative criticism, on which it may suffice for the moment to refer to c. 5, 11, was directed especially against the Stoics and their leader Chrysippus. Compare also II, 65, 162 and III, 17, 44. He wrote nothing except some letters to the Cappadocian king Ariarthes, but his lectures were reported by listeners and published.

33. 31. **ita** goes with *disseruit,* not with *multa;* it points to the character of his arguments, which were such *ut excitaret* (sc. *Carneades*) *homines* &c. For the arrangement of the words compare Verr. II, 3, 8: *magistratuum nostrorum iniurias ita multorum tulerunt, ut numquam ante hoc tempus ad aram legum . . . confugerint.*

8
5 34. 1. **Qua quidem in causa.** The idea may be better defined by mentally supplying *tractanda.* Cicero says: While undertaking this discussion I am quite in a position to defend myself from any one who blames me for it. — It is entirely erroneous to refer this expression, as many have done, to the Stoics and Epicureans.

34. 2. [**benivolos.** So Müller writes here, and in I, 21, 58; 44, 122 from the Mss. Both *bene-* and *beni-* are correct, but the former became the recognized form from the first century of the empire. Brambach.]

6 34. 6. [**brevi tempore edidimus.** See Introduction, p. 19.]

34. 10. **eam . . . philosophiam,** i.e. *Academicam.* In Acad. II, 19, 61 Cicero represents Lucullus as saying to him: *Tune eam philosophiam sequere, quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio, privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus?* — The dative *rebus* is not to be taken with *lucem eriperet* on account of the order of the words; we might rather supply a dative like *nobis* or *hominibus.* Compare Acad. II, 10, 30: *quid eum facturum putem de abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur?* ibid. 32, 105: *non enim lucem eripimus: sed ea, quae vos percipi, eadem nos videri dicimus;* and 103: *ab Academia sensus eripi.* Compare Liv. X, 32: *nebula erat — densa adeo, ut lucis usum eriperet.*

34. 12. **desertaeque disciplinae.** See below c. 5, 11. Antiochus, mentioned just below, is to be regarded as a *desertor* of the Academy.

34. 19. **Diodotus,** a Stoic, lived for several years in Cicero's house and left him a considerable property at his death.

34. 19. **Philo** of Larissa, an Academic, fled during the Mithridatic war in 666 from Athens to Rome, where Cicero, as he himself says Brut. 89, 306, *totum se ei tradidit.* He was the last representative of any note of the Academic philosophy. *Philone vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit* says Cic. Acad. II, 6, 17.

34. 19. **Antiochus** of Ascalon, a disciple of Philo, but not his successor. He abandoned the Academic scepticism and devised for himself an eclectic, dogmatic system composed of Platonic, Aristotelic and Stoic tenets taken together. Comp. Acad. II, 22, 69; and especially Madvig, Preface to Cic. De Fin., p. 61, ff.

34. 20. **Posidonius** of Apamea in Syria, disciple of the Rhodian Panaetius, the most distinguished of the Stoics at that time. He lived and taught mostly at Rhodes and is hence called Rhodian, but also passed some time at Rome. All that remains of his numerous writings in fragments and citations may be found in *Posidonii reliquiae doctrinae. Coll. atque illustr.* J. Bake. Lugd. B. 1810. 8.

34. 25. **Nam cum otio** &c. See Introduction, p. 20. 4

34. 29. **ad decus et ad laudem civitatis.** Comp. De Div. II, 2, 5: 7
magnificum illud etiam Romanisque hominibus gloriosum, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant.

34. 31. **multorum — scribendi studia.** Comp. De Offic. II, 1, 2. 8
No notice has come down to us of the many whom Cicero here speaks of. We know indeed that several of his contemporaries wrote in Latin on philosophical topics, for example P. Nigidius Figulus and M. Terentius Varro, not to speak of the poet Lucretius; but they were not induced to do so by Cicero's example any more than the Epicureans Amafinius, Rabirius and Catius, whom he mentions disparagingly. Acad. I, 1, 5; Tusc. IV, 3, 6; Ad Famil. XV, 16, 1; 19, 1. Perhaps however Brutus and Plancus mentioned by Quintilian X, 1, 123 and C. Asinius Pollio were among those whom he has in mind.

35. 2. **vinceremur,** not *vincamur.* The imperfect limits the remark to Cicero's previous writings, and the sense is simply that he succeeded in not falling behind his Graecian models in adequate expression of philosophic ideas. In another place with patriotic enthusiasm he maintains broadly *Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putant, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam,* De Fin. I, 3, 10; comp. III,

2, 5. On the other hand in Tusc. II, 15, 35 he acknowledges the greater richness of the Greek.

9 35. 3. **fortunae iniuria,** alluding to the death of his daughter. Comp. Introduction, p. 19.

35. 9. **totae quaestiones,** investigations of philosophic questions in all their bearings, their general scope, as opposed to isolated, aphoristic meditations.

35. 11. **alia ex alia;** not simply distributive as it generally is, but also reciprocal, ἐξ ἀλλήλων as below c. 43. Comp. De Fin. IV, 17, 47: *nihil differre aliud ab alio;* De Legg. I, 19, 52: *videtisne quanta series rerum sententiarumque sit, atque ut ex alio alia nectantur;* and further Drakenborch on Liv. IV, 22, 5; and Schneid. on Caes. Bell. Gall. VI, 37, 6.— In Greek too ἄλλος ἄλλον for ἀλλήλους. See Bekk. Anecd., p. 81, 8 and 379, 9.

5 10 35. 15. [**Quin etiam obest** &c. The reason may be found in Acad. II, 3, 9: *nam quod dicunt omnia se credere ei, quem iudicent fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare potuissent* &c.]

35. 21. **'Ipse dixit.'** Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 196: παρὰ Πυθαγορείοις τὸ αὐτὸς ἔφα, τουτέστιν ὁ Πυθαγόρας. The expression was afterwards used proverbially of unconditional belief on authority, *iurare in verba magistri.*

11 35. 24. **quattuor Academicis libris.** Cicero wrote at first two books of Academic investigations, one entitled *Catulus*, the other *Lucullus* after the two chief personages who carry on the discussion. He afterwards abandoned these and wrote four other books instead, dedicated to Varro. The beginning of the first book of the second series and the second book of the first (*Lucullus*) are still extant. [For **iis** the Mss. and edd. generally have *his.*]

35. 27. **lucem auctoris.** *Auctor*, from the same stem with *aio* and *autumo* (see Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, p. 407), is originally he who asserts something effectually (*der etwas wirksam ausspricht*), with confidence, energy, vouching for what he says to other persons. From this original meaning all the various usages of the word are easily explained. An *auctor* of a doctrine is then not only its originator but its representative at any particular time, (for example Chrysippus is called *divinationis auctor*, De Divin. II, 28, 610); and *lux auctoris* is the light that comes from a valiant champion, by which a doctrine is made evident to others and gains prominence. The Academic school no longer had any such representative since the death of Philo, and so Cicero complains that it was *propemodum orba.*

35. 29. **profecta a Socrate.** Socrates was thought to be the prede-

cessor of the Academic scepticism and the opposition to the dogmatism of the other schools because of his assertion: That he knew only one thing, namely, that he knew nothing; and because of the reasoning he used to convict of ignorance those who boasted of knowing something. —**Arcesilas** of Pitane in Æolis B.C. 316–241 went further than Socrates; for as Cicero says, Acad. I, 12, 45, *negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset; sic omnia latere in occulto.* — On **Carneades** see c. 2, 4.

35. 35. **veri reperiendi causa.** The question with them was certainly one of *truth*, although in the end they only arrived at the result that in the absence of a sure criterion a certain and definite knowledge of the truth was unattainable and that one must rest satisfied with probability. De Fin. II, 14, 43: *Quasi desperata cognitione certa id sequi volunt, quod veri simile videtur.* Acad. II, 3, 7: *nihil aliud agunt, nisi ut in utramque partem disputando eliciant aliquid, quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat.* Comp. ibid. 24, 76.

36. 5. **alio loco,** namely, in the Academica. For what follows com- 12
pare De Off. II, 2, 7.

36. 9. **iudicandi et adsentiendi nota:** a criterion for judging and deciding. [Cicero uses several expressions for this, there being no single Latin word corresponding to the Greek κριτήριον: *regula et iudicium,* below 1, 16, 43; *distinctio in agnoscendo* Acad. II, 86; *cognitionis nota,* ibid. 110 &c. See Nägelsbach, Lat. Stil. § 1, end.]

36. 10. **exstitit.** "The result for us Academics is,—or, we have drawn the conclusion" &c. In the following clause the words **multa esse probabilia** evidently mean that there are many things probable and yet not certain, which still may furnish to a reasonable man sufficient guides for his practical actions.—**Visum,** accus. from the verbal subst. *visus,* synonymous with *visio,* properly signifies the mental act of the person beholding; it may however be applied to the object which gives rise to the perception; as here *visum insignem et illustrem habere,* "to cause a definite and clear perception" (*eine bestimmte und klare Anschauung bewirken*). [Professor Schoemann here seems to take *visum* as the act of perception, and *habere* in the sense of "to cause." But it would seem better to take *visum* = *speciem,* the sense of the passage being that some things have an appearance sufficiently clear for practical purposes, though they may have no perfectly sure criterion. Comp. Acad. II, 31, 101: . . . *ut ei multa vera videantur, neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam;* 99: *Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit.* Cicero generally uses the neuter

visum for the Greek *φαντασία*, as in Acad. I, 11, 40 and II, 6, 18, and this is one reason why Heindorf brackets this whole sentence; Baiter does the same.] — The construction at the end of the sentence is not quite regular. It would be more correct were it either *quae . . . sapientis vitam regerent* or *quibus . . . sapientis vita regeretur.* As it is, *quae quamquam* can only be equivalent to *et quamquam haec*, and one would rather expect *iis sapientis vitam regi*, so that both clauses, *multa esse probabilia* and *iis . . . regi* connected by *quae* (for *et haec*), would depend on *exstitit.* But such irregularity is easily explained and excused.

36. 11. **percipere̓ntur.** This expression, like *comprehendere* with which it is often coupled, especially in the Lucullus, denotes a perfectly certain and undoubted knowledge and comprehension of an object, the ἀσφαλὴς καὶ βεβαία καὶ ἀμετάθετος κατάληψις of the Stoics.

6 13 36. 15. **omnes, qui . . . iudicent,** *i.e.* all those who pronounce a distinct judgment; the Dogmatics in contradistinction to the Academics who refrained from any such judgment: *nullam rem aperte iudicant,* § 11; comp. III, 40, 95: *ea quae disputari disserere malui quam iudicare.* [But why are the Dogmatics summoned rather than any others? and in point of fact the Academic bears a most important part in the dialogue. The natural meaning of *qui . . . iudicent* would seem to be "to consider the *sententias philosophorum in medio positas* and judge which of them are true"; *iudicare quae sit earum vera* can hardly mean "to hold a clear opinion on the question in general"; *earum* must refer to *sententias* preceding. The sentence seems to be rather an awkward appeal to all the world, in the same vein as the quotation from Caecilius just below.]

36. 18. **(est) in Synephebis.** The verb is wanting in the Mss. *Synephebi* was the title of a *fabula palliata* of Caecilius Statius, a younger contemporary of Plautus. The Greek original was by Menander. — The first two of the verses cited are regular trochaic tetrameters; the other two were doubtless of the same metre, but, whether by the fault of Cicero or that of the copyists, have gotten into confusion. [**non vult;** *nevolt* Schoemann, Baiter I and II.]

14 36. 29. **auspiciis, quibus nos praesumus.** Cicero had been a member of the college of Augurs since the year 700 of the city, the 54th of his age. He also wrote a book *De Auguriis*, probably after the *De Nat. Deor.* and *De Divin.* See the fragments in Orelli IV, 2, p. 478.

15 37. 3. **C. Cottam;** see Introduction, p. 17.

37. 4. **feriis Latinis.** The ancient feast of the Latin Confederation was annually celebrated on the Alban Mount, the Roman consuls presiding, even long after the confederation had ceased to exist. It did not take

place on a fixed day, but was always announced by the consuls (*feriae conceptivae*). In Cicero's time it lasted four days, during which public business ceased and public men had leisure to visit their country seats.

37. 6. **exedra** or **exhedra** was a large room with a high ceiling, two ends of which formed semicircles with benches running quite around against the wall, where people gathered for social intercourse. See Mazois, "Der Palast des Scaurus," übers. von Wüstemann, pp. 119, 126. —The interaspiration, which the Mss. have here, was employed by the Graecian grammarians only in such compounds as *ἐξἑσίη*, *διἑπε* and the like, when the object was to indicate a doubtful etymology. Comp. Lehrs, De Aristarchi stud. Hom., p. 316. The Latin spelling of such words varies. Comp. Schneider, Elementarlehre I, p. 192. According to Bücheler in the N. Rhein. Mus. XIV, 3, p. 429 the interaspiration was not indicated in Cicero's time.

37. 10. [Our text has **Peroportune** here and **oportune** three lines below; it is the usual spelling in the Mss. So I, 33, 92; II, 22, 58; 52, 130; see Halm, Laelius, p. 618, 32, edit. Orell. II.]

37. 11. **altercatio** always denotes a lively and somewhat passionate interchange of words.

37. 14. **M. Piso.** He refers to M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus, adopted 7 16
son of a M. Pupius, consul in 693, whom Cicero several times mentions as an incompetent and vain man; in another place however he compliments him for integrity, eloquence and learning. He was a follower of the Peripatetic school, and in the fifth book of the De Fin. Cicero makes him the expounder of their doctrine about the highest good, as understood by Antiochus.

37. 15. **earum quidem, quae in honore sunt.** The only ones of which this could be said at that time were the Epicurean, Stoic and the Peripatetic; the Pythagorean had an enthusiastic and learned champion in P. Nigidius Figulus, but beyond this was little known. On the Academic see above c. 5, 11.

37. 17. **Antiochi.** See note to c. 3, 6.

37. 17. **ad hunc Balbum missus,** *i.e.* dedicated to him. Comp. De Senect. I, 3: *hunc librum ad te de senectute misimus.*

37. 19. **re concinere, verbis discrepare.** Comp. De Legg. I, 21, 55: (*Zeno*) *cum decus, quod antiqui summum bonum esse dixerant, solum bonum dicat, itemque dedecus illi summum malum, hic solum; divitias, valetudinem, pulchritudinem commodas res appellet, non bonas; paupertatem, debilitatem, dolorem incommodas, non malas; sentit idem quod*

Xenocrates, quod Aristoteles, loquitur alio modo. Ex hac autem non rerum sed verborum discordia controversia nata est de finibus &c.

37. 21. **Egone?** So below III, 3, 8. Comp. De Legg. I, 4, 14: *Sed iam ordire explicare, quaeso, de iure civili quid sentias. Egone? summos fuisse in civitate viros* &c., where Goerenz cites other examples. The fuller phrase De Fin. III, 3, 11: *de quibus cupio scire quid sentias. Egone, quaeris, inquit, quid sentiam?*

37. 26. **non verborum parva, sed rerum permagna dissensio.** On this question consult the third and fourth books De Fin.; especially IV, 22 ff. and III, 15 with Madvig's note.

17 37. 29. **me intuens.** "Παρενθήκη est; with a glance at me." Wolf. So II, 41, 104 and Brut. c. 72, 253. In like manner Acad. I, 1, 2: *iam pridem ad hunc ipsum (me autem dicebat) quaedam institui.* De Fin. V, 3, 7: *hoc, inquit, non poterit sic abire, cum hic adsit; me autem dicebat.* Isoc. Panath. c. 85: *σὺ μὲν πεποίησαι τοὺς λόγους (ἐμὲ λέγων) ὡς ἂν ἅπαντ' ἀποδεχομένου μου τἀκείνων.* Before the following **de natura agebamus deorum** supply something like *dicam ei.* Comp. Heindorf on Hor. Sat. II, 1, 80; Ochsner, Cicer. Eclog., p. 339. This omission is common in Greek. See Heindorf on Plat. Gorg. § 21.

37. 29. **ab eodem Philone;** because both had had him for teacher, *eodem uterque magistro usi.* On Philo see note to 3, 6.

37. 35. **nihil scire didicistis.** The Academics had taught them that there was no such thing as certain knowledge. Seneca, doubtless thinking of this passage, Epist. 88 says: *Academici novam induxerunt sententiam, nihil scire;* and Lactantius III, 14: *Haec (Academia) nihil docet, nisi ut scias te nihil scire.*

38. 1. **adiutorem — auditorem.** A paronomasia, unobjectionable where it occurs naturally. Examples from Cicero may be found in Jul. Theobald, De Annominat. et Alliterat. ap. Cic. Bonn 1852. — On **nolo . . . sed** comp. Madvig Emend. Livian., p. 77; Heindorf Hor. Sat. I, 1, 3.

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18 38. 7. **et ex Epicuri intermundiis.** The copula adds a more special designation to the preceding general expression *ex deorum concilio.* According to Epicurus the gods dwelt in the *intermundiis.* In this passage, in De Fin. II, 23, 75 and De Divin. II, 17, 40 Cicero uses this word to translate the Greek *μετακόσμια, i.e. τὰ μεταξὺ κόσμων διαστήματα* (Diog. L. X, 89), the intervals between the worlds considered by him as infinite in number. See below note to 20, 53.

38. 9. **Platonis de Timaeo deum;** Timaeus of Locri in lower Italy, a Pythagorean, whose instruction Plato is said to have enjoyed according to Cic. De Repub. I, 10, 16. Plato represents him in the dia-

logue bearing his name as giving his views about God and the creation of the world; and it is undeniable that much of the Pythagorean doctrine, which may really have been taught by Timaeus, is contained in that dialogue. Hence *Platonis de Timaeo deum* here is equivalent to *de Timaeo acceptum*, "the god of Plato, that Timaeus taught him." It is generally considered that the extant treatise π. ψυχᾶς κόσμου καὶ φύσιος bearing the name of Timaeus is a comparatively recent forgery.

38. 10. **anum fatidicam.** Cicero doubtless found this sarcastic expression in some of his Greek predecessors. Plutarch repeats the same, De Nobil. c. 13: ἐκείνη ἡ ὑμετέρα πρόνοια, χρησμολόγος γραῦς. Velleius moreover misrepresents the Stoic view in speaking of the Pronoea as an individual person, and he is therefore corrected by Balbus below II, 29, 73.

38. 11. **mundum ipsum.** The Stoics considered the universe as God, in so far that they held it to be endowed with a soul, and to be permeated if not by an immaterial, yet by a thinking and willing principle, namely the fiery ether, just as the human body is by the soul; the doctrine is developed in detail in the second book c. 8 ff. Compare note to c. 14, 37.

38. 12. **ardentem,** because of the fiery ether just mentioned, *ardor caelestis;* comp. c. 14, 37; II, 11, 30. 31; 12, 32; 15, 41.

38. 14. **quibus enim oculis [animi].** Velleius foresees and meets 19
the objection that it might be seen if not with the bodily, at least with the mind's eye. "With what sort of mind's eye?" he asks, not being willing to concede anything of the sort. Comp. *mentis oculi*, De Orat. III, 41, 163 and Orat. c. 29, 101, *pectoris oculi*. Ovid. Met. XV, 64. φρενὸς ὄμμα, Aristoph. Av. V, 1376. τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα, Plato Rep. VII, p. 533 D, and Stallbaum's note.—In the present passage *animi* is wanting in several Mss. and is also considered as suspicious by critics.

38. 17. **tanti muneris,** i.e. *tanti operis*. The two expressions are united in Cicero Tusc. I, 28, 70: *moderator tanti operis et muneris;* and below II, 35, 90: *architectum tanti operis tantique muneris*. *Munus* is especially used of public buildings, as temples or theatres, constructed at private expense.

38. 19. **illae quinque formae.** Plato in the Timaeus, p. 53 C, § 107 ff. in conformity with the Pythagoreans (comp. Plutarch Plac. Phil. II, 6) derives the so-called four elements from the geometrical shaping of the formless matter, which he calls, not ὕλη, but only χώρα; namely, the earth from the cube, water from the icosahedron, air from the octahedron, fire from the pyramid, to which is added a fifth from the dodecahedron, the nature of which he does not clearly explain. Later writers

consider as the πέμπτη οὐσία, *quinta natura* or *quinta essentia* (Macrob. in Somn. Scip. I, 14, 20) the *aether*, *i.e.* the fine etheric substance of which according to Aristotle the heavenly bodies consisted, which surrounded and penetrated the universe and formed according to many the substance of the soul. According to Plato however, who takes the αἰθήρ only for the higher, finer air (p. 58 D), the soul comes neither from this nor from any mixture or combination of the five forms of matter (comp. Trendelenburg's note to Arist. De Anim. I, 2, 7, p. 228); and all that the earlier commentators have advanced to explain the traditional reading in the text, *ad animum efficiendum*, is quite untenable. The correct reading is *afficiendum*. For Plato explains in detail, p. 64 A to 68 C, how the different modifications and mixtures of the elements are adapted to affect the organs of sense and by means of these the soul (τὸ φρόνιμον, p. 64 B) and to produce *sensus*, *i.e.* perceptions. — **Sensus**, not *senses* but *perceptions*, as often elsewhere; comp. Acad. I, 11, 40: *Zeno sensus esse censuit a quadam impulsione oblata extrinsecus.* — **pariendos sensus**, like *dolorem parere*, De Fin. I, 15 end; *somnum parere*, Plin. Hist. Nat. XIX, 8, 38.

38. 21. **Longum est ad omnia;** *dicere* is omitted as in Tusc. III, 18, 40: *sed non necesse est nunc omnia;* ibid. IV, 20, 46: *exspecto quid ad ista* sc. *dicturus sis;* and often elsewhere. — *ad aliquid dicere*, to speak against something. De Div. II, 3, 8: *dicendum est mihi ad ea, quae a te dicta sunt.* Comp. below II, 1, 1.

38. 22. **Sed illa palmaris** [Schoemann's reading for *palmaria*], "worthy of the palm," *i.e.* the prize of victory; ironically of course. But it is very doubtful whether Cicero really wrote thus, supplying mentally *sententia* from § 18, or *res* (as Zumpt thinks, *ad Verrin*, p. 297 and p. 700). Perhaps he wrote: *sed illud palmare est*, or *illa palmaria* as Baiter and Madvig prefer; for although Plato's assertion is a single one, yet it might have been made several times and in several sentences (p. 32 C, 33 A, 41 A) and so be indicated by a plural.

38. 26. **physiologiam,** not what is called so now-a-days, but natural science. Comp. De Div. I, 41, 90: *naturae rationem, quam physiologiam Graeci appellant.* — Moreover Plato (Timaeus, p. 41, A) expressly recognizes the law which Velleius reproaches him with being ignorant of; but he still ascribes to the highest God, the creator of the world, the power of endowing what he has created with eternal existence.

38. 28. **quid est . . . nihil sit extremum?** The question, equivalent to a negation, relates properly only to the second number of the sentence, *cuius nihil sit extremum:* the first, *cuius principium aliquod sit*, gives the circumstances under which that question is asked. Cicero might

have written: *quid est, cuius, cum principium aliquod sit, nihil sit extremum?* On this form of sentence in general see below note to c. 9, 23.

38. 29. **si est [eadem]** scil. *ac Platonicus deus.* The traditional reading, *Pronoea vero si vestra est, eadem requiro* gives no adequate sense, but has found some defenders.

38. 32. **mortalem mundum.** Comp. note to II, 46, 118.

38. 33. **Ab utroque,** i.e. *a te, Lucili, et a Platone.*—For the matter 9 21
itself see Lucret. V, 169 ff.

38. 34. **exstiterint:** i.e. *prodierint ad aedificandum.*

39. 2. **nam fateor** etc. Comp. Plat. Timae., p. 39 E: *ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ ξυνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται (ὁ δημιουργός.) ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου. Saeculum,* according to Censorin. *d. die nat.* c. 17, *spatium vitae humanae longissimum, partu et morte definitum.* Originally therefore the span of life; later a definite period of a hundred or a hundred and ten years; sometimes too a longer period in general of no precise limits.

39. 3. **sed fuit . . . intellegi (non) potest.** The connection of thought, misunderstood by many, is as follows: Before the creation of the world and the heavenly bodies there was an eternity without beginning or division into periods; but of its duration (lit. of what sort it was in respect to duration, *spatio*) we can have no conception. We can conceive only measurable and limited time; but this was a thing impossible before the heavenly bodies existed, by whose movements time is measured and divided.—The negation before *potest* is indispensable. Comp. Arist. Phys. IV, 11; Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. hypot. III, 140 f. Victorin. ad Cic. De Invent. I, p. 79, Orelli.

39. 6. **ut fuerit.** We should expect *ut fuisse intellegamus;* the abbreviated form of expression is not unfrequent. Comp. De Fin. I, 5, 14: *adduci vix possum, ut ea tibi non vera videantur,* for *ut ea tibi vera esse non credam.* De Legg. III, 15, 33: *ego in ista sum sententia, nihil ut fuerit in suffragiis voce melius,* for *ut fuisse putem;* more examples of the sort where a consequence only conceived is expressed precisely as an actual one may be seen in Madvig's note to the above passage De Fin., and Haase notes to Reisig's Vorlesungen, p. 557. Comp. also below c. 27, 75 and 34, 95. [The two examples cited by Prof. Schoemann are quite dissimilar. After *adduci* there is plainly an ellipsis as it is commonly explained. But with *in ista sententia sum* the explanation does not hold. I am not of the opinion that I think a thing is so, I am of the opinion that it is so. So in Tusc. V, 41, 119: *quorum ea sententia est ut virtus per se*

ipsa nihil valeat, the clause with *ut* is the plain statement of the opinion. Take the example in Fam. XV, 15, 2: *equidem fateor meam coniecturam hanc fuisse ut — communi saluti consuli vellent;* was his conjecture that he conjectured so and so? De Fin. II, 3, 6: *Hoc vero optimum, ut is . . . nesciat.* De Div. II 2, 5: *Magnificum illud . . . ut . . . non egeant.* Tusc. IV, 47: *ita enim definit, ut perturbatio sit* &c., not a result, but the substance of the definition, *censet . . . esse.* Fam. XV, 2, 8: *hac opinione ut . . . liberarit.* In all these cases the *ut* clause does not express a result, but merely the idea in a simple form as a conception, without regard to the actual reality. In the text the sense is: The idea is inconceivable that there was ever any such thing as time when there was no means of measuring it. The usage is doubtless an extension of the consecutive *ut*, but is sufficiently common to be noticed apart.]

22 39. 11. **signis et luminibus.** The second word is in a measure explanatory of the first; for *signa* are here the heavenly bodies, as it were lights of heaven, as below c. 13, 35. Lucr. I, 1088: *atque ideo totum circumtremere aethera signis. Signa* is especially used of the constellations of the zodiac, as in II, 20, 52.

39. 12. **tamquam aedilis,** because the *aediles* had the care of decorating the public places on festive occasions. That illuminations were included is not especially stated, but may be reasonably inferred.

23 39. 17. **ut fere dicitis.** Comp. II, 53, 133 and 62, 154.

39. 19. **An stultorum.** They are immediately after called *improbi*, because *improbitas* springs from *stultitia* or *insipientia*, *i.e.* the want of that proper insight and of moral consistency in action, which belongs only to the *sapiens*. According to the Stoics there is no middle term between *sapientia* and *stultitia* (comp. De Fin. IV, 19); and as wisdom is attained only by a very few, the great mass of men are *stulti* or *improbi.* — For **cum omnes stulti sint miserrimi** comp. III, 32, 79.

39. 20. [**deinde quid est adsecutus?** The *deinde* occurring three lines below is at first a little confusing. Velleius says that these things were not created for the sake *stultorum* for two reasons: first (*at primum*), because there was no occasion for the Deity to show any favor to the wicked (*improbi* or *stulti*); second, (*deinde quid est adsecutus?*) because it has been of no avail if he did. The answer *nihil* is to be understood after *adsecutus.* This answer is now justified on two grounds: first, (*cum omnes* &c.) because the *stulti* are already as wretched as they can be from their own *stultitia;* second, (*deinde quod ita multa sunt* &c.) because of the many ills of life &c.]

39. 23. **ut ea sapientes** &c. The consequence of the clause *ita multa sunt incommoda* is really contained in the second of the two clauses

connected by *ut, stulti nec vitare venientia possint* &c., and not in the first *sapientes ea commodorum compensatione leniant;* this last contains rather a concession, inserted only for the purpose of bringing out into a stronger light from the contrast the following clause, the real consequence of *ita multa sunt* &c. Hence Cicero might have written: *ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut, etsi* (or *cum*) *ea sapientes . . . leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praesentia.* — This peculiarity of inserting concessions or assumptions without the corresponding conjunctions before the clause which really contains the essential fact is very frequent in both of the ancient languages; and examples may be found in this treatise, besides those mentioned above, in c. 8, 20; I, 26, 74; 31, 86; II, 34, 87; III, 13, 32. Comp. Hand's Tursell. I, p. 349: Matthiae, Verm. Schr., p. 52. For Greek examples where the two clauses are distinguished by μέν and δέ see note to Isaeus, p. 195.

39. 27. [**animi natura intellegentis.** Schoemann reads:] *animi* **10**
natura et intelligentia, according to the most probable emendation of the passage which is corrupted in the Mss. The special designation is added to the more general by the copula. — We shall see below c. 18, 48 that the Epicureans held that intelligence could only exist in connection with the human form.

39. 28. **nunc autem hactenus.** The adverb can hardly be taken **24**
with *admirabor*, which would give no proper sense; but must be explained elliptically, supplying some verb like *dicam*. "So much for the present on this point." Comp. De Div. II, 36, 76.

39. 28. **admirabor,** "I will express my astonishment at." Comp. De Div. I, 58, 131: *Haec habui de divinatione quae dicerem; nunc illud testabor* &c.

39. 30. **rotundum.** This alone is the predicate. The three preceding adjectives are only qualifications of *mundum* supplied from the foregoing sentence. It seems particularly absurd to the Epicurean that the animated, immortal and moreover happy universe should be round. The reason for emphasizing *beatum* more than the other attributives by prefixing *et eundem* will be seen from what follows; for this revolution of a round god is in complete contradiction with his pretended happiness.

39. 31. **Plato,** in the Timaeus, p. 33 B. Pythagoras held the same opinion according to Diog. Laert. VIII, 105.

39. 33. **ea celeritate contorqueatur.** We must bear in mind the old idea that the earth remains fixed and all the rest of the universe revolves around it daily.

39. 35. **Quodque.** The conjunction *que* often makes the transition

to something new, quite different from what precedes, when *porro*, *deinde*, *iam vero* or the like might have been used instead. Examples in abundance may be found in Goerenz De Legg., p. 47 and Madvig De Fin., p. 476. — In what went before Velleius was speaking of the revolution of the universe; he now passes on to the earth, which does not revolve, but suffers cold and heat. The reasoning is briefly this: The earth, as part of the universe, is also a part of God; but the earth is subject to cold and heat; therefore God is so subject. But as cold and heat are very unpleasant to men, so we cannot doubt that they are unpleasant to God; but this is inconsistent with his happiness. Comp. Matthiae, Verm. Schr., p. 54.

40. 1. **sic afficiatur** [an emendation of Schoemann] for *significetur* in the Mss., which nobody has been able to explain, referring to the heat and cold mentioned immediately after. [Lachmann, Lucret. p. 351, proposes *sic incitetur*, understanding the passage to refer to what precedes; but the *enim* of the next sentence seems to forbid that. Müller gives the Mss. reading without emendation.]

40. 6. **quae, si mundus est deus.** A more correct arrangement would be *quae, quoniam partes mundi sunt, si mundus est deus* &c.

25 40. 9. [**Lucili,** *i.e.* Balbus, the representative of the Stoics in the discussion. — **Qualia vero (vetera) sint.** The passage in the Mss. is hopelessly corrupt, the best having: *Qualia vero est;* Müller leaves it without any attempt at restoration, and Schoemann reads: *Qualia vero (cetera) sint.* The reading given in the text is an emendation proposed by A. Weidner in the Philologus, Vol. 38, 1879. Comp. Tusc. I, 13, 29: *Si vero scrutari vetera et ex iis ea, quae scriptores Graeciae prodiderunt, eruere coner* &c. — **ab ultimo . . . superiorum.** From the most remote, *i.e.* the earliest in point of time.]

40. 10. [**Thales** of Miletus, founder of the Ionic school, born about B.C. 640, left no writings, but his doctrine, handed down by tradition, was later committed to writing, for example, by Aristotle.]

40. 12. **deum autem eam mentem** &c. This sounds as if Thales as well as Anaxagoras (c. 11, 26) recognized a spiritual, creative, original being along with and distinct from matter, which is doubtless an error. Thales held that the primal existence was a fluid which he called ὕδωρ; but a living, not a lifeless fluid, and one endowed with a δύναμις κινητική; force and matter united in one. Μίαν καὶ κινουμένην ἀρχήν says Simplic. ad Ar. Phys. f. 6, 18. Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. I, p. 56, calls this δύναμις κινητική divine: it is doubtful whether Thales called it so or not; but he certainly never regarded it as conscious, thinking mind. *Nihil huic operi ex divina mente praeposuit.* Augustine D. Civ. Dei VIII, 2. — **Si di possunt esse** &c. The objections of the speaker really apply not to the view which

he has just ascribed to Thales, but only to the intimate union of mind and matter in the same elementary substance; so that in the statement of that view we must suppose an incorrectness of expression, perhaps through the fault of Cicero, which has obscured its real purport. — [The reading of this passage here given has become a sort of *textus receptus*, and we have not ventured to give any other; but it is far from satisfactory. We have to deal of course not with what Thales really taught, but with what Cicero thought he taught; and the answer is such as Cicero supposed an Epicurean would have made. In line 11 Cicero says that Thales taught that *aquam esse initium rerum*, and that *deum eam mentem esse*, which created all things out of water. He must have thought then that *deum* and *mentem* were identical, denoting the creating power as distinguished from *aqua*, the matter. Now the Epicurean's objections to almost all the views commented upon in the following summary is simply that we cannot conceive of God or mind without sensation, or without a body for this purpose: cf. l. 20, *quasi aut aër sine ulla forma deus esse possit* &c.; l. 31, *aperta simplexque mens, nulla re adiuncta, qua sentire possit, fugere intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur;* 41, 33, *aër . . . quem sensum habere potest aut quam formam dei?* So in 42, 2, in the criticism on Plato; in 42, 29, on Aristotle; in 43, 14; in 43, 20. In the passage in question the objection is made that God or mind must have a body and hence sensation; and if it could be otherwise, Thales had no need of associating god or mind with water, he might have left it a separate existence. We understand then the two suppositions *Si di possunt esse sine sensu*, and *si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore* as the same in substance; and the conclusion to be drawn in the form of the question, — *mentem cur aquae adiunxit?* Heindorf proposed *si dii possunt esse sine sensu cur aquae mentem adiunxit, si ipsa mens* &c. Prof. Schoemann (Opusc. Ac. III, p. 285) says of this "*Hoc refutari nihil opus est,*" and emends the passage as it stands in our text. But assuming as he does that the two suppositions are different in substance, there should be two conclusions also differing in substance. What difference is there between associating mind with water, or water with mind? The logical train of thought under Schoemann's supposition would be: *Si di possunt* &c., *deum* (not *mentem*) *cur aquae adiunxit; si mens constare* &c., *mentem cur aquae adiunxit.* It is of course not possible to say what Cicero really wrote; but we should prefer to read: *Si di possunt esse sine sensu, mentem cur aquae adiunxit, si ipsa mens* &c. The edd. and Ms. O have *sensu et mente cur aquae adiunxit;* and B[1] (Orelli) has *mentem* for *mente*. A. Weidner (Philologus, Vol. 38, 1879) emends thus: *Sed nec di possunt esse sine sensu, et mentem cur aquae adiunxit* &c].

40. 15. [**Anaximandri,** also of Miletus, an Ionic philosopher, born about B.C. 611. He held the existence of a primeval substance, ἀρχή, which he called ἄπειρον. It was undefined in quality and unlimited in extent. There is a difference of opinion whether he considered the ἄπειρον to be a mixture of all the elementary substances which in time separated and assumed distinct existence, or an indefinite substance which potentially contained all the others. Aristotle, Phys. III, 4, says that he taught that the ἄπειρον was itself divine, contained and governed everything. It is probable however that Anaximander did not express himself very clearly on these points. He is said to have taught that the soul was of the nature of air. See Ueberweg, Gesch. der Phil. I, p. 36.] — **nativos esse deos,** *i.e.* that the gods had not always existed, but had come into existence in the course of the development of the universe. Comp. Schwegler on Arist. Metaph. XII, 2, 5, p. 239.

40. 16. **innumerabilis mundos.** Apparently not only the heavenly bodies are here meant, which, as we know, Anaxagoras held to be gods, but other worlds like our own. Comp. Stobaeus, Eclog. I, p. 496; August. De Civit. Dei VIII, 2.

40. 17. **intellegere.** See c. 14, 36.

26 40. 18. **Anaximenes,** likewise of Miletus and of the Ionic school like Thales and Anaximander, whose disciple he is said to have been. — **aëra.** He held the doctrine of an elementary substance like the air, which he considered, as Thales did water and Anaximander the ἄπειρον, not as mere lifeless matter, but as endowed with living force. Stobaeus, I, p. 56 says also that he called it god. — **eumque gigni.** The statement that Anaximenes held the airy elementary substance to have been created, not to have existed from eternity, is doubtless an error, difficult to understand or excuse. *ex eoque omnia gigni* would be a more correct statement (Stobaeus, p. 296); but that is not to be thought of here.

11 40. 22. **Anaxagoras** of Klazomenae, also of the Ionic school (B.C. 500), lived and taught a long time at Athens. It is very doubtful whether Cicero and others are right in calling him a disciple of the preceding.

40. 23. **primus . . . voluit.** Anaxagoras passes for the first philosopher who rose to the idea of a pure, immaterial spirit. It is certain that he held the existence of a νοῦς, which as a thinking, moving and regulating principle he opposed to the original matter that contained in itself all the constituents of the physical world, the so-called ὁμοιομερῆ, and believed the two to be essentially different. He called the νοῦς λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον; expressions which may be due to the want of a more appropriate designation for what is purely immaterial (ἀσώματον, see

note to c. 12, 30); but only in so far as we consider it certain that Anaxagoras really understood the *νοῦς* to consist not only of finer and purer matter than everything else, but as actually *immaterial*. But is this really so sure?

40. 24. [**discriptionem et modum.** For *modum* Schoemann has *motum* and compares Arist. Phys. Ausc. VIII, 1: *φησὶ γὰρ (ὁ 'Αν.) ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων καὶ ἠρεμούντων τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, κίνησιν ἐμποιῆσαι τὸν νοῦν καὶ διακρῖναι.*]

40. 25. **motum sensui iunctum et continentem,** "activity producing motion (*bewegende Thätigkeit*) bound up and going together with sensation and consciousness" (for *sensus* includes both these ideas). That the activity of mind is attended with sensation and consciousness follows, without being especially stated, from the fact that *ratio*, reason, is ascribed to it. But according to Epicurus not only is an activity of anything infinite and incorporeal which works upon matter and sets it in motion impossible, because only matter can work upon matter, but any sensation is impossible, because this too can only result from the action of matter upon matter.—In the following words: *neque sensum omnino, quo non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret*, it is hardly correct to take *ipsa natura* as nominative and only another expression for *infinitum*. It is rather an ablative absolute. Cicero says that sensation would be inconceivable such as we should have to assume under the supposition of an infinite incorporeal spirit, namely that it would perceive without its nature receiving an impression from without (*naturâ non pulsâ*). *Ipsius* would be a better reading than *ipsa*.—[This passage is very obscure, and the explanation turns upon Cicero's understanding of Anaxagoras's doctrine. He seems to have thought that Anaxagoras held that the *νοῦς* was immanent in and coextensive with the universe; and then makes the Epicurean object that there can be no motion and sensation combined in what is infinite, nor any sensation at all unless nature itself experiences such sensation. There can be no motion and sensation in the infinite because, as the Epicurean thought, motion and sensation cannot exist *sine corpore*, the Deity must according to them be endowed with a *corpus* or a *quasi corpus;* and there can be no sensation at all of the *mens infinita*, if that be immanent in and coextensive with the universe, because sensation must result from some external cause, and there can be no such cause external to the whole universe. Comp. p. 41, 11 and Schoemann's note.]

40. 28. **si mentem istam quasi animal.** Epicurus considered two things essential to the *animal;* an inward portion, the *anima*, from which comes the name, and an outward portion, the body. Now if the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras is an *animal*, it must be likewise so constituted; and

hence, inasmuch as the spirit, properly so called, can only be the inward portion, we must conceive the *νοῦς* as provided with an external body.

27 40. 30. **Quod quoniam non placet,** *scil. Anaxagorae.* [There is here an ellipsis somewhat of this sort: Since Anaxagoras rejects this idea, he must hold that the mind is *aperta simplexque;* and *aperta simplexque mens* &c. is beyond our power of conception.]

40. 31. **aperta,** i.e. *nullo corpore cincta.* The same idea is contained in *nulla re adiuncta qua sentire possit,* because according to Epicurus sensation is only possible by means of a material body.

40. 32. **intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem:** "this exceeds the power and faculty of comprehension of our reason." The general *intellegentiae vim* is further defined by *notionem,* our comprehension.

40. 33. **Alcmaeo** of Crotona, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras, by some considered to be of his school. Little is known of his opinions; whether he really held only the heavenly bodies to be gods, or accepted other divine existences besides them, is not to be ascertained. [Arist. De Anima, I, 2, 17: *Φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν (τὴν ψυχὴν) ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις· τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἀεὶ κινουμένῃ· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.*]

40. 35. **Pythagoras** of Samos lived and taught in lower Italy and died at Croto at a very old age B.C. 497. — **Nam** is here not causal, but only a particle of transition, as it often is in passing to something which is to be stated with vivacity and confidence. It is originally a particle of asseveration; the causal signification is only a secondary one.

41. 1. **animum . . . commeantem,** *i.e.* a soul of the universe permeating and animating everything: *πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον,* Sext. Empir. adv. Math. IX, 127, not immaterial, but a very fine, fiery ether. Cicero does not expressly say that Pythagoras called this soul of the universe God; but in this connection it followed as a matter of course, and hence it is unnecessary to insert *deum,* before *animum* for instance.

41. 2. **ex quo nostri animi carperentur.** Diog. Laer. VIII, 28: *εἶναι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα αἰθέρος.* Cic. Cat. Mai. 21, 78: *Pythagoras Pythagoreique numquam dubitarunt, quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus.*

28 41. 6. [**autem** here introduces another objection, like our "moreover"; it merely continues the argument.]

41. 7. **nihil nisi animus,** *i.e.* entirely incorporeal and immaterial. But if the soul of the universe was a fiery ether, it was not immaterial, and the difficulty which Velleius here suggests was unreal.

41. 8. **Xenophanes,** born at Colophon, was banished from there, and emigrated to the Phocaean colony of Elea in lower Italy; he was contemporary with the Persian wars and founder of the Eleatic school.

41. 8. **mente adiuncta omne praeterea, quod esset infinitum** &c. Construed thus the sense must almost necessarily be, that Xenophanes understood the *mens* and besides (*praeterea*) the infinite All as two different things, but still as subsisting in union, and that he called them both together God. If Velleius really meant this, it was certainly an error and in contradiction with what we know of Xenophanes from other sources. I have therefore taken the liberty to change the traditional punctuation, writing *omne, praeterea quod* instead of *omne praeterea, quod* &c. It is certain that *praeterea quod* might have been said as equivalent to *praeterquam quod,* though there may be no other example of it. The sense of the passage would then be: that Xenophanes taught that the *Omne,* endowed with intelligence, was not only infinite, but was also God. [We have retained the usual punctuation in the text.]

41. 10. **item, ut ceteri,** like Thales for example (c. 10, 25) and Anaxagoras (c. 11, 26).

41. 11. **neque sentiens neque coniunctum.** Whatever is infinite cannot be touched by anything outside of itself, and hence cannot experience sensation (see note to § 26) nor stand in connection with anything, because outside of itself there is nothing.

41. 12. **Parmenides** of Elea, disciple of Xenophanes, set forth doctrines such as are here cited in the second part of his didactic poem, in which he treated, not as in the first part περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, *i.e.* of that which really exists, but περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, of phenomena; and set up a sort of scientific dogmatism (τὰ πρὸς δόξαν).

41. 13. **coronae simile.** In the world sprung from the elementary substance Parmenides assumed the existence of a number of concentric spheres, which he called στεφάνας: τὴν δὲ μεσαιτάτην ἁπάσαις τοκέα καὶ κληδοῦχον ἐπονομάζει, δίκην τε καὶ ἀνάγκην, Stobae. Ecl. I, p. 482. Comp. the verse of Parmenides preserved by Simplicius, Phys. f. 9 a: ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων, ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ. In taking the exterior sphere of all for the abode of the δαίμων instead of the middle one Velleius confounds the views of Parmenides with those of the Stoics. On this see c. 14, 37; and comp. Somn. Scip. c. 4.

41. 13. **continente ardore,** i.e. *continuo, perpetuo.* Comp. Curt. VII, 20, 2: *continenti incendio cuncta torrentur.*—**lucis orbem** = *orbem lucidum.*

41. 16. **monstra,** also used of fantastic views, absurdities in III, 17, 44; like *portenta,* I, 8, 18; 16, 43; and III, 38, 91.

41. 17. **ad deum revocet,** "refers to the divine being," *i.e.* represents them as his manifestations or actions. Parmenides treats of the attracting and repelling forces in his poetic language under the terms *πόλεμος, νεῖκος, στάσις, ἔρως* &c., of which there are traces in the fragments.

41. 19. **in alio,** namely *in Alcmaeone,* § 27.

12 29 41. 20. **Empedocles** of Agrigentum, about the middle of the fifth century, set forth his views on natural philosophy, as Xenophanes and Parmenides did, in a didactic poem, of which several important fragments are still preserved.

41. 21. **in deorum opinione** for *in opinione de dis,* as further on, *nullam opinionem eius.* So *coniectura provinciae* Verr. III, 52, 121; *dubitatio iuris* pr. Caecina c. 4; *oratio falsae legationis* and other examples in Heinrich ad Cic. fr.; or. pr. Flacc. p. 94 and Reisig's Vorles. ed. Haase, p. 650.

41. 21. **Quattuor enim naturas,** *i.e.* the so-called four elements, called *στοιχεῖα* since Aristotle, but designated by Empedocles in his poem *περὶ φύσεως* as *τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα*; they are also personified as divine beings and called by mythological names of gods, which however may be considered as a poetic license, such as we often find in Lucretius. Velleius evidently makes more of it than Empedocles intended.

41. 24. **Protagoras** of Abdera, contemporary of Socrates, was one of the most distinguished among the so-called sophists, men who at that time travelled about as teachers of knowledge and taught for money. He maintained that there was no such thing as certain, objective knowledge, no universally valid truth, but only subjective ideas and opinions; and he used the same language in regard to the belief in the gods. Comp. c. 23, 63.

41. 26. **Democritus,** also of Abdera, a somewhat younger contemporary of the preceding. On his doctrines referred to here see more in the note to c. 43, 120.

41. 27. **imagines earumque circumitus** for *imagines circumeuntes,* a strange hendiadys, but doubtless chosen designedly to bring out more pointedly the strangeness of the thing by the strangeness of the expression. So further on **scientiam intellegentiamque nostram,** the abstract for the concrete, *animum nostrum scientem et intellegentem.* On the **natura quae imagines fundat** see note to c. 24, 66 and 43, 120.

41. 33. **Diogenes Apolloniates** of Apollonia in Crete, contemporary of Anaxagoras. The air-like elementary substance, which he held with Anaximenes (c. 10, 26), he considered not only as endowed with living

force, but as also *compos divinae rationis* (Augustine, De Civ. Dei VIII, 2); πολλὰ εἰδός (Simplic. in Arist. Phys. f. 33 a).

41. 34. **Platonis inconstantia.** This inconsistency evidently can- 30
not be held to exist between the two assertions contained in the following relative clause, which are not at all contradictory; but in the positive views afterwards cited which Plato sets forth in other places. Consequently Cicero should have made the clauses, in which these views are stated, also dependent on the relative *qui*, opposing them to what precedes by *tamen:* for example, *qui in Timaeo* (or *qui, cum in Timaeo*) ... *censeat, alibi tamen sine corp.* &c. [The opposition seems to be rather between *qui in Timaeo ... censeat* and the sentence beginning *Idem et in Timaeo.* Cicero says that in these two dialogues Plato holds that nothing can be known of the Deity, and yet in the very same dialogues he says that various things, *mundum, caelum, astra* &c. are God. Compare what is said of Xenophon in the next passage: *facit Socratem disputantem formam dei quaeri non oportere, eundemque et solem et animum deum dicere* &c. The clause *Quod vero* &c. merely mentions in passing another notion of Plato on the same subject.]

41. 35. **in Timaeo nominari neget posse.** Plat. Tim., p. 28 C, and Cicero's translation of the Tim. c. 2.

42. 1. **in legum libris.** Namely, VII, c. 22, p. 821 A. But Velleius either from design or carelessness has ignored Plato's true meaning.

42. 3. **ἀσώματον.** Plato does not himself use this expression in the Timaeus, although he does so in other dialogues. I should hesitate to take this as an interpolation as Baiter and Heindorf do. The corresponding Latin word *incorporeus* is not found as early as Cicero. Comp. Gell. V, 15, 1.

42. 5. **careat etiam prudentia;** inasmuch as this is only a result of experience, and experience only a result of sense-perceptions, which are impossible for an incorporeal being.

42. 7. **mundum deum esse.** Tim., p. 34 B; 68 E; 92 C. The God in the universe, which is hence called God itself, is the soul bestowed upon it by the highest God, the δημιουργός. Comp. note to c. 14, 37.

42. 7. **caelum, astra, terram.** Legg. VII, 22, p. 821, and X, 8, p. 896 f. These too are divine only because the divine soul of the universe dwells in them.

42. 8. **animos.** Plato calls the soul not God, but only godlike, inasmuch as it also partakes of the soul of the universe. Tim., p. 41 C.

42. 8. **quos maiorum institutis accepimus.** Tim., p. 40 D ff. Plato allowed the gods of the popular belief, as he had no reason to deny their existence, to pass for creatures and servants of the supreme God.

["The distorted conceptions of the Platonic doctrines, which we find here, are not to be laid to the charge of Cicero, but to that of some Greek authority of the Epicurean school, who, it would seem, designedly for his own purpose expounded the Platonic teachings and in part misrepresented them." R. Kühner, Wesen der Götter, übers. u. erkl., p. 64.]

81 42. 10. [**Atque etiam** here and below § 32 serves only to make the transition. It is worth while to notice the different particles used for this purpose throughout the whole passage from § 25. Compare a similar one, II, 47, 122.]

42. 12. **formam dei quaeri non oportere.** Xenophon, Memor. IV, 3, 13.

42. 13. **solem et animum deum.** In the Memorabilia the sun is nowhere called God; and of the soul it is only said *τοῦ θείου μετέχει.*

42. 13. **modo unum, tum autem plures deos.** It is true that Xenophon sometimes uses the plural *οἱ θεοί*, sometimes the singular *ὁ θεός*, *τὸ θεῖον*, also *τὸ δαιμόνιον*; but he uses the singular, as all other writers do, only to designate the divine power in general, not this or that particular god. An especial designation of a supreme God governing and maintaining the world, as opposed to the other gods, is found only in IV, 3, 13, a passage which is considered without reason by some critics as an interpolation, though an old one.

42. 14. [**sunt iisdem in erratis.** We say in English that a *person* is in error; but here we must translate by the adjective. So below § 37: *magno in errore sententia est;* De Fin. II, 14, 47: *Atque his tribus generibus honestorum notatis quartum sequitur et in eadem pulchritudine et aptum ex illis tribus;* a similar use in Tusc. III, 18, 42: *Quae sequuntur in eadem sententia sunt* &c.]

18
82 42. 15. **Antisthenes** of Athens, disciple of Socrates, founder of the Cynic school. In the Herculan. Fr. of Philodemus, p. 21 (72 Gomp.) we find: *παρ' Ἀντισθένει δ' ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι πολλοὺς θεούς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἕνα.* His speculations in natural philosophy led him to the idea of one God, at the same time that he allowed the traditional gods of the popular belief to pass for creatures and subordinate servants of the supreme God, just as other philosophers did. The judgment therefore that follows, *tollit vim et naturam deorum*, is to be regarded as unfounded.

42. 18. **Speusippus,** likewise of Athens, and successor of his uncle Plato in the Academy.

42. 18. **vim quandam . . . eamque animalem.** An animal, *i.e.* a living force, a soul of the universe. From Stob. Ecl. I, p. 58 taken with Arist. Metaph. XII, 7, § 19, p. 1072 we learn that he called this

νοῦς; ascribing however the highest intellectual and moral perfection not to this *νοῦς*, but to a later stage of development. Nothing more is known of his views, and we cannot be certain whether *qua omnia regantur* is really said here in the same sense as he intended it.

42. 20. **in tertio de philosophia libro.** This work is no longer 33
extant. It was one of the popular works written in the form of a dialogue. See Bernays, Die Dialoge des Arist., pp. 95 and 99.

42. 22. **menti,** *i.e.* the highest intelligence, the pure, incorporeal spirit, *νοῦς*. Metaph. XII, 6. 7. 9.

42. 23. **mundum ipsum deum esse.** Aristotle nowhere asserts that the universe is God: but he calls the heavens *ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ θεῖον*. De Caelo II, 1, 3.

42. 23. **alium quendam.** He means probably what Aristotle in Meteor. I, 3 and De Caelo II, 4 calls *πρῶτον στοιχεῖον, πρῶτον τῶν σωμάτων*, an *οὐσία σώματος ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς ἐνταῦθα* (i.e. *ἐν τῇ γῇ*) *συστάσεις θειοτέρα καὶ προτέρα* (De Caelo I, 2), the *quinta natura* mentioned above (note to c. 8, 19), which occupies the space above the moon, and from which are formed the heavenly bodies and their spheres. This nobler, godlike element is endowed with a circular motion, which explains the revolution of the heavens and the heavenly bodies; and it is this motion which is here designated by *replicatio*, a motion returning upon itself. Comp. Stob. Ecl. Phys. I, p. 64 and especially Plut. Plac. Phil. I, 7.

42. 25. **caeli ardorem.** Only another name for the substance just spoken of, which Aristotle himself (De Caelo I, 3) explains to be what others call *aether*. On this expression see note to c. 8, 18.

42. 28. **illi tot di.** By this expression it is impossible to understand the three just mentioned, the *mundus*, the governor of the *mundus*, and the *caëli ardor*. Therefore some passage must have been lost in which heavenly bodies were probably spoken of; and those, being formed of a divine matter, might themselves be called divine (*θεῖα, δαιμόνια*). Comp. Stob. Ecl. Phys. I, p. 486, where they are also called *θεοί*.

42. 32. **semper se movens.** According to Aristotle the supreme God is himself without motion, but is himself the cause of the motion of the universe. The Epicurean could not quite understand anything that caused motion, being itself immovable; hence he says *se movens*.

42. 33. **Xenocrates** of Chalcedon, disciple of Plato (hence *condis-* 34
cipulus of Aristotle), and successor of Speusippus as teacher in the Academy after B.C. 339.

42. 35. **deos enim octo esse dicit.** The account of the theology of Xenocrates is very incomplete; it is more fully given in Stob. Ecl. I, p. 62. At the head he placed the *μονάς* and the *δυάς*, the unity and the

duality; the former he also called Zeus and mind, νοῦς; the latter he characterized as a female principle, and called it mother of the gods, ruler of the sublunary world, soul of the universe. The heavens and the heavenly bodies were gods that had come into being (not existing from eternity); as were also the elementary spirits which had rule in the air, the water and the earth, and to which he gave the names of the popular deities, Here, Poseidon, Demeter.

43. 1. [**stellis vagis,** below *errantibus stellis, i.e.* the planets. Repub. I, 14, 22: *quae* (*stellae*) *errantes et quasi vagae nominarentur.*]

43. 5. **Ponticus Heraclides,** from Heraclea in Pontus, disciple of Plato and Speusippus and later of Aristotle. Other authorities also represent him as a versatile writer who did not disdain to bring in much that was strange and fabulous.

43. 7. **sensuque deum privat;** evidently from the Epicurean's point of view, who with his opinions could not allow any sensation or consciousness to gods of this sort.

85 43. 9. **Theophrasti** of Eresus in Lesbos, disciple and successor of Aristotle.

43. 12. **Strato** of Lampsacus, ἀνὴρ ἐλλογιμώτατος καὶ φυσικὸς ἐπικληθείς, Diog. L. V, 2. The little that is found about him has been gathered by Nauwerck, De Stratone Lampsaceno. Berol. 1836.

43. 13. **in natura sitam.** Comp. Cic. Acad. II, 38, 121: *negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quaecumque sint, omnia effecta esse natura.* On *natura* as a blind, unconscious natural force (*natura nesciens quid faciat* in Seneca, Quaest. Nat. 1 princ.) see II, 32, 81.

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86 43. 15. **Zeno** of Citium in Cyprus, who studied partly with the Cynic Crates, partly with Xenocrates the Academic, was founder of the Stoic school, and died at a very old age at Athens about B.C. 260.

43. 15. **naturalem legem.** Diog. L. VII, 88: κοινὸς νόμος, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί.

43. 17. **quo modo efficiant animantem** &c. A wilful misunderstanding of the opinion of Zeno similar to one noticed above on the πρόνοια, c. 8, 18.

43. 19. **aethera.** See below B. II, 9, 23 ff.

43. 20. **nihil sentiens.** So the Epicurean says, because he cannot conceive of an ether with sensation and reason, as Zeno understood it. On **intellegi** comp. III, 15, 38; and on **si . . . potest** Opusc. Ac. III, p. 311.

43. 22. **rationem quandam;** λόγον, the same as the *lex* above mentioned. — **affectam,** which is rather incongruous here and certainly unnecessary, was hardly written by Cicero. Comp. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 313.

Or shall we assume that Cicero thought to put a somewhat inappropriate expression in the mouth of the Epicurean?

43. 23. **astris.** See II, 15.

43. 24. **annis, mensibus** &c. Evidently a perversion, to which Zeno's allegorical explanations of the mythological gods perhaps gave occasion.

43. 25. **Hesiodi theogoniam interpretatur.** Zeno certainly wrote no particular commentary on the Theogony, but only referred to it in his writings on natural philosophy, such as *περὶ κόσμου*, and explained the theogonic fables allegorically, *per quandam significationem* as is stated below, in harmony with his system.

43. 26. **usitatas perceptasque.** See note to II, 39, 91.—**Cognitiones** =*notiones*, as below c. 17, 44.

43. 30. **Aristonis** of Chios, not be confounded with the Peripatetic 37
of the same name from Ceos. We have no other information regarding his doctrines, and hence can form no judgment of the correctness of the statement here made.

43. 33. **Cleanthes** of Assus in Lycia, Zeno's successor as head of the Stoic school.

43. 34. **ipsum mundum.** Zeno had done the same before. See II, 8, 21.

43. 35. **totius naturae menti atque animo,** *i.e.* to the soul of the universe. This is a repetition of the idea of the preceding phrase; for the universe is only called God, because it is filled with and animated by the universal soul. Comp. Varro in August. De Civit. Dei VII, 6: *Hunc ipsum mundum esse deum; sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem, ita mundum deum dici ab animo, quum sit ex animo et corpore.*

44. 1. **ultimum . . . ardorem.** Also the same thing in another form; for it is the fiery ether that partly encompasses the universe, partly penetrates it as its soul.

44. 7. **in animi notione . . . reponere.** Epicurus assumed the existence of an innate idea, the so-called *πρόληψις*, of God (see c. 16, 43); a god, to be entitled to our belief, must correspond to this innate idea, must fit into this mould, so to speak; and this is itself the proof whether he is really a god; just as, if we wished to ascertain whether a foot were the one it purported to be, we were to place it in one of its foot-prints, and judge from the result. Comp. Plato Republ., p. 462 A: *ἄρα ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνος ἡμῖν ἁρμόττει*; so also Cicero Orat. c. 38, 133: *ea oratio* (Demosthenis de Corona) *in eam formam, quae est insita in mentibus nostris, includi sic potest, ut maior eloquentia non requiratur;* where the idea is also the frame into which the work of art must fit. So *ibid.* c. 5, 15.

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38 44. 9. **Persaeus** was not only a disciple but fellow-countryman of Zeno.

44. 10. **a quibus . . . esset inventa.** Of course Persaeus did not explain the existence of all the gods in this way, but only of some of them, as Bacchus, Ceres, Aesculapius. See II, 24, 62.

44. 11. **ipsasque res utiles.** See II, 23, 60. 62; and 31, 80.

44. 13. **Quo . . . quam . . .** A sort of ἐπεξήγησις where the idea, which is referred to by the relative as contained in the foregoing, is afterwards reasserted in a different and more definite form. Comp. De Fin. I, 6: *ait enim declinare atomos sine causa; quo nihil turpius physico, quam fieri sine causa quidquam dicere;* where Madvig gives further examples. Verr. IV, 35, 77; Orat. I, 37, 169. The Greeks often use the same form of sentence. See Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 450, 2 and Rem. 2.

39 44. 16. **Chrysippus** of Soli in Cilicia (B.C. 280–206), disciple and successor of Cleanthes, very active as a teacher and author, and regarded as the one who really completed the Stoic system; see the verse in Diog. L. VII, 183: εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στοά. Hence the transition to him is especially marked by *iam vero.*

44. 19. [**cogitatione posse depingere.** Cicero often uses *cogitatio* for our "fancy," "imagination," the genus for the species, there being no exactly corresponding word in Latin. Mil. 29, 79: *fingite animis . . . liberae sunt enim nostrae cogitationes et quae volunt sic intuentur, ut ea cernimus, quae videmus . . . fingite cogitatione imaginem huius conditionis meae.* Nägelsb. § 8, 1.]

44. 20. **in ratione . . . et . . . mente.** The copula adds a more special to a general expression. The soul of the universe is referred to. *Τὴν φρένα πάντων καὶ . . . λόγον καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ψυχήν* is the expression in the passage relating to Chrysippus of the Herculanean fragment, referred to in Introduction, p. 15.

44. 22. **eius animi fusionem universam,** for *eius animum ubique fusum;* the abstract for the concrete. This is clearly only another expression for the soul of the universe.

44. 22. **eius ipsius principatum.** Again the same thing differently expressed. For the subject-matter comp. II, 11, 29.

44. 24. **fatalem . . . necessitatem** &c. The εἱμαρμένη (c. 20, 55), the eternal law, by the force of which events succeed one another in a continuous chain of cause and effect.

44. 25. **ignem . . . et . . . aethera.** The special expression added to the general one, which might, if used alone, suggest only the common earthly fire. Comp. note to II, 15, 41; and for *et* Hand Tursell. II, p. 477.

44. 26. **quae natura fluerent atque manarent.** *fluant, manent*

would have been more correct. See however note to c. 22, 61. For the subject-matter comp. II, 33, 84 and Ps. Plutarch De Plac. Phil. I, 9: *οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὕλην δι' ὅλου τὴν ὕλην.* Bouhier has proposed *manerent* instead of *manarent* on account of *terram;* which is of course inadmissible. Heindorf's suggestion is better; *ut aquam et aëra: tum solem, lunam, sidera, terram* &c. The words *qua omnia continerentur* are superfluous, probably an old addition suggested by *omnia continentem* above.

44. 29. **etiam homines eos . . .** The souls of ordinary men at death are lost in the universal nature; those of the better sort maintain a personal existence and lead a godlike life until the general conflagration of all things; a few of especial excellence are taken into the number of the gods. See II, 24, 62 and Ps. Plutarch De Plac. Phil. IV, 7; Diog. L. VII, 157 and other passages.

44. 30. **aethera . . . Iovem.** See II, 2, 4 and 25, 65. 40

44. 31. **Neptunum.** See II, 26, 66 and 28, 71. Perhaps *aether* would have been more correct than *aër*, but the Epicurean is not quite so exact. The author of the Herculanean fragment col. 3, 2 (p. 80 Gomp.) uses *ἀέρα* even of Zeus; and 8, 3 (p. 85) he calls the Stoic gods *ἀέρας καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρας.* Moreover Empedocles did not strictly distinguish the two expressions. See Karsten, Emped., p. 217; and further in Schneider, Callimach. I, p. 293; and Munro's note on Lucretius II, 1115.

44. 32. **terramque . . . quae Ceres.** See II, 26, 67 and 28, 71.

45. 1. **sempiternam . . . veritatem.** Eusebius Pr. Evang. XV, 14: *ἀλήθειαν καὶ νόμον τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀδιάδραστον καὶ ἄφυκτον.*

45. 3. **Orphei.** The so-called Orphic theogony. 41

45. 4. **Musaei.** He is spoken of as a friend and disciple of Orpheus, and was also said to have written a poem on the theogony. All the citations from it are gathered in Schoemann Opusc. Ac. II, p. 6.

45. 7. **Diogenes Babylonius.** He was a disciple of Chrysippus, from Seleucia in Syria, *καλούμενος δὲ Βαβυλώνιος διὰ τὴν γειτωνίαν*, as Diog. L. says VII, 81. His book *περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς* is also referred to Hercul. Fr. 5, 15 (82 Gomp.).

45. 12. **fusa;** the proper expression not only for the outflow of 16 42
poetic or prophetic inspiration but for the utterances of delirium or thoughtlessness. Comp. c. 24, 66; De Fin. IV, 4, 10: *poetarum more verba fundere;* De Div. II, 11, 27: *concitatione mentis edi et quasi fundi.*

45. 18. **portenta magorum,** *i.e.* the fantastic doctrines of the Persian and Median religion; their priests and sages were called *magi.* (Comp. c. 8, 18; 11, 28.) All that was known of their religion by the 43

Greeks and Romans is collected by Thomas Hyde, Hist. relig. vett. Persar. eorumque magorum. Oxon. 1700. Further information may be found in Duncker, Gesch. des Alterth. II[2], p. 369 ff.

45. 19. **Aegyptiorumque . . . dementiam.** Velleius refers to the worship of the sacred animals and of the gods appearing under the form of animals. See c. 29, 81; 36, 101; III, 19, 47.

45. 22. **venerari Epicurum.** This is characteristic. The followers of Epicurus frequently used such exaggerated expressions of reverence towards their master and were ridiculed for it by their antagonists. Comp. Plut. contra Colot. c. 17.

45. 26. **anticipationem . . . πρόληψιν.** Epicurus designated by this term the universal ideas acquired from recollection of repeated perceptions and comparison of the impressions made thereby, inasmuch as they precede and form the basis of every judgment of true and false and of all further operations of the mind; this is indicated by the following words *sine qua . . . potest.* Comp. Sext. Empir. adv. Math. I, 57: *οὔτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἄνευ προλήψεως.* [Diog. L. X, 33: *τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος.*]

45. 30. **de regula et iudicio,** according to Diog. L. X, 27 *περὶ κριτηρίου, ἢ κανών*, *i.e.* on the test of truth or the rule *i.e.* of judgment. In this book Epicurus set forth his system of Logic. [See note on I, 5, 12.]

17
44 45. 32. [**Cum enim non . . .** The negative belongs to the first clause, of which *sit constituta* is the verb, and for *que* after *maneat* we should use in English an adversative conjunction, *but.* **ad unum,** "without exception."]

45. 35. **innatas cognitiones.** Cicero must have known that Epicurus did not hold the *πρόληψις* to be innate, but to arise after the manner mentioned above; hence Diog. L. X, 33 calls it *μνήμη τοῦ πολλάκις φανέντος.* In using the word *innatas* therefore he merely indicates the *natural* origin in the mind, the *in animo natum*, which was not clearly expressed by *insitas.* Comp. note to II, 4, 12; 17, 45. [De Fin. I, 9, 31: *Itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem* &c.]

46. 1. **id verum necesse est.** Comp. II, 2, 5; and 4, 12; *per contra* I, 23, 62.

46. 4. [**hanc nos habere anticipationem,** namely *ut deos beatos* &c. which comes after the following parenthesis.]

46. 7. **quam antea nemo.** The Stoics, the first of whom Zeno was contemporary of Epicurus, used the word in a similar signification; it

would seem from this passage that they took it from Epicurus. See Diog. L. VII, 54.

46. 8. The sentence, broken by the parenthesis, is taken up again by 45
igitur; and we should expect, in harmony with what precedes, *habere,* parallel with *hanc nos habere.*

46. 9. [**ipsorum deorum;** so also Baiter, *i.e.* "the existence of the gods." Schoemann has *deorum ipsorum.*]

46. 12. **ab Epicuro.** In the so-called *κυρίαις δόξαις* (see c. 30, 85) *i.e.* the principal points of his doctrine, preserved by Diog. L. X, 139 ff. The first of these is: *τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.*

46. 16. [**satis erat dictum.** For the indicative in the apodosis see Madvig Gr. 348, Obs.; Roby, 1535.]

46. 18. **habet venerationem.** So *luctum habere* (De Leg. II, 26, 65), *delectationem, admirationem, exspectationem, laetitiam, spem, timorem habere* (Ad Famil. V, 12, 18) and the like are said of things which give rise to those feelings. Comp. Beier on De Offic. II, 6, 9. — **a vi atque ira** goes with *metus;* as *metuere ab aliquo,* "to be afraid of a person."

46. 23. **vitae actionem,** as in I, 1, 2 and 37, 103, "manner of life."

46. 26. **occurrit.** In § 46 we shall see how this is to be understood. 18 46

46. 27. **ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones,** "not to explain everything by reference to primary ideas." The primary ideas are the *προλήψεις* explained above. The object of Velleius is now to arrive at the same data by a process of reasoning §§ 47, 48, in order to gain from the *πρόληψις* by *γνῶσις* a *κατάληψις* (Theodoret. Therap., p. 42 Gaisf.). Cotta exposes the weakness of the argument c. 32, 89. 90.

46. 30. **eandem** equivalent to *item,* as Brut. 84, 290: *Non omnes qui* 47
Attice, iidem bene dicunt. See Reisig, § 210; Mad. Gr. 488.

46. 33. **Vos quidem, Lucili, soletis** &c.; Balbus too does so in II, 54 ff.

46. 33. **Cotta meus modo hoc modo illud.** Comp. De Div. I, 30, 48
62: *Namque Carneades concertationis studio modo hoc modo illud ait;* Ad Attic. XIII, 25, 3: *O Academiam volaticam et sui similem; modo huc modo illuc.*

47. 7. **quasi corpus . . . quasi sanguinem.** According to Epicu- 49
rus the mind too is material as well as the body, and consists like all other things of atoms, but of atoms of an especial fineness. (Diog. L. X, 63. 66. 67; Lucret. III, 178 ff.) But as only the material can affect what is

material, therefore the impressions in virtue of which the mind conceives the ideas of the gods must proceed from something material; *i.e.* the gods must be material. But their matter must be of another and finer sort than that of the objects which affect our bodily organs of sense; otherwise we should perceive them with these organs, which is not the case. Comp. Lucr. V, 149. It is this other, finer matter of the gods, which affects the mind directly without the interposition of the bodily sense-organs, that is here called *quasi corpus, quasi sanguis.*

19 47. 9. [**acutius et . . . subtilius . . . quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscere,** with such acuteness and subtlety that not every one (*quivis*) can take in the truth of them.]

47. 13. [**docet eam** &c. As this passage has been very much discussed, we give here the text of Schoemann, followed by his notes, adding afterwards comments upon the text in the present edition. Sch.: Epicurus . . . docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu, sed mente cernantur, nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum, ut ea quae ille propter firmitatem στερέμνια appellat, sed imaginibus, similitudine et transitione perceptis; quum[que] infinita simillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis existat et ad nos affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere, quae sit et beatae naturae et aeternae. It is to be noticed that S. reads *cernantur*, divides the passage at *perceptis*, reads *quum*[*que*], *species, ad nos, beatae naturae et aeternae.*] — **primum.** The corresponding *deinde* is omitted; it might stand before *cum* in the next sentence where *que* is wanting in the Mss. — **non sensu sed mente.** See above note on *quasi corpus.* — In this same sense *occurrit* § 46 is to be taken, of ideas which occur to the mind when awake or in a dream; comp. Sext. Empir. IX, 25. — **nec soliditate quadam** &c. Epicurus called the solid bodies perceived by the senses στερέμνια, as distinguished from the εἴδωλα, *i.e.* more attenuated atomic forms, which, similar in form to the solid bodies, stream forth from them: ἀπόρροιαι τὴν ἑξῆς θέσιν καὶ τάξιν διατηροῦσαι, ἥνπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἶχον, Diog. L. X, 46. — The bodies of the gods are not στερέμνια, and the atomic forms which flow from them are, as Lucretius IV, 732 teaches, *multo magis tenuia textu, quam quae percutiunt oculos visumque lacessunt.* These last have a coarser constitution, which Cicero denotes by *soliditas;* the divine atoms have not this *soliditas*, cannot therefore *soliditate quadam cerni* like the στερέμνια. — **ad numerum.** Below c. 39, 109 it is said of the divine images which come into the mind: *Fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur,* from which may be inferred that Epicurus taught

that these images produce in the mind only a general conception without distinction of single individuals: and with this agrees the allusion in c. 29, 80 to the undistinguishable similarity of the gods. *ad numerum cerni* then is equivalent to *ita cerni ut numerari singillatim possint;* for the possibility of counting presupposes a power of distinguishing individuals. —**imaginibus, similitudine et transitione perceptis,** i.e. *imaginibus propter similitudinem et transitionem perceptis.* The *transitio* is plainly the passing over of the images from the gods to the minds of men. But *similitudo* reminds one of the phrase *similia similibus percipiuntur.* The divine images are of similar constitution with the part of the mind affected by them, the *mens animi* (Lucret. V, 149). Hence they are perceived by the mind directly without the intervention of the bodily eye.—**Quumque.** Having first shown how the mind arrives at the general idea of God, he shows secondly, how it acquires the conception of a happy and immortal being.—On *que* which, though wanting in the Mss., is indispensable see note to c. 10, 24.—**infinita species.** The reason for the singular may be seen from c. 36, 109: *fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur.*—**ex innumerabilibus individuis,** i.e. *atomis.* Comp. c. 39, 109: *innumerabilitas suppeditat atomorum.*—**intellegentiam,** *i.e.* rational knowledge acquired by reflection. The *praenotio* or πρόληψις gained from the *imagines* excites the mind to reflect on the nature of the gods (Gr. ἐπιβάλλειν, ἐπιβολή), and it thus arrives at the idea of God as a happy and immortal being; and this as a consequence of the law of isonomy. Comp. Introd., p. 24; also Appendix.

[Baiter II varies from our reading thus: *perceptis; cum[que]* in l. 16 (dividing the passage at *perceptis*)*; species* for *series; a deo adfluat, cum max. vol.* &c. for *ad nos adfluat; tum max. vol.* l. 18. Müller makes no pause after *cernatur* l. 14, divides the passage at *appellat* l. 16; has *cum max. vol.* l. 18. The changes proposed in our text are to divide the passage at *adfluat* l. 18, and to read *tum max. vol.* instead of *cum max. vol.*—*tum* is in fact the reading of Ms. B of Orelli. *series* l. 17 is an emendation of A. Brieger. There are two points upon which Epicurus's doctrine is here given; *primum,* the mode of our perception of the gods (the particle *deinde* is left out); *tum,* the way in which we arrive at the idea of their happiness and immortality. They are perceived, according to him, *non sensu, sed mente,* the first distinction; secondly, not by reason of their *soliditate* (*quadam,* "so to speak"), nor *ad numerum,* κατ' ἀριθμόν, so that we distinguish their individual identity, *sed imaginibus,* but by impressions or pictures perceived through their likeness one to another, and *transitione* their continually coming in upon the mind,—and this last because there is an infinite series of identical

pictures constantly coming to us from innumerable individual natures:— in the next place, *tum*, our minds upon reflection arrive at the conception of a nature that is happy and immortal, *i.e.* the nature of the gods. The clause *cum infinita . . . adfluat* seems to be better taken with what precedes than with what follows; comp. § 108 fin. *Fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur;* also Diog. L. X, 139: *τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς εἶναι· . . . οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιῤῥύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένους ἀνθρωποειδῶς.*]

50 47. 25. **si mortalium . . . et si, quae interimant.** See Introd., p. 25 for the misconception occasioned by the order of these two phrases.

47. 28. **Balbe, soletis,** that is, you and your school; as in De Orat. I, 35, 160: *Quid est? Cotta, quid tacetis?* Virg. Æn. IX, 525: *Vos, O Calliope, precor, adspirate canenti.* Tibull. I, 3, 1: *Ibitis Aegaeas sine me, Messalla, per undas.*

51 47. 30. **Nihil enim agit.** We should expect *agunt;* but such transitions from plural to singular, when classes of things are in question, are frequent, as also from singular to plural. See below c. 36, 101; 38, 106; 41, 113. 114.

20
52 48. 4. **vicissitudines ordinesque,** equivalent to *earumque ordines,* or *vicissitudines ordinatas,* as a hendiadys.

53 48. 8. **natura,** blind, unconscious force of nature, as c. 13, 35. Comp. also note to c. 24, 67.

48. 11. **innumerabilis mundos.** The reasons of Epicurus for assuming a large number of worlds may be seen in Lucretius II, 1052 ff. But they only amount to this, that the contrary cannot be proved. Moreover Epicurus was not the first to assume the existence of several worlds. Comp. above c. 10, 25, and Stobaeus Ecl. I, p. 496.

48. 12. [**Quod quia.** *Quod* thus used is much less frequently found with *quia* than with *si, nisi;* it connects the foregoing with what follows, introduces a step in the argument. Comp. De Fin. I, 20, 67. Madvig Gram. § 449; Roby Gram. § 2214.]

48. 12. [**sine aliqua mente,** "without some mind or other." So in II, 66, 167: *Nemo igitur vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino umquam fuit.* And so generally with *sine* when the sentence is negative in form *aliquis* is used; De Fin. III, 9, 30, negative from the force of *mancam;* ibid. III, 11, 37. On the other hand when the sentence is affirmative *ullus* is used. Cic. De Rep. I, 43, 67; II, 11, 22; II, 39, 66; *sine ulla dubitatione.* Tusc. III, 3, 5; Balb. 13, 31; Catil. IV, 3, 5; Verr. II, 4, 18, § 39 &c.—In De Offic. II, 11, 40 we find *ullus* where we should expect *aliquis: Ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possunt sine ulla parti-*

cula iustitiae vivere; i.e. they cannot get on without some measure of just dealing, namely, the laws of honor that prevail among thieves. In the first class of cases the sentence is really affirmative from the two negatives *non* and *sine;* so that the rule of the use of *aliquis* is still observed.]

48. 13. **ut tragici poetae** &c. An imitation of a passage of Plato, Cratyl., p. 425 D: *ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι, θεοὺς αἴροντες.* Horace also reproves the clumsy use of a *deus ex machina,* Ars Poet. 191.

48. 13. **explicare argumenti exitum.** The unravelling of a plot is the business of the poets; and hence we should expect *non possunt.* But here, as often happens, Cicero has briefly taken together the thing compared and the object with which the comparison is made, instead of saying, as strict precision would have required, something like this: *cum explicare argumenti exitum non possunt, sic vos, cum disputando efficere quod vultis non potestis.* Comp. Horace Ep. I, 10, 42: *cui non conveniet sua res, ut calceus olim si pede maior erit subvertet, si minor uret.*

48. 17. **ita** is not to be taken with *late* but with *peregrinatur.* The 54
connection of the two phrases of which *peregrinatur* and *videat* are the verbs is a concessive one, as the *tamen* shows; "though the mind roams about far and wide, yet it never sees" &c. The assertion in *peregrinatur* holds *ita,* "with this limitation." Comp. Or. pro Sest. c. 5, 13: *verum hoc ita praetereamus, ut tamen intuentes et respectantes relinquamus;* De Prov. Cons. c. 17: *ita dissensi ab eo, ut coniuncti tamen amicitia maneremus;* Suet. Oct. 56: *amicos ita magnos et potentes in civitate esse voluit, ut tamen pari iure essent.* Also without *tamen,* Ad Attic. XIII, 27, 1: *ita multa mutari volunt, ut mihi de integro scribendi causa non sit.*

48. 17. **nullam oram ultimi.** The genitive defines the idea: "no boundary formed by the extreme limit"; like the expressions *fines montium et fluviorum,* boundaries formed by mountains and rivers; *exitus mortis,* like Homer's τέλος θανάτοιο (Ruhnken on Vellei. II, 7, 1); *urbes municipiorum et coloniarum, arbor abietis* &c. See Reisig's Vorles., Haase's note 523; and Madvig Epist. ad Orell., p. 79.

48. 20. **cohaerescunt tamen inter se.** On this see below c. 25, 69.

48. 28. **fatalis necessitas.** Comp. c. 15, 40; III, 6, 14; De Div. I. 55
55, 125: *Fatum id appello, quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna.*

48. 34. **haruspices,** interpreters of signs, who employed their art especially in the inspection of the entrails of the victims at sacrifices and in the explanation of many sorts of prodigies, *prodigia, portenta, ostenta, monstra* (II, 3, 7). *augures* were the observers and interpreters of the

signs which the gods gave chiefly through the flight of birds, but also by means of various animals, of celestial phenomena, especially lightning &c. *harioli* were soothsayers, who made a business of foretelling the future from all sorts of signs for pay; they are always mentioned with contempt, while the augurs at Rome were a corporation composed of distinguished citizens, and the *haruspices*, though Etruscans, and hence foreigners (II, 4, 11), formed a college and were often consulted on affairs of state. *vates* were inspired seers, prophets; *coniectores* were interpreters of dreams.

48. 35. **His terroribus.** This idea, like that noticed above c. 16, 43, is characteristic of the school. The Epicureans considered it as one of the greatest merits of their master that he had freed them not only from superstition, but from every sort of fear of the gods. Comp. Lucret. Book V at the beginning, and Plutarch, *Non posse suaviter vivi* &c. c. 8.

49. 6. **non tam . . . audiendi,** *i.e.* the important point for me was, not so much to make a discourse myself, as to draw you out, and to hear what you could say in answer.

21 57 49. 14. **[disputata,** "advanced in argument."]

58 49. 15. **de familiari illo tuo.** The allusion is of course to some person very well known to those present, whom for this reason it was unnecessary to name; and as in De Or. III, 21, 78 the orator L. Crassus is called a *familiaris* of Velleius, this seems to have induced some old critic to insert his name here, where it is found in several Mss. The calling the Romans *togatis* after their national costume would be rather expected from a foreigner, and may be defended by similar passages as De Orat. I, 24, 111; III, 11, 43; but it is not known that L. Crassus was particularly well versed in philosophy, especially that of Epicurus, or that he was the champion of it at that time; but this he must have been to make it possible for Cotta to appeal to his judgment as he does here. For these reasons we are inclined with Madvig, note to Cic. De Fin. I, 5, 16, to refer the passage to the Epicurean Phaedrus, who perhaps stood in a similar intimate relation to Velleius as Diodotus did to Cicero. See c. 3, 6.

49. 16. **videor audisse.** The full expression is *mihi videor;* but the pronoun being easily understood is often omitted. Comp. II, 46, 117; 61, 153. For further examples see Beier's note to De Offic. I, 1, 1.

49. 22. **quam solent vestri.** It is often stated that the Epicureans laid very little weight on the form of discourse, and the extant fragments of Philodemus and Epicurus too confirm it. *Minime aptum ad dicendum genus* they are called in Cic. Brut. c. 35, 131.

59 49. 22. **Zenonem.** Ζήνων ὁ Σιδώνιος, ἀκροατὴς Ἀπολλοδώρου, πολυγράφος ἀνήρ, καὶ νοῆσαι καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι σαφής. Diog. L. X, 25 and VII, 36. Comp. below c. 33, 93.

49. 23. **Philo noster.** See c. 3, 6. Although it cannot be stated with certainty, yet it is very probable that Cicero here attributes to Cotta what was really true of himself. Also c. 28, 79; 33, 93.

49. 30. [**bona venia me audies,** excuse me for saying so, *i.e.* for the use of the epithets *tam levis, tam ineptas.*]

49. 33. [**in physicis.** Under this head the ancients brought the ques- 60
tion of the existence of the gods.]

50. 5. **Simonide,** the famous lyric poet from Ceos, who, like his 22
somewhat younger contemporaries, Pindar, Æschylus and his nephew Bacchylides, lived often and for a long time at Syracuse at the court of the elder Hiero. With what is said of him here comp. what Tertullian Ad Nat. II, 2, p. 183 Oehl. says of Thales: *Thales Milesius Croeso sciscitanti, quid de deis arbitraretur, post aliquot deliberandi commeatus nihil renuntiavit.*

50. 10. **quid dicit, quod . . . esset.** *Sit* would have been more cor- 61
rect; but as the preceding *dicit* is used irregularly (though the assertions of Epicurus may be considered as present and still subsisting in his writings or in tradition), Cicero might properly use *esset* in the relative clause, just as if *dixit* had preceded in the principal one. Similar examples may be found above c. 15, 39 (*fluerent atque manarent*), ibid. 40 (*appellarent*), III, 28, 70 (*uterentur*); others may be found in Reisig, Haase's note No. 500; and Madvig, Cic. De Fin., p. 464.

50. 13. [**difficile est negare.** A proposition to be answered in the next sentence.—**in contione,** *i.e.* before a public assembly, on grounds of public policy; but there is no difficulty in denying the proposition *in huiusmodi sermone,* in a familiar conversation among ourselves.]

50. 14. **consessu.** [Schoemann reads *in consessu* and says]: if the preposition is allowed to stand here, we must assume that some word like *hoc* or *tali* has fallen out before *consessu.*

50. 15. **ego ipse . . . is.** The repeated reference by the demonstrative pronoun serves to bring out the contrast more plainly. Comp. note to III, 39, 93. [The pronoun *is* here repeats the subject *ego,* of the first person; it refers in sense to *pontifex* and *qui . . . arbitror;* "as *pontifex,* and as holding the opinion &c. (*qui . . . arbitror*), under these circumstances (*is*) I should desire" &c. It is used with reference to the first or second person only where it has the force of *talis.* Cic. Phil. II, 30, 76: *qui magister equitum fuisse tibi viderere . . . is per municipia coloniasque Galliae . . . cum Gallicis et lacerna cucurristi.* The usage is to be distinguished from that referred to by Prof. Schoemann in III, 39, 93. Where *idem* is used there are two predicates, expressed or implied, belonging to

the same subject, one of which is sometimes opposed to the other; "the same person not only does *this*, but he also does *that*"; or "although he does *this*, he still does *that*."]

50. 18. **ad veritatem plane,** "entirely according to truth," *i.e.* as absolute truth would require; so that I should be convinced of it by positive proof, *non opinione*, not by an opinion I had been persuaded to adopt.

23 62 50. 29. **nulla suspicio deorum.** For the opposite view see Cic. De Leg. I, 8, 24; Tusc. I, 13, 30. Comp. Fabric. Bibliograph. Antiquar., p. 304; and B. Constant De la Religion I, p. 4.

63 50. 29. **Diagoras** of Melos, one of the Cyclades, contemporary of Democritus, Protagoras and Socrates. He was also a lyric poet, and some verses of his poems which still remain breathe a thoroughly religious feeling. His atheism, which is repeatedly alluded to, is perhaps to be attributed to error in scientific speculations, due to the influence of Democritus, whose disciple he is said to have been, and of Protagoras; although other reasons are alleged for it. See Meier in the Encyclopaedia of Ersch and Gruber.

50. 30. **Theodorus** of Cyrene, under Ptolemaeus Lagi, denied not only the existence of the gods but also the truth of our moral perceptions, which he considered as only devised to keep the multitude in check. See Diog. L. II, 99.

50. 31. **Protagoras.** See note to c. 12, 29.

50. 33. **neque ut sint neque ut non sint.** The exact words of Protagoras are preserved in Diog. L. IX, 51: περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὔθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν. Sometimes they are given in a somewhat different shape. See Frey, Quaest. Protag., p. 98. Cicero's translation word for word violates the Latin usage. Moreover according to Diog. 54 the accuser of Protagoras was Pythodorus, one of the four hundred (in the year 411); and if the accusation was brought at that time, it may be assumed that the men, who were then in power, being opposed to the unbridled democracy, felt that they ought not to tolerate such free-thinking doctrines as Protagoras preached. In other cases the Athenians were as a rule very tolerant in regard to theoretical views, and interfered to punish only in those cases, where the existence of the gods was expressly denied, or when the existing institutions and customs were attacked and violated. Comp. Schoemann, Griech. Alterth. II^3, pp. 161 and 587; and Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. des Griech. Volksglaubens, p. 435.

51. 5. **Tubulus** (*L. Hostilius*): "*cum praetor quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob rem iudicandam, ut anno proximo P. Scaevola trib. pl. ferret ad plebem, velletne de ea re quaeri.*

Quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quaestio Cn. Caepioni (ann. 613); *profectus in exilium Tubulus statim, nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta.*" Cic. De Fin. II, 16, 54.

51. 6. **Lupus.** Perhaps L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, who was consul in the year 579. That he was severely handled by the satirist Lucilius is shown by Horace Sat. II, 1, 68; and Pers. I, 114; of the reason nothing is known.

51. 6. **Carbo** (*C. Papirius*), the famous demagogue, and doubtless the object of attack on the part of the satirist for his demagogical doings.

51. 6. **Neptuni filius** is equivalent to *homo saevus et immanis* according to Gellius, N. A. XV, 21, in allusion to Polyphemus, Cercyo, Sciron, the Laestrygones and similar monsters which the myth spoke of as sprung from Neptune. The *aut* of the Mss. is probably not genuine and the expression denotes no other than Carbo; for the idea, that the reference is to some mythical hero, perhaps Cercyo, only deserves to be mentioned as a curiosity.

51. 14. **atomorum . . . licentia,** on account of the arbitrary *declina-* 65
tio atomorum, as Epicurus held it. See c. 25, 69.

51. 14. **quodcumque in solum venit,** "whatever comes into your minds." The origin of the expression is obscure. See Wolf Litt. Anal. IV, 347 ff.

51. 15. **Quae primum nullae sunt,** *i.e.* the atoms. The *primum* leads one to expect a second proposition in regard to the atoms, which however is wanting; it is clear too that the next sentence does not, as the *enim* suggests, give a reason for the non-existence of the atoms. The passage is incomplete; and the thought may be conjecturally supplemented partly from Cicero himself (Acad. I, 7, 27), as follows: *quae primum nullae sunt; nihil est enim [in rerum natura minimum, quod dividi nequeat; deinde, ut sint, moveri per inane non possunt, siquidem id dicis inane] quod vacet corpore; corporibus autem omnis obsidetur locus.* Comp. Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, p. 287.—Epicurus assumed as the beginning of all things an empty space and atoms moving therein. Diog. L. X, 40; and especially Lucret. I, 500 ff. Other philosophers denied entirely the existence of an empty space. Stobaeus Ecl. I, 19; Plut. Plac. Phil. I, 18.

51. 18. **oracula fundo.** See note to c. 16, 42. 24

51. 20. **flagitia** for *opiniones flagitiosas, contemptu et vituperatione* 66
dignas. So also III, 38, 91. After the statement of these opinions the thread of the discourse is resumed by *hanc tu opinionem.*

51. 20. **[Democriti.** See c. 43, 120 and note.]

51. 20. **Leucippi.** "*plenum et inane dixit esse, unde omnia gignerentur.*" Cic. Acad. II, 37, 118. The *plenum*, παμπληθές, was an infinity of infinitely small invisible and indivisible particles, στερεά, ἀδιαίρετα, ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων. Arist. De Gen. et Corr. I, 8. — Leucippus was however but very little older than Democritus.

67 51. 29. **Quid enim mereas?** "What could induce you (what would you take) to give up being an Epicurean?" Comp. De Fin. II, 22, 74: *Quid enim mereri velis . . . quid merearis igitur, ut dicas te omnia voluptatis causa facturum?* Verr. IV, 60, 135: *quid arbitramini Rheginos merere velle ut ab iis marmorea illa Venus auferatur?*

52. 2. **nulla moderante natura.** This contradicts what Velleius said above, c. 20, 53. But in a certain degree both are true. The atoms in moving perpendicularly downward plainly obey a law of nature; but they vary from this direction without a specific law, and it is only by virtue of this variation that the origin of the world is possible. See note to c. 25, 69.

68 52. 8. **ut tu paulo ante;** above c. 8, 20.

52. 11. **in dumeta conripitis.** The simile is taken from game hard pursued and flying into the thick wood where the hunter cannot easily follow; so the Epicureans recur to propositions that are unintelligible and hence hard to controvert. This is shown in the following chapter by two examples, which are foreign to the main subject; that is taken up again in c. 26, 73.

25
69 52. 19. **nihil fore in nostra potestate.** Inasmuch as the soul also consists of atoms, if the atoms had no power of varying from the course prescribed by the law of nature, all the activities of the mind must follow the law of nature, and free will would be excluded. For this reason Epicurus conceded to the atoms a certain power of voluntary motion, which enabled him, he thought, to explain by the concurrence of the atoms thus varying from the perpendicular line both the origin of the universe and the freedom of the human will. Comp. Cic. De Fato, c. 10, 22; and especially Lucret. II, 217 ff. and 251 ff.

52. 21. **quod Democritum fugerat,** because Democritus had assumed not a perpendicular motion with a voluntary deviation, but a whirling motion inherent in the nature of the atoms and taking place of necessity. Diog. L. IX, 45: πάντα τε κατ' ἀνάγκην γενέσθαι τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀνάγκην λέγει. See De Fin. I, 6, 18.

70 52. 25. **aut etiam aut non,** "either Yes or No." Compare De Fato, c. 10, 21; and Acad. II, 30, 97 where the same thing is said of Epicurus; and for *etiam* for affirmation see Heindorf's note to Hor. Sat. II, 3, 97.

Probably Epicurus did not say exactly what Cicero here states, but only that the so-called principle *exclusi tertii* does not hold unconditionally, inasmuch as in alternative propositions referring to the future it is quite possible that neither of the alternatives may be true. Comp. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik I, p. 403; and Zeller III², 1, p. 391.

[Zeller III¹, p. 233 thinks that Epicurus did not mean to impeach the formal correctness of the disjunction, but only the material truth of the two propositions. He did not deny then that of two contradictory cases one or the other must occur, that the statement was true that 'Epicurus will be either alive or dead to-morrow'; but he denied only the truth of the two propositions each taken by itself, *i.e.* he denied the truth of the propositions 'Epicurus will live,' and 'Epicurus will not live,' because either one becomes true only when the actual occurrence takes place.]

52. 33. **omnis sensus veri nuntios.** Lucretius IV, 480 ff. gives Epicurus's reasons; namely that what is called illusion of the senses is not the fault of the senses themselves, but of a wrong interpretation of the sensuous impression; see ibid. 464 ff.

52. 34. **Nihil . . . nimis callide** for *admodum* or *valde callide.* So *non nimis* for "not extremely." Cic. Div. in Caecil. c. 22, 71: *Hoc statuere, iudices, debetis, Caecilium non nimis hanc causam severe, non nimis accurate, non nimis diligenter acturum.* Tusc. V, 33, 93: *non nimis fortasse subtiliter, utiliter tamen;* Acad. II, 47, 146: *nec tamen nimis eleganter.*

53. 1. **dum individuorum corporum concretionem fugit.** Epi- 71
curus did not deny that the bodies of the gods consisted of atoms; he denied only the *concretio, i.e.* the thicker, more compact constitution of their bodies. Comp. 27, 75. So for example in II, 39, 101 he opposes *concretus aër* to *fusus et extenuatus; crassum caelum atque concretum* II, 16 in.; *pingue et concretum caelum,* De Divin. I, 57, 130; *nimis concreti humores,* below II, 23, 59; *terrena concretaque corpora,* Tusc. I, 18, 42. But it is certainly untrue that Epicurus attributed to the gods this finer, more subtle constitution of body simply for the reason here assigned by Cotta. See Summary, p. 26, n. 1; and for the true reason see note to c. 18, 49.

53. 3. **sed tamquam corpus,** sc. *esse ait,* supplied from the preceding *negat;* as De Fin. V, 29, 88: *Ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen;* a frequent ellipsis. So *nolo . . . sed,* c. 7, 17.

53. 4. **Mirabile videtur** &c. Comp. De Div. II, 24, 51 where this 26
sentiment is assigned to the elder Cato.

53. 7. **si in ceris fingeretur**; "if a person had such an idea in regard to figures of wax or clay."

72 53. 10. **dictata**, passages, chiefly from poets, which were dictated to scholars to be learned by heart. Comp. Hor. Ep. I, 18, 13 : *puerum saevo credas dictata magistro reddere.*

53. 12. **in scriptis.** Diog. L. X, 13 mentions a saying of Epicurus of this sort in a letter. He also cites from another letter (§ 6) the words: παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεῦγε.

53. 14. **nihil enim olet** = *nullum odorem olet; i.e.* he shows no familiarity with the schools of Plato or Aristotle, the former of whom taught in the Academy, the latter in the Lyceum, both names of gymnasia at Athens. Ad Attic. II, 1, 1 : *ideo bene olere, quia nihil olebant, videbantur.*

53. 15. **e puerilibus disciplinis.** He means the so-called ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία, that is, the usual course of instruction, consisting chiefly of grammar and rhetoric.

53. 16. **Xenocraten.** See note to 13, 34.

53. 18. **Pamphilum.** He is also mentioned in Diog. L. X, 14, but is otherwise unknown. Whether he is the same with the author of a τέχνη ῥητορ. mentioned by Arist. Rhet. II, 23, we cannot tell. Comp. Spalding's note to Quintil. III, 6, 34.

53. 20. **agripeta**, *i.e.* as colonist, Gr. κληροῦχος, because in the year B.C. 351 the Athenians gave to the poorer citizens the confiscated land in Samos, divided into 2000 sections (κλῆροι).

73 53. 23. **In Nausiphane . . . tenetur.** The sense is : In regard to Nausiphanes he cannot avoid it ; he is proved to have learned something from him, which he would not allow in regard to Pamphilus, though he confessed to having heard him. Comp. Orat. pro Caec. c. 2 : *facile honestissimis testibus in re perspicua teneretur*, i.e. *convinceretur ;* and further Ernesti Clav. Cic. sub tit. — Nausiphanes of Teos according to Sext. Emp. Math. I, 2, p. 599, Bekk. and Diog. L. IX, 69 was a disciple of the sceptic Pyrrhon, but is spoken of by Diog. Praef. 15 as a follower of Democritus. Cotta also says below c. 33, 93 that Epicurus learned something from him. It was maintained that he was indebted to him for his logic (see note to c. 16, 43). For remarks of Epicurus about him see Diog. L. X, 14, and 7, 8.

53. 26. **quid audierat?** The sense is: Epicurus spoke insultingly of Nausiphanes as if he owed nothing to him. And yet if he had not learned something from him what could he have learned at all? He would have been utterly ignorant, and would not have known even these doctrines of Democritus, on which his whole system of physics rests.

53. 30. **naturae ratio.** Comp. c. 8, 20 : *physiologiam, id est naturae rationem*, and note.

53. 31. **istud quasi corpus . . . quid intellegis?** The argument is here resumed after the digression, " now what do you understand by this *quasi corpus?*" Comp. De Fin. II, 15, 50: *Quid ergo hoc loco intellegit honestum?* Paradox VI, 1: *quem enim intellegimus divitem, aut hoc verbum in quo homine ponimus?*

53. 32. [**Ego enim te scire** &c. The sense is: I am quite willing to 74
acknowledge that you know more about these things than I do; but once state them in the form of propositions, and there is no reason why I should not comprehend them as well as you.]

54. 3. **tamquam Heraclitus.** Cicero also hints farther on in III, 14, 25 that the obscurity of Heraclitus, for which he was called ὁ σκοτεινός, was intentional; [De Fin. II, 5, 15]. This strange idea is found also in other authors, as in Diog. L. IX, 6. — *Quod inter nos liceat.* The fuller expression Ad Attic. II, 4, 1: *quod inter nos liceat dicere;* [comp. § 59, *bona venia me audies*].

54. 4. **species ut sit** for *ut esse statuatur.* Comp. note to 9, 21. 27 75
54. 5. **nihil concreti** &c., nothing solid (in contrast to liquid, see *concrescere* II, 10, 26); *nihil solidi,* nothing solid, massive (in contrast to soft, pliable): *nihil expressi,* nothing stamped in tangible, perceptible form; *nihil eminentis,* nothing distinctive. For the genitive see Zumpt Gr. § 433.

54. 7. **in Venere Coa,** *i.e.* in the famous picture of Apelles, which represented the goddess as ἀναδυομένη.

54. 10. **similitudines rerum** esse for *sunt;* transition from orat. rect. to orat. obliq. In the next section for *nec esse humana* &c. he might have said *nec sit,* continuing the dependence on *quod.*

54. 10. [**Fac id . . . mihi esse persuasum;** "Suppose me to be persuaded of that which cannot even be comprehended." *id* is to be taken with *persuasum.*]

54. 19. **Primum quidque,** " each one in its order"; that is, always 77
taking the object which for the moment stands at the head of the others. The proper explanation of this often misunderstood expression is given by Giese, note to Cic. De Div. I, 57, 127; and Madvig De Fin. note, p. 321.

54. 26. **deos ipsos.** Comp. Plut. De Is. et Osir. c. 71: οἱ τὰ χαλκᾶ καὶ τὰ γραπτὰ καὶ λίθινα μὴ μαθόντες μηδ' ἐθισθέντες ἀγάλματα καὶ τιμὰς θεῶν, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς καλεῖν. In Cic. De Div. in Caec. c. 1, 3 the Sicilians complain: *sese iam ne deos quidem in suis urbibus ad quos confugiant habere, quod eorum simulacra sanctissima C. Verres e delubris religiosissimis abstulisset.*

54. 30. **videbatur.** For the imperfect see Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, p. 309.

54. 31. **physice,** ironically, as II, 18, 48. Comp. c. 30, 83.

54. 31. **quasi sui . . . lena.** Nature, or the peculiar natural constitution of any being, presents itself to such being as the most beautiful; as a *lena* recommends to her customers the attractions she offers them.

55. 3. **eam esse causam** &c. This part of the sentence can only depend on *quid mirum,* and would force the reader to take the preceding *si . . . putaret* as an inserted conditional clause, and not, as would be most natural, with *quid mirum* directly. Besides, as it here stands, it presents a violation of the consecutio temporum not easy to explain. Finally, it is evidently quite superfluous; and would have been better left out, if indeed Cicero really wrote it. Comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, 317. 18.

28 78 55. 11. **Triton,** a sea god, son of Poseidon and Amphitrite, was represented with two bodies of fishes instead of feet; therefore *natantibus invehens beluis.*

55. 12. [**invehens** is here equivalent in sense to *invectus.* Comp. Cic. Brutus c. 97: *Adolescentia per medias laudes quasi quadrigis vehens.* Apuleius Metam. Lib. I, init.: *Equo indigena peralbo vehens.* Corn. Nepos, in Timotheo: *Idem classi praefectus, circumvehens Peloponnesum* &c. Davies suspects that Cic. had in mind a passage from some poet.—Schoemann reads *nolis esse?* —making it a question.]

79 55. 15. [**quotus . . . quis-que,** "the *whatth* one," as we say "every tenth one, hundredth one"; *i.e.* "what proportion of men is handsome?"]

55. 16. **e gregibus epheborum.** He refers to the youths gathered in companies in the gymnasia for exercise in common.

55. 19. **vitia saepe iucunda.** See the same topic treated in Lucretius IV, 1154 ff. Comp. also Hor. Sat. I, 3, 40.

55. 20. **Alcaeum,** the Lesbian lyric poet, of whose erotic poetry occasional mention is made, as for instance Cic. Tusc. IV, 33, 71, and some fragments remain.

55. 22. **huius collegae et familiaris nostri;** the one now living and well known to us. Comp. II, 2, 6; De Offic. III, 16, 26: *Cato, huius nostri Catonis pater.* The allusion is to Q. Lutatius Q. F. Q. N. Catulus, consul in A. U. 676, and colleague of Cotta in the Pontificate. His father of the same name was consul in 652, and one of his epigrams on the same subject may be seen in Gellius N. A. XIX, 9.

55. 22. **municipem tuum Roscium,** the famous comic actor Q. Roscius, who was defended by Cicero in an oration still extant, and was, like Velleius, a native of the municipium Lanuvium.

55. 32. **strabones . . . paetulos.** Schol. Cruq. note to Hor. Sat. I, 29 80
3, 44: *strabo dicitur qui est detortis oculis, paetus autem, qui est oculis leniter declinatis, cuique huc et illuc celeriter volvuntur.*—By the following *quae sunt in nobis* the defects (*vitia*) indicated by the preceding words are intended. Comp. II, 8, 21.

56. 3. **florere . . . Academiam.** [That is the gods would find in each other *tantam similitudinem, ut in iis nulla inesset certa iudicandi nota*, as Cicero puts it in § 5 of this book; they would perforce be New Academicians.] The joke of course must not be taken too seriously; for although the gods might not be able to distinguish between themselves, they might distinguish other objects.

56. 8. **sic . . . ut dicis;** above c. 18, 46. 81

56. 17. **crocodilum** &c. The same beasts were not accounted holy 82
in all parts of Egypt; those which were worshipped in one part might be killed with impunity in another, as Heródotus II, 69 expressly says in regard to the crocodiles; and according to Plutarch De Is. et Osir. c. 72 there was an idea that this difference had been designedly arranged by the old rulers to aid in dividing the people for the purpose of governing them more easily. Ibises and cats were equally sacred throughout the whole land, and a few other animals besides, which are enumerated in Strabo XVII, p. 812.

56. 20. **illam vestram Sospitam,** *i.e.* Juno with the epithet *Sospita*, whose worship, originally peculiar to Lanuvium (hence *vestram*), had become Roman since the year 416; see Livy VIII, 14, 2. She is represented with a goatskin, pointed shoes, spear and shield by a statue in the Vatican (Müller Archæol. § 353, 3) and on coins, best on those of the gens Procilia in Patin, Famil. Rom., p. 234. The form of construction, instead of *quam tibi illa vestra Sospita videtur*, is a common attraction in such comparisons. Similar instances in c. 31, 86 and II, 11, 29. Further examples in Wunder's note to Cic. pro Planc., p. 103; and Madvig's note to Cic. De Fin., pp. 150 and 294. For *quam tibi* see the remark at the end of the Summary, p. 32.

56. 30. **Alcamenes,** a famous sculptor of the age of Pericles. Valer. 30 83
Max. VIII, 11, ext. 3 (ed. Halm) says of his Vulcan: *stat dissimulatae claudicationis sub veste leviter vestigium repraesentans, ut non exprobrans tamquam vitium, ita tamen certam propriamque dei notam decore significans.*

56. 33. **Age et . . . facimus.** *Age* is used in a transition to some- 84
thing new, often with *porro* (Verr. II, 5, 22), *nunc* (Pro Rosc. Amer. 27, 108) and similar words. Comp. below II, 47, 120; III, 17, 43; Hand Tursell. I, p. 208. *Et* in this connection is evidently not simply copulative,

but corresponds to *etiam*, as Cicero sometimes uses it, at least in the philosophical writings and in the letters. Comp. Hand II, 513, 517; and Kühner's note to Tusc. III, 13, 28. After speaking previously of the form under which the gods are conceived he passes on to their various appellations. For the indicative in this form of question compare above c. 29, 80 (*arbitramur*); below c. 32, 90 (*putamus*) and further Madvig on Cic. De Fin. II, 23, 76; and Opusc. Acad. alt., p. 41.

57. 2. **in pontificiis** *sc.* **libris.** These are the so-called *Indigitamenta, quae et nomina deorum et rationes ipsorum nominum continent.* Serv. ad Virg. Georg. I, 21; comp. Preller, Röm. Mythol., p. 119.

57. 3. **istud . . . ita.** Comp. De Divin. II, 8, 21: *quod certe vobis ita dicendum est;* and more in Hand Tursell. III, p. 485. [De Fin. I, 7, 26: *quod tibi ita videri necesse est;* II, 9, 28: *cur id non ita fit?* V, 26, 77: *quod nisi ita efficitur.*]

57. 7. **ipsum sibi displicere.** *tibi* would have been more exact; but what precedes really applies not so much to Velleius, as to the Epicureans in general.

[**Haec vestra sunt.** There seems to be something wrong here. Cotta has just finished his refutation of the Epicurean doctrine that the gods have human forms; he asks, l. 7, *An tu mei similem putas esse aut tui deum?* and answers himself, *Profecto non putas.* He then asks, *Quid ergo?*—do you think the sun and moon are gods? and shows this to be absurd. Then according to the common reading he says, *Haec vestra sunt.* But these doctrines last mentioned are not Epicurean doctrines, *vestra, i.e.* of Velleius and his sect. Then in the next sentence he goes on: If they have not human forms, as I have shown, nor any such forms (*tali aliquo*), which you are quite certain of &c. The words *nec tali aliquo* refer to *solem aut lunam aut caelum;* but they must refer to some view which Velleius did not accept as true; and the words *Haec vestra sunt* state the contrary of what would be expected. Possibly they should be a question; or is the reading of the Ms. I (ed. Moser) the true one, *Haec vera sunt?*]

57. 12. **humano (visu)** = *humana specie.* As the Mss. here have a break, the word to be inserted is by no means sure; it might be *corpore.* But the emendation *venerantes* for *numerantes* is certain.

57. 17. **Itaque** &c. It is clear that the simple quotation in this sentence is not properly that which is to serve as proof of the view just mentioned in the preceding, but that such proof consists in the supposed intentional ambiguity of Epicurus, which is afterwards spoken of. This connection of thought would have been more properly expressed as follows: *Itaque cum in illis selectis eius brevibusque sententiis . . . prima sententia sit . . . in hac ita exposita sententia* &c.—On the κύρ. δόξ. see

note to c. 17, 45. [Or is *itaque* at the beginning of this sentence equivalent to "and so," "accordingly," introducing an illustration or confirmation of the opinion before referred to? See Reisig, Vorles. § 272.]

57. 24. **an, si quid sit.** Cicero could very well leave out the apodo- 31 86
sis, which is easily supplied from the foregoing, namely *id nec habere nec exhibere cuiquam negotium*. Some unintelligent readers have supplied *id esse immortale*, which is now found in nearly all the Mss.—[The ambiguity of course consists in this: Epicurus says "Whatever is happy and immortal"; he does not say whether or not there be any such.]

57. 25. **Non animadvertunt** &c. On the connection of the members of this sentence see above note to c. 9, 23.—**quam . . . te.** See note to 29, 82 *illam vestram Sospitam*.

57. 26. **Metrodorum.** He was the nearest friend and disciple of Epicurus, *paene alter Epicurus* (De Fin. II, 28, 92); and author of numerous works.

58. 1. **in deorum numero ponere.** [Schoemann has *natura* for 87
numero and says]: It is hardly an allowable expression, and probably only an error in copying for *in deorum numero ponere*.

58. 5. **duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus.** The *unus orbis* is the ecliptic; and the two *ultimae partes* are the points of contact with the Tropic of Cancer in the north, and the Tropic of Capricorn in the south.

58. 7. **lustrationem** for *circumitum*, because in religious purifications, which the word properly indicates, the purificatory offerings were carried around. *Lustrare* is so used below, II, 20, 53; and 41, 106.

58. 9. **ab isdem principiis,** *i.e.* if their courses are reckoned from the same starting point, they consume different periods of time to accomplish the same distance.

58. 15. **Ita fit,** "the result is then," instead of *ita fiet*, which would be 88
strictly more correct. See Kühner's note to Tuscul. II, 7, 16; and below c. 43, 121.

58. 16. **Seriphi,** now Servino, one of the Cyclades, small and barren, often served as a proverbial designation for anything petty and narrow. It was a place of banishment under the emperors.—**Ut** at the beginning of the sentence = *velut*, "as for example"; comp. II, 33, 86; other examples in Giese's note to Cic. De Div. I, 39, 86; and Madvig De Fin. IV, 12, 30.

58. 21. **quae,** by a σύνεσις or σύνταξις πρὸς τὸ νοούμενον refers to the idea of *praecepta dialectica* involved in the preceding *dialecticorum*. Comp. Tusc. I, 2, 4: *erga in Graecia musici floruerunt discebantque id omnes*.

58. 21. **argumenta sententiae conclusisti** [Müller reads *argumento sententiam*], "you have drawn up the arguments for your opinion in regular, syllogistic forms." Comp. De Fin. III, 8, 27 : *concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta sic;* Acad. II, 9, 27 : *quae esset conclusi argumenti fides.* For the conclusion of Velleius see above c. 18, 48.—The reading of this passage is uncertain. The Mss. have *argumenti sententiam*, which is possibly an error for *argumenti summam. summam orationis* is used in the same signification in De Or. II, 38, 158 and *summa* is confounded with *sententiae* by the copyists in other passages. See Madvig De Fin. II, 31, 100.

82 89 58. 28. **sumpsisses,** "you might have assumed it," = *sumere poteras* or *debebas*, as below III, 31, 76 *dedisses.* See Zumpt Gr. § 529 Rem.; Madvig De Fin. II, 12, 35 ; Naeke's note on Valer. Cato, p. 161 ; Wagner Virg. Æn. IV, 678.—**Quid autem est** &c. [Schoemann reads *qui* on the ground that the question really is, not *what* the *gradatim* means, but with what propriety it can be applied to the form of argument of Velleius.] On the frequent confusion see Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, pp. 305, 325.

90 58. 35. **formae figuram,** "the structure of the form" (die Bildung der Gestalt), as Lucretius says, IV, 67: *veterem formae servare figuram. Forma* denotes the form as shown in the general impression which it makes, *figura* the structure and relation of the parts ; the *forma* stands out visibly ; the inner construction enters into the *figura.* Hence Cicero says in De Offic. I, 35, 126: *formam nostram ceteramque figuram;* and the colour may also enter into the *forma*, ibid. 36, 130: *formae dignitas coloris bonitate tuenda.*—On the following **di semper fuerunt** see the Summary, p. 27.

59. 3. **ea, qua erant forma di.** The *forma* of the preceding clause is repeated, as often happens, in the relative clause for the sake of greater precision ; and the use of the demonstrative *ea* in the foregoing need not prevent such repetition, as has been supposed. Comp. Caes. Bell. Gall. I, 49, 1 : *ultra eum locum, quo in loco Germani consederant;* Cic. in Catil. III, 10, 25 : *in hoc autem uno bello, quale bellum;* Pro Cluent. c. 54 init.: *lex ea, qua lege;* and *ibid.* 57, 166 ; De Repub. 1, 26 : *ad eam causam referendum est, quae causa genuit civitatem.*

91 59. 9. **putamus?** "Shall we then believe?" For the indicative in such questions see note to § 84.

83 59. 15. **memoriter,** not as often explained "from memory," but "with good memory, correct memory" ["mindfully" from *memor.*], forgetting nothing ; see Madvig De Fin., p. 74.

59. 30. **[quando quidem** introduces the reason for asking the question *quae . . . venustatis* just preceding. The sense is: I ask this because you claim that the gods have these organs *propter pulchritudinem*. Velleius had said this in § 47.]

59. 32. **Hermarchus** of Mitylene, disciple and successor of Epicurus. 93
Among his writings mentioned by Diog. L. X, 25 were ἐπιστολικὰ περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους εἴκοσι καὶ δύο and a book πρὸς Πλάτωνα; and Porphyr. De Abstin. I, 26 mentions his book against Pythagoras, chiefly upon abstinence from animal food.

59. 34. **Leontium** is called Ἀττικὴ ἑταίρα in Diog. L. X, 23, and παλλακὴ of Epicurus. A few words from one of his letters to her are found in the same passage, § 5; and a picture of Leontium in an attitude of deep thought, by the painter Theodorus is spoken of by Pliny, Hist. Nat. XXXV, 11. More about her may be found in Menage, Historia mulierum philosopharum, at the end of the edition of Diog. L. II, p. 618, Hüb.; and on her identity with the Leontium of Hermesianax see Schulze, Quaest. Hermes. (Lips. 1856), p. 22.

59. 35. **sed tamen,** sc. *meretricula*. The sense is: but still a person of such sort, that in spite of her talent and elegant style she ought not to have undertaken things of that sort.

59. 35. **Epicuri hortus,** because Epicurus lived and taught in his garden in the neighborhood of Athens. He left it in his will to Hermarchus and his successors in the office of teaching. Diog. L. X, 17.

60. 1. **Zeno.** The Epicurean mentioned above, c. 21, 59.

60. 2. **T. Albucius** is called by Cic. Brut. c. 35, 131 *perfectus Epicureus*. He lived a long time in Athens and was ridiculed by Lucilius for his Graecomania. See De Fin. I, 3, 9. As propraetor of Sardinia in the year 650 he was guilty of extortion, and was afterwards prosecuted and condemned for it.

60. 2. **Phaedro,** the Epicurean mentioned in the Introduction, whose lectures Cicero mentions hearing, De Fin. I, 5, 16; Ad Famil. XIII, 1, 2.

60. 5. **Phaedoni** of Elis, who was brought to Athens as a slave, taken prisoner in war, made the acquaintance of Socrates and at his instigation was ransomed. Plato named his dialogue on immortality after him. He also wrote several dialogues himself. Diog. L. II, 105.

60. 6. **Timocraten.** Whatever Epicurus may have written, he could hardly have cherished enmity against him; at least in his will still extant, he made Timocrates and a certain Amynomachus heirs of his fortune. Diog. L. X, 16.

60. 7. **in Democritum . . . ingratus.** Comp. De Fin. I, 6, 21: *Democritum, laudatum a ceteris, ab hoc, qui eum unum secutus est, nollem*

vituperatum. Epicurus in ridicule called him Ληρόκριτος. Diog. L. X, 8.

60. 8. **Nausiphanen.** See c. 26, 73 from which passage the insertion of *non* before *nihil,* wanting in most Mss., is justified.

84 60. 10. **Apollodorum, Silum,** two philosophers not otherwise known; for the Epicurean Apollodorus, who according to Diog. L. X, 2 and 25 was Zeno's teacher, is out of the question. It might sooner be the Stoic mentioned in Diog. L. VII, 39, where the other name *Syllus* has been restored upon conjecture. Other suppositions are not worth mentioning.

60. 12. **Latino verbo utens.** This is not incredible, inasmuch as we may assume some knowledge of Latin in the case of philosophers whose lectures were attended in great measure by Romans. Zeno might have used the Latin word for the reason that it indicated better than any Greek word what he wished to express, that sort of idle lounging about and that untiring loquacity which characterized the *scurra,* and which might have been criticised even in Socrates by his enemies. The comic poet Eupolis also called him πτωχὸς ἀδολέσχης. Meineke Fragm. com. V, 1, p. LXXXVIII.

60. 13. **Chrysippam.** He probably meant to ridicule a wordy loquacity like that of a talkative old woman; Chrysippus was in fact a very voluminous and wordy writer, and γραολογία was the expression for loquacity. Sext. Emp. Adv. Gram. § 141.

94 60. 14. **senatum . . . recitares,** like a censor; comp. Liv. XXIII, 23, 5; and XXIX, 37, 1; Cic. Orat. pro Domo, c. 32, 84.

60. 18. **lucubratione anicularum.** Not only study but the labour of women by lamplight were designated by *lucubrationes;* in Liv. I, 57 S. Tarquinius finds Lucretia sitting *inter lucubrantes ancillas.*— Cotta says therefore that Epicurus's notions about the gods are hardly fit for old women's spinning-rooms.

95 60. 23. **nam quod . . . dicitis.** How this is to be taken is stated at the end of the Summary.

60. 27. **deus ut . . . sit** = *ut esse statuatur.* See note to c. 9, 21; 27, 25.

60. 30. **durum,** only because not yet in use; comp. Quintil. VIII, 3, 32. But the formation of both words is quite correct, like *necessitas* and *necessitudo, claritas* and *claritudo,* and the forms cited by Gellius XIII, 3: *suavitudo, sanctitudo, acerbitudo, acritudo,* with *suavitas* &c. Also *duritudo, planitudo, saevitudo, tarditudo, vastitudo.* See Ritschl. De Fictil. Litter. (Berolin, 1853), p. 20.

96 61. 1. **innumerabilia.** See above c. 20, 53.

61. 3. **quae sola divina natura est:** "which (namely, happy and immortal) the divine nature, and no other, is." The neuter *quae* refers to both predicates *beata* and *aeterna* in the preceding clause. If there were only one of them, for instance *aeterna*, the phrase would run: *quod sola divina natura est;* as in De Fin. IV, 24, 66: *ut iam omnes insipientes sint miseri, quod profecto sunt;* and in the same way the demonstrative *hoc*, ibid. § 65: *non tamen erat ille sapiens: quis enim hoc?* Comp. Livy XXX, 30: *Quod enim ego fui ad Trasimenum, id tu hodie es.*—The traditional reading of this passage, *sunt* for *est*, is not susceptible of any rational explanation, that is, any that suits the context.

61. 7. **accedebat.** The imperfect in relation to the time when the opinion was formed (*ratio docuit*); reason ought to have recognized this truth, which is such not only now, but was so at that time. Compare below c. 35, 98 *videbas*, and 36, 100 *habebam.*—[**deorum.** Schoemann reads *dei*, and says:] the Mss. have *deo* for *dei*. On this see Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 321. Possibly the reading should be *deorum*.

61. 10. **in rubro mari.** 'Ερυθρὰ θάλασσα, the sea to the south of Asia 35 97
and Libya, with the Persian and Arabian gulfs. See Ps. Arist. De Mund. c. 3 and Kapp's note and the commentators on Herod. I, 1.

61. 27. **quid est . . . conturbet?** "How can the form alone throw 98
you into such confusion?" That is, how can the prejudice or the assumed πρόληψις in regard to the form of the gods so disturb your judgment that you cling to the belief in it, while you set yourself against other assumptions no more arbitrary than that? On *conturbare* comp. Beier on De Offic. III, 10, 40.

61. 28. **his . . . adiunctis . . . rationem** is equivalent to *haec una cum ratione:* all these endowments belong to man, as well as reason.

61. 34. **uno digito plus:** "a finger too many," lit. more by one finger than one ought to have; the ablative of measure, as *sol multis partibus maior quam terra* (II, 36, 92); Verr. II, 52, 129: *Siculi nonnumquam uno die longiorem mensem faciunt aut biduo;* Orat. 51, 173: *versus una syllaba brevior aut longior.*

62. 7. **Et eos vituperabas.** Above c. 20, 53 sq.—**Et** for *et tamen* 36 100
or like εἶτα in Greek with the expression of astonishment. Phil. I, 8, 19: *Quid? lege, quae promulgata est de tertia decuria, nonne omnes iudiciariae leges Caesaris dissolvuntur? Et vos acta Caesaris defenditis, qui leges eius evertitis?* Other similar examples in Horat. Tursell. De Partic., p. 286, Schwarz; and Hand. Tursell. II, p. 492.

62. 14. **Aberrant coniectura.** Comp. Verr. III, 67, 156: *hic vehe-*

menter errat Timarchides, sed errat domestica coniectura; Ad Attic. XIV, 22, 1: *vereor ne nihil coniectura aberrem.* With *aberrare* of course *a vero, a proposito* is to be supplied. A complete misunderstanding of the expression has occasioned the placing of the preposition *a* before *coniectura;* and one must then imagine that *coniectura* can mean *the very truth that is sought after;* as the latest defender of this opinion says, "*coniectura cum effectu*" or "*finis quo tendimus.*"

62. 18. **Et barbati quidem** &c., "And of a bearded Jupiter forsooth" &c. This is represented to be quite as certain as what precedes, and with a view of weakening or destroying its force as an argument. See Schwarz on Hor. Tursell., p. 284; Jahn on Cicero Or. c. 50, 168; and especially Madvig Emend. in Cic. Libr. Phil., p. 91.

101 62. 24. **ob aliquam utilitatem.** An assertion often made, but hardly correct, at least in this general form. The worship of animals is a sort of fetishism, resting upon a vague feeling of a superhuman power of nature as displayed in them, which man in an uncultivated state wonders at and reveres. In Plut. De Is. et Osir. c. 74 the *συμβολικόν* is placed along side of the *χρειῶδες*; and in c. 77 animals are called *αἰνίγματα τοῦ θεοῦ*. Comp. the learned remarks of J. A. Kanne in the Introduction to his Mythologie der Griechen, and Duncker, Geschichte des Alterthums I, p. 53, 2d edition.

62. 28. **volucris anguis.** Other authors make the same statement, but derive the winged serpents in part not from Lybia but from Arabia, as Herod. II, 75; III, 107; Ammian. Marcell. XXII, 15, 26. Schneider on Ælian. H. An. II, 38 is of the opinion that the creatures in question are flying lizards (the *draco volans* of Linnæus). The whole matter is doubtless exaggerated and fabulous.

62. 28. **vento Africo.** For the Italians the *Africus* is the West South-West wind, *ab occidente hiberno, qui apud Graecos λίψ dicitur* (Seneca Quaest. Nat. V, 16), because it came to them from the province Africa. Here it must be a West wind, as Lybia lay in this direction from the Egyptians.

62. 32. **tamen beluas** &c. The connection of the sentences shows that this is the true construction, not *concludam tamen,* because *ita concludam* &c. is not opposed to, but rather follows from what goes before; Cotta concludes thus, not *although,* but *because* he wishes to be brief. The *tamen* points to a thought not expressly stated because easily supplied from the connection, as often occurs in conversational style: Although people laugh at the Egyptians for their worship of animals, yet the animals (and this by way of excuse) are not considered sacred without some reason.— For **tamen** = *saltem, certe* comp. Giese on Cic. De Div. II, 38, 80. In the

same order and meaning it is also found in Verres I, 1, 21: *si reticeat et absit, tamen impudentiae suae pudentem exitum quaesisse videatur;* Ad Famil. XV, 17, 2: *Nos hic . . . tamen ad te scribam aliquid . . . Sullam patrem mortuum habebamus.*

62. 35. **habet** for *habent*, see note to c. 19, 51. 102

63. 4. **Haec oratio . . . spoliat,** *i.e.* what you say takes away from 87 the gods motion &c. In the same way De Leg. I, 3, 10: *Legationem aliquam nimirum ista oratio postulat;* what you say indicates a wish for a *legatio*. Comp. II, 1, 3 and 10, init.

63. 10. **actio vitae.** See note to c. 17, 45. 103

63. 16. **quae igne nasci putentur,** *i.e.* by a so-called *generatio originaria*, which the old natural philosophers held to be unquestionable. Seneca Quaest. Nat. V, 6 says of the animals mentioned here: *ignis, qui omnia consumit, quaedam etiam creat, et quod videri potest non simile veri, tamen verum est, animalia igne generari.* And Pliny H. N. XI, 36: *In Cypri aerariis fornacibus ex medio igni maioris muscae magnitudinis volat pennatum quadrupes; appellatur pyralis, a quibusdam pyrausta. Quamdiu est in igni vivit; cum evasit longiore paulo volatu, emoritur.* In other connections *pyraustae* denote what we call millers.

63. 23. [**Quicquid . . . attigeris, ulcus est.** *ulcus* is a weak point, 104 an insurmountable difficulty. So De Orat. 2, 72, 292: *malum vitiumque causae.*]

63. 25. **Sic enim dicebas,** *i.e.* above c. 19, 49: but there Velleius 105 says not *speciem dei*, but *vim et naturam deorum*, which is quite a different thing. The *species* are taken cognizance of by the mind through the *imagines* which affect it, although afterward further reasons are found; but the nature of the gods cannot, like their form, be known from *imagines*, but only be deduced by the reason, *mente* or *cogitatione cerni:* they are according to Epicurus only λόγῳ θεωρητοί.

63. 26. **neque eandem ad numerum permanere.** This could only mean that the divine forms do not remain the same but are variable in respect to number; that they therefore appear now in greater now in lesser number. But according to Epicurus there can be no question of number in regard to the gods. Cicero perhaps wrote *neque eam ad numerum permanare*, so that *ad numerum* would be taken in the sense given in the note to § 49, i.e. *sic ut numerari possit*, and *permanare* in that of *flowing*, the *transitio* of the images. So far as concerns the language there would be no objection to this; and in fact one Ms. has *permanare*, which would of course however have very little weight if the sense were not in its favor. Lachmann also writes *eam* for *eandem* in note on Lucret., p. 24, but retains *permanere*.

63. 28. **similitudine et transitione.** To understand this rightly see note on § 49.

63. 29. **ex eoque fieri.** See note on § 109.

88 63. 32. **tantum modo ad cogitationem valent,** because they make no impression on the senses, but only on the mind, and so they simply give rise to ideas.

63. 34. **talem conformationem animi,** that is, an idea not resulting from any sensuous perception, but only from a mental act. *animi* is genitive subjective, not objective.

106 64. 2. **Ti. Gracchum** &c. A reference to the well-known story that Ti. Gracchus when tribune of the people proposed the deposition of his colleague M. Octavius who had opposed him, and called on the people to vote on the question.—On **ut**="for example" see note to c. 31, 88.

64. 4. **imagines remanere.** According to Epicurus there flow from objects not only images of coarser consistency which are perceived by the eye, but also those of more subtle nature which are directly perceived by the mind. Lucret. IV, 726 ff. Such images continue to exist, even when the objects from which they proceed have passed away; which accounts for the presence in the mind of the forms of those long dead, as for example in dreams. Lucret. V, 63. *Remanere* is to be understood of continuance in time, not in place; for, as Lucret. IV, 728 says, *simulacra vagantur . . . in cunctas undique partis.* Comp. Cic. De Div. II, 67, 137. For this reason the reading of the majority of Mss., *pervenerint,* would seem preferable to *pervenerim,* which has been adopted by recent editors from four Mss. Comp. Jahrb. für Phil. 1875, p. 691.

107 64. 10. **A Democrito haec licentia.** "This arbitrary assumption is borrowed from Democritus."

64. 13. **omnium in me incidere imagines** &c. Images or representations of all of them, just as it happens or as I fancy. Comp. De Div. II, 67, 139 where it is said of this Epicurean theory: *omnia igitur quae volumus nota nobis esse possunt; nihil est enim de quo cogitare nequeamus.* Cicero also ridicules it Ad Fam. XV, 16, 1. An attentive reader of Lucretius IV, 726 ff. will find with a little thought what an Epicurean might answer to this and the following objections.

64. 15. **nec ea forma**=*non tamen ea forma.*—In the following sentence *illae* would be more correct than *illi ergo;* but the masculine is excusable because the images represent the persons. Further on we find *Orpheus, id est imago eius.*

64. 16. **Orpheum poëtam** &c. The language here, misunderstood by some, evidently means that Aristotle entirely denied the existence of

Orpheus. For the allusion to him enters into the connection of the argument only on the assumption that he is adduced as an example of a *non-ens*. Comp. Lobeck Agl., p. 349 f. The fact that Orphic doctrines are several times mentioned in the extant writings of Aristotle proves nothing against the present passage; the name served as a convenient traditional designation for certain theological views. The opinion here mentioned by Cicero was probably to be found in the Dial. περὶ φιλοσοφίας. See Bernays, Dialoge des Arist., p. 96.

64. 17. **hoc Orphicum carmen . . . Cercops.** The Pythagorean Cercops, of whom we have no further information, was thought by some (for example by Epigenes in περὶ τῆς εἰς Ὀρφέα ποιήσεως in Clem. Alex. Strom. I, p. 397 Pott.) to be the author of two Orphic poems, the (Θησέως) κατάβασις εἰς ᾅδου, and the ἱερὸς λόγος. The latter, often called in the plural ἱεροὶ λόγοι, consisted of twenty-four rhapsodies and contained a very extended theogony; another, likewise called ἱερὸς λόγος, was of ethic and ascetic character. There was also a Cercops from Miletus, to whom a Hesiodic poem, Aigimius, was attributed; whether he was the same with the Pythagorean cannot be determined with certainty.

64. 22. **Scyllae, Chimaerae.** This objection is answered by Lucret. 108
IV, 736 ff. The next one it were better not to have made, it is so very easy to meet from Epicurus's standpoint; the third is answered by Lucret. IV, 780 ff.; the fourth IV, 761 ff.

64. 33. **Num eadem . . . omnia sempiterna?** Epicurus assumed 39 109
the existence of the infinite quantity of atoms only for the purpose of explaining the assumed everlasting efflux of the impressions from the gods. But Cotta speaks in this passage as if Epicurus intended to prove the immortality of the gods from the inexhaustible mass of the atoms; and in §§ 105–107 as if he used the ceaseless efflux of the divine images for the same purpose. That is certainly an error or an intentional misrepresentation. Epicurus first assumed the immortality of the gods on account of the πρόληψις, and then tried to strengthen the belief by appealing to the law of isonomy. According to this law, in contrast with mortal beings, there must necessarily be immortal ones; and since all other beings of whom we have knowledge are mortal and transitory, the gods are the only ones remaining to whom we either can or must ascribe immortality. The argument may be a weak one; but it is better at any rate than that which Cotta ascribed to him. For the following objections of Cotta see the note, Summary, p. 26 ff.

65. 1. **sint aliqui immortales.** The subjunctive as *modus potentialis* = *εἶεν ἄν.*

65. 3. **sint quae . . . conservent;** [Schoemann reads *sunt* &c.]. The opponent is speaking.

65. 4. **ea conservent, quae sunt.** The sense is: there may certainly be certain preserving forces; but they can only preserve what really exists. But I do not believe that your gods really exist.

40 110 65. 10. **et deus vester.** As this is opposed to the foregoing, *sed* might have been used; but all languages sometimes use the simple copula when the opposition is not to be made especially prominent. Cic. De Leg. II, 21, 53: *hoc vero nihil ad pontificium ius, et e medio est iure civili.* Other examples in Hand Tursel. II, p. 495.

65. 11. **ne beatus quidem:** "and moreover not happy": simply continuative, not cumulative, as in cases where *ne . . . quidem* = not even. Comp. III, 17, 43; 26, 68; and more in Madvig Cic. De Fin. note, p. 816.

111 65. 17. **quos non pudeat.** The Mss. omit the negative, so that the sense would be: The other Epicureans are ashamed of their master; you alone do not share in this. It is unnecessary to note the improbability of such a compliment to Velleius in the mouth of Cotta.

65. 20. **persequitur omnis nominatim,** for example in the περὶ τέλους, of which a passage, quoted by Athenaeus VII, p. 280 A, is translated by Cicero, Tusc. III, 18, 41: *Nec equidem habeo quod intellegam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates, quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas, quae auditu et cantibus, detrahens eas etiam, quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis, suavis motiones, sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu.* But Cicero has omitted in the translation the portion to which the censure contained in *obscoenis* especially applies, τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων ἡδονάς; *quae si appelles honos praefandus sit* he says De Fin. II, 10, 29.

113 65. 28. **At has leviores ducis;** an objection which Cotta himself makes in behalf of Epicurus in order to controvert it directly; just as in c. 41 init.: *At dolore vacant.* — Epicurus was often reproached with inconsistency in his teachings in regard to pleasure; while in many passages he represented the pleasures of the senses as the highest good, at other times he disparaged these and exalted the pleasures of the mind. Comp. Tusc. III, 20, 46. The following *quousque ludis?* hints that he could not have been really in earnest.

65. 29. **titillatio.** Epicurus said γαργαλισμός and γαργαλίζειν. Athen. XII, 546 E; Plutarch, Non posse suav. vivi, c. 3 and others. Cicero, translating the words in other passages by *titillare* and *titillatio* (De Fin. I, 11, 39; Tusc. III, 20, 47; De Offic. II, 18, 63; Cat. Mai. 14, 4), always adds a *quasi* to qualify the inappropriate expression.

65. 33. **Metrodori.** He appears also in Plutarch in the passage cited above as a very strong defender of sensuous pleasure: *οἴονται δὲ περὶ γαστέρα τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πόρους τῆς σαρκὸς ἅπαντας, δι' ὧν ἡδονὴ ἐπεισέρχεται, καὶ πάντα καλὰ καὶ σοφὰ ἐξευρήματα τῆς περὶ γαστέρα ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα γεγονέναι καὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ ταύτης ἐλπίδος ἀγαθῆς, ὡς ὁ σοφὸς εἴρηκε Μητρόδωρος.*

66. 7. **Cogitat.** For the number see note to c. 19, 51. **41** **114**

66. 12. **ne intereat.** These words are wanting in the Mss., but are preserved in the citation of the passage in Augustin. Epist. 56 tom. II, p. 267, ed. Basil. 1569. It is not advisable to strike them out and to read *non pereat* or *non conteratur* for *non vereatur.* The idea is that the continual fear of annihilation must interfere with the happiness of the gods.

66. 14. **affluant,** sc. *ad nos,* which, being so easily understood, could very well be omitted. Comp. c. 19, 49.

66. 16. **de sanctitate.** Comp. c. 44, 122. Among the works of Epicurus cited by Diog. L. X, 27 is one *περὶ ὁσιότητος.* Whether there was a special one *περὶ εὐσεβείας* is not known. **115**

66. 17. **Ti. Coruncanium,** the first plebeian Pontifex Maximus. Cicero also speaks of him (II, 66, 165) as a man beloved of the gods for his goodness; in III, 2, 5 as an authority in matters of religion; he says the same also of P. Scaevola.

66. 18. **Scaevolam,** *i.e.* P. Mucium P. F. Q. N. who was Pontifex Maximus in 631.

66. 20. **ut Xerses.** Herod. VIII, 109 and many others state that Xerxes destroyed the temples and sanctuaries during his expedition to Greece.

66. 22. **homines non colant.** Comp. Plaut. Poen. V, 4, 14: *Juppiter, qui genus colis alisque hominum.*—The word is evidently here chosen chiefly on account of the *colendos* preceding; comp. Ovid. Metam. VIII, 724: *Cura pii dis sunt, et qui coluere coluntur.*

66. 23. **At est eorum** &c. With reference to what Velleius said in c. 17, 45. **116**

66. 29. **pietas, iustitia adversum deos.** Inasmuch as justice yields to every one that which is due, it includes what is due to the gods. Cic. Partit. Or. c. 22, 78: *In communione autem quae posita pars est (virtutis) iustitia dicitur, eaque erga deos religio, erga parentes pietas, vulgo autem bonitas;* Macrob. In Somn. Scip. I, 8, 7: *De iustitia veniunt innocentia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio;* Lact. Div. Inst. VI, 10: *Primum iustitiae officium est coniungi cum deo, secundum cum homine.*

66. 31. **Sanctitas . . . scientia colendorum deorum.** This corresponds to the Stoic definition of εὐσέβεια in Diog. L. VII, 119 : εἶναι δὲ τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας. Comp. Xen. Mem. IV, 6, 4 ; and Sext. Emp. IX, 123. — It is not strange that expressions of this sort have no precisely defined meaning, and hence are not always used and explained in the same way.

42
117 67. 2. **Diagoram aut Theodorum.** See note to c. 23, 63.—**Protagoram ;** note to c. 12, 29.

118 67. 8. **totam de dis inmortalibus opinionem fictam.** This opinion was avowed by many in the time of the Sophists, and the oldest evidence for it are some verses which Plutarch (De Plac. Phil. I, 7) cites from the Sisyphus of Euripides, but which others ascribe to Critias. Comp. Introd., pp. 6, 7.

67. 11. **Prodicus Cius,** a Sophist of the Socratic age, and in many respects worthy of great consideration. The opinion here quoted is also ascribed to him by Sext Emp. adv. Phys. c. 2, p. 522 : Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος ἥλιόν φησι καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ὠφελοῦντα τὸν βίον ἡμῶν οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν Νεῖλον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δήμητραν κληθῆναι, τὸν δὲ οἶνον Διόνυσον, τὸ δὲ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον, καὶ ἤδη τῶν εὐχρηστούντων ἕκαστον.

119 67. 17. **Euhemero,** from Messina in Sicily, at the end of the fourth century B.C., a friend of the Macedonian Cassander ; he wrote a ἱερὰ ἀναγραφή, professedly based on documents which he claimed to have found in the temple of Zeus Triphylios on an island of the Southern Ocean called Panchaia ; according to these documents all the gods of the popular belief, from Uranus down, were nothing more than deified kings and heroes of early times. Extracts from his book are given especially in Diodor. V, 42 ff. ; and Euseb. Praep. Evang. II, 4. Ennius translated it into Latin, and a number of passages of the translation are found in Lactant. Inst. Div. I, 11 ; but their genuineness is doubtful. — Hoeck, Kreta III, 326 ff., and Gerlach in his Histor. Studien, p. 137 ff., treat of Euhemerus at length.

67. 22. **Ubi initiantur** &c. The verses are from a tragedy otherwise unknown. — Instead of **orarum** we must either (with Bentley on Horace Od. I, 35, 29) read *oraī*, or take *orarum* as partitive genitive, depending on *ultimae*. *Ultima orarum*, "the extreme of the boundaries." [But this would require the genitive *ultimae* to depend on *gentes*, which seems rather forced. Why not *gentes ultimae orarum*, as in Hor. Od. I, 35 *ultimos orbis Britannos*, or Tac. Agr. c. 30 *Nos terrarum ac libertatis extremos ?* "the most remote people of the countries," instead of "the people

of the most remote countries."] — The following anapæstic verses are perhaps taken from the Philoctetus of Attius, and refer to the mysteries of the Cabiri at Lemnos. Probably the verses cited by Varro L. L. VII, 11 went before:

Lemnia praesto
littora rara et celsa Cabirum
delubra tenes, mysteria queis
pristina castis concepta sacris.

See Hermann Opusc. III, p. 120.

67. 26. **Quibus explicatis** &c. That is, the deeds and experiences of the gods, set forth in the mysteries, have an allegorical signification; if you bring them down to their true meaning (*ad rationem revocatis*), you recognize in the gods the powers of nature personified, and in their actions and experiences natural events. This was the view of thinking minds; but we cannot believe that the priests themselves gave explanations of that sort to those initiated in the mysteries. — Comp. besides the similar expressions in regard to the allegorical interpretations of the Stoics III, 24, 63.

67. 29. **hortulos suos inrigavit,** alluding to the garden in which 43 120
Epicurus lived. See note on 33, 93.

67. 29. **nutare,** to waver, have no settled, tenable opinion. Comp. De Fin. II, 2, 6: *Nunc autem dico ipsum Epicurum nescire* (*quid sit voluptas*) *in eoque nutare.*

67. 30. **Tum enim censet . . .** So far as we can ascertain the theological views of Democritus, he held first the existence of a divine substance pervading the whole universe, consisting of special atoms of the most subtle constitution. This is the θεία οὐσία in Clem. Alex. Strom. V, § 88, p. 698 Pott., and the κόσμου ψυχή in Plutarch Plac. Phil. I, 7. From this substance proceed not only the individual gods but also the souls of living beings, which by breathing constantly receive as nourishment particles of this same substance which pervades the air. Arist. De Resp. c. 4. It is this substance doubtless which Cicero here means by *principia mentis*, and which above also c. 12, 29 he intends by *natura quae imagines fundat.* For from this proceed the divine forms called εἴδωλα on account of their subtle, etherial constitution quite different from the coarser corporeal form: δύσφθαρτα μέν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δέ. καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιά, τὰ δὲ κακοποιά. Sext. Emp. IX, 19, p. 553. These are Cicero's *animantes imagines, quae vel prodesse nobis soleant vel nocere;* and likewise without doubt the *imagines divinitate praeditae* mentioned in the beginning of the passage. But the last-mentioned *ingentes imagines,* which embrace the whole universe from without, are not alluded to in this shape by any other author, and probably are the result of a misunderstanding.

68. 1. **patria Democriti.** The city of Abdera was proverbial for stupidity. See C. F. Hermann's Urkundl. Gesch. von Abdera, in his Abhandl. und Beitr. zur Class. Literatur, p. 106 ff.

121 68. 7. **negat idem esse in deo gratiam.** See the *κυρία δόξα* cited above c. 17, 45. On *idem* comp. note to III, 39, 93.

68. 11. **amari . . . diligi.** These expressions are often used together; the former indicates an affection coming from the heart and to some extent involuntary, the latter a well-grounded esteem. *Amant di homines*, because it is of the divine nature to love men: *diligunt di homines* in that they bestow their special favor on the pious and virtuous.

44 68. 14. For **Censent autem** we should probably read *Censent enim;* it is certain that both particles are often confounded by the copyists. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 355.

68. 15. **Nihil est enim virtute amabilius.** Comp. De Amic. c. 8, 28: *nihil est enim amabilius virtute, nihil quod magis adliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem eos etiam quos numquam vidimus quodam modo diligamus.*

68. 17. **quid mali datis?** In the language of common life *dare* in many phrases is equivalent to "cause, bring about"; e.g. *malum dare*, frequent in the comic writers.

68. 17. **in inbecillitate.** Comp. De Amic. c. 9, 29: *quam (benivolentiam) si qui putant ab inbecillitate proficisci, ut sit, per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae.*

68. 24. **utilitatum suarum;** *nostrarum* would be more correct; but since in what precedes the first person only represents the indefinite subject *aliquis*, the transition to the possessive of the third is easily explained.

123 68. 31. **Ludimur;** because he is not really in earnest. Comp. c. 40, 113; and III, 1, 3.

68. 35. **Posidonius.** See c. 3, 6.

124 69. 11. **valeat,** like the Greek *χαιρέτω, χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν αὐτόν*, an expression of common life, to indicate that one cares for nothing more to do with a person. Donatus on Terent. Andr. IV, 2, 13 calls it *renuntiationis verbum.*

69. 12. **propitius sit:** a customary formula in invocations of the gods. See Brisson. De Form. I, 184. Hence the verb *propitiare deos = placare.*

BOOK SECOND.

78. 2. **rhetore** for *oratore*, to indicate a regularly trained speaker, which is not implied in *orator*. The word is used in the same sense of L. Torquatus in Brut. c. 76, 265. Generally *rhetor* means a teacher of rhetoric. Comp. Plin. Ep. IV, 11 : *eo decidit, ut rhetor de oratore fieret.* In later times however the *rhetores* were also generally called *oratores.* See Ruhnken Praef. Ad Rutil. Lup., p. XXVI and Cramer ad Schol. Juven., p. 550. 1 1

78. 3. [**indisertum** contains the protasis of *pertimuissem ;* as *sine ista philosophia* does that of *rhetorem quamvis eloquentem*, sc. *pertimuissem.*]

78. 7. **corona** is used to denote the circle of listeners at judicial trials. Comp. De Fin. II, 22, 74 : *at tu eadem die in iudicio, aut, si coronam times, dic in senatu.* Brut. 51, 192 : *in iis etiam causis, in quibus omnis res nobis cum iudicibus est, non cum populo, tamen, si a corona relictus sim, non queam dicere.*

78. 7. **ad ista alias,** sc. *dicam.* Comp. note on I, 8, 19.

78. 9. [**malim** is Müller's reading, *mallem* that of all the edd. and 2
Mss. except A, which has *malem.* Müller feels justified in reading *malim* on account of the confusion in the Mss. In D. N. III, 9, 21, A V have *vellis* for *velis ;* in II, 59, 147 they all have *velim* for *vellem ;* in III, 4, 9 all have *velis* for *velles* &c. Schoemann here has *vellem* with the following note :] *mallem,* not *malim,* because the speaker renounces the fulfilment of the wish, knowing, as he does, that Cotta would hardly treat of the gods in the same way that he would do himself. That he afterwards says *aveo audire* does not conflict with this ; it is a sort of revocation of the preceding renunciation. Nor does the use of *dum . . . inducat,* instead of *dum . . . induceret* after *mallem* contradict it ; such slight inconsistencies are permissible in familiar conversation. Comp. De Fin. I, 7, 25 : *si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista per se esse iucunda.* De Div. II, 59, 122 : *ne si navigare quidem velim, ita gubernarem, ut somniaverim.* Plin. Ep. X, 115 : *lege Pompeia permissum Bythinicis civitatibus adscribere quos vellent cives, dum civitatis non sint alienae ; dum* here = *dummodo,* as in the passage of the text.

[The imperf. subj. of these words *mallem* &c. is generally used when the fulfilment of the preference &c. is no longer possible. In this case it

is not so because Cotta had finished his discourse and because, as Balbus knew, the Academic had nothing positive to say on the subject; Balbus calls attention to it this way. The tense of *inducat* may be more than an oversight. "I should have preferred to hear Cotta continue his speech rather than leave off where he did, and see how he gets on when he comes to propound a system of positive theology; he ought to have one and I am curious to know what it is."]

3 79. 3. **istam quaestionem.** This pronoun is used because the person addressed is the one who proposes the discussion, and who also last spoke. On *iste* referring to the person addressed see Reisig, Vorl. § 209.

79. 7. **sumamus,** of subjects which one takes up for discussion. De Orat. II, 90, 366: *quis Antonio permisit, ut et partis faceret et utram vellet prior ipse sumeret?*

2 79. 16. **Ennius,** who more than any one else made the Romans
4 acquainted with the works and various forms of Greek poetry, modelled his tragedies chiefly upon the plays of Euripides. The verse here quoted is from the Thyestes. For others of similar import see below c. 25, 65. [Schoemann reads *sublimen* and remarks:] Festus (p. 306 M) apparently vouches for the form *sublimen* (subst.) as having been used by Ennius; but this is not quite certain. [Baiter also has *sublimen* in both editions.]

79. 18. **Iovem.** The ancients recognized the fact that the name *Iovis* (properly *Diovis*) signified "the heavenly" (see Varro L. L., V, 66), and modern comparative philology has confirmed it. *dium* too means the heavens, the bright sky, which spreads the light of day (*dies*) over the earth. Ζεύς, Διεύς, *deus*, θεός are of the same root; and the supreme being bears the distinctive name of "heavenly father," *Dius pater*, *Diuspiter*, *Diespiter*, *Iuppiter*. The Stoic however completely identifies God with the heavens, indeed he makes the heavenly ether God, as older philosophers had already done before him, whose views Euripides assigns to his heroes in some of his tragedies.—In the following **illum vero et Iovem** Balbus has in mind the supposed derivation of the name from *iuvare*, c. 25, 64.

79. 21. **patrem divumque** &c., equivalent to the Homeric πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. The Stoic however understands thereby the creator, while in Homer and the other poets the name *Zeus* does not designate the creator, but only a paternal ruler; this is noted by Arist. Polit. I, 12. Cf. Div. Chrys. Or. XII, 75: πατὴρ δὲ (Ζεὺς) καλεῖται διά τε τὴν κηδεμονίαν καὶ τὸ πρᾳον.

5 79. 24. **cognitum conprehensumque.** The second word defines the first more precisely, and in the Stoic sense is to be understood of a

sure knowledge accompanied with a firm conviction. Comp. note on I, 5, 12 and Acad. I, 11, 41.

79. 27. **inveterari** for the *inveterare* of the Mss. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 383 and Neue, Formenlehre, p. 260.

79. 28. **ceteras opiniones . . . extabuisse.** We should expect directly the antithesis *naturae autem iudicia . . . confirmari*, or the like. But the speaker first adds something more for the confirmation of the first assertion, and, repeating it in other words: *opinionis commenta delet dies*, adds the antithesis *naturae iudicia confirmat.*

79. 31. **apud inferos portenta.** A hyphen, as in c. 3, 7: *P. Claudii bello Punico primo temeritas;* and 5, 14 : *praeter naturam portentis.*

80. 1. **religionum sanctitates** = *religiones sancte habitae et observatae.* But the assertion that there was a constant improvement in the matter of religious observances must not be taken too strictly; it is contradicted by the numerous complaints of Cicero and others about the increasing decline of religious feeling. Cicero too contradicts himself very soon by what he makes Balbus say (c. 3, 9) on the neglect of the auspices.

80. 2. **quod et praesentes . . . declarant.** The *et* here is not 6
equivalent to *etiam*, but corresponds to another that should have followed, for example *et praedictionibus ac praesensionibus futura significant* (c. 3 in.), which Cicero had in mind but forgot while citing the examples of divine manifestations. It is a case of anacoluthia. For examples see Matthiä De Anacoluthis ap. Ciceronem in Wolf's Litt. Analect. III, p. 5; or A. M. Vermischte Schriften, p. 56; and Madvig Cic. De Fin., p. 804; Madv. Gram. 480 and obs. 1.

80. 3. **apud Regillum.** When the Latins under Octavius Mamilius took up arms against Rome in favor of the exiled Tarquins, they were beaten by the dictator A. Postumius Albus at Lake Regillus in the Tusculan district A.U.C. 258. Dionysius A. R. VI, 13 and others mention the appearance of Castor and Pollux; Livy says nothing about it.

80. 6. [**ex equis.** For the preposition here and below *cum equis* see Roby 1174. 1937; 1235; Madvig 258, obs. 3.]

80. 7. **Persem victum nuntiaverunt,** *i.e.* they gave news of the victory which L. Æmilius Paulus gained over Perseus (or Perses) of Macedonia at Pydna in the year 586.

80. 8. **huius adulescentis.** On the pronoun see note I, 28, 79. The person referred to is P. Vatinius, against whom there is an oration of Cicero still extant.

80. 8. **praefectura;** a *municipium*, to which a *praefectus iuri dicundo* was sent from Rome as chief magistrate.

80. 13. **ad fluvium Sagram.** This small stream separated Croto

from Locri. The battle, which ended in the total defeat of the people of Croto, took place about B.C. 580. See Heyne, Opusc. Ac. II, p. 185; and on the participation of the Dioskuri see Klausen, Æneas u. d. Penaten, p. 666; and Preller, Röm. Myth., p. 659.

80. 16. **Faunorum,** field and wood gods of a lower order, to whom were ascribed all sorts of spectral apparitions and cries. Originally the popular belief knew only one Faunus, who was said to have been king in old times in Latium; at a later period there were many. Comp. De. Div. I, 45, 101; and below III, 6, 15.

3
7 80. 19. **ea ostendi,** for *eas*. Comp. note on c. 5, 15. The Mss. add *quae sint* or *quae sunt* or *quae futura sunt;* evidently additions of persons who were disturbed by the neuter of the pronoun. For *hominibus*, which is plainly unnecessary, perhaps *divinitus* would be better.—The following series of synonymous expressions is also found De Div. I, 42, 93. It is difficult to distinguish the ideas clearly; but it may be said with Doederlein (Synon. Part 5, p. 174), that *prodigium* expresses more particularly what is significant and leads to important consequences; *ostentum* what is wonderful and extraordinary; *portentum* what is terrible and threatening; and *monstrum* what is unnatural and ugly.—The pronoun **illa** has no grammatical relation to the preceding *ea;* it is rather to be explained *illa quae nobis res futuras ostendunt* &c.

80. 20. [This phrase **illa ostenta** &c. is cited by Nägelsbach, Latein. Stylistik, § 3, 2, b, as a case where the want of an article in Latin is supplied by the demonstrative pronoun, equivalent here to Greek τά. *ostenta* &c. are then subjects of *dicuntur*. Comp. Tusc. V, 27, 78: *Mulieres . . . in certamen . . . veniunt . . .; quae est victa, ea laeta prosequentibus suis una cum viro in rogum imponitur, illa victa maesta discedit.* But it seems preferable to take *illa* as referring to *praedictiones et praesensiones* with a change of gender like that of *ea*.]

80. 21. **quodsi ea ficta credimus.** We should expect *quae de Mopso* &c. *traduntur* to follow; instead of that Cicero with a freer turn of expression uses only the names.—They are all names of famous seers of the heroic age.

80. 24. **si res . . . repudiaret.** Comp. Verr. II, 55, 138: *ut, etiamsi homines tacerent, res tamen ipsa illum censum repudiaret.*

80. 25. **P. Claudii** (*Pulchri*) **temeritas.** The occurrence took place A.U.C. 505; the battle was near Drepanum against the Punic general Adherbal.

8 80. 30. **Iunius** (*L. Pullus*). The disaster happened near the promontory Pachynum: his mistake was *quod vitio navigasset* (Cic. De Div. I, 16, 29), i.e. *contra auspicia*, or *avibus non addicentibus.*

80. 33. *C. Flaminius* (*Nepos*), "*contra auspicia profectus, signis militaribus effossis, quae tolli non potuerant, et ab equo, quem conscenderat, per caput devolutus, . . . ab Hannibale ad Trasimenum lacum caesus est.*" Epitom. Liv. lib. XXII.—The person whom Cicero calls *Caelius* is *C. Caelius Antipater*, an annalist of the first half of the seventh century, who had written the history of the second Punic war.

81. 3. **religione . . . multo superiores.** Sall. Cat. c. 12: *nostri maiores religiosissimi mortales.* Comp. Preller, Röm. Myth., p. 113; Boissier, Études sur Varron, p. 297.

81. 4. **Atti Navii.** Comp. Livy I, 36, where he is called *inclitus ea tempestate augur, i.e.* in the time of Tarquinius Priscus. It is an error of memory that Cicero mentions Hostilius here; in other passages, De Repub. II, 20, 36 and De Div. I, 17, 31 where the same story is told in more detail, he gives it correctly.

81. 10. **peremnia,** auspices taken at the crossing of a river.

81. 11. **ex acuminibus,** "*auspicium totum militare*" says Cicero De Div. II, 36, 77. But it is impossible to ascertain with certainty what is to be understood by *acumina*, whether the points of lances on which electric flames were sometimes seen, or the tongued flames of the sacrificial fire, or the points of the beaks of the birds, or what not. See the citations in Giese and Moser, Cic. De Div., p. 293.

81. 11. **nulla, cum viri vocantur.** The *nulli viri vocantur* of the Mss., which no one has ever been able to explain (comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 275), must necessarily be thus amended. Gellius XV, 27, 3 expresses the idea more fully: *cum viri ad praelium faciendum in aciem vocabantur.* While the army was forming in line of battle the general took the auspices: *is apud quem in exercitu auspicium imperiumque erat, in tabernaculo in sella sedens auspicabatur.* Sabidius in Schol. Veron. on Virg. Aen. X, 241. When the soldiers were arranged in battle array, *in procinctu*, they occupied the time while the general was taking the auspices in making their wills before three or four of their companions: *interim ea mora utebantur qui testamenta in procinctu facere volebant,* says Sabidius *in loco.* A will made under such circumstances without further formalities (*sine libra atque tabulis*, De Orat. I, 53, 228) was legally valid. When the taking of the auspices fell into disuse the *testamenta in procinctu* also ceased, as there was no time for making them. This incidental remark may be here superfluous; but it need not for that reason have been regarded by the critics as suspicious. It is to be considered in the same way as the similar remarks II, 36, 91; 43, 111; III, 10, 25. The opinion of some that the *testamenta in procinctu* had not fallen into disuse in Cicero's time is without foundation.

81. 13. **cum auspicia posuerunt,** *i.e.* as proconsuls or propraetors, when their *auspicia* or the right *rei publicae causa auspicandi* had already passed over to their successors in the consulship or praetorship. Comp. De Div. II, 36, 76.

81. 14. **imperatores,** the two P. Decii Mures, father and son, the former in the Latin, A.U.C. 415, the latter in the Gallic war, 457. See Livy VIII, 8 and X, 28.

4 81. 19. **P.** (*Cornelio*) **Scipione, C.** (*Marcio*) **Figulo coss.,** A.U.C. 592.

81. 20. **Ti.** (*Sempronius*) **Gracchus,** the father of the two celebrated tribunes. — He was consul for the first time in A.U.C. 576 with C. Claudius Pulcher, the second time in 590 with M. Iuventius Thalna.

81. 21. **crearet.** This expression is quite frequently used of the magistrate who conducted an election, *qui comitia consulibus* (*praetoribus, aedilibus* &c.) *rogandis habet.*

81. 21. **primus rogator,** i.e. *rogator primae centuriae* or *praerogativae,* he who collected the votes of the first century and informed the presiding magistrate of the result. This is called *referre praerogativam* in Cic. De Div. II, 35, 75 where the same story is told, or *nomina referre;* here *ut eos,* i.e. *eorum nomina rettulit.* On the other hand *rogator comitiorum* was the person who presided over the assembly, because his duty was to ask the people for whom they would vote, or in case of proposed laws whether they would accept or reject them: *populum rogare magistratus* or *leges.* This *rogator* must then be distinguished from the official mentioned in the text.

81. 24. **quos ad soleret;** a not uncommon anastrophe of the preposition with relative pronouns, as *quem per, quem contra, quos adversus* and the like. Examples from Cicero may be found in Beier, Ad Fr. Or. pro Tull., p. 57; Madvig De Fin., p. 549; Roby, 1038.

11 81. 31. **e provincia,** from Sardinia, whither he was sent as proconsul.

81. 31. **ad collegium** sc. *augurum,* to which he himself belonged; De Div. I, 17, 33; Ep. ad Quin. Frat. II, 2. — **libros** sc. *augurales,* which probably contained a collection of the old rules and formulas with explanations of various learned members. They are called *Commentarii* in De Div. II, 18, 42.

81. 32. **vitio sibi tabernaculum captum.** To take the auspices for a proposed electoral meeting the presiding magistrate went soon after midnight to an appropriate open place outside of the city where a tent was erected for the purpose: *tabernaculum capere.* But on his way thither, as he passed the *pomerium* or the region of the city walls, he was obliged to observe the omens as a warrant for proceeding further; otherwise the

tabernaculum was not *rite captum;* see Lange, Röm. Alterth. I, p. 413. Now Gracchus, after the first pitching of the *tabernaculum*, had occasion to return to the city; but on repassing the *pomerium* he forgot to observe the omens again as required by law; hence the *tabernaculum* was *vitio captum*. Comp. De Div. II, 17, 33.—[Schoemann reads [*ad*] *hortos Scipionis*.] The preposition before *hortos* is wanting in the Mss.; some have *in hortos*, which should then be *horto* or *hortis;* (*in villa Scipionis* is found in Granius Licin., p. 10, ed. Bonn.). *Hortos* cannot be taken as apposition to *tabernaculum* as has been proposed; it would be better to strike out the words. [Baiter brackets them.]

82. 1. [**Senatus ut abdicaret;** for the ellipsis see Roby 1441 and Madv. Gram. 479.]

82. 13. [Baiter and Schoem. read *ars nulla medicinae est* for the reason given by Madvig that "it is good Latin to say *medicina ars non est*, but not *ars nulla*, no science." Müller answers that *ars medicina* is perfectly good (Varro L. L., V, 93; Quint. XII, 11, 24, *rei militaris et rusticae et medicinae*), *i.e.* he takes *medicina* as an adjective.]

82. 15. **non deorum natura.** *Numen*, and not *natura*, would be better in opposition to *coniectura*. Comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 327. It is not meant that Cicero really wrote *numen; natura* is rather to be taken in the same sense as in De Div. I, 49, 110.

82. 16. **omnis omnium gentium** without any substantive for *omnis*, is also found I, 18, 46.—**Summa** is the sum and substance of the matter. Cic. Acad. II, 9, 29: *Non debere eos in suo decreto fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret;* De Fin. V, 5, 12: *nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla aut dissensio;* Ad Fam. XIII, 75, 2: *Summa est, in quo mihi gratificari possis, si curaris, ut Avianus me a te amari sciat.*

82. 17. **innatum,** "arisen in the course of natural development," not "innate"; for the Stoics did not, any more than the Epicureans, admit the existence of innate ideas. See above note I, 17, 44 and Plut. De Plac. Phil. IV, 11.

82. 18. **Cleanthes.** See I, 14, 37. With the four following reasons 5 13
Cleanthes does not mean to give a proper speculative proof of the existence of the gods; but only to show the *innasci*, the natural origin of the belief in their existence. He therefore says, not *argumentis* or *rationibus*, but *causis*, *i.e.* occasions, for this is the proper idea of the word; hence the phrase *causam capere;* and so in § 14 when he says *tertiam causam, quae terreret animos fulminibus* &c., the expression is strange, but not exactly to be condemned. The *occasion* terrifies a man, in so far as it arises from the terrifying phenomena of nature.

82. 20. [**Primam posuit eam** &c. One is almost tempted to refer *eam* and *alteram* to *notiones*, considering the expressions *eam, quae orta esset*, and *alteram, quam ceperimus;* but farther on we find *tertiam, quae terreret*, and *Quartam causam esse* &c., which show that the antecedent is *causis*. The passage is carelessly written.]

14 82. 28. **praeter naturam . . . portentis**; a hyphen, as above c. 2, 5.

82. 30. **nuper bello Octaviano.** A.U.C. 667. The consul Cn. Octavius, a partisan of Sulla, was besieged and slain by his colleague L. Cornelius Cinna and Marius who had just returned from Africa, while Sulla was fighting against Mithridates. *Bellum Octavianum* also in De Div. I, 2, 4; Philipp. XIV, 8, 23; Florus III, 21, 9. The adverb *nuper* might seem to indicate that we must imagine the present conversation to have taken place but a short time after that war. But the meaning of *nuper* is very relative, and it is hence used of somewhat remote periods of time, as in De Div. I, 39, 85: *ante philosophiam patefactam quae nuper inventa est;* and c. 50, 126 we even find: *quae nuper, id est paucis ante saeculis, reperta sunt;* where the period of modern culture is opposed to the early dark and uncultivated ages.

82. 32. **Tuditano** (*C. Sempronio*) **et** (*M'.*) **Aquilio coss.** A.U.C. 625. On the death of Scipio Africanus see III, 32, 80 and note. The double sun in that year is also referred to in De Repub. I, 10, 15.

15 83. 4. **non esse ea fortuita** for *eas fortuitas*. Comp. above c. 3, 7; and below 7, 18 extr.; also 34, 87; and 35, 88; De Leg. II, 11, 28: *Bene vero quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides consecratur . . . ut, illa qui habeant . . ., deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent.* The use of the neuter here is not strange because the objects to which the pronoun refers have only a grammatical, not a natural, gender.

83. 4. [**Ut, si quis** &c. *Ut* here means "as for example"; and corresponds to *multo magis . . . statuat necesse est* below. The apodosis of *Si quis . . . venerit* is *non possit* &c.]

83. 10. **nihil . . . vetustas mentita sit,** *i.e.* the endless lapse of time has never deceived men's expectations; the phenomena have always happened just as they ought and were expected to do according to the laws observed by men. Comp. c. 21, 56. Τίς γένοιτ' ἂν ἀψεύδεια τοιάδε; is the question asked in a similar connection in the treatise De Mundo, c. 5, falsely ascribed to Aristotle, but the work of some later Peripatetic.

6
16 83. 12. **Chrysippus quidem.** See note I, 15, 39.—**quamquam est acerrimo ingenio, tamen . . .** If Cicero meant to say that, clever as Chrysippus may have been, the following argumentation was cleverer than one would have expected of him, he has not expressed himself very

clearly. It is not *in spite of* his real ability, that he has made such an argument, but *because* his ability, however great people thought it, was even still greater than the common opinion. The excellence of his argumentation therefore was to be opposed not to his ability itself, but to the common opinion of his ability, somewhat thus: *quamquam accerrimo esse ingenio credatur, tamen, quae dicit, eiusmodi sunt* &c. Whether the argumentation really required so much keenness is another question; however that may be, it had already been made before Chrysippus by Cleanthes as may be seen from Sext. Emp. IX, 83.

[According to the preceding note the drift of the sentence would be that Chrysippus in the argument that follows showed himself to be cleverer than he was generally thought to be. But taking the language as it stands the opposition would rather seem to be between *acerrimo ingenio* and *ab ipsa natura;* "although he is a man of very keen mind and so quite able to construct a perfectly sound and convincing argument, yet the argument which he actually makes on this point is so sublime that you would think he had 'borrowed a leaf from the book of nature,' and not have found it out himself." The point of the remark is then not the greater or less keenness of Chrysippus, but the soundness and beauty of the argument; and in the mouth of a Stoic this seems more natural than a very dubious compliment to Chrysippus.]

83. 20. **(a) quo illa conficiuntur.** The preposition, wanting in almost all Mss., is as indispensable here as before *homine* in the preceding sentence. Comp. Hand Tursell. I, p. 31 f., and below III, 10, 25 where the same argument is made in somewhat different language.

83. 26. **desipientis adrogantiae.** Comp. De Leg. II, 7, 16: *quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte adrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet?*

83. 29. [A. du Mesnil in Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1877, p. 760 proposes to strike out the *non;* Müller (Adnotat. Crit.) approves, adding: The sentence is negligently written; it should run either thus: *An . . . possis adduci, ut putes; tantum ergo ornatum . . . nonne desipere videare?* or thus: *An . . . non possis adduci, ut putes; tantum ornatum . . . ut tuum ac non deorum . . . putes, possis?*]

83. 30. **et mustelis.** The ancients kept weasels as well as cats in 17
their houses for the destruction of mice. Comp. Phaedr. Fab. I, 22; Perigon. on Aelian. V. H. XIV, 4.

83. 34. **omnia supera esse meliora.** This sentence leads us to expect a line of argument similar to that in Sextus Emp. IX, 86 ff.: namely that the beings who live in the higher regions of the universe must be of a higher, superhuman nature, and therefore gods. Instead of this however

there follows something which has no necessary connection with what precedes, namely that the reason which dwells in man forces us to acknowledge also a reasonable principle in the universe from which the human reason is derived. One would think that Cicero had quoted from his original authority rather carelessly.

84. 2. **quibusdam regionibus atque urbibus.** See below c. 16, 42.

18 84. 5. **Et tamen,** *i.e.* in spite of all its imperfection the human reason is of such sort that we can only explain it as an outflow from a higher divine reason. Comp. c. 31, 79. *aliam quam* would perhaps be a better reading than *aliquam;* for the circumstances are different in passages where *aliquis* seems to be equivalent to *alius quis;* see Haase's note to Reisig, p. 338.

84. 8. **apud Xenophontem.** Memor. I, 4, 8: *νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σὲ εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι*; comp. below III, 11, 27; Tusc. V, 13, 38: *humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest.*

84. 10. **terrenam . . . viscerum soliditatem** = *viscera solida et terrena. Viscera* includes not only the intestines but everything except skin, bones and blood. Comp. below c. 63 extr.; Tusc. II, 14, 34: *Spartae pueri ad aram sic verberibus accipiuntur, ut multus e visceribus sanguis exeat;* Lactant. De Opif. Dei, c. 7: *deus ossa visceribus operuit.* Hence *visceratio, κρεανομία.* — Ochsner, Ecl. Cic., p. 22 has correctly remarked that *animam illam* would be more correct than the *animum illum* of the Mss.

19 84. 24. **tot rebus ipsis se inmutantibus,** "by the transformation of so many things within themselves"; *i.e.* their being subject to a transformation which takes place in themselves by a process having its moving spring within themselves. Evidently the changes in plants are meant, where the plant is developed from the seed, the fruit from the flower; and these changes stand in so close connection with the nearness or remoteness of the sun, that one can infer its position from them. Comp. Plin. H. N. XVIII, 27. The ancients however speak also of many other changes that go on in plants and beasts coinciding exactly with specified seasons of the year; examples may be found in Cic. De Div. I, 9, 16; II, 14, 33; Theophrast. Hist. Plant. I, 16; Gellius N. A. IX, 7, 1 and others. The ablatives *solstitiis brumisque* are not to be taken with *cognosci,* but serve as a more precise definition to *accessus discessusque.* — **Solstitium,** although properly it denotes the winter as well as the summer solstice, is regularly used to mean the latter and opposed to *bruma* or *hiems.* Iuven. IV, 92: *sic multas hiemes atque octogesima vidit solstitia.* Comp. Gesn. on Varro R. R. I, 46.

84. 26. **aestus maritimi,** the ebb and flow of the ocean. See III, 10, 24. Similar movements of the sea occur in some narrow passages in the Mediterranean, as in the Euripus and the Fretum Siculum; also in the Adriatic sea according to Strabo V, 1, 5, p. 212. Hence the expression *fretorum angustiae*. The old naturalists generally held that these movements were caused by the influence of the moon: *τῶν περὶ τὸν ὠκεανὸν πλημμυρίδων καὶ ἀμπώτεων αὕτη (ἡ σελήνη) αἰτία ἐστί*, says Cleomedes in the treatise on the phenomena of the heavens, II, 1, p. 105; and Bake, p. 416 cites several others. [Comp. De Div. II, 14, 34: *Quid de fretis aut de marinis aestibus plura dicam? quorum accessus et recessus lunae motu gubernantur.*]

84. 27. **una totius caeli conversione cursus astrorum dispares.** The stars have an apparent motion with the whole heavens around the earth, but not all at the same rate. The greater part of them move so that they always keep the same place in the heavens, thus moving only along with the heavens, and these are called *stellae fixae*; others move in such manner that while moving along with the heavens around the earth they have an independent motion of their own, and are seen now here and now there; they are therefore called *planetae*. But these *cursus dispares* also follow an established law; hence the expression *conservari*. Comp. c. 20, 51.

84. 30. **et continuato.** The adjective is thus placed in order to bring out more pointedly the idea that the soul of the universe is to be conceived as a continuous, undivided whole.

84. 31. **fusius** is sometimes wrongly translated "at greater length"; 20
it means "in loose discourse, not confined to a strict order and division." Cic. De Leg. I, 13, 36: *quae fuse olim disputabantur ac libere, ea nunc articulatim dissecta dicuntur*. See Bake's remark. [But *uberius* and *fusius* seem to be opposed here to *brevius* and *angustius* in the next sentence. So Orat. II, 38, 159: *et genus sermonis affert Stoicus non liquidum, non fusum ac profluens, sed exile, aridum, concisum ac minutum*; Quint. II, 4, 7: *materia abundantior atque ultra quam oporteat fusa*. See the examples in Harpers' Latin Dictionary s. v.—**Academicorum calumniam.** So Acad. II, 5, 14: *Arcesilae calumnia.*]

84. 34. **ut profluens amnis.** A similar comparison occurs in Quint. XII, 2, 11.

85. 3. **Zeno.** His own words are cited in Sext. Emp. IX, 104. Diog. 8 21
L. VII, 143, ascribes the same argumentation to Chrysippus, Apollodorus and Posidonius.

85. 8. **quae sunt iis carentia.** A *structura ad sensum*; for the

demonstrative refers to the ideas of ***sapientia, beatitudo, aeternitas*** contained in the preceding adjectives. See above I, 29, 80.

22 85. 13. **urguet angustius,** "passes on with a closer, more concise reasoning toward his result." *Urguere* denotes the emphatic persistence in an assertion or an argument by which the assent of others is compelled. So De Fin. IV, 48, 77: *urguent tamen et nihil remittunt,* where Cicero is speaking of the argumentation of the Stoics by which they tried to compel assent to their proposition: *omnia peccata paria.* — The following argument of Zeno is also found in his own words in Sext. Emp. IX, 101.

85. 20. **modulate,** "melodiously," with melody; **numerose,** "rhythmically."

85. 24. [**idem,** Baiter II, *item.*]

9
23 85. 28. **dixeram.** For the pluperfect see Haase's note to Reisig, p. 504; Jahn on Orat. 29, 101. — **motu suo,** i.e. *motu proprio;* it is αὐτοκίνητον, not set in motion or activity by anything external to itself.

86. 2. [**extincto calore occidimus ipsi;** *ipsi,* "we ourselves," as distinguished from *calor,* the vital principle. So farther on he says *eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem.*]

24 86. 3. **Quod quidem Cleanthes . . . docet, quanta vis insit.** A sort of epexegesis similar to that noticed in I, 15, 38; for here also the relative refers to what precedes as object of *docet,* the same idea being afterwards repeated in another form, *quanta vis insit.* Comp. De Fin. II, 4, 12: *Quod vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse eum, qui futurus sit philosophus, scire litteras;* Corn. Nep. Attic. c. 18: *magistratus eorum non amplius quinis versibus descripsit, quod vix credendum sit, tantas res tam breviter potuisse declarari;* comp below c. 37, 93, and further Jahn on Orat. c. 16, 52. The frequent combinations *quod si* (above c. 1, 3, below II, 38, 96), *quod cum, quod quoniam* and the like have sprung from this form of expression, although a freer use often obscures the origin.

86. 5. **quin is.** Comp. note III, 13, 34.

86. 6. **venae et arteriae.** The second expression serves to specify the first, for it is only the arteries, not the veins, that beat; but *vena* is very often used in a generic sense including also the arteries; and hence one may say *venae micant, venas tangere* and the like, though Gellius XVIII, 10 censures this as a *loquendi imperitia.* Comp. note 55, 138. — [**quum cor . . . palpitaret** is a curious form of expression; we should expect *ita mobiliter palpitare* with *quum . . . evulsum* in the form of an adverbial sentence of time.]

86. 12. **eam caloris naturam,** "this heat substance." For heat is

regarded as a substance in the physics of the Stoics; and *natura* in its concrete signification comprises every natural substance; further on the earth is called *terrena natura*.

86. 18. **terram fumare calentem.** These words form the last half 25
of a hexameter. It is hardly to be supposed that Cicero would quote a line of poetry for so unimportant an observation; it occurred to him by chance. In Orat. c. 56, 189 he remarks how easily this may happen, and many collections have been made of examples from the best writers. Comp. note c. 60, 151 and Wolf on Tacit. Ann. I, 1.

86. 21. **eaque,** i.e. *terra,* not, as some have thought, *vis caloris*. Comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 329. One must not be led astray by the *in terris* in the next clause instead of *in sese*. Comp. immediately below § 26: *atque aquae* &c.; III, 11, 28: *illa (natura) cohaeret naturae viribus;* De Republ. II, 40, 67: *immani et vastae insidens beluae coercet et regit beluam.* — For the subject-matter see Ideler on Aristot. Meteor. I, p. 440.

86. 24. **ex se generata,** *i.e.* without seeds by a so-called *generatio* 10 26
originaria. See note I, 37, 103. — Plants are called *stirpibus infixa* because they are held in the earth by means of the *stirpes*, which includes the lower part of the stalk or trunk with the root. Comp. § 28, extr. *Temperatio* is the right measure, the proper degree of heat, as above c. 5, 13 *caeli temperatione*. Of course *ea* does not belong to *temperatione* but is accusative and repeats the idea of the subject; as c. 9, 24 *id vivit,* and § 27 *ea et ipsa*.

86. 27. **fusio** is the property of water, when it is not confined, to spread on all sides. The expression serves therefore to define further the preceding, *liquor*. The Mss. have *effusio* without *et*. Instead of *deinde* corresponding to *primum* follow later *Atque etiam maria* . . .

86. 31. **maria . . . tepescunt.** Plutarch Quaest. Nat. c. 8: τὴν τῆς θαλάττης σύμφυτον οὖσαν θερμότητα ἐκριπίζουσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνεμοι καὶ τρέφουσιν.

86. 34. **excitatus;** modern science calls it "sensible" as opposed to latent heat.

87. 1. **recalescunt;** supply mentally: *si quando perfrixerunt.*

87. 1. **aër . . . maxime frigidus.** Plutarch De Primo Frig. c. 9: οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ τῷ ἀέρι τὸ πρώτως ψυχρὸν ἀποδιδόασιν. Comp. Diog. L. VII, 137. The Stoics held cold as well as heat to be a substance, a sort of matter, and located it more particularly in the air. Seneca Qu. Nat. II, 10: *Natura aëris gelida est.* When other things grow cold it is a result of the supervention of this material cold; and this explains what is said above of the freezing of water: *aquilonibus reliquisque frigoribus adiectis*

durescit umor, "when the cold substance contained in the north winds or other objects comes to unite itself with the water." So what follows directly about the air, *multo calore admixtus*, as also a few lines before *admixtum esse calorem* refer to the admixture of the material heat which is the ether.

27 87. 3. **oritur ex respiratione aquarum.** See c. 33, 84: *Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre aether.*—Below c. 45, 117 however the warmth of the air is explained by the proximity of the ether.

87. 5. **quam similitudinem** = *cuius rei similitudinem* or *c. r. simile quid.* Comp. De Fin. V, 15, 42: *ea sequimur ad quae nati sumus. Quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis;* and ibid. *suam cuique rei naturam esse ad vivendum ducem; quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet.*

28 87. 10. **mundum ipsum;** the universe itself, as opposed to its constituent parts. Comp. c. 12, 32: *nulla pars corporis est, quae non minoris sit, quam nosmetipsi sumus.* So *ipsius mundo* c. 22, 58, and *mundum ipsum* c. 31, 80; 34, 86.

11
29 87. 16. **Natura est igitur.** *Natura* is not the subject but the predicate to the subject understood from the foregoing, *calidum illud atque igneum*: "this warm and fiery principle is a substance, which" &c. For the difference between this and the earthly fire, fire in its narrower sense, see below c. 15, 40.

87. 19. **cum alio iuncta atque conexa.** More correctly it would have been: *ex pluribus iuncta et composita.* Ἐν παντὶ πολυμερεῖ σώματι is the phrase in Sext. Emp. IX, 119 where this argument of the Stoics is given.

87. 20. **ut in homine mentem** for *ut* or *qualis in homine mens est.* Comp. note I, 29, 82.

[The ἡγεμονικόν is the supreme, governing principle of the world, the highest reason, the soul of the universe, the fiery spirit which penetrates every thing (πνεῦμα δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον); just as in man the ἡγεμονικόν is the reason. Diog. L. VII, 139: *οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῶον ὄντα καὶ λογικὸν ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν* Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Τύριος; the world then is conceived by the Stoics as a living being (ζῶον), and its reasoning soul as the godhead. God is the universe; but is also the ἡγεμονικόν, the soul of the universe, a part of the universe. The whole argument is thus stated by Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. IX, 119: *ἐν παντὶ πολυμερεῖ σώματι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν διοικουμένῳ ἐστί τι τὸ κυριεῦον* (= ἡγεμονικόν). *Καθὸ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν μὲν ἢ ἐν καρδίᾳ τοῦτο τυγχάνειν ἀξιοῦται ἢ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέρει τοῦ σώματος. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυτῶν*

οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὧν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ῥίζας, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ κατὰ τὴν κόμην, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐγκάρδιον. Ὥστε, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικεῖται πολυμερὴς καθεστώς, εἴη ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κυριεῦον καὶ τὸ προκαταρχόμενον τῶν κινήσεων· οὐδὲν δὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἢ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, ἥτις θεός ἐστιν. Kühner.]

87. 34. **omnem vim mundi natura divina contineri;** "the uni- 30
verse, with all that pertains to its being and idea, depends for its existence and maintenance upon a divine being that pervades it." For *contineri* comp. § 29 init. Instead of it we have § 28 init. *sustineri;* below *retineri;* and § 31 *teneri;* which all come to the same thing.

88. 1. **ad sensus commovendos.** The phrase in the Greek original was perhaps *πρὸς κίνησιν αἰσθήσεως* or *αἰσθητικήν*, *i.e.* for the activity of the perception and consciousness; whereas Cicero's words have reference rather to a working on the senses, which is not in question here.

88. 2. **hic noster calor,** *i.e.* the natural heat that pervades the world immediately surrounding us, the earthly beings; not the common fire as opposed to the elemental fire, as a recent commentator imagines. For this common fire according to § 41 is *confector consumptorque omnium,* whereas *hic noster calor* is that heat which preserves and vivifies things, the *θερμότης ψυχική*, as Aristotle calls it, De Gen. Anim. III, 11. Comp. above p. 73, Remark.

88. 9. **mundo valentius.** Comp. Ps. Aristot. De Mundo c. 5: *τίς* 31
γὰρ ἂν εἴη φύσις τοῦδε (τοῦ κόσμου) κρείττων.

88. 10. **Audiamus enim Platonem.** The following proposition from 12 32
Plato is not cited apropos of what immediately precedes, *nam quid . . . teneatur,* which is rather to be regarded as a sort of parenthesis; but of the clause preceding that, namely *praesertim cum . . . moveatur,* and to give the reason why this clause was presented as the chief argument for the proposition that the *mundi ardor* (*αἰθήρ*) is a being endowed with perception and thought. The passage of Plato which Cicero refers to is found in Phaedr., p. 245 C, § 51, and is translated Tusc. I, 23.—For **esse** before *ponit,* which some have objected to, comp. Acad. I, 5, 19: *corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in partibus;* and other examples in Madvig De Fin. V, 25, 73.

88. 26. **inchoatis** = *imperfectis.* Comp. De Leg. I, 9, 27: *prima et* 33
inchoata intellegentia; Off. I, 43, 153: *cognitio manca et inchoata.*

88. 28. **Primum enim.** Instead of the corresponding *secundo* or *deinde* we have § 34 *autem* as very often happens.—The order of beings here corresponds to the order of their souls, which the Stoics distinguished, therein agreeing with Aristotle. Plants are endowed with a *ψυχὴ φυτική* or

θρεπτική only, beasts with a ψυχὴ αἰσθητική besides, men with a λογική also. Comp. Arist. De. An. II, 3; Macrob. In Somn. Scip. I, 14, 7; and 19, 23.

13 88. 34. **Quartus autem gradus.** It is evident that while the first three grades are known by experience, the fourth is only assumed to complete the series, which otherwise would not include the most perfect beings, as is seen from § 35.

88. 35. **natura boni sapientesque.** Comp. Senec. Epist. 95: *di immortales nullam didicere virtutem, cum omni editi, et pars naturae eorum est esse bonos.* Φύσει καθαροὶ καὶ ἀκήρατοι in Epict. IV, 11, 3. *Deorum virtus natura excellit, hominum autem industria,* Cic. Top. c. 20, 76.

89. 1. **ratio recta constansque;** reason that always hits the mark, true to itself, never falling into contradiction with itself: λόγος ὀρθὸς καὶ ὁμολογούμενος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ἀμετάπτωτος (Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3); to think and act in conformity with this is wisdom and virtue.

The *recta ratio* is **supra hominem putanda** only in so far as regards an inborn reason, not one that is gradually developed and brought to perfection. For although man very seldom really reaches it, it is not to be thought utterly impossible; *homo enim sapiens fieri potest* he says below § 36. But comp. De Offic. III, 4, 16; De Amic. c. 5, 18.

35 89. 4. **in ulla rerum institutione,** in the case of any organized system of things; of any things which are arranged by nature or by man.

89. 9. **in omni natura,** i.e. *in universa natura* or *rerum omnium natura,* hence *in mundo.* On *rerum omnium natura,* which is here at least as fitting as *r. omnis n.* comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 362. [*ac* connects *sic* and *multo magis;* "in the same manner and in much higher degree."]

36 89. 25. **deterior potius.** *potius* is by no means superfluous, merely strengthening *deterior.* On the contrary it alone really serves for the comparison of the two members; the assertion is that the predicate *deterior* would be applicable to the condition of the *mundus rather* than to that of man. The comparison to which the comparative *deterior* points is not fully developed in the sentence, because it is easily understood without that; we may supplement thus, *deterior de duabus.*

37 89. 31. **undique aptum:** "on all sides, *i.e.* in all respects suitably arranged." — **omnibus suis numeris et partibus.** The second expression might have been omitted; for *numeri* often denotes all the essential parts of a thing, conformably to the Greek usage; as in Diog. L. VII, 100: τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὸ πάντας ἀπέχειν τοὺς ἐπιζητουμένους ἀριθμοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως.

89. 32. **Scite enim Chrysippus.** The sense of the argument which 14
Cicero does not bring out very clearly is doubtless this: All which simply serves something else as a means to an end is not absolutely, but only relatively perfect. The universe alone, since it comprehends everything within itself and so serves nothing else as a means, is its own end and absolutely perfect. Hence that cannot be wanting to it without which it would not be absolutely perfect, namely, reason. — On **enim** see note c. 16 init.

90. 3. **ad mundum . . . imitandum.** This does not refer to an artificial or an artistic imitation of nature, but to a conformity in will and deed with the supreme law of reason and right; the ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν. Comp. De Senect. c. 21, 77: *Sed credo deos immortales sparsisse animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui terras tuerentur, quique caelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo atque constantia;* Senec. De Vita Beata c. 3: *a natura non deerrare et ad illius legem exemplumque formari, sapientia est.* Other examples in Beier on Cic. De Offic. I, p. 325.

90. 4. [**Sed mundus . . . complexus est.** We should expect the 38
present here; comp. De Fin. II, 34, 112: *non . . . maria pedibus peragrantem, sed omne coelum . . . complexum;* and ibid. III, 5, 17: *quiddam . . . complexum et continens veritatem.*]

90. 9. **similitudines adiungens.** Chrysippus often used them; see above c. 8, 22.

90. 15. **efficitur tamen in homine virtus.** The general idea of 39
virtus according to De Leg. I, 8, 22 is *nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura,* the complete development of all the faculties and capacities of any being: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of Aristotle. Such *virtus* is realized (*efficitur = ad effectum perducitur*) in man, *i.e.* in the wise man (§ 36), although rarely and with difficulty because of the hindrances which oppose him. It is however always realized in the divine universe which nothing hinders (§ 35).

90. 19. **quae . . . gignuntur.** Comp. c. 36, 92. — We have already 15
seen I, 10, 25; 11, 27; 12, 30 that other philosophers before the Stoics considered the heavenly bodies to be gods.

90. 22. **animantia.** Comp. Somn. Scip. c. 3: *ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis, quae . . . divinis animatae mentibus* &c.

90. 25. **inmenso mundo.** Cleomed. II, 84: πάντα τὸν κόσμον φωτίζει 40
σχεδὸν ἀπειρομεγέθη ὄντα. *Inmenso mundo* is a dativus commodi. [Schoemann does not supply the *in*.]

90. 26. **is eius tactus est,** "its effect, its influence upon us is such";

whereas before *tactus* denoted the sense of touch itself. Comp. De Div. II, 46, 97: *ex quo intellegitur plus terrarum situs quam lunae tactus* (the effect of the moon) *ad nascendum valere.* Comp. De Or. II, 14, 60.

90. 28. **Oceanique alatur umoribus.** Comp. c. 33, 83 and 46, 118. Diog. L. VII, 145: *τρέφεσθαι δὲ . . . τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης θαλάττης, νοερὸν ὄντα ἄναμμα, τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐκ ποτίμων ὑδάτων, ἀερομιγῆ τυγχάνουσαν καὶ πρόσγειον οὖσαν.* Comp. Ideler on Arist. Meteor. II, 2, 6. — [**posset** is an emendation of Müller. Schoemann reads] *possit* = *δύναιτ' ἄν*, *modus potent.* The protasis is contained in *sine pastu* = *nisi pascatur.*

41 90. 32. **confector consumptorque.** The second word serves to define the first, which of itself alone might be ambiguous. *Confectrix rerum omnium vetustas* is cited from Cicero by Lactantius VII, 11, 5.

90. 34. **ille corporeus,** i.e. *qui est in corporibus;* although in other places the word rather means "corporeal," *corpore praeditus,* as also in Cicero Timae. c. 4 and 8. On the other hand in De Fin. III, 14, 45 *res corporeae* are bodily endowments, as health, beauty &c. — It is hardly necessary to remark that *ignis corporeus* here is quite the same with *hic noster calor* above § 30, the heat which gives life and growth to all earthly creatures. This comes from the *ardor caelestis,* the ether of the highest regions, where it is pure and unmixed with grosser matter. Cicero uses *ardor* for the Greek *αἰθήρ* (from *αἴθω*); and Balbus below c. 36, 91 thinks it necessary to make a sort of excuse for employing it as being less current in Latin.

91. 5. **et quidem,** here equivalent to *et profecto;* an addition with emphasis.

42 91. 8. **Aristoteli videtur.** No such remark is to be found in the extant writings of Aristotle; but the Ps. Plutarch (Plac. Phil. V, 20) says: *ἔστι πραγματεία 'Αριστοτέλους, ἐν ᾗ τέσσαρα γένη ζώων φησί, χερσαῖα, ἔνυδρα, πτηνά, οὐράνια.* Besides comp. note I, 13, 33; and Bernays, p. 102.

91. 13. **in iis sensum inesse** &c. It would have been more correct, and more adapted to the purpose of the argument, had Cicero written: *in iis sensum acerrimum inesse et intellegentiam celerrimam.*

16 91. 15. **Etenim licet videre.** *Etenim* introduces not a reason for the proposition immediately preceding, which, as following from undisputed premises, needed no further reason, but rather a reason in addition to those already brought forward; it is therefore a new link in the chain of reasoning, and would have been introduced quite as well at least by *porro* or *praeterea.* Cicero often uses *etenim* and *enim* in this way. Comp. Madvig De Fin. I, 1, 3. The warrant for this usage is to be found in the real meaning of *enim,* which originally was not causative but only asseverative.

91. 26. **neque naturam significat,** "points neither to a mere force of nature," *i.e.* a blind and unconscious force. For this signification of the word, which the connection absolutely requires, comp. c. 32, 81; I, 13, 35; and III, 11, 27. *Significare* is used in the same way c. 22, 54: *significant eandem mentem atque prudentiam;* and c. 33, 85: *tantam naturae sollertiam significat; declarare* in the same sense is found in c. 32, 81.

91. 30. **aut natura aut vi aut voluntate.** It is plain that *natura* 44
here denotes the force of nature that works unconsciously in everything, *vis* a force that operates from without; to both these is opposed the motion resulting from free will and inherent power. This view of Aristotle, as well as that cited above § 42, occurred doubtless in the dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας. No passage that exactly corresponds is found in his extant writings, but in De Caelo III, 2 he says: ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ βίαιον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν ἢ κατὰ φύσιν. In the same work I, 2 however he distinguishes a motion of three kinds, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, περὶ τὸ μέσον. The last, the circular motion, is by nature peculiar to what he calls the πρῶτον στοιχεῖον, and what others call *aether;* the heavens and the heavenly bodies are composed of this πρῶτον στοιχεῖον, their motion being so far a natural one, and yet withal a voluntary one; this is to be understood of the planets.

91. 33. **[in] sublime.** The preposition probably was added by copyists, who were unacquainted with the adverbial use of *sublime.* Comp. Priscian XVII, 1, 11 and the citations of Kühner, Tusc. I, 17, 40.

92. 15. **certa notione animi praesentiamus.** This expression, like 17 45
the following *praesensionem notionemque nostram,* refers to the πρόληψις, which the Stoics believed in, like the Epicureans. See note I, 17, 44 and 14, 37. It is a φυσικὴ ἔννοια (Diog. L. VII, 54), which arises in the mind without particular teaching or reflexion, ἄνευ διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας, in a natural and simple manner, ἀνεπιτεχνήτως. Plut. Plac. Phil. IV, 11. In another passage, De Stoic. Rep. c. 17, these προλήψεις are also called ἔμφυτοι in the same sense as Cicero calls them *innatas* c. 4, 12. — Man has then a natural preconceived notion of the divine nature, and is convinced of the substantial truth of this notion immediately, intuitively, and without proof; and he admits the truth of any further scientific idea of the divine nature only in so far as he finds it to correspond to this preconceived notion, so far as he can bring it into harmony with that; this Cicero expresses below by *accommodare;* comp. Orat. c. 7, 23: *unum (Demosthenem) accommodare ad eam, quam sentiam, eloquentiam.*

92. 18. **primum hunc ipsum mundum.** The corresponding *deinde* is wanting. The heavenly bodies evidently would come next; but in the tirade against Epicurus Cicero forgets so entirely the form of the sentence,

that when he comes back to the stars there is no proper place for the *deinde*.

46 92. 21. **minimeque resipiens patriam,** i.e. *Atticam. Attici praeter ceteros in facetiis excellunt,* Cic. De Orat. II, 54, 217. On *resipere* comp. Gellius III, 3: *Non dubium est, quin istae fabulae resipiant stilum Plautinum.*

47 92. 30. **paulo post;** c. 22, 58 ff.

18 92. 32. **noli prae te ferre,** "don't make a parade" as if it were something to boast of, and not rather to be ashamed of.

92. 33. **Conum tibi ais** &c. See I, 10, 24.

92. 34. [**Novum etiam oculorum iudicium,** *i.e.* your sense of sight seems to be differently constituted from that of other people, as well as your mental judgment.]

92. 35. **Sed sint ista pulchriora . . .** The contrast to this concession does not come until § 48, and then in a different form. Except for the intermediate sentences Cicero would have continued somewhat thus: *illud tamen certe manifestum est, hanc aequabilitatem motus* &c.

92. 35. **dumtaxat aspectu,** "at least so far as the appearance is concerned," taking this only into consideration. Comp. Madvig De Fin. II, 7, 21.

93. 1. [**ea figura.** The Stoics, in agreement with Aristotle, imagined the universe to be a globe consisting of several concentric spheres, which with the earth were held fast in space by the force of gravity. Diog. L. VII, 140: *ἕνα τὸν κόσμον εἶναι πεπερασμένον, σχῆμα ἔχοντα σφαιροειδές· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν ἁρμοδιώτατον τὸ τοιοῦτον.* Kühner.]

93. 5. **globus (sic enim σφαῖραν interpretari placet).** The language seems to indicate that *globus* in the mathematical signification was not yet generally in use in Cicero's time. He uses it for the heavenly spheres in Somn. Scip. c. 4; of the earth ibid. c. 6 and Tusc. I, 28, 69. Originally it meant only a "lump," akin to *glomus*, as Priscian I, 8, 44 remarks. Seneca Quaest. Nat. IV, 11 and often in other places, as well as Pliny several times, uses *pila* in speaking of the earth.

93. 8. **a medioque tantundem absit** &c. [Schoemann has the old reading *a medioque tantum absit extremum, quantum idem a summo; quo nihil* &c.; and wrestles with it in the following note.] The extreme (*extremum*) of the sphere or circle is the whole surface or circumference; and if one were to specify any point as the "highest" (*summum*), this would necessarily lie on the surface of the sphere or in the circumference of the circle, and could not be opposed, as is here done, to the *extremum*. If the passage is not corrupt, we must assume that Cicero did not mean by

extremum the whole surface or the whole circumference; but imagined two diametrically opposed points, one above the centre called *summum*, the other below, which would have been more correctly called *imum*, not *extremum*. In this case the error would only be that an expression which might be applied to other bodies or figures is here applied to the sphere or circle alone.

93. 10. **eruditum illum pulverem,** *i.e.* mathematical studies; be- 48
cause the old mathematicians made use of a table covered with fine sand and a small stick called *radius* to draw geometrical figures. [Tusc. V, 23, 64: *ex eadem urbe humilem homunculum a pulvere et radio excitabo, qui multis annis post fuit, Archimedem.*] — **physici,** with irony. Comp. I, 27, 77.

93. 18. **caeli palatum.** Probably *palatum* was originally "what 49
covers like an arch," and hence could be used of the heavens that overarch the earth, as well as of the palate that overarches the mouth. The Greek *οὐρανός* also means both palate and heaven; and the same homonymy is found in other languages, as J. Grimm remarks in Haupt's Zeitschr. für Deutsches Alterthum VI, p. 541.

93. 19. **quorum alterum,** *i.e.* the fixed stars. — **alterum autem,** the 19
planets. — **conversiones duas;** two sorts of revolutions, a daily one around the earth from East to West, and another around the sun from West to East; in c. 20 he speaks of the different periods required for this last in the case of different bodies. — **isdem spatiis,** sc. *utramque;* each of these two revolutions always takes place in the same *path;* for this is the proper meaning of *spatium*. Comp. c. 40, 103.

93. 26. **easdem . . . opacet.** It is incorrect to say that the sun darkens any part of the earth. It leaves it in shade while it is shining on the opposite side. So Horace improperly says in the Carm. Saec. 9: *alme sol, curru nitido diem qui promis et celas;* and when Pliny H. N. II, 5, 4 says *hic* (*sol*) *reliqua sidera occultat, illustrat,* the *illustrare* can only happen when the sun sets and so allows the stars to become visible. So Livy XXXIII, 7, 9 says: *iuga montium detexerat nebula,* the mist, *i.e.* by passing away. Comp. below c. 40, 102. Similar examples in Reisig Vorles., p. 306 with Haase's note; and Lobeck Paralip., p. 559; Kühner Ausf. Gram. § 597 r., p. 1074.

93. 27. **umbra terrae soli officiens,** the shadow of the earth which shuts out the sun, *i.e.* the light of the sun. The conical shadow of the earth, falling in any part of the heavens, banishes in a certain sense the light of the sun, and makes night; hence *umbra terrae meta noctis,* De Div. II, 6, 17.

93. 29. [**modici,** "regular," according to measure, *modus*.]

93. 30. **circumitus orbium** = *circumitus in orbem*, revolution in a circle. Comp. Timae. c. 9: *nox et dies . . . unum circumitum orbis efficit.* — While the sun revolves around the earth from East to West 365 times and a fraction, it moves backward along the ecliptic through the twelve signs from West to East; sometimes it approaches nearer to our *orbis terrarum* while moving up to the sign of the Cancer in the North, sometimes it goes farther from it while moving downward to the sign of Capricorn. — The calculation of the tropical solar year of 365¼ days is moreover much older than the introduction among the Romans of the Julian year which was based upon it.

50 94. 2. **solis annuos cursus,** *i.e.* the moon makes in a month the passage through the twelve signs of the Zodiac, which the sun completes in a year.

94. 7. [Schoemann reads (*Ita*) for (**Inde**) and says:] *Ita* before *in lunae* has fallen out in the Mss. *Inde* might have been used instead.

20

51 94. 11. **earum quinque stellarum.** It is well known that the ancients were acquainted with only five, or, counting the sun and moon, with seven planets. Yet many people surmised that there might be several others invisible for their feeble light. Senec. Nat. Qu. VII, 13, 1.

94. 13. **progressus et regressus.** The apparent motions of the planets are sometimes forward and sometimes backward, called nowadays the direct and the retrograde motions.

94. 15. **tum adeunt, tum recedunt.** This, like *antecedendo et retardando* § 52, is to be taken in reference to the sun. All the planets, as well as the sun, move through the Zodiac; at times they are nearer, at times farther from the sun; sometimes they go before, sometimes after it. Of course all this is to be understood of their apparent, not their real motion.

94. 19. **magnum annum . . . nominaverunt.** An elliptical expression for *constituerunt quem magnum annum nominaverunt.* So De Leg. I, 8, 24: *ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum caelestibus vel genus vel stirps appellari potest*, for *ex quo extitit quae . . . appellari potest.* Invent. IV, 12, 27: *ex quo in aliis anxietas, in aliis iracundia dicitur* for *ex quo existit quae . . . dicitur.* Comp. Hand on Wopkens Lectt. Tull., p. 126; Madvig Emend. Liv., p. 367.

94. 20. **ad eandem inter se comparationem,** "to the same relative position." *Comparatio* means originally "arrangement together," at first of pairs, afterwards of several objects.

52 94. 22. **Quae quam longa sit . . .** The length of this so-called

magnus annus, μέγας ἐνιαυτός, in which the ἀποκατάστασις, or the return of sun, moon and planets to the same relative position, should take place was fixed by Cicero in the Hortensius at 12,954 years (according to the Dial. de Causs. Corr. Eloqu. c. 16). Other estimates, some larger, some smaller, may be found in Lindenbrog on Censorin. c. 18; or in Voss on Virgil Ecl. IV, 5. Some persons held that after the expiration of the great year the destruction of the world by fire (the ἐκπύρωσις, see c. 46, 118) would take place and a new world would arise. Nemes. De Nat. Hom. c. 38; Thomasius De Exustione Mundi, § 7 ff.

94. 25. **XXX fere annis.** The period is a little more than 29 years 164 days.

94. 31. **annis XII.** More exactly in 11 years 315 days 14 hours.

94. 33. The year of Mars consists of 686 days and 23 hours. For 53
lustrat comp. note I, 31, 87.

95. 1. **anno fere vertente.** So Cleomed. I, 3, p. 23. — Plin. H. N. II, 8, p. 16 Gron. gives 339 days; the period is really only 87 days 23 hours. — *Annus vertens*, like *mensis vertens* in Plaut. Pers. IV, 4, 76, with reflexive meaning of the participle corresponds to the Greek περιπλόμενος or περιτελλόμενος ἐνιαυτός.

95. 2. **unius signi intervallo;** really not more than 28 degrees.

95. 5. **Lucifer . . . Ἕσπερος.** According to some Pythagoras, according to others Parmenides, first discovered that the morning and evening stars were the same planet. See Diog. L. VIII, 14; IX, 23.

95. 6. **cursum anno conficit;** in 224 days 16 hours.

95. 7. **et latitudinem . . .** The paths of the planets intersect the Zodiac, which forms a wide girdle, in an oblique direction; so that they approach sometimes the upper or northerly, sometimes the lower or southerly border.

95. 8. **duorum signorum intervallo;** at the most 48 degrees.

95. 11. **non possum intellegere:** "I cannot conceive of." Comp. 21
III, 15, 38. Of course *sine mente* &c. belong not to *intellegere* as an ad- 54
verbial qualification, but to the object of *intellegere*.

95. 17. **cursus . . . caelo inhaerentes.** Taken strictly this might be called a *contradictio in adiecto;* but the sense is made plain by what follows, namely, that the revolution of the fixed stars is not dependent on or caused by the motion of the encircling heavens or ether but they have their own distinct sphere: *orbis in quo infixi sunt . . . stellarum cursus sempiterni*, as is said in Somn. Scip. c. 4, 17. This was imagined to consist of a solid crystalline matter. A separate sphere was also assigned to each of the five, or, counting the sun and moon, seven planets, in and along

with which it revolved. The clearest exposition of the matter is given by Schwegler on Aristot. Metaph. XII, 8, 12, p. 274 ff. Comp. also Ideler on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 418.

56 95. 27. **nec vanitas,** "no unreliableness, falsity." They never falsify the reckoning; as above c. 5, 15 it is said: *in quibus nihil umquam immensa et infinita vetustas mentita sit.*

95. 27. **omnis ordo,** "complete order"; so c. 22 fin. *omnis ornatus.*

57 95. 33. **Haud ergo** &c. I fancy I shall make no mistake if, after what I have already said, I commence my discussion about the godhead, or nature (which according to the Stoics are the same), with a quotation from Zeno.

22 96. 1. **ignem esse artificiosum** &c. Diog. L. VII, 156: *δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς) τὴν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν. ὁδῷ βαδίζον* denotes a mode of operation constant, definite and designed, as also below c. 32, 81. In distinction from this *πῦρ τεχνικόν* Zeno called the earthly fire *πῦρ ἄτεχνον*, as Balbus above c. 15, 41 called it *confector et consumptor omnium.* Stobae. Ecl. I, p. 358. From another point of view Æschylus (Prom. v. 7) calls it *πάντεχνον* because of its usefulness for various arts.

96. 5. **magistrum artium reliquarum.** Apuleius (De Mundo, Tom II, p. 134 Altenb.) expresses the idea involved in this as follows: *Nam quid, oro te, ornatum atque ordinatum videri potest, quod non ab ipsius (mundi) exemplo imitatura sit ratio?* All artistic effort is a creation with intelligence and design after the example of nature, which creates with intelligence and design. *Omnis ars est imitatio naturae,* Senec. Ep. 65.

96. 6. **omnis natura;** every force of nature, acting in any portion of the universe or in any single being, in contrast to the *natura ipsius mundi,* the universal nature working throughout the universe. Comp. c. 10, 28.

58 96. 9. **non artificiosa solum, sed plane artifex.** The former is less than the latter; *artificiosus* may be said of one who has a high degree of skill without being a thorough artist, an artist by profession; the latter is the *artifex,* the artist in all that he undertakes.

96. 11. **ut ceterae naturae . . . sic natura mundi.** *Ut . . . sic* introduce not only parallel but contrasted expressions. (See Goerenz on De Fin. I, 1, 3.) As on the one hand the nature of individual beings is bound up in and conditioned by their *semina,* their germs in which the law of their development is contained (*in seminibus vis inest earum rerum, quae ex iis progignuntur,* De Div. I, 56, 128), so on the other hand universal nature follows her own free and rational determination.

96. 23. [**nec cessantium** &c., "neither leading a life of complete 28 59 inactivity, as the Epicurean gods are represented to do, nor yet performing their functions with a labor that is excessive or irksome." Balbus alludes to the remarks of Velleius in I, 20, 52.]

96. 29. **monogrammos deos.** Gods, who have only the outlines of a form, *liniamentis dumtaxat extremis*, as is said above I, 44, 123. In the same way Lucilius called a pale and emaciated man, who was a mere shadow, *vix vivum hominem ac monogrammum.* Nonius, p. 37 Merc. Comp. above I, 18, 49; 27, 75; 35, 98.

96. 34. [**multae . . . naturae deorum.** For the expression comp. in the preceding chapter *natura mundi, ceterae naturae;* De Fin. 4, 7, 16: *omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui.* Below 23, 62 he says simply *Utilitatum igitur magnitudine constituti sunt ei di.*]

96. 35. **non sine causa.** These words express a concession or recog- 60 nition. The Stoic does not reject the view in question, though he does not undertake to establish it by reasoning, because that is impossible for him to do. The universality of the view alone gives it a claim to recognition. Although he only allows it to hold good at first of individuals, and those the wisest, yet its universal acceptance proves to him that there must have been an anticipation of it in the minds of men.

97. 3. **quod erat a deo natum.** Comp. below § 62: *qui utilitates quasque gignebant;* and De Offic. II, 5, 16: *nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quae non homini ab homine nascatur.*

97. 4. **nomine ipsius dei:** so it is only by metonymy, the gifts being called after the givers, not themselves deified as many erroneously thought. See I, 14, 38 and III, 16, 41. Comp. Plutarch De Is. et Osir. c. 70: *ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τὸν ὠνούμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ὠνεῖσθαί φαμεν Πλάτωνα, καὶ Μένανδρον ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὸν τὰ Μενάνδρου ποιήματα ὑποτιθέμενον, οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι τὰ τῶν θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ποιήματα καλεῖν οὐκ ἐφείδοντο.* Also Schoem. Opusc. Ac. II, p. 56. — The following verse is from Terent. Eun. IV, 5, 6.

97. 7. **res ipsa.** In default of a more definite expression Cicero makes 61 use of the vague and general term *res*, a certain something wherein a greater power is revealed, and in which a man, although he feels it within himself, recognizes a gift or inspiration from higher powers. Comp. c. 31, 79. In most Mss. *vis* is found after *ut ea ipsa;* evidently an error, as the connection shows. Had Cicero thought it necessary to add a noun, he would have used *res;* as immediately after, *ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit.*

97. 9. **a M. Aemilio Scauro;** about A.U.C. 645, when he was censor. *Fides* and *Mens* had temples in Rome before this, as Cicero immediately says of the former. *A. Atilius Calatinus* was consul 496 and 500, dictator

505. Cicero mentions a temple consecrated by him to *Spes*, De Leg. II, 11, 28. The worship of *Fides* is said to have been instituted by Numa, Liv. I, 21.

97. 11. **a M.** (*Claudio*) **Marcello;** in the second Punic war. *Q. Maximus*, next mentioned, is the famous Fabius Cunctator who conquered the Ligurians in 521. — *non* has probably fallen out before *multis;* for there was at the most an interval of twenty-nine years between Fabius Maximus and M. Marcellus.

97. 16. **Voluptatis.** The customary name in worship was *Volupia;* as also *Libitina* for *Lubentina Venus.* — **vocabula consecrata sunt,** "the names were devoted to the appellation of divine beings," instead of "the things denoted by those names were deified."

97. 18. **sed tamen.** Although sensual pleasure according to the Stoics was not included among the things which nature requires (*res naturales*), yet it excites nature very powerfully and so comes under the head of those things *in quibus vis inest maior aliqua.*

24 62 97. 26. **hunc Liberum Semela natum,** *i.e.* the Greek Dionysus, to whom the name of the old Italic god *Liber* was transferred on account of certain resemblances. But Dionysus, at least as Cicero thought, was a deified mortal, while *Liber* was considered a god by birth. Comp. Preller Röm. Myth., p. 440 ff.

97. 27. **Libera,** also an old Italic goddess, like her mother Ceres; both were afterwards identified with Greek goddesses, Persephone and Demeter. — The mysteries here referred to are doubtless the Eleusinian, in which Dionysus (Iacchos) was worshipped along with Demeter and Persephone or Kore; but this mystic Dionysus seemed so different from the mythical son of Semele that Cicero had no hesitation in explaining him to be the same with the old Italic Liber.

97. 30. **in Libero non item;** *i.e.* whereas Libera is universally considered the daughter of Ceres, and the name is explained from that circumstance, Liber does not pass for the son of Ceres. — But whose son he was considered to be we do not know.

97. 32. **quorum cum remanerent animi.** Comp. note I, 15, 39.

63 98. 2. **induti specie humana,** *i.e.* the fact that these divine beings, which are really nothing but forces of Nature, were not only personified, but were conceived of in human form, gave occasion to the mythological fables of the poets.

64 98. 9. **id est igneam.** The Stoic adds this to indicate how the view of the ancients is to be understood in conformity with the doctrines of his school.

98. 12. **spatiorum ac temporum.** The second word serves to explain the first. If there were room here there would be much to say against the explanation given in the text of the name and idea of Kronos, common as it was, if not universal, among those who in ancient times took the stories of the gods as allegories. Cotta refutes, as they deserve, in III, 24, 62 the etymology of Saturnus and most of those which follow. A more probable one, *Saturnus a satu*, is given by Varro L. L., V, 64. The older form of the name was *Saëturnus*, i.e. *Saïturnus*, which would explain too the length of the first syllable in *Saturnus*. See Ritschl De Fictil. Litt. (Berolin, 1853), p. 7 ff. Others derive this name from the Sanscrit, from *Savitar*, which denotes the "begetter," and was also an epithet of the sun. So Schweizer in the Zeitsch. für Vergleich. Sprachwiss. IV, 68. 25

98. 18. **ut eum alligaret,** because the lapse of time in a certain sense depends on the measure of time given by the heavenly bodies, by which the divisions of time, years, months and days are fixed.—The sudden change of subject is allowable, as there was no danger of confusion. Similar examples in Wopken's Lectt. Tullian., p. 264.

98. 19. **Iuppiter . . . iuvans pater.** Against this see note c. 2, 4. Yet the derivation here given by Cicero was a very natural one and especially commended itself to the religious feeling of the ancients on the same ground that he suggests for their placing *optumus* before *maxumus*. Comp. Or. pro Dom. c. 57, 144: *quem propter beneficia P. R. optumum, propter vim maxumum nominavit.*—**conversis casibus** = *obliquis casibus.* [*Iuppiter* stands without a subject, as the clause *a poëtis . . . dicitur* mentions only an incidental circumstance; at *hunc igitur*, l. 39, the thread is again taken up, but with the construction changed. So Müller explains the text; commonly *Iuppiter* is taken as subject of *dicitur*, l. 21, and *hunc igitur Ennius* begins a new sentence. Müller's text gives the full force to the *igitur*.]

98. 29. **exsecrabor** in the second verse from Ennius appears to be used for *consecrabo*, a usage which, though no other example of it is known, does not contradict the etymology and the original meaning based on it, namely, the separating of something from the number of other things as *sacrum* (consecrated to the deity). Heindorf's explanation is far less probable; he takes *exsecrabor hoc quod lucet* for *iram caeli imprecabor*, and refers *cui* to some person on whom the speaker desires the anger of heaven to fall.—The verses of Euripides, it is uncertain from what play, perhaps from the Antiope, are found in Stobae. Ecl. I, 3, 2; Lucian, Iup. Trag. 41, and others as follows: *ὁρᾷς τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ' ἄπειρον αἰθέρα, καὶ γῆν πέριξ ἔχονθ' ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις· τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἡγοῦ θεόν.* The translation is probably Cicero's own.—**breviter,** which precedes in the Mss., must either be changed to *graviter* or cancelled. 65

22
66 99. 5. **inter mare et caelum.** The Stoic prefers to say "between sea and sky," i.e. *aether*, rather than "between earth and sky," because he thereby at the same time intimates the intermediate nature of the air between water and ether. Comp. c. 39, 101; 45, 117; Ps. Aristot. De Mund. c. 3; and further in Balfour on Cleomed., p. 315 Bak.

99. 9. **a iuvando.** The derivation is hardly admissible. The name is rather from the same root as *Iovis*, and to be compared with the Greek Διώνη.

99. 10. **ex fabulis;** according to the mythological fables, for which it may suffice to refer to Hom. Il. XV, 187 ff.

99. 11. [Schoemann reads *altero*], old form for **alteri.** Comp. Reisig, Vorles. § 121.

99. 13. **Neptunus.** The comparison of this etymology with that of *Portunus* is curious enough. It is quite possible that the name is related to *nare*, but we must think on the signification of *flowing*, which the verb has lost in Latin, but which the Greek νάω and νέω retain. The forms ναίω (for νάω), the Fut. νεύσομαι or νευσοῦμαι, and ναῦς, *navis*, testify to the digamma in these words. So then *Nevitunus*, *Nevtunus*, *Neptunus* would not be improbable, and the name would be of the same root as the Greek Νηρεύς. Others compare it with the Sanscrit *Naupati*, the name given in the Rigveda to the god of the overhanging cloud-heavens.

99. 14. **Diti.** The identification with Πλούτων is easily and often made; whether correctly so is a question.

99. 16. **Proserpina** may be a corruption of the Greek Περσεφόνη, which was introduced the more easily because in this form it reminded one of *proserpere*, and seemed to point to the springing up of plants. The explanation of the Greek name is uncertain. — The words **nuptam dicunt** which have fallen out in the best Mss. stand in some after *nomen est*.

67 99. 19. **a gerendis frugibus Ceres.** So Varro says too, L. L., V, 64, but wrongly. The name seems rather to be related with *Cerus manus*, cited from the Carmina Saliaria, and explained to mean *creator bonus*, from the root *cer*, from which *creo* also comes. Comp. Corssen, Krit. Beitr. z. Röm. Lautlehre, p. 342. — That Δημήτηρ was the same as Γῆ Μήτηρ is an error that prevailed among the learned Greeks, and has been obstinately held by some moderns. Comp. Ahrens Dial. Dor., p. 80, and Kühner, Greek Gr. 1^2, p. 122 (Germ. ed.). It is equivalent to Δέα μήτηρ, goddess mother. Δέα is cited by Hesychius as the Tyrrhenian name of Rhea, like the equivalent *dea*. This form also occurred in the Doric dialect; see Grammat. Vat. at the end of Gregor. Cor., p. 692 Schaef.

99. 22. **Mavors** is to be connected with *mas*, *maris*, which originally was the same as *mars;* this by reduplication became *Mamers*, and by

interchange of *m* for *v Mavers, Mavors.* The name denotes then the *manly*, the *strong* one. In the prayers of the Fratres Arvales *Marmar* and *Marmor* occur. Comp. Corssen in the Zeitsch. f. Vgl. Sprachk. II, 1. Other derivations and explanations are given, which cannot be discussed here. [See Preller, Röm. Mythol., p. 296, note 1.]

99. 22. **Minerva,** anciently *Menerva* (Quintil. I, 4, 17), from the root *men*, to which *mens, memini,* *μένος* belong, signifies the *wise*, the *thinking* one.

99. 24. **principem in sacrificando.** The examples and proofs in Brisson. De Formul. I, 75 show that Ianus used to be named first in solemn sacrifices and invocations of the gods.

99. 25. **Ianum . . . ab eundo.** The root of the verb is of course *i*, 27
which suffers the umlaut only in some forms, so that it is unnecessary to attribute to Cicero the form *Eanus*, as Cornificius does in Macrob. Saturn. 1, 9; and as *ianua* denotes "the door," "the entrance," it is very natural to consider Ianus as the god of the entrance, of doors and gates. (Comp. especially K. Boethke, Ueb. d. Wesen des Janus. Progr. des Gym. zu Thorn 1863.) It is still a question, whether this was really the original idea of the god, or whether the name was not at first *Dianus*, from which came *Ianus*, as *Iovis* from *Diovis*, and *Iuno* from *Diuno*.

99. 29. **in ea dea . . . sacrificatio extrema est.** The adjective is apposition, not predicate, to *precatio et sacrificatio.* The expression is equivalent to *extrema pars* or *exitus precationis et sacrificationis.*—**est in ea dea** = *versatur in ea dea*, i.e. *in eius deae veneratione.* The remark itself in respect to the Romans is nowhere else expressly confirmed: indeed others, for example Ovid. Fast. VI, 298, 303, say that Vesta was invoked at the beginning; which agrees with the Greek rites. For among the Greeks Ἑστία was according to many authorities first, according to some few last, invoked. Comp. Griech. Alterth. II ^{3}, p. 258; and especially A. Preuner, Hestia-Vesta (Tübing. 1864), pp. 9–29.

99. 31. **di Penates;** a general designation of those gods who were 68
worshipped at home as protectors of the household; they did not however like the Lares form a separate class of subordinate deities, but belonged to the number of the highest gods. The relation of the name with *penitus* and *penus* is evident.

100. 2. **Sol . . . quia solus.** So Varro also thinks, L. L., V, 68. But the name rather comes from the same root from which *σέλας* and *σελήνη* come in Greek, and *Solen* in the Northern languages (Goth. *Sauil*, Lith. *Saule*, "the sun"). Comp. Corssen, Beitr., p. 386.

100. 5. **Dianam, eamque Luciferam:** Ἄρτεμιν φωσφόρον or σελασ-

φόρον. It is true that in Cicero's time Artemis was invoked among the Greeks as the goddess of childbirth, a function which was ascribed to her as the goddess of the moon. As early as the tragedians she was represented as the goddess of the moon.

100. 8. **vagantibus,** sc. *stellis,* i.e. the planets. The moon is called *vaga luna* in Hor. Sat. I, 8, 21 (see Heindorf in loc.). *Omnivaga* is found nowhere else. The moon does in fact appear more than other heavenly bodies to be wandering here and there.

69 100. 8. **Diana . . . quia noctu quasi diem efficeret.** There is some truth in this. Diana denotes the heavenly goddess of light; from the root mentioned in the note to c. 2, 4.

100. 11. **'menses.'** There is no doubt that the name of the moon, μήνη, as well as others in the cognate languages, really contains the idea of measuring and signifies the moon as the measurer of time. Comp. Lassen, Ind. Alterth. I, 765; II, 1118. This meaning can be also recognized in μήν and *mensis.* For the various views *quoto post conceptionem mense infantes edi soleant* comp. Censorin. De Die Nat. c. 7.

100. 12. **Timaeus** of Tauromenium in Sicily, historian, at the beginning of the third century B.C.—The temple at Ephesus was set on fire by the Ephesian Herostratus to gain for himself an imperishable name, which he has succeeded in doing. Comp. Solin. c. 40.

100. 16. **Venerem.** It is quite as certain that the name does not come from *venire,* as it is uncertain whence it really comes. According to Pictet, Origines Indo-Europ. II, p. 692, it comes from the Sanscrit *van* = *colere, servire, amare,* whence also *veneror,* the old German *win,* friend, and the northern *vän.*

28
70 100. 19. **a physicis rebus . . . inventis,** "from correct and useful observations of physical objects." For *videtisne* see III, 27, 69, note.

100. 21. [**errores turbulentos,** "troublesome errors"; our word "troublesome" comes through the French from *turbula,* with the English suffix —*some,* German —*sam.*]

100. 22. [**enim** generally stands second in the sentence except there be some unimportant word accompanying the emphatic one. See M. 471, Obs. 1.]

100. 23. **noti sunt;** ironically; we act as if we knew them.

100. 27. **apud Homerum.** Il. XX, 67 ff.

100. 29. **cum Titanis,** for *Titanibus.* This metaplasmus is found especially in the quotations from Ennius in Lactantius B. I., although only *Titan* occurs in the nom. sing. But Priscian V, 4, 26 gives also *Titanus;* the abl. *Titano* is found in Varro L. L., VII, 16; and Lactant. also has the nom. pl. *Titani,* which Priscian cites from Naevius.

100. 31. **Sed tamen . . .** The connection is: Although these fables 71
are stupid affairs and we discard them altogether, we are not on this account to reject the popular deities too; only we must have the right idea of them.

101. 6. **superstitiosi.** It is quite clear that the derivation of the 72
word given in the text deserves no consideration; nor any more the various opinions of ancients and moderns, excepting perhaps that of J. Grimm, Deutsche Mythol. II, p. 1059: "*superstitio*, from *superstes*, denotes in the case of individual men a continued persistence in opinions which the majority of sensible persons have abandoned."

101. 9. **religiosi a relegendo.** See note I, 2, 3. The verse cited by Gellius IV, 9: *religentem te oportet esse, religiosus ne fuas* (for that is the true reading), cannot be held to warrant the derivation given in the text by Cicero, as *religens* is not a current word, but one manufactured by the poet to support that derivation. Competent scholars have long thought that no grammatical objection lies against the derivation from *religare*, especially when it is considered that there was an old form *ligĕre* for *ligare*. Comp. Ebel in the Zeitsch. f. vgl. Sprachk. IV, p. 449.

101. 12. [**superstitioso** and **religioso** here designate merely the words *superstitiosus* and *religiosus;* but in accordance with the more usual Latin usage are taken into the sentence and put in the ablative as though they were used in their actual meaning. See Nägelsbach Lat. Styl. § 3, 2, c.]

101. 20. **dictum est.** See I, 8, 18. On *hesterno die* see Introduc- 29 73
tion, p. 20.

101. 24. **praecise dicitur,** "is an elliptical expression," in which something is omitted which must be mentally supplied. Comp. Ad Herenn. IV, 30, 31: *praecisio est cum, dictis quibusdam, reliquum relinquitur inchoatum in auditoris iudicio.*

101. 25. **Areopagi.** In Cicero's time the Areopagus had, as the coun- 74
cil of state, a far more extended sphere and more important influence on public affairs than in the flourishing period of Athens, when, especially after Pericles, its competence was very limited. Comp. Ahrens de Athen. statu inde ab Achaic. foed. inter. Goetting, 1829, p. 34 ff.; and Philippi, der Areopag und die Epheten, p. 314.

101. 32. **unum . . . limatum,** i.e. *praeter ceteros* or *in paucis limatum.* It is not alone with superlatives that *unus* serves to strengthen the expression. Comp. Lucret. VI, 1229: *illud in his rebus miserandum et magnopere unum aerumnabile erat;* Horat. Sat. I, 10, 40: *potes . . . comis garrire libellos Unus vivorum, Fundani;* II, 6, 57: *me mirantur ut*

unum egregii mortalem altique silenti; Epod. XII, 4: ***sagacius unus*** *odoror.* In the text the Mss. carelessly have ***unum*** before ***convenit,*** where it gives no adequate sense.

80 75 102. 2. **constitutas,** "set in order"; for the Stoic did not, any more than other ancient philosophers, believe in an actual creation of the world by the gods, that is, a creation out of nothing. Comp. note c. 35, 88. In the passage farther on: ***ab animantibus principiis ea esse generata,*** it is only intended to say, that the existing divine factors in the creation of the world, themselves issued from the elemental ether, the *λόγοι σπερματικοί* (Plut. De Plac. Phil. 1, 7, 17; Diog. L. VII, 148), or the *δυνάμεις γόνιμοι* (as M. Aurel. IX, 1 extr. calls them) which are spirit and matter in one, have caused later created things to issue from themselves. It must however be confessed that this proposition does not really belong here, where the discourse was to be, not of the origin of things, but of the government of the world.

102. 8. **ea esse generata.** The Mss. have ***eam . . . generatam,*** which would refer to *sentiens natura.* But by this last expression we can only understand, as the subsequent explanation §§ 81–86 shows, the soul of the universe, *i.e.* the portion of the original deity entering into the universe (see Introd., p. 8), which first manifests itself in the *λόγοις σπερματικοῖς,* Cicero's *animantibus principiis,* but is by no means created by them.

76 102. 12. **simulacra . . . imagines.** The change of expression does not denote a difference in the views of these philosophers, but the two words are synonyms employed for the sake of variety. Comp. I, 12, 29 where the gods of Democritus are also called *imagines;* and I, 26, 74. It is quite true however that the *εἴδωλα* of Democritus differ from those of Epicurus in this, that the latter proceed from the divine beings existing in the *intermundia;* the former arise from the atoms flowing forth from the formless divine substance (see note on I, 43, 120), which take various forms by their own agency. Comp. Papencordt De Atomic. Doctr. (Berolin. 1832), p. 70; and Schoemann's essay De Epicuri Theolog. in his Opusc. Ac. IV, p. 353.

102. 12. **quodam pacto negat.** This is true in a greater degree of Epicurus, whose so-called gods were hardly worthy the name, than of Democritus, whose gods were not entirely without influence on the affairs of men. See above I, 43, 120.

102. 18. **vi magna incitata.** A necessity assumed to be *original,* and yet set in action by any other force, would be a contradiction. *vi magna* then is not to be translated "*by* a powerful force," but "*with* powerful force," [abl. *modi*]; and *incitata* is to be taken in a medial, not a passive sense ["acting powerfully"].

102. 24. **Etenim.** See note c. 16 init.

102. 26. [**Ergo** here introduces the *argumentum ex contrario* in the form of a question: "can it then be that ... ?" The answer follows in *At et ignoratio rerum* &c. Comp. Tusc. I, 31; II, 39; Seyffert, Scholae Lat. I, p. 129.]

102. 30. [**minime cadit in maiestatem,** "by no means falls in with (our idea of) the majesty of the gods," does not comport with it.]

102. 34. **inter seque ... coniunctos.** See note on 62, 154. 31 78

103. 2. **eadem ... ratio.** This follows of course; because the con- 79
trary is inconceivable, namely a specific difference between the divine and human reason, however great the quantitative difference may be.

103. 3. **eademque lex.** Comp. De Leg. I, 6, 18: *Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria.* Ibid. 7, 23: *inter quos autem ratio, inter eos etiam recta ratio communis est; quae cum sit lex, lege quoque conciliati homines cum deis putandi sumus.*

103. 7. **quae qui convenit,** for *quas* &c. Comp. note on c. 5, 15.

103. 10. **nisi ab superis.** Comp. c. 6, 18. Under *superis* we are to understand particularly the heavenly bodies. Somn. Scip. c. 3, 15: *hominibus animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis.* With mind of course comes at the same time the capacity for reason and all the virtues.

103. 15. **cum satis docuerimus.** Namely, c. 15, 16.—**et caelum** 80
= *et aethera.* See c. 36, 91.—**mundum ipsum,** the universe in general. See note c. 10, 28.

103. 21. **naturae.** Above c. 30, 75 it was called *naturae sentienti.* 32 81
The epithet is here omitted, because the Stoic idea of *natura,* which on account of the indwelling soul of the universe includes the attribute of *sentiens,* is yet to be set forth, as opposed to others who took the term *natura* in a different sense. Comp. c. 33, 85.

103. 24. **vim quandam sine ratione.** Comp. I, 13, 35; II, 16, 43; III, 11, 27.

103. 25. **alii autem.** We have seen above c. 22, 57 that the Stoics especially belonged to these. Comp. Acad. I, 7, 28: (*natura sentiens*), *in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna: quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam: quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam quandam.*

103. 27. **declarantem ... quid sequatur;** *i.e.* she allows in each

case her designs and aims to be seen. *Sequi aliquid*, "to pursue something as an end." — For **via progredientem** comp. c. 22, 57.

103. 29. **seminis enim . . .** An example to confirm what was just said.

82 104. 1. **ut Epicurus.** Sext. Emp. IX, 333 gives Epicurus's own words: ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ κενόν. Comp. Lucret. I, 419: *Omnis ut est igitur per se natura duabus consistit rebus: nam corpora sunt et inane.* — By the following **quae his accidant,** *i.e.* their accidents, is to be understood the motion of the atoms in empty space, and the origin of things resulting from it.

104. 3. **natura constare . . . mundum** &c. The sense is: We mean that the world is not a mere mechanical lifeless aggregate like a stone or a clod of earth, but a living organic whole like an animal or a plant.

104. 4. **nulla cohaerendi natura,** without a force of organic coherence working in it. *Natura*, like φύσις, denotes also the δύναμις ἐνοικοῦσα τοῖς σώμασι, as Galen says Comm. in Hipp. Ep. 6, p. 5 init.; and Cicero also uses *cohaerere* in other places of the organic combination in one whole. Comp. c. 34, 87; 45, 115; 62, 155; Acad. I, 7, 28: *omni natura cohaerente et continuata;* De Leg. I, 8, 24: *alia quibus cohaererent homines;* De Orat. II, 80, 325: *ut non adfictum aliquod sed cohaerens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur;* Sen. Quaes. Nat. II, 2 extr.: *naturam corporis nulla ope externa sed unitate sua cohaerentis.* The same author, Ep. 102, calls bodies thus organically cohering *continua*, in contrast to the *composita*, those artificially put together by external means. On this subject Sext. Emp. IX, 78–84 deserves to be consulted.

83 104. 11. **Eiusdemque exspirationibus** &c. Comp. c. 15, 40; and 46, 118, where however the heavenly bodies only are in question. The nourishment of the air and the ether by aqueous evaporations from the earth forms part of the doctrine of the intertransformation of the elements, which is set forth in § 84.

104. 14. **adspiratione aëris.** See below note c. 55, 136.

104. 15. **aër nobiscum videt** &c., *i.e.* our seeing, hearing and speaking takes place with the help of the air. The Stoics explained sound as resulting from the wave-like vibrations of the air when disturbed; we hear when the ear receives these vibrations. Seeing results from the formation in the air between the object and the eye of a cone of rays of light, the apex of which falls upon the eye. Plut. Plac. Phil. IV, 19; Diog. L. VII, 157. 158. But the opinions of the ancients were very various. Comp. Gell. V, 16 and Schneider on his Ecl. Phys. II, p. 245 ff.

84 104. 18. **Quaeque in medium locum mundi qui est infimus** &c.

The *medius locus* of the universe, which is therefore also the lowest (see c. 45, 116), is occupied by the earth, c. 36 init. That which falls upon it from above is the various sorts of atmospheric storms; that which rises up from it into the higher regions is the evaporations from it; that which moves around it is the heavens with the heavenly bodies; and by virtue of these motions proceeding from, tending to, or encircling this general centre the world appears to be a coherent, uniform system, a *continens unaque natura*. [The real object of *efficiunt*, so far as the sense is concerned, is contained in the adjectives *continentem* and *unam*; "these operations make the continuity and unity of nature."]

104. 22. **vicissitudine eorum.** The mutual transformation of the elements here alluded to was taught before by the older natural philosophers, like Heraclitus, who called it a ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω, a rising and falling; the fire (or ether) is condensed into air, the air into water, the water into earth, the earth again becomes water, &c. Senec. Quaest. Nat. III, 10; Plut. De Prim. Frig. c. 14; Diog. L. IX, 9; comp. below III, 12, 31. Many propounded similar ideas, for which see Ideler on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 426; Schwegler on Arist. Metaph. I, p. 72.

104. 27. [**coniunctio continetur.** Such expressions are frequent: *curriculum circumscripsit*, for *dedit; terminabit modum*, for *ponet, faciet; societatem coniungere, coire* for *facere* &c. See Nägelsbach Lat. Styl., p. 289.]

104. 30. **utrumvis ut sit.** See c. 46, 118. 85

104. 30. **natura mundum administrari.** Cicero might properly have omitted here the epithet *sentiente*, as he had already expounded the Stoic idea of nature, and the verb *administrari* itself indicates a designed, intelligent government. In what follows the epithet is sometimes expressed, sometimes omitted.

105. 1. **Etenim.** The remark made c. 16 init. holds true here. 86

105. 7. **seminator et sator.** The Stoics call the various manifesta- 84
tions of the deity in the various parts of creation λόγοι σπερματικοί (see note c. 30, 75); but the unity which lies behind all these and manifests itself in them is called in the singular λόγος σπερματικός, as creative reason. Diog. L. VII, 136. Cicero translates σπερματικός by *seminator et sator*.

105. 18. **ea fortuita.** For the neuter see note on c. 5, 15. 87

105. 26. **solarium discriptum;** a real sun-dial, because of the lines drawn upon it, in distinction from the *solarium ex aqua*, a water clock, the etymological meaning being lost sight of. The former is also called by the Greek name *sciotherum* or *sciothericon;* the water clock is also called *clepsydra*, and was originally extremely simple, but since the Alexandrinian artist

Ctesibius, a complicated hydraulic machine. Censorin. D. D. Nat. c. 23, speaking of the introduction of both into Rome, says: *Illud satis constat, nullum (solarium discriptum) in foro prius fuisse quam id, quod M. Valerius ex Sicilia advectum ad rostra in columna posuit* (ann. 481); *deinde aliquanto post P. Cornelius Nasica censor ex aqua fecit horarium* (ann. 595), *quod et ipsum ex consuetudine noscendi a sole horas solarium coeptum vocari.*

88 105. 30. **sphaeram;** a so-called *planetarium*, to represent the planetary system and its motions, with wheels fitting into one another; of course not like the modern ones with clockwork, but still moved apparently by means of an ingenious hydraulic mechanism: *machinatione quadam* as is said below c. 38, 97. Cicero, Tusc. I, 25, 63 speaks of one that Archimedes had: *Archimedes, cum lunae, solis, quinque errantium motus in sphaeram inligavit, effecit . . . ut tarditate et celeritate dissimillimos motus una regeret conversio.* Comp. Fabric. on Sext. Emp., p. 577; and Biblioth. Gr. IV, 14, 16.

105. 31. **Posidonius.** See note I, 3, 6.

85 105. 34. **Hi autem;** the Epicureans. In order rightly to understand what follows it must be remembered that *mundus*, like the Greek κόσμος, really denotes the world not from the material but from the formal point of view. Plin. H. N. II, 4: *Nam quem κόσμον Graeci nomine ornamenti appellaverunt, eum nos a perfecta absolutaque elegantia mundum;* Plut. Plac. Phil. II, 1: Πυθαγόρας πρῶτος ὠνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὁλων περιοχὴν κόσμον ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως. Comp. Ideler on Arist. Meteor. 1, p. 325. The substance of the world too according to the Stoics was not created (see note c. 30, 75), but proceeded from the original existence which is also the highest god, just as all the individual gods which bear rule in the world proceeded from him. But these gods that have thus come into being also take part in the arrangement and order of the world; the world, becoming, gradually developing itself, is fashioned and ordered with their coöperation; and so has become a *mundus* or κόσμος, a symmetrical whole. The supreme god is the *architectus* (§ 90); the inferior gods are his servants and aids.

106. 2. **Archimedem.** On his *sphaera* see note on 34, 88. It was set up on the *arx* at Syracuse (Ovid. Fasti VI, 279), and enclosed in a glass case or ball, as we gather from the description of Claudian. Epigr. 18 (68). Marcellus brought it to Rome and placed it in the temple of Virtus. Cic. De Re Pub. I, 14.

106. 5. **apud Accium.** In his *Medea*, as is seen from Nonius, p. 90, where the ninth of the following verses is quoted. — Verse 4, **reflat.** The shepherd takes the ship for a monster that, snorting (*spiritu*), blows away

the waves before him.—V. 5, **interruptum . . . nimbum,** a breaking rain cloud.—**dum . . . dum** seem anciently to have been equivalent to *tum . . . tum*. Catullus LXII, 45, says *sic virgo dum intacta manet, dum cara suis est* for *cum . . . tum* (or for *dum . . . usque eo*, as Quintil. IX, 3, 16 takes it). Comp. Savelsberg in the N. Rhein. Mus. XXVI, p. 135. But Drakenborch on Livy XL, 42, 7, and Arntzen on Aurel. Vict. 89, show that *dum* and *tum* are often confounded by the copyists.—V. 10, **Triton,** the sea god, subject to Neptune (see I, 28, 78), who presided especially over streams.—In the last verse perhaps *erigit* should be the reading for *eruit*, as Lachmann Lucret., p. 346 thinks.

106. 24. [The common text has: *Delphini.*"—*Item alia multa.*—"*Silvani* &c. Müller proposes *item illa moles?*]

107. 1. **tantique muneris.** See note I, 8, 19. 90

107. 4. **in media parte mundi.** Comp. c. 39, 98. This was not 36 91
only the opinion of the Stoics, but was of old the prevailing view of the majority of people; expressly testified to by Thales (Plut. Plac. Phil. III, 11), Anaximander (Diog. L. II, 1), Pythagoras (Id. VIII, 25), Leucippus (IX, 30), Diogenes of Apollonia (IX, 52) and others.

107. 5. [**animali.** This seems to be the true reading, and is that of Baiter in both editions. Cicero is here giving only a simple definition of *aër*, as in N. D. III, 14, 34: *simplex est natura animantis, ut vel terrena vel ignea vel animalis vel umida;* and Tusc. I, 17, 40: . . . *reliquae duae partes, una ignea, altera animalis;* Tusc. I, 18, 42: *spirabilem, id est animalem.* Prof. Schoemann retains *animabili* of the Mss. and gives the following note]: *animabili*, "animating," "vivifying"; because, as is said c. 45, 117, *vitalem et salutarem spiritum praèbet animantibus.* The adjectives in *-bilis* often have an active meaning. See below note c. 39, 98.

107. 6. **perceptum . . . usu;** understood, comprehended in consequence of continual use. Comp. De Fin. III, 2, 5: *rhetorica, dialectica, grammatica, geometria, musica, quamquam Latine ea dici poterant, tamen, quoniam usu percepta sunt, nostra ducamus.* Quintil. V, 12, 1: *vel ab aliis tradita vel usu percepta.* Comp. above I, 14, 36: *usitatas perceptasque notiones.*—Cicero also derives *aër* from the Greek in Acad. I, 7, 26. The older Romans said *spiritus* or *caelum*. See Plin. H. N. II, 5: *spiritus, quem Graeci nostrique eodem vocabulo aëra appellant;* ib. c. 38: *namque et hoc caelum appellavere maiores, quod alio nomine aëra;* Lucret. IV, 133: *caelum qui dicitur aër.*—It is very uncertain whether the verses are quoted from the Dulorestes of Pacuvius. Comp. Jahn. in Hermes II, p. 230.

107. 13. **quasi vero non Graius hoc dicat.** As the part in the play

represented a Greek, the poet certainly erred in making the speaker refer to the Romans as *nostri*, and so to the Greeks as strangers. The criticism of Cicero is just. The following words *At Latine loquitur* contain an objection to this criticism, which is however immediately answered. This objection, says Cicero, would only hold if we were not obliged really to imagine the speaker as a Greek; but the poet himself in the following verse of the same piece shows us expressly that we must do so. — Evidently the whole digression is introduced to give an appearance of the greater ease of friendly conversation, as also in III, 10, 25.

92 107. 17. **ex aethere . . . existunt.** Comp. c. 15 init.

107. 22. **mota loco** for *moti*, the speaker still thinking of *sidera*.

107. 23. **conflagrare.** Cicero was writing hastily and left out of account the possible alternative that the earth might also grow cold if the sun were to move away from it.

87 93 107. 29. **unius et viginti . . . litterarum.** That is the number of letters in the Latin alphabet; for Y and Z are foreign to the Latin language and only used in Greek words; so that Quintil. I, 4, 9 calls X the last of the Latin letters. Comp. Priscian I, 15 and Corssen üb. Aussprache &c.; I, p. 7. [For the order of the words, adjectives with adjectives &c. comp. Phil. II, 27, 66: *permagnum optimi pondus argenti;* Liv. 10, 46: *frequenti publicorum ornatu locorum;* Nägelsbach Lat. Styl., p. 466.]

107. 31. **annales Ennii.** An epic poem containing the Roman history up to the time of the poet, the beginning of the sixth century.

107. 32. **quod nescio.** The relative pronoun serves to recall what precedes, in this case *posse . . . annales Ennii effici;* and the sentence would be grammatically complete without the following words *tantum valere fortuna*, which only contain the same idea in another form. Comp. note c. 9, 24.

94 108. 1. **quam ποιότητα Graeci vocant.** Cicero adds this remark because the Greek word was quite familiar to his readers, but the Latin word was first coined by himself, as he says Acad. I, 6, 24, where he reckons it among the *verbis inauditis*. The Greek ποιότης too was first coined by Plato, as is remarked in his life in Westermann's Biogr., p. 393, as well as in other places. The word occurs in Theaet., p. 182 A, where Plato himself calls it an *ἀλλόκοτον ὄνομα*.

108. 9. **qui locus est proximus,** according to the division given above c. 30, 75. As Balbus has in fact been treating of this part of the argument since c. 36, he calls attention to it as it were in a supplementary way. This is not to be regarded as an error of Cicero, but is a part of the imitation of extempore discourse, which very well admits of the *fusius disputare* (see note c. 7, 20).

108. 10. **Aristoteles.** No passage corresponding to that quoted in 95
the text is found in the extant writings of Aristotle; yet Sext. Emp. IX, 22 cites the following passage of his: *θεασάμενοι γὰρ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἥλιον περιπολοῦντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὔτακτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων κίνησιν, ἐνόμισαν εἶναί τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ εὐταξίας αἴτιον.* It was probably from the dialogue *περὶ φιλοσοφίας* mentioned above I, 13, 33; II, 15, 42. 44.

108. 32. **quae cum viderent.** [Schoemann reads *haec* for *quae*, and says] the Mss. all have *quae cum viderent.* If Cicero really wrote thus, he must in his haste have lost sight of the construction of the sentence, which is in itself not impossible. It is still quite as probable that he wrote neither *haec* nor *quae*, and that the words *cum viderent* went with *immutabilis cursus*, and that the conclusion of the sentence commenced with *profecto.* That is Madvig's opinion. [Müller prefers to suppose that at the end of so long a passage Cicero changed the construction and wrote *quae* than that the copyists changed *haec* into *quae*, or themselves interpolated the *quae*. Baiter II brackets the *quae.*]

108. 35. **quondam eruptione Aetnaeorum ignium.** It is impos- 88 96
sible to ascertain which of the various eruptions of Ætna is here alluded to; the notices of the ancients in regard to them are collected by Cluver. Sicil. Ant. I, 8, p. 104 ff.

109. 15. **horas,** i.e. *horarium* or *horologium.* It would be difficult to 97
find other examples of *horas* in this signification, except perhaps in the expression *ad horas mittere*, Cic. Brut. c. 54, 200: "to send some one to look at the clock"; Petron. c. 71: *horas inspicere.* The words *machinatione quadam* show that a hydraulic clock is alluded to.

109. 24. **ipsa in sese nutibus suis conglobata;** gathered into the 89 98
shape of a ball by reason of the tendency of all its parts towards the centre. Comp. c. 45, 116: *omnibus eius partibus in medium vergentibus.* The same explanation of the spherical form is often found also in other places, as *e.g.* in Arist. De Caelo II, c. 14. Others derived it from the revolution of the heavens around the earth; Plin. H. N. II, 64: *immensum eius globum in formam orbis assidua circa eum mundi volubilitate cogente.* Comp. Bake on Cleomed., p. 276, and Ideler on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 497.

109. 26. **insatiabili varietate,** i.e. *quae numquam nos satiat*, that never causes satiety and annoyance. So c. 62, 155: *insatiabilior species;* Fr. Hortens. Orell. IV, 2, p. 482: *caeli signorum admirabilem ordinem insatiabilemque pulchritudinem magis spectat.* Other examples of adjectives of this termination in active signification are *animabilis* above c. 36, 91 [in

our text *animali*]; and *patibilis* III, 12, 27; and others still in Perizon. on Sanct. Min. I, 15, 4; and Lorenz on Plaut. Mostell. V, 1147.

99 109. 33. **lapsus;** used of any gliding motion, and hence of the flight of birds through the air.

100 110. 10. **alludit;** the most picturesque expression of the beating of the waves on the shore, as if in sport (*ludus*). Catullus LXIV, 67: *ipsius ante pedes fluctus salis alludebant;* Cic. Topic. 7, 32: *solebat Aquilius quaerentibus quid esset litus ita definire: qua fluctus alluderet* (al. *eluderet;* so in the passage in the text the Mss. have *eludit* or *cludit,* wrongly; the latter perhaps has arisen out of *accludit,* since, according to Fleckeisen, Philol. XI, p. 189, the old form *cludo* was for *ludo*). — **ex duabus naturis;** to a person on the shore neither the land overflowed by water, nor the shallow water, where the bottom is easily seen, seem precisely either one or the other, but rather a sort of union of both land and water.

101 110. 11. **mari finitumus aër.** See note on c. 26, 66. — **die et nocte distinguitur;** because it is light by day and dark by night, and so appears as it were of different colors. Ovid Metam. XV, 189: *Nec color est idem caelo cum lassa quiete Cuncta iacent media, cumque albo Lucifer exit Clarus equo.*

40 110. 17. **omnia cingens . . . aether.** Comp. I, 14, 37, and below c. 45, 115. De Div. II, 43, 91: *caelum, extremum atque ultimum mundi.*

102 110. 23. **binas . . . reversiones.** Comp. note on c. 19, 49 in fine. The one *reversio* takes place when the sun reaches the extreme point (*extremum*) of his course in the North and from there turns towards the South; the other, when it moves again from the extreme Southern point towards the North.

110. 24. (**sol**) **tristitia quadam contrahit terram,** for *efficit ut terra contrahatur quadam tristitia;* an expression similar to one noticed above c. 19, 49: *sol terras opacat.*

103 110. 26. **luna . . . maior quam dimidia pars terrae.** Not everybody held this opinion; some, among them Posidonius himself (Plut. Plac. Phil. II, 27), and still later Pliny (H. N. II, 11, p. 20 Gr.), thought the moon larger, or at least not smaller, than the earth. For other views see Forbiger Handb. der alten Geographie I, p. 524, and Ideler on Arist. Meteor. I, p. 332.

110. 27. **iisdem spatiis,** in the same path; for the path of the moon, as well as that of the sun and all the planets, lies within the Zodiac.

110. 32. **e regione solis,** over against the sun, or, astronomically *speaking, in* opposition with the sun; over the earth, while the sun is under

it. On the other hand what Cicero expresses by *opposita* is called in astronomical language conjunction, *σύνοδος*, when moon and sun stand near each other in the heavens, the moon being between the earth and the sun, and in regard to us before the sun, *opposita*, or sometimes just under it, *supposita*, in which case a total or partial eclipse results. Thales understood the causes of the eclipses of the sun and moon so well that he was able to predict one of the sun. See Diog. L. I, 23 with the remark of Menage. But this is doubted by more recent writers on the history of astronomy. See Philol. XXII, p. 550.

111. 3. [**notarum.** So Ms. A, and Baiter in both edd. Schoemann 104
has the following note]: *notata . . . similitudine.* The Mss. have in part *nota*, in part *notarum*, the latter being only a conjecture, which is grammatically admissible and not improbable on diplomatic grounds; but the reading in the text *notata* is quite as probable, i.e. *animadversa et consignata*, understanding as subject the imagination of the observer.

111. 5. **Aratus** of Soli in Cilicia, B.C. 275, wrote a didactic poem in 41
two parts, *Φαινόμενα*, "phenomena of the stars," and *Διοσημεῖα* (*Διοσημίαι*), "signs of the weather"; it was translated by Cicero, and again by Cæsar Germanicus, *i.e.* Domitian, not as has been supposed by the son of Drusus, adopted son of Tiberius. Of Cicero's translation we have only fragments, though of considerable extent; of that of Germanicus the first part is complete, of the second only a couple of verses remain. Besides these there is a translation of Rufus Festus Avienus of the fourth century much more free than those of Cicero or Domitian; but these last even, like all the ancient translators, did not consider such exactness necessary as is nowadays required in a translator.

111. 9. **cetera.** The other heavenly bodies in contradistinction to the immovable axis.

111. 14. **duplici de cardine,** "on the two-fold axis." Cicero calls 105
the axis around which the universe revolves two-fold (this he did not find in Aratus), because he imagines it as divided into two parts by the earth, which lies in the middle of the universe, and through which the axis necessarily passes. — The pole which he has in mind is the North pole, the only one visible to us.

111. 17. **Cynosura,** the little bear, properly only the polar star, then the whole constellation; **Helice,** the great bear, also called the *septem triones*, the seven plough oxen, or in the singular *septentrio* on account of the seven very bright stars which compose it; this name was then also given to the lesser bear, the *Cynosura*. See c. 43, 111 and Heyne on Virg. Georgics *III, 381.*

42 106 111. 31. **superaque.** Priscian XIV, 2, 11, p. 980 Putsch.: *Quaedam praepositiones etiam syncopam passae sunt, ut supra pro supera, et infra pro infera, et extra pro extera. Nam antiqui trisyllaba ea proferebant, ut Cicero in Arato: 'Torvu' draco,'* etc.

107 112. 1. [**cum totius est.** Schoemann has *quum totius sit* with the following note.] The Mss. have *est*, which no doubt should be changed. The following *tum* has also fallen out in the Mss. Comp. Schoemann Opusc. Ac. III, p. 335.

112. 3. **non una modo.** *mŏdō* is here used, according to the older Iambic measure; later it was used as a Pyrrhic, *mŏdŏ*. Comp. Lachmann on Lucret. II, 1135.

108 112. 14. **ortus ubi atque obitus** &c., where the East and West join, *i.e.* under the North pole, where the meridian, drawn through our zenith and prolonged beyond the pole, touches the horizon and divides the East and West sides of the heavens. Comp. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 336. For *subitoque recondit* of the Mss. the true reading is probably, as Grotius thought, *subito aequore condit.* — **Subito,** part. perf. pass. from *subire.*

112. 20. **Engonasin;** ἐν γόνασιν, a kneeling, armed man very near the head of the dragon, hence *id caput attingens.* The kneeling man, Lat. *ingeniculus*, also *nixus* (*gnixus* according to Fleckeisen in the N. Rh. Mus. 1852, p. 230), was explained by some to be Hercules, by some Theseus, by others in different ways. See Voss on Aratus v. 63. — The **Corona,** mentioned directly after, was explained to be the garland of Ariadne carried to heaven by Dionysus. Arat. v. 71.

109 112. 22. **Anguitenens,** Ὀφιοῦχος, the serpent-holder, was, according to the so-called καταστερισμοί of Eratosthenes, Aesculapius, whom Juppiter struck by lightning and then transferred to heaven; others explained it however differently. See Hygin. P. Astr. II, 14. — **eius** in v. 3 is to be read as a monosyllable like *cuius* below c. 44, 112. — **Nepaï,** v. 6, "of the Scorpion."

110 113. 8. **Spicum,** neuter, as in Varro ap. Non., p. 225 Merc.: *Neque in bona segete nullum est spicum nequam, neque in mala non aliquod bonum.* Comp. Cic. De Senec. c. 15, 51: *fundit frugem spici.* — **pedibus,** fallen out in the Mss., must be restored after Arat. v. 96.

43 113. 13. **pedibusque tenetur,** i.e. *calcatur.* — The **tremula flamma** in the following verse denotes the scintillation of the stars.

113. 18. **obductus** = *obiectus* or *obversus.*

113. 19. **truculenta tuetur.** The neuter of the adjective performs the office of an adverb, like *insueta rudens* Virg. Aen. VIII, 248; *crebra ferit* Georg. II, 500; *acerba ruens* Lucret. V, 34; and oftener in the

singular, as *acutum cernere* Hor. Sat. I, 3, 26; *torvum clamare* Virg. Aen. VII, 287; *laetum fremere* Stat. Theb. III, 618. The usage is peculiar to poetic language; a few expressions however are common in prose, as *sublime* which occurs several times above II, 16, 44; 37, 89; 39, 101; *derectum* c. 57, 144.

113. 30. **Hyadas . . . a pluendo;** because when they rose early with 111
the sun in May the rain generally came on. See however Göttling, Ges. Abhdl. I, p. 179, who doubts this explanation and defends the translation *Suculae*, which was also considered an error by Gellius XIII, 9, 4.

114. 3. **Cynosurae . . . Arcti;** the bear *Cynosura*, to distinguish it from the other bear *Helice*. See c. 41, 105.

114. 8. **aspectum . . . parentis;** her mother, *Cassiepia*, mentioned above. The construction of *aufugere* with the accusative is doubted but still not incredible.

114. 11. **contingit caput alvo.** The constellation does not present the entire body of a horse, but only the fore part as far as the belly; and this stands just above the head of Andromeda. The horse referred to was Pegasus. Arat. v. 213–233.—The **stella iungens** is a star between the belly of the horse and the head of Andromeda, which can be taken as part of one as well as of the other; hence ξυνὸς ἀστήρ in Aratus, v. 205.—For **duplices formas** comp. Virg. Aen. I, 93: *Duplices tendens ad sidera palmas;* Cic. De Prov. Cons. c. 6, 13: *has duplices pestes sociorum.*

114. 18. **aquilonis tangitur auris;** the wind blowing from the North pole touches him more than the other, which lies farther South.

114. 22. **Cuius,** in one syllable, like *eius* above c. 42, 109.—**genus,** 44
old form for *genu*. Comp. Priscian. VI, 4, 19.—**omni ex parte;** the 112
Vergiliae lie all together near the left knee of Perseus, crowded in a very small space; ἤλιθα πᾶσαι says Arat. v. 251: *brevis locus occupat omnes,* German v. 255. They are called *Vergiliae*, the Spring constellation, according to Festus, *quia earum ortu ver finitur.* But this explanation is doubted. Greek πλειάδες, "ship stars," because when they rose the sailing season began; others derive from πλεῖος, as they are a closely packed group of stars. Comp. Rivola, Ueb. d. Griech. Sternbilder, Progr. d. Gymn. zu Bruchsal, v. 1861; and M. Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, p. 17 of the Amer. edition. Others still have referred the name to πελειάδες, which denotes a sort of pigeon.

114. 25. **Fides,** the Lyra, according to Aratus transferred to heaven by its inventor Hermes.

114. 30. **Capricornus.** The old name Αἰγόκερως means only goat-horned, and refers, according to the most probable view, to the horned

and goat-footed Pan. See Voss on Arat. v. 285. Hence *corpore semifero.* He "breathes cold," because the winter solstice happens when the sun is in that constellation.

113 115. 3. **posteriore vi corporis;** with the powerful hinder part of his body he as it were draws the bow behind him, because this immediately follows him. The bow is carried by Sagittarius.

115. 4. **Ales,** called by others *Cycnus;* afterwards comes the *Aquila.*

114 115. 14. Perhaps **Aries tagit,** i.e. *tangit,* should be read for *Aries tegit.* See Lorenz on Plaut. Mostell. v. 453; and Neue, Formenlehre, p. 315. — **Fluminis . . .,** the constellation of the river, called by some, as Aratus, v. 360, Eridanus, by others the Nile. — **quem,** as if *fluvii,* not *fluminis,* went before.

115. 17. **procera Vincla,** the band that encircles the tails of the two fishes. — **Nepae,** of the Scorpion. See c. 42, 109. — Near this comes the **Ara,** which is fanned by the breath of the South wind because it lies in the South, just as above § 111 the northernmost fish is touched by the North wind.

115. 22. **Centaurus,** referred to Chiron. The lower part of his body lies near the *Chelae, i.e.* the claws of the Scorpion. He holds in his hand his prey, here called *quadrupes vasta.* It is clear that *cedit,* i.e. *accedit,* is preferable to the *caedit* of the Mss. for this reason alone, that the Centaur cannot hold the beast in his hand and slay him at the same time.

115. 31. **ille . . . Ante Canem,** the Προκύων, precursor of the great dog, *i.e.* Sirius. Both were explained to be the hunting dogs of Orion. **Geminis sub ipsis,** immediately under the Twins. See Wagner Quaest. Virg., p. 468. — **Extremam** in the preceding verse refers to the *Hydra,* as is seen from Arat. v. 448.

115 116. 5. **intellegi . . . non possunt.** Comp. De Leg. II, 7, 16: *quid est enim verius quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet, aut ut ea, quae vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet?*

45 116. 12. **quasi quodam vinculo.** To such a band may be compared the fiery ether which encircles the universe (c. 40, 101) and pervades all its parts, which is the living and divine principle (*animans et deus,* c. 46, 118), the source of all forces operating in the universe and hence of gravitation or the centripetal force *quae ad medium rapit et convertit extrema.*

116 116. 18. **medium infimum in sphaera est.** Comp. c. 33, 84; Tusc. V, 24 fin.; Sallust De Deis et Mundo c. 7 extr.: *σφαίρας πάσης τὸ κάτω μέσον ἐστίν.*

116. 23. **huic continens aër.** Comp. c. 26, 66. 117

116. 30. **nisu suo conglobata.** The same as was said of the earth 46
above c. 39, 98: *in sese nutibus suis conglobata.*

116. 31. **sua momenta sustentant;** they always preserve their equilibrium because in the sphere the weight (*momentum*) of one side is always balanced (*sustentatur*) by that of the other.

116. 32. **ut ante dixisse videor,** namely, c. 18, 47. On *videor* comp. note I, 21, 58.

116. 34. **vaporibus aluntur.** Comp. c. 15, 40 and 33, 83. 118

117. 1. **refundunt eadem,** for *eosdem*. See note c. 5, 15.

117. 4. **Panaetius** of Rhodes, the most distinguished of Stoic philosophers of his time, *vel princeps disciplinae Stoicae* (De Div. I, 3, 4), flourished about B.C. 140. — It is evident from several notices that he deviated in many points from the views of the older heads of his school.

117. 4. **ut . . . omnis mundus ignesceret.** Heraclitus had already held *ἕνα εἶναι κόσμον, γεννᾶσθαί τε αὐτὸν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ πάλιν ἐκπυροῦσθαι κατά τινας περιόδους ἐναλλὰξ τὸν σύμπαντα αἰῶνα* . . . Diog. L. IX, 8. The Stoics, like Heraclitus, held the existence of an original fiery element (the *στοιχεῖον κατ' ἐξοχήν* according to Chrysippus in Stobae. Ecl. I, p. 312), namely the ether, which they also called *fire*, though they distinguished it from the coarser earthly fire; moreover they believed that the universe which had originally been developed from this element would return to it again, and after that come forth from it anew. Comp. Diog. L. VII, 141 who also gives the opposing view of Panaetius, namely that the world was eternal. — Instead of **ignesceret** we should expect *ignescat* on account of the preceding *putant*. The change, on which see note I, 22, 61, was all the easier because of the intervening *dubitare dicebant.*

117. 11. **cum summa Saturni refrigeret.** The planet Saturn is 119
called *summa*, being the extreme one of the system so far as the ancients knew. On the different influences ascribed to the planets see Plin. H. N. II, 8, p. 14 Gr.: *Saturni sidus gelidae ac rigentis esse naturae, multoque eo inferiorem Iovis circulum . . .; tertium Martis, quod quidam Herculis vocant, ignei, ardentis a Solis vicinitate . . .; huius ardore nimio et rigore Saturni interiectum ambobus ex utroque temperari Iovem, salutaremque fieri.*

117. 13. **duae Soli oboediant,** *i.e.* Venus and Mercury, which, as being nearest the sun and regulated by it in their motion, are subject to it.

117. 14. **Luna** &c. Plin. H. N. II, 99 and 101, p. 106 ff. treats of the influence of the moon on plants and animals.

47 120 117. 19. **Age;** see note I, 30, 84.

117. 26. **a caulibus,** i.e. *a brassicis*. *Caulis* often occurs in this special signification. See Heindorf on Hor. Sat. II, 4, 15. Hence several Mss. have *brassicis* as a gloss on this passage, which afterwards with a *que* annexed crept into the text. The antipathy between wine and the cabbage is often mentioned, and it was thought that eating cabbage prevented drunkenness. See Geopon. V, 11; Plin. H. N. XX, 9, p. 618; XXIV, 1, p. 860 Gr.

121 117. 30. **coriis tectae.** The so-called pachyderms are meant, to which the elephant, the rhinoceros, the hippopotamus, the swine &c. belong.

117. 31. **squama** like *pluma* is used here in a collective sense, in which *pluma* is often, and *squama* rarely, found. But Juvenal, Sat. IV, 25 says: *hoc pretium squamae*, for *squamarum*, i.e. *piscis squamosi*.

122 118. 6. **altero conatum haberent . . . altero secernerent;** a so-called chiasmus; for the first *altero* refers to *appetitum* last mentioned, and the second to the first mentioned *sensum*.

118. 12. **atque etiam aliorum . . .** As the contrast is between the lower or short-legged and the higher beasts, we should expect after *aliorum* referring to the former a corresponding form referring to the latter; *e.g.* *alia autem, quae altiora sunt* . . . The law of symmetry is neglected, as not seldom happens. Comp. Madvig De Fin., p. 809.

123 118. 15. **manus** is frequently used of the trunk of an elephant, and Lucretius calls the elephant *anguimanus*. It must be noticed that *manus*, like *χείρ*, is often used of the whole arm including the hand; as Plaut. Mil. Glor. II, 4, 7: *dispessis manibus patibulum quom habebis*.

118. 16. **habebat.** The tense is used in reference to the point of time when nature first produced the beasts, and, as an artist does, fitted one piece to another and all parts to the whole. The imperfects that follow are to be explained in the same way.

118. 17. [The Mss. read *aliis generis;* Müller brackets the *generis*, leaving *aliis*, as Cicero seems not to have used the genitive form *alius* except in Inven. II, 6, 21 *res alius modi*, and because many beasts devour their own kind as well as others.]

48 118. 21. **si quid incidit,** "if anything comes in their way"; the allusion is plainly to the spiders that make no net in contrast to those that do so and have just been mentioned. On the various sorts see Plin. H. N. XI, 24; Arist. H. A. IX, 39.

118. 22. **Pina vero . . .** Greek *πίνη* or *πίννη*, a sort of muscle. What Cicero says here and in De Fin. III, 19, 63 of its *societas* with the *squilla*, a small sea-crab, which from its relation to the muscle is called πινοτήρης,

is also stated by Pliny H. N. IX, 42, p. 635; Plut. De Sollert. An. c. 30; and several other writers. According to modern naturalists however the thing is very doubtful.—*pina* of the Mss. after *morsu* must be stricken out; *morsu* belongs to *squillae*.

118. 27. **admirandum est, congressune** &c. *Mirari* and *admirari* 124
not only express a feeling of wonder, but include also the idea of *not understanding;* and as this implies uncertainty, ignorance, both verbs may take after them an indirect question. [Comp. English "I wonder whether" &c. *admiratio* in the next sentence is "matter for admiration, wonder or perplexity."]

118. 32. **anitum** for *anatum*. See Lachmann on Lucret., p. 16.

118. 34. **exclusi fotique** is not a ὕστερον πρότερον; for the *fovere* continues more or less after the *excludere*, as Cicero himself says below c. 52, 129.

119. 3. **platalea.** This name occurs nowhere else. Pliny H. N. X, 49
40, p. 700 calls the bird *platea* and says the same of it as Cicero does here. Aristotle H. An. IX, 10 says of a πελεκᾶς, that he throws up the muscles which he swallowed alive with the shells closed; and then as they are dead and the shells are open he takes out the meat and leaves the shells. It is the meat that Cicero here calls *ea quae sunt esculenta*.—What Pliny and Cicero tell of the robbing of the booty from other birds is told by modern naturalists of a sort of mew, the *Lestris parasitica* or *Larus parasiticus*.—Instead of **in quod ipsa invaderet** the Mss. have *id quod*, evidently an error, because the relative sentence does not serve at all to define the preceding *captum*. Comp. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, 337.

119. 9. **Ranae marinae.** The animal here meant is called by Pliny H. N. IX, 42 *rana piscatrix*, ἁλιεύς in Plut. d. Sollert. An. c. 27, and Antig. Hist. Mir., p. 74 West. It is not properly a frog, but a fish which has some resemblance to a frog, now called *Lonchus piscatorius*. It has on the head a pair of thread-like prolongations with the ends rounded which it makes use of as a sort of bait. Comp. Oppian. Halieut. II, 86. [*Moveri* is used in the middle sense.]

119. 13. **Illud . . . animadversum,** "the fact observed by Aristotle." —**a quo pleraque** sc. *animadversa sunt*. But this observation is not found in the extant works of Aristotle.

119. 19. **ea . . . adiuvatur,** namely, when they fly with the wind blowing from behind; whereas the preceding *aër . . . adversus pellitur* refers to a flight against the wind, when the triangular form of the flock helps the flight. Comp. Plut. ibid. c. 10.—What is said of the birds in the rear laying their heads and necks upon those in front is disputed. It

is a fact however that they relieve each other in leading the train. — [Schoemann reads *una succedit ex iis* and continues this note:] In the Mss. *una* has fallen out because of the foregoing *um*. It is difficult to believe that Cicero himself left out the subject of the sentence.

126 119. 25. [**Iam** introduces something new; *vero* emphasizes it as more important than the preceding; *illa* also calls attention to the points which immediately follow defining it. So in § 127 init.: *Iam illa cernimus, ut* &c. In § 132 *Iam* introduces the last of a series, which is much less common. Sections 132 and 141 are interesting for the use of the particles introducing the several points.]

50 119. 27. **ea quae . . . reperta sunt.** The physicians did not invent the methods which the dog and the ibis make use of, but they devised the application of these methods to the use of men. Cicero's expression is elliptical; the thought would be more fully expressed as follows: *quae . . . reperta sunt, haec a bestiis quoque fieri videmus; nam vomitione canes* &c. Comp. Pliny H. N. XXIX, 4: *vomitiones quoque hoc animal hominibus monstrasse videtur;* also Plutarch c. 20. — [For **Atque** Schoemann reads *At quam* and refer to his Opusc. Ac. III, p. 339.] On **illa . . . quod** see note on III, 7, 17; and on **nuper** above c. 5, 14. — It is pretty generally admitted that dogs cure their indigestions by vomiting, which they produce by eating grass; and in general many beasts possess the instinct, when they are sick or wounded, of eating or doing whatever will cure them; and so the *purgationes* of the ibis may be quite true. But we can hardly believe what is next said of the panthers and wild goats, especially the falling out of the arrows after the animals have eaten dictamnus. Still both circumstances are related by several ancient authors.

127 120. 4. **odoris foeditate.** The skunk cannot be meant, as that animal is found only in America; but there are several European animals that possess the property of producing bad odors when they are under the influence of fear.

51 120. 8. **arborum omniumque rerum** &c., "of trees and all other plants." So very often the genus is subjoined to the individual or the species by the simple copula; as *Pindarus novemque lyrici . . . magni Iovis et deorum nuntius;* and similar examples in Burmann on Petron. c. 2. In the absence of a word embracing the whole genus of vegetable growths, — for *planta* denotes only slips, layers, &c., — Cicero either uses *stirpes*, which properly denotes only the trunk of the plant, or he adopts a circumlocution. As here, so in c. 33, 83; and similarly c. 10, 26 and 28. Comp. Ad. Famil. VII, 26, 2: *terra nata;* and Madvig De Fin. IV, 5, 13.

120. 20. **eoque,** namely *cibo, fingit animal;* the seed devotes all the 128
nourishment which it accumulates to the development of the germ. — **saeptum,** sc. *locis,* i.e. *utero.*

120. 31. **aqua et sustinentur et fetum fundunt;** a sort of zeug- 129
ma, for the ablative *aqua* properly goes only with *sustinentur;* with *fetum fundunt* it would be *in aqua.*

120. 34. **nascuntur et educantur.** Grammatically of course only **52**
ova can be taken as the subject; but the reader naturally understands the young ones creeping forth from the eggs.

121. 12. **tota aestate;** a hundred days, during the whole three summer 130
months. Pliny H. N. V, 9, p. 269: *Incipit (Nilus) crescere luna nova, quae post solstitium est, sensim modiceque, cancrum sole transeunte; abundantissime autem, leonem; et residit in virgine iisdem quibus accrevit modis. In totum autem revocatur intra ripas in libra, ut tradit Herodotus, centesimo die.* See Herod. II, 19.

121. 14. **Mesopotamiam . . . Euphrates.** The Euphrates annually overflowed its low banks when the snow melted on the mountains of Armenia, where it takes its rise. Dams and canals served to restrain the inundation. See Arrian. Exp. Al. VII, 21, 3. Heeren, Ideen &c. 2 Ausg. (1805) I, p. 772.

121. 15. **Indus . . . maximus.** Several of the ancients, as Arrian Ind. c. 4, expressly state that the Ganges is larger than the Indus; but the largest rivers of Europe and Africa, the Danube and the Nile, are smaller than the Indus. Id. ibid. c. 3. — Of the inundations of this and the neighboring rivers Strabo speaks in XV, 1, p. 692; but what Cicero says of the sowing that results is not found anywhere else; and it cannot be determined what the *semina frumenti similia* were. Strabo ibid., p. 694 mentions a wheat-like grain that grew wild in the land of the Musicani east of the Indus. Comp. besides Theophr. Hist. Pl. IV, 5: φέρει δὲ (ἡ Ἰνδία) καὶ σπέρματα ἴδια, τὰ μὲν τοῖς χεδρόποις (pulse) ὅμοια, τὰ δὲ τοῖς πυροῖς καὶ ταῖς κριθαῖς· and further on, γένος ἀγρίων κριθῶν ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἄρτον ἡδεῖς καὶ χονδρὸς καλός. And Pliny H. N. XVIII, 7, p. 431: *hordeum silvestre, ex quo panis apud eos praecipuus.*

121. 25. **ventos Etesias.** This was the designation of the winds **53** 131
which rise at a definite time and blow continuously for a season from the same quarter; especially the northwest winds, which generally blow from the summer solstice to the dog-days. See Forbiger Handb. d. Alten Geogr. I, p. 619.

121. 29. **aestus maritimi.** See note c. 7, 19. [Schoemann reads 132

mutuo for [**multum**] and remarks:] instead of *mutuo* perhaps *multum* should be read; the Mss. have *multum*. [Kayser: *motu lunae*, apud Baiter II.]

121. 29. **montes vestiti atque silvestres;** the second expression to define more nearly the first. Comp. c. 64, 161: *vestitusque densissimos montium*.

121. 31. [For **utilitates,** a conjecture of H. A. Koch, Schoemann reads *dotes*.]—**dotes denique innumerabiles,** "in short, gifts without number" with which the earth is provided, and which serve mankind partly for nourishment and partly for other necessities of life (*ad victum et ad vitam*). *Denique* is regularly used to close with a general and comprehensive term an enumeration of several particulars.—**artes,** which is the reading of the Mss. for *dotes*, is an error in copying which often occurs; see Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, 340; had Cicero mentioned the arts here, he would have erred in putting together things which should remain distinct. For the arts are invented by man; this capacity of invention is all that nature has given him; they should therefore not be thrown together with the salutary and useful phenomena and products of nature, which by their *dotes*, the properties with which nature has endowed them, are useful and valuable to men. Moreover the arts are afterwards mentioned in their proper place, c. 59, 148. *Dotes* is precisely the word for the sense required here. [*Dotes* is a conjecture of Schoemann.]

54 134 122. 15. **os . . . spiritu augetur,** "the mouth is gifted with breath"; for *augeri aliqua re* is never used except of things which are to one's advantage, useful or agreeable. But the old physiologists themselves would hardly have acknowledged that the breath was especially of advantage to the mouth; rather as Cicero himself says, c. 55, 136, the breath is the *cibus animalis, quo maxime aluntur animantes*.

122. 17. [For [**ab iis**] Schoemann writes *ab his* without brackets and gives this note:] *manditur ab his. ab his* might have been left out here, but still it is defensible. See Opusc. Ac. III, p. 372.

122. 18. **adversi dentes** are the front teeth, as *adversum corpus* the front of the body.

135 122. 21. **stomachus,** the œsophagus; not the stomach proper, but the way to it. Celsus IV, 1: *deinde duo intinera incipiunt; alterum asperam arteriam nominant, alterum stomachum; arteria exterior ad pulmonem, stomachus interior ad ventriculum fertur.*

122. 22. **tosillas,** tonsils, the glands at the back of the mouth at the commencement of the œsophagus. *Colles faucium spectantes uvam* (the *uvula*), Lact. De Opif. Dei, c. 11, 9.

122\. 24. **depulsum . . . depellit.** The use of the same word twice at so short an interval, where it would have been easy to use, for *depellit*, perhaps *deglutit*, or for *depulsum*, *depressum* (as Bünemann on Lact. De Opif. Dei, c. 10, 16 proposed), is evidently a fault which is only explained by the haste and carelessness with which Cicero wrote this part of the book devoted to anatomy, and of which there are many other traces. Comp. note on c. 58, 145.

122\. 31. **quodam operculo,** the epiglottis, Gr. ἐπιγλωττίς. See Gell. 136
XVII, 11 where various views are mentioned in regard to its use.

122\. 33. **alvi natura.** Comp. De Fin. V, 11, 33: *hoc intellegant, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt;* Lucret. I, 276: *cum mollis aquae fertur natura repente flumine abundanti.* It is easy to see that such a circumlocution would not be everywhere admissible; it is only so where the object is considered in respect to its natural constitution and purpose.—**alvus** means here the stomach, but farther on (*multiplex et tortuosa*) the bowels; the term therefore includes both the *ventriculus* and the *intestina. Alvus superior* is used for the stomach in Cato R. R. 156. Greek ἡ ἄνω κοιλία and ἡ κάτω κοιλία.

122\. 34. **pulmones et cor . . . spiritum ducant.** The part which the heart was supposed to bear in the process of breathing is given more definitely below c. 55, 138. It is of course one of the many errors in this part of the book; to note them all would require too much space and be of little use.

123\. 9. [The Mss. have *in re spiritu* which Lamb, Schoemann and 55
Müller correct to *in respiratu,* Madvig and Baiter to *intrante spiritu.*] **tum se contrahunt adspirantes, tum in respiratu dilatant.** Above c. 54, 136 the word *respiret* is plainly used of *breathing out*, exhaling the air already in the lungs; and likewise below in § 138. *Adspirare* however in cases where it seems to mean this really means only the breathing upon something, *adflare, adhalare,* as De Div. I, 36, 79, where the influences are spoken of *quae fiunt ex disparili adspiratione terrarum.* Comp. ibid. 57, 130; and above c. 33, 83 *adspiratio aeris* where the point is not so much the *inhaling* as the influence of the air which is necessary to the growth of animals in breathing and in other ways. *Respirare* too is never used really for *inhaling* as opposed to *exhaling*, but only of breathing in general, the *spiritus reciprocatio* (Gell. XVII, 11, 4) in which the others alternate; or it means to recover the breath after the breathing has been for a time interrupted. In the present passage Cicero meant by *adspirantes* only the breathing upon something. He avoided the word

exspirantes because this is ordinarily used only of dying. *Respiratus* can only mean in this passage *inhaling* the air, and so differs from *respirare* in the passages above referred to. The form *respiratus* is found elsewhere only in Apulei. Met. IV, 15: *parvis respiratui circa nares et oculos datis foraminibus;* where, as is seen, the breathing in general is spoken of, like the Gr. ἀναπνοή. Madvig conjectures *intrante spiritu* for *in respiratu.*

[The passage is singularly confused. Dr. Kühner (Wesen der Götter, Uebers. ü. Erkl., p. 228 note) considers *adspiratione aeris* in 33, 83 as clearly meaning the inhalation of the air. If we suppose Cicero in the present passage to have stated the facts correctly, he must mean by *adspirantes* "exhaling," and by *in respiratu* "inhaling the air"; and if so, he uses the terms very carelessly. Dr. Kühner however thinks that he used the terms in the usual sense, and misunderstood the facts; that is, that he really thought the lungs contracted by inhalation, and expanded by exhalation. Prof. Schoemann in his second edition seems to think that the terms are used in the ordinary sense, but that Cicero from mere carelessness says the contrary of what he should have said.]

137 123. 18. **ad quas omnes eius viae pertinent,** i.e. *omnes sanguinis viae.* The prevailing view of the ancient physiologists was that the liver was the central organ for the veins, and that it turned the *chylus* into blood and passed it on to the veins. Comp. Galen. De Usu Part. XVI, 1, 10, 14.

123. 19. **per quas lapsus cibus,** *i.e.* the food changed into blood, the chyle which has become blood.

138 123. 33. **spiritus per arterias.** This view was the prevailing one before Galen. It was supposed that the air entered not only the lungs but the left chamber of the heart, and passed from thence into the arteries. Galen in a special essay proved that the arteries also contained blood.

139 123. 34. **toto corpore** = *per totum corpus.* Comp. § 141 *toto corpore . . . fusus.*

124. 2. [**finiendos.** Heindorf conjectured *fingendos.*]

124. 5. **qui . . . a corde tracti.** The idea that the nerves proceeded from the heart was refuted by Galen, as an error held by many (among them by Aristotle), in the book De Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. lib. I. But *nervi,* like νεῦρα, denotes also the tendons and sinews, called by later writers *tendines,* σύνδεσμα; and Cicero in this sense says: *nervos, a quibus artus continentur.* Comp. Philipson. ὕλη ἀνθρωπ., p. 12; and Anke in Philol. XXXII, p. 590.

56
140 124. 6. **ad hanc providentiam;** an abbreviated expression for *ad haec, quae de providentia dixi.* — The following **a dis** (or *a deo* in older editions) is not genuine. If Cicero had really written that, he certainly

would not have continued *quae . . . constituit*, but *qui constituerunt*. Perhaps he really wrote *ab ea*, i.e. *a naturae providentia*.

124. 9. **humo excitatos** &c. Comp. De Leg. I, 9, 26: *nam cum ceteras animantes* (*natura*) *abiecisset ad pastum, solum hominem erexit, ad caelique quasi cognationis domiciliique pristini conspectum excitavit.*

124. 11. **ex terra homines . . .** *ex terra*, standing at the beginning, properly goes with *spectatores* in the second member which Cicero had in mind on commencing the sentence, though he inserted for the sake of contrast the negative member, *non ut incolae.*

124. 19. **[in] sublime**; see note c. 16, 44.—**iudicium magnum** 141
earum est, "their judgment is of great importance." Comp. c. 58, 146; De Orat. III, 59, 222: *oculorum magna est moderatio*, is of great significance.

124. 26. **omnesque minimos . . . adpulsus,** "all, even the slightest impressions." Comp. above I, 24, 67: *omnibus minimis temporum punctis;* III, 35, 86: *omnia minima curant;* De Fin. V, 29, 88: *nec ullo minimo momento.*

124. 32. **primum . . . saepsit; quas primum perlucidas fecit.** 57 142
Sed lubricos oculos fecit corresponds to the first *primum; firmas autem* to the second. The use of *primum* twice in this way is a fault which might have been avoided with more care.

124. 34. **ut continerentur.** It is a little doubtful what the subject of this verb is, *oculi* or *membranae*. It comes however to the same thing; for the *membranae*, which Cicero means, are the exterior parts of the eye itself, the cornea. By means of its hardness and stiffness it maintains its form (*continetur*) so as not to be dispersed or put out of place.

125. 1. **pupula,** also *pupilla*, the pupil, Gr. κόρη, of the picture which is represented in it; ἐν ᾧ τὸ εἴδωλον ἀντιλάμπει τοῦ βλέποντος. Plutarch De Fac. in Orb. Lun. c. 27.

125. 8. **et somno coniventibus** etc. The reading of the Mss. in this 143
passage contains so gross a violation of grammatical construction that it is difficult to believe that Cicero really wrote it so. After *coniventibus*, whether taken as abl. abs. or dat., a clause ought to follow with some other subject than *oculi;* such is not the case, but instead of it comes *utque quiescerent*. Nothing can be made of this *utque*, or *ut qui* as some Mss. have it; it must have crept in through an oversight. But the copyists, misled by the preceding *apertis*, have written *coniventibus* instead of *coniventes* (*coniventeis*) sc. *oculi*, as Cicero wrote; in this way we gain the necessary subject to *quiescerent*. In the intervening sentence *quam . . . egeremus* the pronoun *eis* would have been enough. The use of the sub-

stantive itself, *oculis*, in its place may be compared with similar examples such as are given in c. 9, 25 note.

[This passage is quoted by Isidorus, Etymolog. XI, 39 ed. Migne, and runs thus: *Munitae sunt autem* (*palpebrae*) *vallo capillorum, ut et apertis oculis, si quid inciderit, repellatur, et somno conniventibus, tanquam involuti quiescant latentes.* In our text we have changed † *ut qui* of Müller and the Mss. to *ut ii*, — taking the sense of the passage to be this: l. 8, *et somno coniventibus* (sc. *palpebris*), *cum oculis ad cernendum non egeremus, ut ii* (sc. *oculi*) *tamquam involuti quiescerent.*]

144 125. 17. **ne quid intrare possit, si pateret.** The elliptical expression might be supplemented by *quod fieret* or *fieri posset, si pateret.* So Gell. V, 19: *tam iure legeque filius siet, quam si ex eo patre natus esset*, i.e. *quam esset filius, si* . . . Comp. Kühner on Tusc. V, 33, 96.

125. 24. **his naturis** = *rebus huius naturae.*

125. 25. **testudine . . . aut cornu.** In stringed instruments the strings are stretched sometimes over a hollow body, *testudo*, as in the case of the *cithara* (guitar), sometimes between two hollow arms, as in the case of the *lyra*. These were called *cornua*. See § 149.

58
145 125. 35. **multa cernunt subtilius,** sc. *quam bestiae.* The comparative is used in all languages in such a way that for the other side of the comparison one must supply not a positive, but a negative. See Nitzsch on Plato's Ion, p. 66. Here we must supplement *subtilius quam bestiae, quae nihil subtiliter cernunt.*

126. 1. **tum venustatem.** The *tum* is awkward, because there is no corresponding *tum* afterwards and it cannot be taken as correlative to the preceding *primum*, unless with Hand Tursell. I, p. 766 we strike out the words *colorum etiam et figurarum* as a spurious addition. Perhaps some old reader wrote on the margin *tum* for the following *atque*, and copyists afterwards inserted it in the text in the wrong place. — The word **decentia** is of Cicero's coinage, as the *ut ita dicam* indicates, in order to express the idea of εὐπρέπεια better than could be done by *venustas* and *ordo*. [Schoemann reads *et figurarum tum venustatem*, the common reading. Müller thinks something has been lost, perhaps *cum* . . . corresponding to *tum*.]

126. 4. **timidumque cognoscunt.** One or the other *cognoscunt* might have been omitted or something else, like *dignoscunt*, been used in its place, but the haste of the writer is evident too in this repetition.

146 126. 7. **intervalla, distinctio.** The former denotes the differences of tone in respect to pitch, in English "intervals," διαστήματα ὀξύτητός τε περὶ καὶ βαρύτητος (Schneider Ecl. Phys., p. 310); the latter probably

refers to the specific difference of the tones of different voices or instruments, the tone-colour, Germ. *Klangfarbe*, Fr. *timbre*.—**Canorum** indicates a full-sounding, melodious voice, as opposed to *fuscum*, a muffled, indistinct one; but the former is elsewhere called by a term transferred from colour *vox candida*, a bright, clear voice, *serena* in Pers. Sat. I, 9 (comp. Heinrich's note).—**Leve, asperum,** the soft voice that falls pleasantly on the ear as contrasted with the rough and unpleasant.—**Flexibile, durum,** the flexible voice, that passes easily through the various changes and gradations of tone, opposed to that which is stiff and unmanageable. The other two terms **grave** and **acutum** refer to the pitch; the bass and treble voices.

126. 10. **gustandi et . . . tangendi** for *gustus et tactus;* the gerund instead of the verbal substantive. On *magna iudicia* comp. c. 56, 141.—[**pariter et,** Heindorf and Schoemann, for † *et parte*, Müller; Baiter II *et arte*.]

126. 13. **ciborum conditiones** = *conditurae*, from *condire*.

126. 15. **mentem,** the intellectual faculty in general; **rationem,** the 59 147
faculty of judging and reasoning; **consilium,** that of devising the means for any given end; **prudentiam,** that of forming an opinion of any particular matter, acquired by observation and experience.—Farther on **intellegentia** is the faculty of perception; **consequentium rerum coniunctio et conprehensio,** the capacity of grouping and comprehending things which belong together; so that *conprehensio* has a meaning here somewhat different from its usual one which corresponds, like *perceptio*, to the Stoic κατάληψις; so **conprendimus** immediately below.

126. 21. **idque ratione** [bracketed by Schoemann]; a suspicious addition. The meaning can only be "and in fact by means of the reason," which is precisely the faculty of forming judgments; or "and in fact conformably to reason," that is, properly, logically. Cicero possibly wrote *et qua ratione*, "by grouping together what belongs together we form conclusions as to what follows and to what extent it follows from a given premise."

126. 25. **quae vos . . . infirmatis,** an allusion to the scepticism of the Academy. See Introd., p. 13. He uses the plural to include not only the opinion contained in the clause with *quod*, but also the arguments which follow. Comp. III, 7, 17.

126. 29. **ut vos soletis dicere,** *i.e.* you and your professional brethren, 148
the orators. In regard to Cotta as an orator see Introd., p. 17; and with the following eulogy on eloquence comp. De Orat. I, 8; De Invent. I, 2.

127. 4. **vox principium a mente ducens . . .** To understand this 149

as the Stoic did one must remember that according to Chrysippus, from whom this portion of the argument is doubtless directly or indirectly taken, the thinking faculty resided in the breast, in the heart, and thus close to the lungs. See Galen. De Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. II, 3 sq., and III, 8. The thought is formed here as *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and comes forth as speech, *λόγος προφορικός*, through the organs of speech. — The Mss. have **percipitur** instead of *percietur* [the reading in Schoemann's text].

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150 127. 13. **molles commissuras et artus,** "the movable, pliant connections and joints"; for which he might have said *commissuras artuum*. *Artus* are really the same as *articuli*, Gr. ἄρθρα, although the word is afterwards used for the members of the body; *mollis* is originally equivalent to *mobilis*, from which it is derived; the meaning "soft" is only a secondary one.

151 127. 24. **condita** is here more probably from *condere* than from *condire*. The salting and especially the conserving, *condire*, of alimentary substances is usual only to a limited extent; the laying aside however, *condere*, is general; and the most important substances, the grains and vegetables, need no conserving. Comp. too c. 62, 156 and 63, 157.

127. 25. **vescimur . . . capiendo** is an inexactness of expression worth noticing, for *quas capimus, alimus* or *quae capiuntur, aluntur*.

127. 31. [**ferrum eligimus**; Mss. *elicimus*. So in 130. 26 for *remedia eligamus* the common reading is *eliciamus*. In Tusc. III, § 83 *stirpes aegritudinis . . . eligendae sunt* and in III, § 84 *fibrae stirpium . . . eligendae sunt* the reading of the Mss. *eligendae* is now accepted instead of the common *elidendae*. In Div. II, § 149 where the common reading was *superstitionis stirpes omnes eiciendae* Madvig and Baiter adopt *eligendae*. Müller proposes to read *eligimus* and *eligamus* in our text; the last is in fact the reading of Ms. A; the former has no Ms. authority.]

127. 32. **venas penitus abditas.** These words form the second half of a trochaic tetrameter, and it is quite possible that not only here but in De Offic. II, 3, 13 Cicero had in mind a passage from some poet. Still the metre may have been only a matter of chance. Comp. note c. 9, 25;

also the passage I, 19, 40: *Epicúrus autem qui res occultás et penitus ábditas* might be taken for an iambic tetrameter.

128. 2. **adfert.** The subject *arborum consectio omnisque materia* is 152
to be supplied from the preceding sentence.

128. 19. **pietas cui coniuncta iustitia est.** *Pietas* according to the 61 153
definition given I, 41, 116 is itself *iustitia adversum deos.* **reliquaeque virtutes** refers to the connection of all the virtues one with another, the *coniunctio confusioque virtutum* as Cicero says De Fin. V, 23, 67, which is often mentioned as a cardinal principle of the Stoic ethical philosophy. Comp. Diog. Laert. VII, 125: *τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν.*

128. 20. **par et similis.** These expressions are frequently used together to express complete similarity in every respect. The difference between them is that *par* indicates the value, importance or power of a thing, *similis* its constitution, external or internal. Quintilian X, 1, 102 speaking of Sallust and Livy says that they were *pares magis quam similes, i.e.* equal in worth, though different in character; and Seneca De Ira I, 9 speaking of the passions says: *quos (affectus) numquam deprimere possis, nisi pares illis similesque opposueris, i.e.* passions equally strong and like in kind.

128. 20. **deorum** for *vitae deorum;* a short mode of expression quite common in comparative sentences, where in comparing together the attributes of two objects the object itself is mentioned in the second member of the comparison instead of its attribute. Comp. Cic. pro Flac. c. 26: *cuius ego civitatis disciplinam atque gravitate non solum Graeciae, sed haud scio an cunctis gentibus anteponam;* De Repub. II, 1: *praestare nostrae civitatis statum ceteris civitatibus;* De Orat. I, 4: *ingenia nostrorum hominum multum ceteris hominibus omnium gentium praestiterunt.*—The opinion, that the wise man (and he alone can enjoy the *vita beata*) is inferior to the gods only in the duration of his happiness, is characteristic of the Stoic philosophy. Seneca Epist. 73: *Iuppiter quo antecedit virum bonum? diutius bonus est. Sapiens nihilo se minoris aestimat, quod virtutes eius spatio breviore clauduntur;* comp. Ep. 77: *quomodo fabula sic vita: non quam diu, sed quam bene acta sit, refert;* Cic. De Fin. III, 14, 46: *Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda beata vita, si sit longa quam si brevis.* Further examples in Gataker on Antonin. III, 7.

128. 26. **omnia hominum causa . . .** This opinion is also distinc- 154
tively Stoic. Comp. Cic. De Fin. III, 20, 67; De Offic. I, 7, 22; De Leg. I, 8, 25; and other examples in Upton on Epictet. I, 6, 1. Pliny too,

although no Stoic, says H. N. VII, procem: *Hominis causa videtur cuncta alia genuisse natura;* and the Christian Lactantius, De Ira Dei, c. 14, says: *vera est sententia Stoicorum, qui aiunt nostra causa mundum esse constructum; omnia enim, quibus constat mundus, ad utilitatem hominis accommodata sunt;* on the other hand Seneca more modestly and rightly says, De Ira II, 27: *nimis nos suspicimus, si digni nobis videmur, propter quos tanta moveantur.* [Comp. Montaigne, Essais, Liv. II, c. 12.]

62 128. 28. **deorum hominumque causa.** Comp. above c. 6, 16. The following phrase *quaeque . . . inventa sunt* is probably spurious, because it contains only a gratuitous and jarring repetition of what was just said; moreover *inventa*, which can only refer to discoveries made by man, seems out of place here where the discourse turns only on the provident care of creative nature.—The following proposition in regard to the world as a state common to gods and men was a favorite idea with the Stoics, constantly repeated. See especially Arius in Euseb. pr. Evang. XV, 15: ὁ κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν θεῶν μὲν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων, τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων· κοινωνίαν δ' ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος. Comp. Cic. De Leg. I, 7, 23; De Fin. III, 19, 64. In the Herculanean Fragment Col. IV, 22 it is ascribed to Chrysippus, in the third book περὶ φύσεως.

155 129. 2. **ad mundi cohaerentiam.** See note to c. 32, 82.—**tamen et spectaculum . . .** is not for *etiam spectaculum*, but points to something which Cicero was about to add in opposition but afterwards forgot, or at least does not bring in the corresponding form. He might have said: *et magnam hominum vitae utilitatem afferunt: eorum enim cursus dimetati* &c. As it is, this last proposition, introduced by *enim*, follows as a proof of the remark immediately preceding in regard to the regularity and ingenious adaptation observable in the movements of the heavenly bodies. For it is just this which has made it possible for mankind to measure time rightly.—The words **ad rationem sollertiamque praestantior** are not to be interpreted by supplying *incitandam*, as if the question were of arousing the reflection and inventive power of man by the observation of the heavenly bodies. *Praestans ad aliquam rem* means: "excellent in regard to (on account of) something"; as in De Leg. II, 13, 33: *multa ad veritatem admirabilia:* "prophecies wonderful in regard to their truthfulness"; Pro Fontei. 15: *vir ad usum et disciplinam peritus, ad casum fortunamque felix:* "an experienced man as regards practice and knowledge, a lucky one as regards chance and fortune."—On **insatiabilior** see note c. 39, 98.

129. 8. **vario leguminum genere.** By this are to be understood

chiefly leguminous plants; not however exclusively, but according to Varro R. R. I, 23, 2 those *quae velluntur e terra, non subsecantur; quae, quod ita leguntur, legumina dicta;* and 32, 2: *dicta a legendo, quod ea non secantur sed vellendo leguntur.* Gr. *χέδροποι, χέδροπα* or *χέδροπες*, which is considered as a corruption of *χέρδροποι*, from *χείρ* and *δρέπω*. Comp. Nicand. Theriac. 652; Ideler, Arist. Meteor. II, p. 526.

129. 23. **nisi forte . . . dubitationem adfert, quin . . .** To under- 63 158
stand the clause with *quin* properly we must bear in mind that the sense of the preceding one is: *nam non sane dubitationem affert.*

129. 27. **bestias hominum gratia.** What the Academic might have replied to this may be gathered, since the corresponding passage in the third book is lost, from Porphyrius De Abst. III, 20. See also what Celsus says and what Origen ctr. Cels. IV, 74 answers.

129. 30. **neque alii . . . potuissent.** This pluperfect is often used in this way instead of the imperfect, inasmuch as the possibility of the thing is represented as the condition which must be fulfilled before the thing itself can take place. Comp. De Offic. II, 3, 12: *neque enim valetudinis curatio neque agri cultura . . . sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset;* Ibid. c. 4, 15: *quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla esse potuisset.* In the same way *audire potuisses*, above I, 21, 57, is to be explained; and *si potuero*, often used for *si potero* is to be regarded from the same point of view.

[The possibility of happening would seem to be a necessary condition to the actual happening of any thing whatever; otherwise it would never happen. The idea of possibility lies here not in the tense, but in the very signification of the word *potuissent;* and the difference between *potuissent* and *possent* is that the former represents the possibility as existing at some earlier time. The idea seems to be that if it were not for the care of men sheep not only would not now be able to exist and flourish, but would never have been able to do so at any time, *according to the original ordinance of nature.*]

129. 35. **se esse generatos.** *Eos* would have been more correct: but the reflexive is used because *canes*, though not grammatically the subject, is thought of as such, being implied in *canum custodia.*

130. 4. **ab illo aureo genere.** Aratus, whom Cicero has in mind 159
here, and from whom he quotes the following verses 130 ff., says of the golden age, v. 110: *αὔτως δ' ἔζωον, χαλεπὴ δ' ἀπέκειτο θάλασσα, καὶ βίον οὔπω νῆες ἀπόπροθεν ἠγίνεσκον, ἀλλὰ βόες καὶ ἄροτρα* &c.; but according to others (as Hesiod W. & D. v. 117; Virgil, Georg. I, 125; Ovid, Met. I, 101) the *earth produced* in abundance in that age all sorts of fruits spon-

taneously and without culture; the necessity for culture came up at a later period.

130. 10. **eorum visceribus.** See note c. 6, 18.— Varro R. R. II, 5; Aelian. V. H. V, 14 and others state that in ancient times it was considered wrong to kill an ox in Italy and Greece, and it was forbidden under severe punishment. Pliny H. N. VIII, 45, p. 556 narrates that at Rome a man was once punished with exile for this crime. The ox was only rarely offered in sacrifice to the gods, under particular circumstances. See Hermann Gottesd. Alterth. § 26, 20 or Schoemann Griech. Alterth. II^3, p. 245.

64 160 130. 14. **animam pro sale** &c. This is cited as a saying of Cleanthes by Clemens Alex. Strom. VII, p. 304 Sylb.; as a saying of various Stoics by Plutarch Sympos. V, 10, 3; and by many others. See Villoison Theol. Phys. Stoic. at the end of Osann's edition of Cornutus, p. 396.

130. 20. **alites et oscines.** Festus, p. 3 Müll.: *alites volatu auspicia facientes;* id., p. 196: *oscines aves ore auspicium facientes.*

130. 21. **res augurare** was said either of things which were consecrated and placed under the protection of the gods by taking the auspices, or of undertakings for which one secured the divine approval (*auctoritas*) by the same means.

161 130. 23. **exerceamur in venando** &c. Other authors speak in the same way of hunting, as Xenophon De Ven. 1, 18, and especially 12, 1: *τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει*: and the subject is treated in detail.

130. 25. **remedia . . . eligamus.** [Schoem. reads *eliciamus*, and says:] We gain from them medicinal remedies by investigation and labor, as above c. 60, 151: *e terrae cavernis ferrum elicimus* [for *eligimus* of our text]. *eligamus*, which is found in the Mss. is far less appropriate, and certainly only a slip of the pen.

65 162 131. 1. **Cotta, quia Carneades** &c. See note I, 2, 4.

131. 2. **nihil tam inridet Epicurus.** See above I, 20, 55. Diog. L. X, 135: *μαντικὴν δὴ ἅπασαν ἀναιρεῖ, καί φησι μαντικὴ ὡς ἀνύπαρκτος.* Of course conformably with his opinion about the gods he could not judge differently.

163 131. 6. **multa augures provident.** The reading of some Mss. *praevident*, approved by many, is probably an error, not because the word is never used by Cicero, as has been too quickly assumed, but because it is out of place here. The augurs in Rome were not prophets: *non enim sumus ii nos augures*, says Cic. De Div. II, 33, 70, *qui avium reliquorumque signorum observatione futura dicamus.* The signs, which they ob-

served, were regarded only as indications whether the gods were favorable or not to any proposed undertaking; they were supposed, as it is expressed in De Harusp. Resp. c. 9, to give *rerum bene gerendarum auctoritatem*, a guaranty for the successful issue; and when the *praedictis augurum* are spoken of we are to understand not prophecies of future events, but only general assurances of a happy issue, or warnings against disaster. *Aves eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos*, De Div. II, 37, 79. So here *provident* is to be taken only of the care on the part of the augurs that nothing should be undertaken against the wish of the gods as ascertained by the auspices. How important their sphere of action was may be seen from Cic. De Leg. II, 12, 31.

131. 7. **vaticinationibus,** the utterances of inspired seers, like those of the Sibylline books which passed at Rome for state oracles, those of the old *Marcii fratres* and others. See De Div. I, 2, 4; 40, 89.

131. 8. **multae saepe res . . . partae.** The sense is: warnings and prognostics of this sort make it possible for men to attain many things according to their desires (*ex sententia*), and to further their interests (*utilitates*). *utilitates* serves to define the general expression *res*. The reading of the Mss. *hominum sententia* (without *ex*) *atque utilitate* is evidently an error. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 378.

131. 10. **sive vis sive ars sive natura;** a power bestowed by the gods, a skill gained by observation, or a natural gift. Comp. De Div. I, 6, 11: *duo sunt divinandi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae*. The first includes divination from signs, as that by the haruspices, the augurs, the astrologers and those who divined by means of the *sortes* (see III, 6, 14 note); the second includes the interpretation of visions, the divine inspiration, *instinctus inflatusque divinus*, which last is in the present passage denoted by *vis*.

131. 20. **ab huiusce terrae continuatione distantium,** i.e. *ab hoc orbe terrarum*, from the portion of the earth which we inhabit, and which, as is said in the following section, forms a large island. There were thought to be four of these islands, *orbes terrarum*, οἰκούμεναι, separated by the great sea; one inhabited by Europeans and their συνοίκοις; the second in the same hemisphere, but in the southern half, the inhabitants of which were called ἄντοικοι; the third and fourth in the northern and southern half of the opposite hemisphere, the inhabitants of which were called περίοικοι and ἀντίποδες of the Europeans. See Cleomed. I, p. 16 and Bake's note, p. 291 ff. 66 164

131. 33. **neminem nisi iuvante deo . . .** The wisest and best of antiquity at all times held that men needed the divine assistance in order to 165

attain to a high degree of virtue, and that the gods willingly gave this assistance to the good; although especially since the sophists there were many who acknowledged only the external good things of life as the gift of the gods. In this sense Cicero represents Cotta as speaking below III, 26.

166 132. 3. **quales supra commemoravi,** c. 2, 5.—**saepe praesentiae;** adverb for adjective.

167 132. 10. **ita refellendum.** The pronoun, left out by the copyists, is indispensable. *Refellendum* relates to the preceding assertion of the care of the gods for men. This divine care, says Balbus, is not to be disproved by adducing such misfortunes as are here mentioned, and then representing them as evidences of the divine anger; or in case they fall upon the good, towards whom the gods can have no hostile feeling, by representing them as proofs that the gods have no thought for the affairs of men.

132. 13. **Magna di curant, parva neglegunt.** The same idea is contained in a verse of Euripides cited by Plutarch Praec. Pol. c. 15: *τῶν ἀγαν μὲν ἅπτεται Θεός, τὰ μικρὰ δ' εἰς τύχην ἀνεὶς ἐᾷ.* Comp. Antonin. VII, 75. Upton's note to Epictet. I, 12, 1.

132. 14. **Magnis viris prosperae semper eveniunt omnes res,** *i.e.* to the wise, the virtuous; for according to the Stoic doctrine virtue sufficed for their happiness, and external things could not make them happy or unhappy. This reason is indicated in the following phrase: *si quidem satis dictum est* &c., which is equivalent to *ad hanc rem demonstrandam satis dictum est;* this however the speaker does not mention to establish the truth of the proposition *magnis . . . res,* but only as his own justification for asserting it.

67
168 132. 20. **in utramque partem . . . disputare.** Comp. Tusc. II, 3, 9: *Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in tontrarias partes disserendi.*

132. 22. **amplificavit Academia.** Cicero often speaks of the advantage derived by an orator from the study of the Academic philosophy from which he would gain the habit of looking at both sides of every subject. Comp. Orat. 3, 12; 21, 80; and De Fato 2, 3.

BOOK THIRD.

137. 11. **Sic mehercule,** "Certainly I do"; *i.e.* of course I have prepared myself well, as I had to do to meet such an antagonist as the Stoic; whereas to meet an Epicurean required no particular preparation. Cotta had said before (§ 1) that he was preparing himself during the discourse of Balbus to reply to it: *quid contra dicerem, meditabar;* and when he remarks there, as well as below in § 4, that he hopes not so much to refute Balbus as to beg for further explanation on several points, we recognize not only the Academic philosopher despairing of further knowledge, but the man of the world paying a compliment; not without a touch of irony too which does not escape Balbus, who answers: *sin me interrogare voles non tam intellegendi causa quam refellendi* &c. *Sic,* instead of *si,* an error of the copyists, is similarly used by Cicero in De Fin. III, 2, 9: *iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, combiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior.—Sic; et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos* &c.; cf. Madvig's note. See also Wopkens Lectt. Tull., p. 171, Hand's note. 1 3

137. 18. **ludere videtur.** Comp. I, 44, 123.

137. 24. [**accepi.** Madvig proposes *cepi,* or rather *percepi.*] 4

138. 5. **ducet oratio.** Comp. c. 17 init. Also *pergit oratio* and *iter sermonis* De Legg. I, 13, 37.

138. 14. **Ti. Coruncanium . . . P. Scaevolam;** see I, 41, 115 note. Scipio here mentioned is P. Cornelius Cn. f. L. n. Scipio Nasica, who was Pontifex Maximus and Consul (563), and was once publicly pronounced by a resolution of the Senate to be the best man in Rome. See Cic. De Fin. V, 22, 64; Livy XXIX, 14, 8. 2 5

138. 16. **C. Laelium,** the famous bosom friend of Scipio Africanus the younger, whom Cicero introduces as the speaker in his discourse on friendship. He was called by his contemporaries the wise man, *sapiens,* and above II, 66, 166 he is mentioned with Coruncanius, Scipio and others as one of the good men especially beloved by the gods. His *oratio nobilis,* alluded to here, was delivered in the year 600 against the proposed law of the tribune L. Licinius Crassus who proposed to abolish the *coöptatio* of the priestly colleges of the *pontifices,* the *augures* and the *decemviri sacris*

as the Stoic did one must remember that according to Chrysippus, from whom this portion of the argument is doubtless directly or indirectly taken, the thinking faculty resided in the breast, in the heart, and thus close to the lungs. See Galen, De Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. II, 3 sq., and III, 8. The thought is formed here as λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and comes forth as speech, λόγος προφορικός, through the organs of speech. — The Mss. have **percipitur** instead of *percietur* [the reading in Schoemann's text].

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155 129. 2. **ad mundi cohaerentiam.** See note to c. 32, 82. — **tamen et spectaculum . . .** is not for *etiam spectaculum*, but points to something which Cicero was about to add in opposition but afterwards forgot, or at least does not bring in the corresponding form. He might have said: *et magnam hominum vitae utilitatem afferunt: eorum enim cursus dimetati* &c. As it is, this last proposition, introduced by *enim*, follows as a proof of the remark immediately preceding in regard to the regularity and ingenious adaptation observable in the movements of the heavenly bodies. For it is just this which has made it possible for mankind to measure time rightly. — The words **ad rationem sollertiamque praestantior** are not to be interpreted by supplying *incitandam*, as if the question were of arousing the reflection and inventive power of man by the observation of the heavenly bodies. *Praestans ad aliquam rem* means: "excellent in regard to (on account of) something"; as in De Leg. II, 13, 33: *multa ad veritatem admirabilia:* "prophecies wonderful in regard to their truthfulness"; Pro Fontei. 15: *vir ad usum et disciplinam peritus, ad casum fortunamque felix:* "an experienced man as regards practice and knowledge, a lucky one as regards chance and fortune." — On **insatiabilior** see note c. 39, 98.

129. 8. **vario leguminum genere.** By this are to be understood

chiefly leguminous plants; not however exclusively, but according to Varro R. R. I, 23, 2 those *quae velluntur e terra, non subsecantur; quae, quod ita leguntur, legumina dicta;* and 32, 2: *dicta a legendo, quod ea non secantur sed vellendo leguntur.* Gr. χέδροποι, χέδροπα or χέδροπες, which is considered as a corruption of χέρδροποι, from χείρ and δρέπω. Comp. Nicand. Theriac. 652; Ideler, Arist. Meteor. II, p. 526.

129. 23. **nisi forte . . . dubitationem adfert, quin . . .** To understand the clause with *quin* properly we must bear in mind that the sense of the preceding one is: *nam non sane dubitationem affert.* 63 158

129. 27. **bestias hominum gratia.** What the Academic might have replied to this may be gathered, since the corresponding passage in the third book is lost, from Porphyrius De Abst. III, 20. See also what Celsus says and what Origen ctr. Cels. IV, 74 answers.

129. 30. **neque ali . . . potuissent.** This pluperfect is often used in this way instead of the imperfect, inasmuch as the possibility of the thing is represented as the condition which must be fulfilled before the thing itself can take place. Comp. De Offic. II, 3, 12: *neque enim valetudinis curatio neque agri cultura . . . sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset;* Ibid. c. 4, 15: *quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla esse potuisset.* In the same way *audire potuisses,* above I, 21, 57, is to be explained; and *si potuero,* often used for *si potero* is to be regarded from the same point of view.

[The possibility of happening would seem to be a necessary condition to the actual happening of any thing whatever; otherwise it would never happen. The idea of possibility lies here not in the tense, but in the very signification of the word *potuissent;* and the difference between *potuissent* and *possent* is that the former represents the possibility as existing at some earlier time. The idea seems to be that if it were not for the care of men sheep not only would not now be able to exist and flourish, but would never have been able to do so at any time, *according to the original ordinance of nature.*]

129. 35. **se esse generatos.** *Eos* would have been more correct: but the reflexive is used because *canes,* though not grammatically the subject, is thought of as such, being implied in *canum custodia.*

130. 4. **ab illo aureo genere.** Aratus, whom Cicero has in mind here, and from whom he quotes the following verses 130 ff., says of the golden age, v. 110: αὔτως δ' ἔζωον, χαλεπὴ δ' ἀπέκειτο θάλασσα, καὶ βίον οὔπω νῆες ἀπόπροθεν ἠγίνεσκον, ἀλλὰ βόες καὶ ἄροτρα &c.; but according to others (as Hesiod W. & D. v. 117; Virgil, Georg. I, 125; Ovid, Met. I, 101) the earth produced in abundance in that age all sorts of fruits spon- 159

taneously and without culture; the necessity for culture came up at a later period.

130. 10. **eorum visceribus.** See note c. 6, 18.— Varro R. R. II, 5; Aelian. V. H. V, 14 and others state that in ancient times it was considered wrong to kill an ox in Italy and Greece, and it was forbidden under severe punishment. Pliny H. N. VIII, 45, p. 556 narrates that at Rome a man was once punished with exile for this crime. The ox was only rarely offered in sacrifice to the gods, under particular circumstances. See Hermann Gottesd. Alterth. § 26, 20 or Schoemann Griech. Alterth. II[3], p. 245.

64
160 130. 14. **animam pro sale** &c. This is cited as a saying of Cleanthes by Clemens Alex. Strom. VII, p. 304 Sylb.; as a saying of various Stoics by Plutarch Sympos. V, 10, 3; and by many others. See Villoison Theol. Phys. Stoic. at the end of Osann's edition of Cornutus, p. 396.

130. 20. **alites et oscines.** Festus, p. 3 Müll.: *alites volatu auspicia facientes;* id., p. 196: *oscines aves ore auspicium facientes.*

130. 21. **res augurare** was said either of things which were consecrated and placed under the protection of the gods by taking the auspices, or of undertakings for which one secured the divine approval (*auctoritas*) by the same means.

161 130. 23. **exerceamur in venando** &c. Other authors speak in the same way of hunting, as Xenophon De Ven. 1, 18, and especially 12, 1: τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει: and the subject is treated in detail.

130. 25. **remedia . . . eligamus.** [Schoem. reads *eliciamus*, and says:] We gain from them medicinal remedies by investigation and labor, as above c. 60, 151: *e terrae cavernis ferrum elicimus* [for *eligimus* of our text]. *eligamus*, which is found in the Mss. is far less appropriate, and certainly only a slip of the pen.

65
162 131. 1. **Cotta, quia Carneades** &c. See note I, 2, 4.

131. 2. **nihil tam inridet Epicurus.** See above I, 20, 55. Diog. L. X, 135: μαντικὴν δὴ ἅπασαν ἀναιρεῖ, καί φησι μαντικὴ ὡς ἀνύπαρκτος. Of course conformably with his opinion about the gods he could not judge differently.

163 131. 6. **multa augures provident.** The reading of some Mss. *praevident*, approved by many, is probably an error, not because the word is never used by Cicero, as has been too quickly assumed, but because it is out of place here. The augurs in Rome were not prophets: *non enim sumus ii nos augures*, says Cic. De Div. II, 33, 70, *qui avium reliquorumque signorum observatione futura dicamus.* The signs, which they ob-

served, were regarded only as indications whether the gods were favorable or not to any proposed undertaking; they were supposed, as it is expressed in De Harusp. Resp. c. 9, to give *rerum bene gerendarum auctoritatem,* a guaranty for the successful issue; and when the *praedictis augurum* are spoken of we are to understand not prophecies of future events, but only general assurances of a happy issue, or warnings against disaster. *Aves eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos,* De Div. II, 37, 79. So here *provident* is to be taken only of the care on the part of the augurs that nothing should be undertaken against the wish of the gods as ascertained by the auspices. How important their sphere of action was may be seen from Cic. De Leg. II, 12, 31.

131. 7. **vaticinationibus,** the utterances of inspired seers, like those of the Sibylline books which passed at Rome for state oracles, those of the old *Marcii fratres* and others. See De Div. I, 2, 4; 40, 89.

131. 8. **multae saepe res . . . partae.** The sense is: warnings and prognostics of this sort make it possible for men to attain many things according to their desires (*ex sententia*), and to further their interests (*utilitates*). *utilitates* serves to define the general expression *res.* The reading of the Mss. *hominum sententia* (without *ex*) *atque utilitate* is evidently an error. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 378.

131. 10. **sive vis sive ars sive natura;** a power bestowed by the gods, a skill gained by observation, or a natural gift. Comp. De Div. I, 6, 11: *duo sunt divinandi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae.* The first includes divination from signs, as that by the haruspices, the augurs, the astrologers and those who divined by means of the *sortes* (see III, 6, 14 note); the second includes the interpretation of visions, the divine inspiration, *instinctus inflatusque divinus,* which last is in the present passage denoted by *vis.*

131. 20. **ab huiusce terrae continuatione distantium,** i.e. *ab hoc* 66 164
orbe terrarum, from the portion of the earth which we inhabit, and which, as is said in the following section, forms a large island. There were thought to be four of these islands, *orbes terrarum,* οἰκούμεναι, separated by the great sea; one inhabited by Europeans and their συνοίκοις; the second in the same hemisphere, but in the southern half, the inhabitants of which were called ἄντοικοι; the third and fourth in the northern and southern half of the opposite hemisphere, the inhabitants of which were called περίοικοι and ἀντίποδες of the Europeans. See Cleomed. I, p. 16 and Bake's note, p. 291 ff.

131. 33. **neminem nisi iuvante deo . . .** The wisest and best of 165
antiquity at all times held that men needed the divine assistance in order to

attain to a high degree of virtue, and that the gods willingly gave this assistance to the good; although especially since the sophists there were many who acknowledged only the external good things of life as the gift of the gods. In this sense Cicero represents Cotta as speaking below III, 26.

166 132. 3. **quales supra commemoravi,** c. 2, 5.—**saepe praesentiae;** adverb for adjective.

167 132. 10. **ita refellendum.** The pronoun, left out by the copyists, is indispensable. *Refellendum* relates to the preceding assertion of the care of the gods for men. This divine care, says Balbus, is not to be disproved by adducing such misfortunes as are here mentioned, and then representing them as evidences of the divine anger; or in case they fall upon the good, towards whom the gods can have no hostile feeling, by representing them as proofs that the gods have no thought for the affairs of men.

132. 13. **Magna di curant, parva neglegunt.** The same idea is contained in a verse of Euripides cited by Plutarch Praec. Pol. c. 15: τῶν ἄγαν μὲν ἅπτεται Θεός, τὰ μικρὰ δ' εἰς τύχην ἀνεὶς ἐᾷ. Comp. Antonin. VII, 75. Upton's note to Epictet. I, 12, 1.

132. 14. **Magnis viris prosperae semper eveniunt omnes res,** *i.e.* to the wise, the virtuous; for according to the Stoic doctrine virtue sufficed for their happiness, and external things could not make them happy or unhappy. This reason is indicated in the following phrase: *si quidem satis dictum est* &c., which is equivalent to *ad hanc rem demonstrandam satis dictum est;* this however the speaker does not mention to establish the truth of the proposition *magnis . . . res,* but only as his own justification for asserting it.

67
168 132. 20. **in utramque partem . . . disputare.** Comp. Tusc. II, 3, 9: *Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi.*

132. 22. **amplificavit Academia.** Cicero often speaks of the advantage derived by an orator from the study of the Academic philosophy from which he would gain the habit of looking at both sides of every subject. Comp. Orat. 3, 12; 21, 80; and De Fato 2, 3.

BOOK THIRD.

137. 11. **Sic mehercule,** "Certainly I do"; *i.e.* of course I have prepared myself well, as I had to do to meet such an antagonist as the Stoic; whereas to meet an Epicurean required no particular preparation. Cotta had said before (§ 1) that he was preparing himself during the discourse of Balbus to reply to it: *quid contra dicerem, meditabar;* and when he remarks there, as well as below in § 4, that he hopes not so much to refute Balbus as to beg for further explanation on several points, we recognize not only the Academic philosopher despairing of further knowledge, but the man of the world paying a compliment; not without a touch of irony too which does not escape Balbus, who answers: *sin me interrogare voles non tam intellegendi causa quam refellendi* &c. *Sic,* instead of *si,* an error of the copyists, is similarly used by Cicero in De Fin. III, 2, 9: *iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, combiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior.—Sic; et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos* &c.; cf. Madvig's note. See also Wopkens Lectt. Tull., p. 171, Hand's note. 1 3

137. 18. **ludere videtur.** Comp. I, 44, 123.

137. 24. [**accepi.** Madvig proposes *cepi,* or rather *percepi.*] 4

138. 5. **ducet oratio.** Comp. c. 17 init. Also *pergit oratio* and *iter sermonis* De Legg. I, 13, 37.

138. 14. **Ti. Coruncanium . . . P. Scaevolam;** see I, 41, 115 note. Scipio here mentioned is P. Cornelius Cn. f. L. n. Scipio Nasica, who was Pontifex Maximus and Consul (563), and was once publicly pronounced by a resolution of the Senate to be the best man in Rome. See Cic. De Fin. V, 22, 64; Livy XXIX, 14, 8. 2 5

138. 16. **C. Laelium,** the famous bosom friend of Scipio Africanus the younger, whom Cicero introduces as the speaker in his discourse on friendship. He was called by his contemporaries the wise man, *sapiens,* and above II, 66, 166 he is mentioned with Coruncanius, Scipio and others as one of the good men especially beloved by the gods. His *oratio nobilis,* alluded to here, was delivered in the year 600 against the proposed law of the tribune L. Licinius Crassus who proposed to abolish the coöptatio of the priestly colleges of the *pontifices,* the *augures* and the decemviri sacris

as the Stoic did one must remember that according to Chrysippus, from whom this portion of the argument is doubtless directly or indirectly taken, the thinking faculty resided in the breast, in the heart, and thus close to the lungs. See Galen, De Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. II, 3 sq., and III, 8. The thought is formed here as λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and comes forth as speech, λόγος προφορικός, through the organs of speech. — The Mss. have **percipitur** instead of *percietur* [the reading in Schoemann's text].

127. 6. **finita dentibus** can hardly be right. Probably it should be *munita dentibus*. See Opusc. Ac. III, p. 377.

127. 6. **vocem inmoderate profusam,** the inarticulate sound; as on the other hand *moderatio vocis* is used in De Leg. I, 9, 27 for the articulation. By means of the articulation are formed the different and definitely determined sounds, *soni vocis distincti et pressi*, the characteristic endowment of the μέροπες ἄνθρωποι, by which they are distinguished from the beasts of which the *vox* is *immoderate profusa*.

60 150 127. 13. **molles commissuras et artus,** "the movable, pliant connections and joints"; for which he might have said *commissuras artuum*. *Artus* are really the same as *articuli*, Gr. ἄρθρα, although the word is afterwards used for the members of the body; *mollis* is originally equivalent to *mobilis*, from which it is derived; the meaning "soft" is only a secondary one.

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although no Stoic, says H. N. VII, procem: *Hominis causa videtur cuncta alia genuisse natura;* and the Christian Lactantius, De Ira Dei, c. 14, says: *vera est sententia Stoicorum, qui aiunt nostra causa mundum esse constructum; omnia enim, quibus constat mundus, ad utilitatem hominis accommodata sunt;* on the other hand Seneca more modestly and rightly says, De Ira II, 27: *nimis nos suspicimus, si digni nobis videmur, propter quos tanta moveantur.* [Comp. Montaigne, Essais, Liv. II, c. 12.]

62 128. 28. **deorum hominumque causa.** Comp. above c. 6, 16. The following phrase *quaeque . . . inventa sunt* is probably spurious, because it contains only a gratuitous and jarring repetition of what was just said; moreover *inventa*, which can only refer to discoveries made by man, seems out of place here where the discourse turns only on the provident care of creative nature.—The following proposition in regard to the world as a state common to gods and men was a favorite idea with the Stoics, constantly repeated. See especially Arius in Euseb. pr. Evang. XV, 15: *ὁ κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν θεῶν μὲν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων, τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων· κοινωνίαν δ' ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος.* Comp. Cic. De Leg. I, 7, 23; De Fin. III, 19, 64. In the Herculanean Fragment Col. IV, 22 it is ascribed to Chrysippus, in the third book *περὶ φύσεως*.

155 129. 2. **ad mundi cohaerentiam.** See note to c. 32, 82.—**tamen et spectaculum . . .** is not for *etiam spectaculum*, but points to something which Cicero was about to add in opposition but afterwards forgot, or at least does not bring in the corresponding form. He might have said: *et magnam hominum vitae utilitatem afferunt: eorum enim cursus dimetati* &c. As it is, this last proposition, introduced by *enim*, follows as a proof of the remark immediately preceding in regard to the regularity and ingenious adaptation observable in the movements of the heavenly bodies. For it is just this which has made it possible for mankind to measure time rightly.—The words **ad rationem sollertiamque praestantior** are not to be interpreted by supplying *incitandam*, as if the question were of arousing the reflection and inventive power of man by the observation of the heavenly bodies. *Praestans ad aliquam rem* means: "excellent in regard to (on account of) something"; as in De Leg. II, 13, 33: *multa ad veritatem admirabilia:* "prophecies wonderful in regard to their truthfulness"; Pro Fontei. 15: *vir ad usum et disciplinam peritus, ad casum fortunamque felix:* "an experienced man as regards practice and knowledge, a lucky one as regards chance and fortune."—On **insatiabilior** see note c. 39, 98.

129. 8. **vario leguminum genere.** By this are to be understood

chiefly leguminous plants; not however exclusively, but according to Varro R. R. I, 23, 2 those *quae velluntur e terra, non subsecantur; quae, quod ita leguntur, legumina dicta;* and 32, 2: *dicta a legendo, quod ea non secantur sed vellendo leguntur.* Gr. *χέδροποι*, *χέδροπα* or *χέδροπες*, which is considered as a corruption of *χέρδροποι*, from *χείρ* and *δρέπω*. Comp. Nicand. Theriac. 652; Ideler, Arist. Meteor. II, p. 526.

129. 23. **nisi forte . . . dubitationem adfert, quin . . .** To under- 63 158
stand the clause with *quin* properly we must bear in mind that the sense of the preceding one is: *nam non sane dubitationem affert.*

129. 27. **bestias hominum gratia.** What the Academic might have replied to this may be gathered, since the corresponding passage in the third book is lost, from Porphyrius De Abst. III, 20. See also what Celsus says and what Origen ctr. Cels. IV, 74 answers.

129. 30. **neque alii . . . potuissent.** This pluperfect is often used in this way instead of the imperfect, inasmuch as the possibility of the thing is represented as the condition which must be fulfilled before the thing itself can take place. Comp. De Offic. II, 3, 12: *neque enim valetudinis curatio neque agri cultura . . . sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset;* Ibid. c. 4, 15: *quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla esse potuisset.* In the same way *audire potuisses*, above I, 21, 57, is to be explained; and *si potuero*, often used for *si potero* is to be regarded from the same point of view.

[The possibility of happening would seem to be a necessary condition to the actual happening of any thing whatever; otherwise it would never happen. The idea of possibility lies here not in the tense, but in the very signification of the word *potuissent;* and the difference between *potuissent* and *possent* is that the former represents the possibility as existing at some earlier time. The idea seems to be that if it were not for the care of men sheep not only would not now be able to exist and flourish, but would never have been able to do so at any time, *according to the original ordinance of nature.*]

129. 35. **se esse generatos.** *Eos* would have been more correct: but the reflexive is used because *canes*, though not grammatically the subject, is thought of as such, being implied in *canum custodia.*

130. 4. **ab illo aureo genere.** Aratus, whom Cicero has in mind 159
here, and from whom he quotes the following verses 130 ff., says of the golden age, v. 110: *αὔτως δ' ἔζωον, χαλεπὴ δ' ἀπέκειτο θάλασσα, καὶ βίον οὔπω νῆες ἀπόπροθεν ἠγίνεσκον, ἀλλὰ βόες καὶ ἄροτρα* &c.; but according to others (as Hesiod W. & D. v. 117; Virgil, Georg. I, 125; Ovid, Met. I, 101) the earth produced in abundance in that age all sorts of fruits spon-

taneously and without culture; the necessity for culture came up at a later period.

130. 10. **eorum visceribus.** See note c. 6, 18. — Varro R. R. II, 5; Aelian. V. H. V, 14 and others state that in ancient times it was considered wrong to kill an ox in Italy and Greece, and it was forbidden under severe punishment. Pliny H. N. VIII, 45, p. 556 narrates that at Rome a man was once punished with exile for this crime. The ox was only rarely offered in sacrifice to the gods, under particular circumstances. See Hermann Gottesd. Alterth. § 26, 20 or Schoemann Griech. Alterth. II^3, p. 245.

64 160 130. 14. **animam pro sale** &c. This is cited as a saying of Cleanthes by Clemens Alex. Strom. VII, p. 304 Sylb.; as a saying of various Stoics by Plutarch Sympos. V, 10, 3; and by many others. See Villoison Theol. Phys. Stoic. at the end of Osann's edition of Cornutus, p. 396.

130. 20. **alites et oscines.** Festus, p. 3 Müll.: *alites volatu auspicia facientes;* id., p. 196: *oscines aves ore auspicium facientes.*

130. 21. **res augurare** was said either of things which were consecrated and placed under the protection of the gods by taking the auspices, or of undertakings for which one secured the divine approval (*auctoritas*) by the same means.

161 130. 23. **exerceamur in venando** &c. Other authors speak in the same way of hunting, as Xenophon De Ven. 1, 18, and especially 12, 1: τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει: and the subject is treated in detail.

130. 25. **remedia . . . eligamus.** [Schoem. reads *eliciamus,* and says:] We gain from them medicinal remedies by investigation and labor, as above c. 60, 151: *e terrae cavernis ferrum elicimus* [for *eligimus* of our text]. *eligamus,* which is found in the Mss. is far less appropriate, and certainly only a slip of the pen.

65 162 131. 1. **Cotta, quia Carneades** &c. See note I, 2, 4.

131. 2. **nihil tam inridet Epicurus.** See above I, 20, 55. Diog. L. X, 135: μαντικὴν δὴ ἅπασαν ἀναιρεῖ, καί φησι μαντικὴ ὡς ἀνύπαρκτος. Of course conformably with his opinion about the gods he could not judge differently.

163 131. 6. **multa augures provident.** The reading of some Mss. *praevident,* approved by many, is probably an error, not because the word is never used by Cicero, as has been too quickly assumed, but because it is out of place here. The augurs in Rome were not prophets: *non enim sumus ii nos augures,* says Cic. De Div. II, 33, 70, *qui avium reliquorumque signorum observatione futura dicamus.* The signs, which they ob-

served, were regarded only as indications whether the gods were favorable or not to any proposed undertaking; they were supposed, as it is expressed in De Harusp. Resp. c. 9, to give *rerum bene gerendarum auctoritatem*, a guaranty for the successful issue; and when the *praedictis augurum* are spoken of we are to understand not prophecies of future events, but only general assurances of a happy issue, or warnings against disaster. *Aves eventus significant aut adversos aut secundos*, De Div. II, 37, 79. So here *provident* is to be taken only of the care on the part of the augurs that nothing should be undertaken against the wish of the gods as ascertained by the auspices. How important their sphere of action was may be seen from Cic. De Leg. II, 12, 31.

131. 7. **vaticinationibus,** the utterances of inspired seers, like those of the Sibylline books which passed at Rome for state oracles, those of the old *Marcii fratres* and others. See De Div. I, 2, 4; 40, 89.

131. 8. **multae saepe res . . . partae.** The sense is: warnings and prognostics of this sort make it possible for men to attain many things according to their desires (*ex sententia*), and to further their interests (*utilitates*). *utilitates* serves to define the general expression *res*. The reading of the Mss. *hominum sententia* (without *ex*) *atque utilitate* is evidently an error. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 378.

131. 10. **sive vis sive ars sive natura;** a power bestowed by the gods, a skill gained by observation, or a natural gift. Comp. De Div. I, 6, 11: *duo sunt divinandi genera, quorum alterum artis est, alterum naturae.* The first includes divination from signs, as that by the haruspices, the augurs, the astrologers and those who divined by means of the *sortes* (see III, 6, 14 note); the second includes the interpretation of visions, the divine inspiration, *instinctus inflatusque divinus*, which last is in the present passage denoted by *vis*.

131. 20. **ab huiusce terrae continuatione distantium,** i.e. *ab hoc* 66 164
orbe terrarum, from the portion of the earth which we inhabit, and which, as is said in the following section, forms a large island. There were thought to be four of these islands, *orbes terrarum*, *οἰκούμεναι*, separated by the great sea; one inhabited by Europeans and their *συνοίκοις*; the second in the same hemisphere, but in the southern half, the inhabitants of which were called *ἄντοικοι*; the third and fourth in the northern and southern half of the opposite hemisphere, the inhabitants of which were called *περίοικοι* and *ἀντίποδες* of the Europeans. See Cleomed. I, p. 16 and Bake's note, p. 291 ff.

131. 33. **neminem nisi iuvante deo . . .** The wisest and best of the *antiquity at all times* held that men needed the divine assistance in order to

attain to a high degree of virtue, and that the gods willingly gave this assistance to the good; although especially since the sophists there were many who acknowledged only the external good things of life as the gift of the gods. In this sense Cicero represents Cotta as speaking below III, 26.

166 132. 3. **quales supra commemoravi,** c. 2, 5.—**saepe praesentiae;** adverb for adjective.

167 132. 10. **ita refellendum.** The pronoun, left out by the copyists, is indispensable. *Refellendum* relates to the preceding assertion of the care of the gods for men. This divine care, says Balbus, is not to be disproved by adducing such misfortunes as are here mentioned, and then representing them as evidences of the divine anger; or in case they fall upon the good, towards whom the gods can have no hostile feeling, by representing them as proofs that the gods have no thought for the affairs of men.

132. 13. **Magna di curant, parva neglegunt.** The same idea is contained in a verse of Euripides cited by Plutarch Praec. Pol. c. 15: τῶν ἀγαν μὲν ἅπτεται Θεός, τὰ μικρὰ δ' εἰς τύχην ἀνεὶς ἐᾷ. Comp. Antonin. VII, 75. Upton's note to Epictet. I, 12, 1.

132. 14. **Magnis viris prosperae semper eveniunt omnes res,** *i.e.* to the wise, the virtuous; for according to the Stoic doctrine virtue sufficed for their happiness, and external things could not make them happy or unhappy. This reason is indicated in the following phrase: *si quidem satis dictum est* &c., which is equivalent to *ad hanc rem demonstrandam satis dictum est;* this however the speaker does not mention to establish the truth of the proposition *magnis . . . res,* but only as his own justification for asserting it.

67
168 132. 20. **in utramque partem . . . disputare.** Comp. Tusc. II, 3, 9: *Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in tontrarias partes disserendi.*

132. 22. **amplificavit Academia.** Cicero often speaks of the advantage derived by an orator from the study of the Academic philosophy from which he would gain the habit of looking at both sides of every subject. Comp. Orat. 3, 12; 21, 80; and De Fato 2, 3.

BOOK THIRD.

137. 11. **Sic mehercule,** "Certainly I do"; *i.e.* of course I have prepared myself well, as I had to do to meet such an antagonist as the Stoic; whereas to meet an Epicurean required no particular preparation. Cotta had said before (§ 1) that he was preparing himself during the discourse of Balbus to reply to it: *quid contra dicerem, meditabar;* and when he remarks there, as well as below in § 4, that he hopes not so much to refute Balbus as to beg for further explanation on several points, we recognize not only the Academic philosopher despairing of further knowledge, but the man of the world paying a compliment; not without a touch of irony too which does not escape Balbus, who answers: *sin me interrogare voles non tam intellegendi causa quam refellendi* &c. *Sic,* instead of *si,* an error of the copyists, is similarly used by Cicero in De Fin. III, 2, 9: *iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, combiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior.—Sic; et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos* &c.; cf. Madvig's note. See also Wopkens Lectt. Tull., p. 171, Hand's note. 1 3

137. 18. **ludere videtur.** Comp. I, 44, 123.

137. 24. [**accepi.** Madvig proposes *cepi,* or rather *percepi.*] 4

138. 5. **ducet oratio.** Comp. c. 17 init. Also *pergit oratio* and *iter sermonis* De Legg. I, 13, 37.

138. 14. **Ti. Coruncanium . . . P. Scaevolam;** see I, 41, 115 note. Scipio here mentioned is P. Cornelius Cn. f. L. n. Scipio Nasica, who was Pontifex Maximus and Consul (563), and was once publicly pronounced by a resolution of the Senate to be the best man in Rome. See Cic. De Fin. V, 22, 64; Livy XXIX, 14, 8. 2 5

138. 16. **C. Laelium,** the famous bosom friend of Scipio Africanus the younger, whom Cicero introduces as the speaker in his discourse on friendship. He was called by his contemporaries the wise man, *sapiens,* and above II, 66, 166 he is mentioned with Coruncanius, Scipio and others as one of the good men especially beloved by the gods. His *oratio nobilis,* alluded to here, was delivered in the year 600 against the proposed law of the tribune L. Licinius Crassus who proposed to abolish the coöptatio of the priestly colleges of the *pontifices,* the *augures* and the decemviri sacris

faciundis, and to introduce in its place the popular vote. Comp. Cic. Lael. c. 25, 96, and below c. 17, 43.

138. 21. **Sibyllae interpretes,** *i.e.* the *quindecimviri sacris faciundis*, a college of which the duty was to keep the Sibylline books, to consult them on the order of the Senate, to report thereon and to carry out the necessary religious observances prescribed by them; from which last duty the title of the office was taken. They were called *quindecimviri* since the year 673 (probably); before this *decemviri*, since 378; in the earlier period *duoviri*.

138. 23. **Romulum auspiciis, Numam sacris.** Nothing is commoner than this reference of the Roman auspices to their founder Romulus, who not only was himself an excellent augur (De Div. II, 33, 70; 38, 90, De Repub. II, 9, 16) and founded the state *auspicato* (De Repub. II, 9, 16) but also handed down to his successors the connection between the state and the gods thus instituted by the auspices of the foundation. The more precise arrangement of the sacra, *i.e.* the religious observances by which the gods are rightly worshipped and of the orders of priests instituted for carrying them out, is quite as often ascribed to Numa (De Repub. II, 14).

8 7 138. 35. **Primum quidque.** See I, 27, 77, note.

138. 35. **et, si id est primum.** The connection is as follows: *si id est primum, esse deos, id ipsum cur ita sit, nihil tu me doces.* But inasmuch as the double relative clause *quod . . . eximi non potest* is inserted after the first member, a *tamen* is inserted in the second member for the sake of the contrast; and in order to bring out distinctly the opposition between faith and knowledge Cicero introduces here also the relative clause *quod . . . auctoritate maiorum*, which in fact only repeats what has been said although with an addition. On *eximi* [which Baiter and Schoemann read for *excuti*] see Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 378 sq.

139. 9. **Egone?** See I, 7, 16, note.

4 9 139. 17. **Quam simile istud sit, tu videris;** a turn of expression, which intimates that the opponent upon closer examination would satisfy himself of the inaptitude of the comparison. In a similar manner, Acad. II, 7, 19: *Epicurus hoc viderit et multa alia;* De Div. II, 53, 108: *vide, quaeso, quam sint ista similia; nam mihi non videntur.*

139. 24. **duo lumina;** two openings for the light, or for seeing; just as *lumina* is often used for *fenestrae.*

139. 24. **ab animo ad oculos.** Tusc. I, 20, 46: *viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares a sede animi perforatae;* and in

the same passage *fenestrae animi*, as in Lactant. De Opif. D. c. 9, 2 : *mens oculis tamquam fenestris utitur*.

139. 31. **argumentando dubiam facis.** Procl. on Plut. Tim., p. 10
416 Schn. : *ὁ πάντα ἀποδεικτικὰ νενομικὼς αὐτὴν μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρεῖ.*

139. 34. **quo haec regantur.** The pronoun *haec*, though not referring grammatically to *caelum*, denotes "*all these things*," *i.e.* the universe, which we unavoidably think of when we regard the heavens. Comp. II, 2, 4 where *haec* logically includes more than *caelum caelestiaque* just preceding.

140. 3. **istum potius quam Capitolinum.** Cotta is quite right here; 11
the unthinking multitude formed their ideas of the gods from the pictures and statues they saw about them, and connected these together in the closest manner; so much was this the case, that they in some degree divided a deity according to the different temples and representations into different persons, which might even be jealous one of another. It once happened to the Emperor Augustus (only in a dream it is true), that the Jupiter Capitolinus complained of the more zealous adoration which was paid to the Jupiter Tonans. Suet. Aug. c. 91 ; Dion Cassius LIV, 4 ; Catull. XIX, 20 represents one Priapus quarrelling with another.—In **quisquam nostrum** however Cotta without doubt says too much. There were many people who, although they did not share the views of the philosophers, did not follow the common multitude; and who, although conceiving of the gods as similar to men and under human forms, still regarded their proper essence and their divine power, their *ἐνέργεια*, *numen*, not as limited and confined in these forms, but as pervading a wider sphere according to the office and power of each; they imagined the *numen* of Jupiter, for instance, as dwelling in the *aether* and like this pervading the whole universe : *τοπικῶς μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ θεῖον ὑπονοεῖν ἄτοπον· ταῖς μέντοι ἐνεργείαις πανταχοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη.* These words of Philoponus (in Lobeck Agl., p. 913) represent pretty nearly the general view of thinking people. Comp. also Seneca Quaest. Nat. II, 45. [**Iovem** is second accusative after *appellet*.]

140. 5. **quos . . . ne animantis quidem.** This refers to the heavenly bodies which the Stoics held to be gods. II, 15.

140. 8. **opinio . . . cotidie cresceret.** II, 2, 5.

140. 8. **stultorum.** See note on I, 9, 23 ; and for the following: *qui illos insanos esse dicatis*, comp. Cic. Paradox. IV.

140. 10. **videmus.** The present for *videre nonnumquam solemus*; 5
like the similar expression II, 2, 6 *praesentes saepe di vim suam declarant.*

140. 10. **in Salaria,** scil. *via.* This was the name of the road leading from Rome into the Sabine country to Reate, *quia per eam Sabini sal a mari* (*i.e.* from the salt works near Ostia) *deferebant.* Fest. Paul., p. 327 Müll. — The city gate corresponding was anciently called *Salaria,* afterwards *porta Collina.* Festus, p. 326. — **nescio quid;** a depreciatory expression.

140. 12. **homines homine natos.** According to the poetic mythology both had a mortal mother, Leda; one, Castor, had also a mortal father, Tyndarus, while Pollux was a son of Jupiter.

140. 13. **Homerus . . . recens ab illorum aetate.** The Tyndaridae were, as brothers of Helen and Clytemnestra, contemporaries of the Greeks who fought before Troy, although they died before the war in the flower of youth. Homer was thought by many, as by Krates and his followers, to have lived immediately after the Trojan war; see Procl. Chrestom. in Becker's edition of the Scholia to the Iliad, p. 1. But Cicero in another passage (De Republ. II, 10, 18) cites the opposite opinion of others, according to which Homer lived about thirty years before the Spartan Lycurgus, whom he places a hundred and eight years before the first Olympiad, *i.e.* 885; and in Tuscul. V, 3, 7 he makes Homer and Lycurgus contemporaries. The reason of his attributing the other view to Cotta is easily seen. The passage of Homer alluded to is Il. III, 243.

140. 14. **cantheriis albis.** Balbus in II, 2, 6 said *cum equis albis.* The expression here substituted is derisive; for *cantherius* or *canterius,* properly *gelding,* is also used, like *caballus,* of common pack-horses. So the following **nullis calonibus,** "without grooms."

140. 16. **M. Catoni,** the old *Censorius.*

12 140. 19. **quod probari potest,** *i.e.* what at least may pass for probable. We know moreover that the Academics recognized in general no certainty but only probability. See Introd., p. 13.

140. 21. **divinos esse et aeternos.** See note on I, 15, 39.

13 140. 25. **(ab) A. Postumio aedem . . . dedicatam.** The temple was vowed by the dictator A. Postumius at the battle of Lake Regillus; it was dedicated at a later time by his son. So says Livy II, 20, 12 and 42, 5, although he says nothing of any apparition in the battle.

140. 27. **Graecorum . . . proverbium.** Suidas: *ἀληθέστερα τῶν ἐπὶ Σάγρᾳ· παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν μέν, οὐ πιστευομένων δέ.* The proverb also occurred in Menander. See Meineke on his fragments, p. 17. For the battle on the Sagra see note on II, 2, 6.

6
14 140. 31. After the apparitions of the gods Balbus (II, 3, 7) had cited divination as a proof of the existence of the gods. The commencement of

Cotta's answer is lost; the portion that remains goes to prove that divination, even if it were any thing more than a figment of the brain, would still be of no use to men, because what was destined to happen would happen at any rate and could not be avoided by knowing it beforehand. This argument is also found De Div. II, 8, 20.

141. 1. **id esse fatum.** Comp. note on I, 20, 55. Chrysippus's definition in Eusebius Pr. Ev. VI, 7, 13 runs thus: *τὸ ἀπαράβατον καὶ ἐξ αἰῶνος καθῆκον τῶν αἰτιῶν, ὅσα οὑτωσὶ κατηναγκάσθε γενέσθαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλως ἔχειν κεκώλυται.*

141. 4. **fissum iecoris:** probably a fissure or cut separating the different lobes of the liver, called *limes* in Seneca Œd. 365. The fissure denoted good or evil fortune according to the circumstances; there was a *fissum vitale*, a *fissum familiare*, and other similar sorts. See De Div. II, 6, 12. 13; Brisson. De Form. I, 31; Müller Etrusk. II, 182.

141. 4. **sortis,** such as were used in the temple of Fortuna at Præneste for divination; they were counters, which when mixed like a pack of cards were thrown into a vase, and one or more were drawn out. Hense the expressions *sortes aequare*, *sortem ducere* or *trahere*. Comp. De Div. I, 18, 34; II, 33, 70; 41, 96; Suet. Tiber. 14. The *sortes* were not all of the same kind, and those expressions do not have the same meaning with all.

141. 10. **Deciorum devotionibus.** See II, 3, 10. 15

141. 11. [**eorum** refers to *deos* in the preceding sentence; *iniquitas* is unfairness, injustice.]

141. 18. **Faunus omnino quid sit nescio;** *i.e.* as a philosopher, and especially of the Academy, he does not know it; as pontifex of course he knows what the Faunus is, at least he knows what invocations and prayers are to be directed to him, what manifestations of power are to be expected from him, what sanctuaries and feasts are sacred to him; on all this consult the citations of Merkel on Ovid. Fast. Prolegg., p. CCII. For *nam* as a particle of transition see note on c. 24, 61.

141. 22. **formatas** for *informatas*, more common in this sense, which 7 16 was also used above II, 5, 13.—The following repetition of the reasons adduced by Cleanthes changes the order there followed, putting the third before the second; evidently because Cotta after answering the argument from divination wishes now to treat only the third, that drawn from the wonderful and awe-inspiring phenomena of nature, leaving the second and fourth for a later part of the discourse when he means to speak of the divine providence, the same arguments being applicable to both. He thus avoids repeating the same thing as Balbus did. That portion of Cotta's discourse is however lost.

18 141. 35. **illa etiam differemus.** The plural is used because the pronoun refers not only to *quod Chrysippum dicere aiebas*, but to the more remote *quae . . . comparabas, et cum . . . adferebas.* Comp. II, 50, 126; 59, 147. The words *quae in domo pulchra cum pulchritudine mundi comparabas* are to be taken as a shorter expression for *quae in domo pulchra cum pulchritudine mundi comparandā dicebas:* for taken literally they would not agree with what Balbus had said II, 6, 17, and with what Cotta would be likely to say. — Before the following **cum . . . adferebas** one must supply of course *quae dicebas.*

142. 7. **physice.** Comp. I, 27, 77 and II, 18, 48. Here too there is a little irony, for the physics of the Stoics amounted to very little for an Academic.

142. 10. **cum docere velles deos esse,** *i.e.* in that part of your discourse where you attempted to prove the existence of the gods. The following words, *quare et mundus* &c., are to be taken with *quae a te nudius tertius dicta sunt,* "the reasons which you adduced to show that the universe &c. was endowed with feeling and mind." — For **nudius tertius** see Introd., p. 20.

8
19 142. 19. **sed ab hac ea quaestione . . . separantur;** *i.e.* the complete proof of the reality of divination falls under another head; in the investigation of the existence and nature of the gods it is taken for granted.

142. 29. **Modo possemus eum animantem cogitare.** This is not to be construed with the preceding *dicebas* and *non dubitabas,* as if Cotta meant to represent it as having been said by Balbus; for Balbus did not make this a condition; he merely deduced the animation of the world as a necessary consequence from the proposition that it was the best and most perfect of everything. Cotta now objects to this deduction, that it involves something inconceivable. Before *Modo possemus* we must supply something like *recte,* or *non intercederem* or the like. For *modo* see Hand Tursell. III, p. 638.

142. 30. **cogitare vel potius . . . cernere.** One can think, *cogitare* in the wider sense of the word, of all sorts of things, even of phantoms; but we can really perceive, *cernere,* only what is true and actually existing.

21 142. 34. **nullo modo prorsus** for *prorsus nullo modo.* The adverb strengthens the negation, the negation does not negative the adverb. So *prorsus* strengthening the negation is placed after *non* in De Fin. II, 5, 17: *Non prorsus, inquit:* "not at all," not, "not quite." Comp. Madvig's note. So with the ordinary *non omnino,* whereas *omnino non* is more rare. So in Greek often, *οὐ πάνυ, οὐκ ἄγαν.*

143. 1. **Nihil est mundo melius in rerum natura.** Balbus says 9
II, 12, 32: *mundus melior* (*est*) *quam ulla natura*, and *mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam universi:* but he nowhere uses the peculiar expression chosen by Cotta, which really amounts to only this, *nihil est mundo melius in mundo*. This includes, it is true, *nulla pars mundi est mundo melior;* but Cotta evidently uses it with the object of offsetting it with his own as a complete counterpart; namely, *Ne in terris quidem urbe nostra*, scil. *quicquam melius est;* although the relations of the objects compared together in the two sentences, *mundus* to *rerum naturae*, and *urbs nostra* to *terrae*, are essentially different.—The following argumentation, which agrees completely with that of Alexinus given by Sext. Emp. IX, 108, deserves the name of *calumnia* which Balbus applies to similar ones II, 7, 20. It grossly misuses the word *melius*, which of course may mean very different things as applied to different objects and relations; and by taking it in some of its relative significations and applying it to the universe one may succeed in throwing an appearance of ridicule on the opinion of the Stoics; but this vanishes as soon as the word is taken in the sense which the Stoics intended. Comp. Prantl Gesch. der Logik I, p. 44.

143. 8. **Istum locum Zenonis conclusio . . . dilatavit.** [Schoe- 22
mann reads *dilatabit* with the following note.] "Zeno's conclusion will widen the application of that proposition"; *i.e.* by means of Zeno's conclusion the proposition can be made to include more than you would wish; it can be used to prove not only that the universe is intelligent but also that it can read &c. The expression may be compared with I, 35, 98: *si semel susceperimus genus hoc argumenti, attende quo serpat. Dilatare* is to make a wider application of a thing; so in De Leg. III, 14, 32: *lex dilatata in ordinem cunctum.* The *dilatavit* of the Mss. is evidently false; no one would imagine that Zeno so turned the proposition. Nor can *dilatavit* be equivalent to *effecit ut dilatari possit.* [We have kept the reading *dilatavit* of Müller, which is also given by Baiter in both editions. In a note Müller proposes the present, i.e. *locus conclusione dilatatur.* There seems to be no valid objection against the perfect, the sense being that Zeno's way of putting the argument has made it possible to extend its application farther than he intended.]

143. 19. **Saepe dixti.** The syncopated form is also found in the Mss. of Cicero De Fin. II, 3, 10; Ad Att. XIII, 32; Pro Caecin. 29, 82. Comp. Madvig Cic. De Fin., p. 153; and Bücheler in the N. Rhein. Museum XI, p. 59.—**nihil fieri nisi ex eo;** Schoemann reads *sine deo* for *nisi ex eo.* See the Appendix *in loco.*

143. 21. **fidicinem etiam et tubicinem;** a similar *calumnia* to

that noticed above. Cotta pretends not to know that all the arts are only especial developments or applications of the general power which the Stoics ascribed to the universe, and that it is illogical to transfer to the universal power what can only arise from its subdivision.

143. 23. [**et quidem** has the Mss. authority. Schoemann and Baiter I and II read *atque idem*. The same Mss. have *et quidem* in II, § 41, which Schoemann there retains, but Baiter I, II changes to *atque item*. *et quidem*, adding a term with some emphasis, is not uncommon, and there seems to be no reason for deviating from the Mss. — Müller does not bracket *erit mundus*.]

10 24 143. 32. **Quid Chalcidico Euripo . . . constantius?** There were probably other opinions about this, for the irregularity of the currents in the Euripus was proverbial. Comp. Plat. Phaed., p. 90 C. Diogenian. Prov. III, 39; IV, 72. There is however in this irregularity a regular movement as Babin explains in Spon's Reisen &c. translated by Menudier II, p. 62. Comp. Ideler on Aristot. Meteor. I, p. 599 and Ulrich's Reisen in Griechenland II, p. 220.

143. 34. **freto Siciliensi.** Pomp. Mel. II, 7: *id angustum et anceps alterno cursu modo in Tuscum modo in Ionium pelagus perfluit.*

143. 35. **Europam Libyamque . . .** The quotation is from an unknown poet, perhaps Ennius in the Annals; it is cited also in Tusc. I, 20, 45. The *fretum Gaditanum* is meant.

144. 1. **aestus maritimi . . .** See note to II, 7, 19.

25 144. 8. **confugitis ad deum.** But whoever says that these things are ordered by nature working blindly and unconsciously (see II, 32, 81 note) no more gives an explanation of them than he who sees in them the working of a divine law. Can one be proved any more than the other? Cotta promises to bring the proof (*quem ad modum docebo*, at the end of the chapter); but the passage in which he attempted it is lost.

144. 16. **in eodem . . . errore versantur,** it rests upon the same error. Tusc. I, 44, 107: *vides quanto haec in errore versentur.* Comp. Wopkens Lect. Tull., p. 77. The expression is generally used in speaking of persons.

144. 17. [**Quid sit melius,** "What is to be understood under the term *melius?*" Cf. § 21: *Sed cum mundo negas quicquam esse melius, quid dicis melius?* &c.]

11 27 *144. 30.* **At enim quaerit . . . Socrates.** See II, 6, 17.

144. 31. **Et ego quaero, unde orationem . . .** To judge of this *objection* see note on c. 9, 23.

144. 33. **ad harmoniam canere mundum.** The Pythagorean view of the harmony of the spheres is jocosely caricatured by Cotta. What Pythagoras really meant may be seen in the Somn. Scip. c. 5: *Quis hic, inquam, quis est qui complet auris meas tantus et tam dulcis sonus? Hic est, inquit ille, qui intervallis coniunctus imparibus, sed tamen pro rata portione distinctis, impulsu et motu ipsorum orbium conficitur, et acuta cum gravibus temperans varios aequabiliter concentus efficit; nec enim silentio tanti motus incitari possunt, et natura fert, ut extrema ex altera parte graviter, ex altera autem acute sonent.* Comp. Martin, Études sur le Timée de Platon II, p. 35 ff.

144. 35. **non artificiose ambulantis.** See II, 22, 57.

145. 3. **quasi cognatione continuata.** See II, 7, 19. — For the fol- 28
lowing **Illa . . . naturae viribus** comp. note on II, 9, 25.

145. 5. [**continerentur, cohaerent et permanent.** We have given here the reading of Baiter II. The passage which Cotta refers to is II, 7, 19: *Haec* (*i.e.* several operations of nature just mentioned) *ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur.* The *ea* there refers to the operations of nature in question, and it seems more natural to take it in that sense here; and Cotta has already said, § 27, *Naturae ista sunt . . . omnia cientis et agitantis motibus* &c., having in mind certain phenomena of nature. He goes on to say *Illa* (these same natural phenomena) *cohaerent et permanent naturae viribus, i.e.* this *consensus* is due to the force of nature and no divine influence is necessary to explain it. In **estque in ea** &c. we take *ea* to refer to *natura.*]

145. 7. **consensus, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci vocant.** Comp. De Div. II, 14, 34: *ex coniunctione naturae et quasi concentu atque consensu, quam συμπάθειαν Graeci appellant.* Also the same, II, 60, 124 and 66, 142.

145. 10. **quae Carneades adferebat.** See note on I, 2, 4. Sext. 12 29
Emp. IX, 138 ff. gives some of the following arguments of Carneades out of his discourses, made public by his disciples, especially by Clitomachus. — Madvig correctly remarks that in the second member of the following sentence Cicero should have written *nullum esse animal sempiternum* instead of *nullum esse corpus sempiternum.*

145. 12. **ne individuum quidem.** Probably a causal conjunction has fallen out before these words, perhaps *nam.* The proposition that no body is immortal rests upon the further one that no body is indivisible and indestructible, which Cotta also refers to in I, 24, 66 as an *oraculum physicorum.* — **ne quidem** does not amplify, but simply means "also not," as it often does. Comp. below c. 17, 43.

145. 14. **nullum est eorum,** referring to the preceding *omne animal,* equivalent to *omnia animalia,* a constructio ad sensum. So in De Fin. IV, 20, 57: *cumque omnis controversia aut de re soleat aut de nomine esse, utraque earum nascitur* &c. — On **patibilis** see note on II, 39, 98. Cicero uses it in passive sense, Tusc. IV, 23, 51; but not elsewhere.

145. 16. **et si omne animal tale est,** i.e. *ferendi et patiendi necessitati obnoxium.* This sentence with the conclusion drawn from it is for the moment put in hypothetical form, to be repeated afterwards with *atqui* in a positive form; and the mortality, the divisibility and the destructibility of all living things then follow as a matter of course. — Moreover in this series of propositions the first, *si nullum corpus inmortale sit* &c., seems to be superfluous in so far that no especial application is made of it to the mortality of the *animalia;* if there had been, it must have been put in between the first and second proposition, somewhat in this way: *ergo cum nullum animal sit nisi corporeum, consequitur etiam animal nullum inmortale esse.* But Cotta might omit this as a thing to be taken for granted.

145. 17. **Ergo itidem.** *Ergo* seems to imply that the divisibility is a consequence of the *ferendi et patiendi necessitas* just mentioned, which would hardly be granted without qualification; *ergo* then would have been better left out. The opinion of some, that *ergo* may be equivalent to *deinde,* is properly rejected. See Hand Tursell. II, p. 464. — The following sentence would be better omitted as it only repeats what has just been said.

30 145. 24. **similiter igitur.** This *igitur* joins the conclusion with the preceding protasis introduced by *si.* So below § 33. Comp. De Invent. I, 34, 69: *quodsi melius gubernantur ea, quae consilio, quam quae sine consilio administrantur, nihil autem omnium rerum melius administratur quam omnis mundus; consilio igitur mundus administratur.*

145. 24. **omnia [quae sunt], e quibus cuncta constant.** If Cicero really wrote thus, *sunt* cannot be taken as the *verbum existentiae* and as a complete predicate; for in that case *omnia quae sunt* would mean "all that exists," which is plainly not intended here; *sunt* must therefore be taken as the copula, and the sense must be *omnia quae sunt cunctorum elementa.* But the strange form of expression is a very improbable one; Cicero probably wrote: *si omnia, e quibus, quae sunt, cuncta constant;* or the words *quae sunt* should be erased.

145. 29. **Etenim omne corpus . . .** This sentence does not give the reason of what immediately precedes, but that of the proposition: *mutabilia sunt omnia.*

31
32 146. 7. **sentit igitur . . . dulcia et amara.** Carneades in Sext. Emp. IX, 139: εἰ γὰρ εἰσὶ θεοί, ζῷά εἰσιν. εἰ δὲ ζῷά εἰσιν, αἰσθάνονται.

πᾶν γὰρ ζῶον αἰσθήσεως μετοχῇ νοεῖται ζῶον. εἰ δὲ αἰσθάνονται, καὶ πικράζονται καὶ γλυκάζονται.—γλυκαζόμενος δὲ καὶ πικραζόμενος εὐαρεστήσει τισὶ καὶ δυσαρεστήσει· δυσαρεστῶν δέ τισι, καὶ ὀχλήσεως ἔσται δεκτικὸς καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, φθαρτός ἐστιν. ὥστε εἴπερ εἰσὶ θεοί, φθαρτοί εἰσιν· οὐκ ἄρα θεοὶ εἰσίν. The same line of argument is there carried out for all the separate senses.

146. 7. **nec potest ullo sensu iucunda accipere, non accipere contraria.** The *nec potest* really refers only to the last member, *non accipere contraria;* and the sentence might have been thus written: *nec potest ullo sensu, quum iucunda accipiat, non accipere contraria;* or: *iucunda quidem accipere, non autem accipere contraria.* It belongs then to the kind spoken of above I, 9, 23.

146. 13. [**sin autem quid** &c. Baiter I and II, and Schoemann read 33
sin autem, quod animal est, id &c.]

146. 23. **quin id intereat.** The pronoun might have been omitted; 34
but similar passages are not rare. Comp. above II, 9, 24; Verres I, 59, 154: *Quis in circum maximum venit, quin is unoquoque gradu de avaritia tua commoneretur?* Sallust Jug. 36, 7: *novus homo nemo tam clarus erat, quin is indignus illo honore haberetur.*

146. 26. **Etenim.** Comp. note on II, 16, 42.—The argumentation 14
of Carneades may be found in Sext. Emp. IX, 180: *εἰ ἔστι θεῖον, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἀλλὰ ἀσώματον μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη διὰ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένας αἰτίας· εἰ δὲ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἤτοι σύγκριμά ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν στοιχείων ἢ ἁπλοῦν ἐστι καὶ στοιχειῶδες σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν σύγκριμά ἐστι, φθαρτόν ἐστι. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ σύνοδόν τινων ἀποτελεσθὲν ἀνάγκη διαλυόμενον φθείρεσθαι.*

146. 28. **concreta est.** [Schoemann has *concretum est* with this note:] scil. *animans,* to be supplied from *natura animantis.* There is no doubt that *animans* may be used in the neuter singular, although Cicero in other places only uses the neuter plural. [Baiter II reads *concreta.*]

146. 34. **Heraclitum sequentes.** He taught too, according to Diog. 35
L. IX, 7: *ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα συνεστάναι καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀναλύεσθαι*; or in his own words quoted in Clem. Alex. Strom. V, c. 14, § 105: *κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.* [Baiter II brackets *non omnes . . . modo.*]

147. 1. **qui quoniam intellegi noluit, omittamus.** A sort of attraction, the relative being taken into the dependent clause instead of being made the object of the leading verb, *omittamus,* in the accusative; so that *eum* must be supplied. So Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 4, 1: *huic corona*

data est; quam quod amor civium, non vis expresserat, nullam habuit invidiam. The same attraction with the demonstrative occurs Sallust Catil. c. 11, 2: *huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit.*— On **intellegi noluit** comp. I, 26, 74.

147. 2. **omnem vim esse igneam.** More distinctly expressed it could have read: *omnem vim vitalem esse igneam;* for this was the opinion of the Stoics. See II, 9, 23. 24.

36 147. 7. **id . . . de calido,** i.e. *id quod de calido dicitis, commune huic est cum umore et spiritu;* or: *pariter de umore et spiritu dici potest.*

147. 9. **animal intrinsecus,** the same as *ex sese animal* which occurs below, "having life from itself, an independent existence."

147. 10. **animam, unde . . . constet animus.** It was an ancient and wide-spread opinion that the soul was aerial and maintained by breathing. Comp. Tusc. I, 1, 19: *Animum autem alii animam, ut fere nostri declarant nomine. Nam et agere animam et efflare dicimus . . .; ipse autem animus ab anima dictus est.* Further details may be found in Lobeck Agl., p. 755 ff.

147. 19. **ad eundem etiam interitum venire.** In the foregoing member Cicero used the subjunctive after *necesse est;* it is easy to see why he now changes to the infinitive. This might be taken to depend on the foregoing *eadem dici possunt,* but not so well; and the change of construction occurs in other passages. Comp. Acad. II, 12, 39: *ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique quod visum sit, assentiatur,* for *assentiri;* De Fin. V, 9, 25: *necesse est finem omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur . . ., sed extrema illa et summa inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint,* for *esse.*

37 147. 23. **ali autem solem** &c. See II, 33, 83 and 46, 118.

147. 24. **Eamque causam Cleanthes adfert.** This is not mentioned elsewhere as the opinion of Cleanthes, but agrees very well with that which Diog. L. VII, 145 ascribes to the Stoics in general, that the sun draws its nourishment from the great sea. For the great sea separates our οἰκουμένη from the opposite southern one (see note to II, 66, 164), and lies itself in the hot zone between the two tropics, one of which, the Tropic of Cancer, Cicero here calls the *solstitialis orbis,* the other, the Tropic of Capricorn, *brumalis.*—It has been noticed that the words **cur se . . . progrediatur** form a hexameter. Comp. note on II, 60, 151.

147. 26. **Hoc totum quale sit, mox.** Balbus had put forth this view of the nourishment of the heavenly bodies by watery vapours in the portion of his discourse devoted to the discussion of the divine providence, II, 45, 118. Cotta proposes to postpone his answer until he comes to consider the same subject. But this part of his argument has been lost.

For the following sentence commencing with **nunc autem** see Rem., p. 73.

147. 30. **Qualem autem deum intellegere nos possumus** &c. 15 88
"How can we form for ourselves an idea of a god without virtue?" For *intellegere* in this signification comp. I, 10, 25; 14, 36; II, 21, 54. The following argumentation is also borrowed from Carneades. See Sext. Emp. IX, 152 ff. It simply shows however that categories, which apply very well to men and human relations, cannot be transferred to the deity, which Aristotle has shown in regard to the various virtues Eth. Nic. X, 8. Arnobius I, 31 says of God: *tu es de quo nihil dici et exprimi mortalium potis est significatione verborum; quid ut intelligaris, tacendum est, atque ut per umbram te possit errans investigare suspitio, nihil est omnino mutiendum.* And III, 19: *Quicquid de deo dixeris, quicquid tacitae mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transilit et corrumpitur sensum, nec habet propriae significationis notam, quod nostris dicitur verbis atque ad negotia humana compositis. Unus est hominis intellectus de dei natura certissimus, si scias et sentias nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi.*

148. 11. **piscem Syri venerantur;** Derceto or Atergatis, a mater- 89
nal natural deity. She had not however quite the form of a fish, but according to Diod. II, 4: τὸ μὲν πρόσωπον ἔχει γυναικός, τὸ δ' ἄλλο σῶμα πᾶν ἰχθύος; or according to Lucian De Dea Syr. c. 14: ἡμισέη μὲν γυνή, τὸ δὲ ὁκόσον ἐκ μηρῶν ἐς ἄκρους πόδας ἰχθύος. Dagon, the god of the Philistines, also had the form of a fish, but the head and hands of a man.

148. 13. **Alabandus** and **Tenes** or *Tennes*, the mythical οἰκισταί of Alabanda in Caria and of the island Tenedos on the Trojan coast, were worshipped as heroes. *Alabandis* (or *Alabandeis*) is the Greek form Ἀλαβανδεῖς. Comp. Schneider Formenlehre, p. 308, and Lachmann's Lucretius, p. 281 note. Below c. 19, 50 Cicero uses the Latin form *Alabandenses.*

148. 14. **Leucotheam, quae fuit Ino** &c. For the fable see the classical dictionaries. Here it may be remarked that Ino and many others of the so-called deified mortals were originally real deities, but afterwards fell to the level of deified heroes, following the vicissitudes of forms of religion which were gradually changed and forgotten.

148. 18. **Omitto illa; sunt enim praeclara;** "I pass over the 16 40
next proposition (*i.e.* that the universe is God), for it is all very excellent,"—although not true—as we must suppose the Academic thought; so that in the praise there is a touch of irony which would have been still more apparent if Cotta had said: *sint etiam praeclara,* "it may be all very fine so far as I know."

140. 10. **in Salaria,** scil. *via.* This was the name of the road leading from Rome into the Sabine country to Reate, *quia per eam Sabini sal a mari* (*i.e.* from the salt works near Ostia) *deferebant.* Fest. Paul., p. 327 Müll. — The city gate corresponding was anciently called *Salaria,* afterwards *porta Collina.* Festus, p. 326. — **nescio quid;** a depreciatory expression.

140. 12. **homines homine natos.** According to the poetic mythology both had a mortal mother, Leda; one, Castor, had also a mortal father, Tyndarus, while Pollux was a son of Jupiter.

140. 13. **Homerus . . . recens ab illorum aetate.** The Tyndaridae were, as brothers of Helen and Clytemnestra, contemporaries of the Greeks who fought before Troy, although they died before the war in the flower of youth. Homer was thought by many, as by Krates and his followers, to have lived immediately after the Trojan war; see Procl. Chrestom. in Becker's edition of the Scholia to the Iliad, p. 1. But Cicero in another passage (De Republ. II, 10, 18) cites the opposite opinion of others, according to which Homer lived about thirty years before the Spartan Lycurgus, whom he places a hundred and eight years before the first Olympiad, *i.e.* 885; and in Tuscul. V, 3, 7 he makes Homer and Lycurgus contemporaries. The reason of his attributing the other view to Cotta is easily seen. The passage of Homer alluded to is Il. III, 243.

140. 14. **cantheriis albis.** Balbus in II, 2, 6 said *cum equis albis.* The expression here substituted is derisive; for *cantherius* or *canterius,* properly *gelding,* is also used, like *caballus,* of common pack-horses. So the following **nullis calonibus,** "without grooms."

140. 16. **M. Catoni,** the old *Censorius.*

12 140. 19. **quod probari potest,** *i.e.* what at least may pass for probable. We know moreover that the Academics recognized in general no certainty but only probability. See Introd., p. 13.

140. 21. **divinos esse et aeternos.** See note on I, 15, 39.

13 140. 25. **(ab) A. Postumio aedem . . . dedicatam.** The temple was vowed by the dictator A. Postumius at the battle of Lake Regillus; it was dedicated at a later time by his son. So says Livy II, 20, 12 and 42, 5, although he says nothing of any apparition in the battle.

140. 27. **Graecorum . . . proverbium.** Suidas: ἀληθέστερα τῶν ἐπὶ Σάγρᾳ· παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν μέν, οὐ πιστευομένων δέ. The proverb also occurred in Menander. See Meineke on his fragments, p. 17. For the battle on the Sagra see note on II, 2, 6.

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14 *140. 31.* After the apparitions of the gods Balbus (II, 3, 7) had cited *divination* as a proof of the existence of the gods. The commencement of

Cotta's answer is lost; the portion that remains goes to prove that divination, even if it were any thing more than a figment of the brain, would still be of no use to men, because what was destined to happen would happen at any rate and could not be avoided by knowing it beforehand. This argument is also found De Div. II, 8, 20.

141. 1. **id esse fatum.** Comp. note on I, 20, 55. Chrysippus's definition in Eusebius Pr. Ev. VI, 7, 13 runs thus: *τὸ ἀπαράβατον καὶ ἐξ αἰῶνος καθῆκον τῶν αἰτιῶν, ὅσα οὕτωσὶ κατηναγκάσθε γενέσθαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλως ἔχειν κεκώλυται.*

141. 4. **fissum iecoris:** probably a fissure or cut separating the different lobes of the liver, called *limes* in Seneca Œd. 365. The fissure denoted good or evil fortune according to the circumstances; there was a *fissum vitale*, a *fissum familiare*, and other similar sorts. See De Div. II, 6, 12. 13; Brisson. De Form. I, 31; Müller Etrusk. II, 182.

141. 4. **sortis,** such as were used in the temple of Fortuna at Præneste for divination; they were counters, which when mixed like a pack of cards were thrown into a vase, and one or more were drawn out. Hense the expressions *sortes aequare*, *sortem ducere* or *trahere*. Comp. De Div. I, 18, 34; II, 33, 70; 41, 96; Suet. Tiber. 14. The *sortes* were not all of the same kind, and those expressions do not have the same meaning with all.

141. 10. **Deciorum devotionibus.** See II, 3, 10. 15

141. 11. [**eorum** refers to *deos* in the preceding sentence; *iniquitas* is unfairness, injustice.]

141. 18. **Faunus omnino quid sit nescio;** *i.e.* as a philosopher, and especially of the Academy, he does not know it; as pontifex of course he knows what the Faunus is, at least he knows what invocations and prayers are to be directed to him, what manifestations of power are to be expected from him, what sanctuaries and feasts are sacred to him; on all this consult the citations of Merkel on Ovid. Fast. Prolegg., p. CCII. For *nam* as a particle of transition see note on c. 24, 61.

141. 22. **formatas** for *informatas*, more common in this sense, which 7 16
was also used above II, 5, 13.—The following repetition of the reasons adduced by Cleanthes changes the order there followed, putting the third before the second; evidently because Cotta after answering the argument from divination wishes now to treat only the third, that drawn from the wonderful and awe-inspiring phenomena of nature, leaving the second and fourth for a later part of the discourse when he means to speak of the divine providence, the same arguments being applicable to both. He thus avoids repeating the same thing as Balbus did. That portion of Cotta's discourse is however lost.

Iberian or Celtic god, also identified with the same. Comp. Dionys. Ant. Rom. I, 38 and Theopomp. Diod. V, 66.

150. 3. **Aether** and **Dies** are parents of Uranus or Caelus according to a different theogony from the common one, given by Hesiod. The same is also followed by Hyginus Praef., p. 2, who gives almost all of the brothers and sisters which follow here; in Hesiod the majority of them are given as descendants of Night, and Cicero agrees with him, as he makes them brothers and sisters of Aether and Dies, who in Hesiod are children of Night; only there the Night produces them alone.—On **Amor** for *Cupido* see Schoemann Opusc. Ac. II, p. 60.

18 45 150. 13. **Aristaeus.** According to the poetic mythology, from which the various popular beliefs were quite divergent, Aristæus was a son of Apollo and Cyrene; the latter was represented as a mortal woman, although a daughter of a river god, Peneus, and a nymph. The origin of the culture and use of the olive, the keeping of bees and of the dairy was attributed to him, and for this he was deified.

150. 13. **Theseus Neptuni.** The myth historically explained makes him the son of the Athenian king Ægeus and of Æthra, daughter of the king of Trœzene, but, says Plutarch, Thes. c. 6: ἦν δὲ λόγος διαδοθεὶς ὡς ἐκ Ποσειδῶνος τεκνωθείη. But Ægeus is really itself a surname of Poseidon, and only by a transformation of the genuine myth designated a human king of Attica; just as Æthra was originally a goddess of the air related to Athene. See Müller, Proleg., p. 272.

150. 16. **iure civili.** This denotes the Roman law as distinguished from the *ius naturale* and the *ius gentium;* sometimes the expression has more special significations, which are unimportant here. Comp. De Offic. III, 5, 23; 17, 69 with Beier's notes.

150. 17. **Achillem Astypalaeenses.** The inhabitants of the island Astypalæa, one of the Cyclades. Achilles was however worshipped in other places. See Preller Griech. Myth. II, p. 440; Jacobi's Handwörterbuch d. Myth. II, p. 440.

150. 19. **Musa matre nati:** not *Musis matribus;* for according to some Calliope was the mother of both; according to others they had different mothers.

46 150. 21. [**Vide igitur, ne . . .;** "See whether it may not be the case that."]—**quod tu quoque visus es dicere.** See II, 24, 62.

150. 24. **Hecatam.** She is the daughter of Asteria in the theogony of Hesiod. For other and different genealogies see Schoem. Opusc. Ac. II, p. 240.

150. 26. [Schoemann and Müller have the common reading *cur non*

Eumenides? quae si deae sunt, quarum . . . lucus Furinae, Furiae deae sunt &c. We have given in the text the emendation of Madvig, adopted by Baiter I and II. Schoemann in his Appendix does not venture to adopt this because it differs too much from the Mss. reading; and thinks that by placing a colon after *Furinae* the difficulties are removed. (We omit this note in the Appendix.) The common text gives this sense: If the Eumenides are deities, the Furies are also deities, — which though true is not important. Madvig's emendation is only a way of untying the knot, but at least gives a reasonable sense.]

150. 28. **lucus Furinae.** Plutarch C. Gracch. c. 17 calls this ἄλσος Ἐριννύων, from which it appears that he took the same view with Cicero in regard to this deity; who according to Varro L. L., V, 84 was little known, although there was a Flamen Furinalis and a feast Furinalia.

150. 30. **Natio** only occurs here; and the form of the name, whether 47
Nascio or *Natio*, is doubtful. The fact that the Romans paid worship to her in the territory of Ardea would show that she was a deity especially belonging to Ardea; possibly the same that Strabo V, 3, p. 376 calls Aphrodite; after Ardea became a part of the Roman state the Romans also joined in her worship, as they usually did in the various religious observances of annexed states.

150. 35. **Moneta** appears in this connection as an especial deity, corresponding to the Greek *Mnemosyne*, which is translated in the same way by others also; whereas in other places and in Cicero himself, De Div. I, 45, 105, Moneta is a title of Juno, "the warning one," which she is said to have received on a special occasion. As the mint was near her temple it was called after her, *officina Monetae;* see Liv. VI, 20, 13; and her title was transferred to coined money.

151. 3. **Serapim Isimque.** The worship of these Egyptian deities 19
had found entrance into Rome as early as the sixth century of the city (Valer. Max. I, 3, 5), and although it was repeatedly forbidden under penalty it constantly reappeared, until at length it was tolerated and after the beginning of the eighth century publicly recognized. See Orelli ad Arnob. II, 73; Preller Röm. Myth., p. 727 and Regionen der Stadt Rom., p. 123. The prohibition of the worship of foreign deities did not rest upon a denial of their existence, but rather on the opinion that certain deities and religions were fitted for some nations but not for others.

151. 12. **Coloni nostri Circeienses.** Circeii in the Volscian terri- 48
tory possessed the *ius Latii* as early as the time of the elder Tarquin. According to Westphal (Die Röm. Campagna, p. 60) the common people of that region preserve to this day a reminiscence of the Circe whose temple Strabo mentions at Circeii (V, 3, p. 232).

151. 16. **apud Pacuvium,** in the tragedy Medus. Aegialeus also occurs in Diodor. IV, 45; Justin. XLII, 3.

151. 17. [**vereor, quid agat Ino;** "I don't see what is to become of Ino."]

49 151. 20. **lege censoria;** *i.e.* in the contract made by the censors with the *publicani,* who undertook the collection of the Bœotian taxes. Amphiraus had a temple at Oropus; Trophonius at Lebadea in Bœotia.

151. 22. **Erechtheus** according to the story perished in the war against the inhabitants of Eleusis under Eumolpus, after he had slain the latter. For this reason Cotta here couples his name with that of Codrus who likewise died for his country. Erechthus was originally a surname of Poseidon, like Ægeus; it was also perpetuated in the public worship in the title Ποσειδῶν Ἐρεχθεύς. The temple, the Ἐρεχθεῖον, was on the Acropolis, and the priesthood was hereditary in the family of the Butadæ.

50 151. 31. **filiaeque eius.** According to the story, which contradicts itself in many particulars, the daughters of Erechtheus in obedience to an oracle gave themselves up as a sacrifice to the gods to obtain victory for their country over its enemies; for this they are several times cited by Cicero as examples of self-denying love of country. Tusc. I, 48, 116; De Fin. V, 22, 62; Pro Sest. 21, 48.

151. 31. [**Leonaticum.** Schoemann reads:] *Leontidum,* the daughters of Leos, a mythical hero of Attica, who in time of famine, following the direction of the oracle, suffered death to save her country. One of the ten tribes instituted by Clisthenes was called after Leos the φυλὴ Λεοντίς, and the citizens of the tribe were called Λεοντίδαι (Paus. I, 5, 2; Ps. Demosth. Epitaph., § 29; R.g. Theokrin, § 18), as if his name had been *Leon;* so after the same analogy the daughters might be called *Leontides.*

151. 35. **Stratonicus,** an Athenian player on the cithara, famous for his witty sayings, of which Athenaeus VIII, p. 348 f. gives some examples; they at last cost him his life, for a Cyprian King whom he had offended by one of them had him poisoned. See Engel Kypros I, p. 496.

20
51 152. 7. **Arqui,** an ancient form for *arcus,* like *senati, tumulti, versi, sumpti* and other similar examples. See Schneider Gram. II, 1, p. 471. But according to Charisius, p. 117 Keil, where this passage is cited, Cicero wrote *Arcuis.* Cf. Fleckeisen Krit. Miscell. (Dresd. 1864), p. 43. In the theogony of Hesiod Ἶρις, the goddess of the rainbow, is the daughter of Θαύμας, a son of the sea, who is the cause of the wonderful phenomena of Nature, rainbows and harpies, *i.e.* whirlwinds, waterspouts and the like. The name Iris is wanting in the Mss.; but *nata,* not *natus,* is found in the greater number, and those the best. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 349.

152. 9. **[quia speciem habeat** &c. So the Mss. read; the edd. generally change to *habet*, but without reason. The clause gives the reason commonly assigned, not the writer's.]

152. 12. **una Centauros peperisse dicitur;** a cloud, to which Zeus gave the form of Hera, was embraced by Ixion and brought forth a Centaur; from this one a train of others descended. Pindar Pyth. II, 50 ff.

152. 13. **tempestates.** There was a temple devoted to them near the Porta Capena, founded by the consul L. Corn. Scipio; see the comment. on Ovid Fast. VI, 193. The custom afterwards mentioned of sacrificing on the departure of a fleet and of throwing the pieces of the sacrifice into the sea is mentioned also by Livy XXIX, 27, 6. Comp. Preller Röm. Myth., p. 293.

152. 15. **Nostri quidem duces** &c. The custom of offering sacrifice on the sailing of a fleet, and of throwing the victim into the sea is also mentioned by Livy XXIX, 27, 6. Comp. Preller Röm. Myth., p. 293.

152. 17. **ita enim dicebas.** II, 26, 67. 52

152. 18. **Tellus.** Her temple at Rome is often mentioned, and the feast of the Fordicidia on the 15th of April, at which pregnant cows were offered to her, is said to have been founded by Numa. See Ovid Fasti IV, 628 ff. and the commentators.

152. 20. **Fontis delubrum Maso . . . dedicavit,** the consul C. Papirius Maso who in 523 defeated the Corsicans. The temple was near the Porta Capena, where before that time stood an altar of Fons or Fontus; and near this was said to be Numa's grave. See De Leg. II, 22, 56. There was also a feast, the Fontanalia, celebrated on the 13th October. See Müller on Varro L. L., V, 22.

152. 20. **in augurum precatione:** in the formula of prayer used by the augurs in their ceremonies, especially when they consecrated the *templum* (*in templo effando*, Varro VI, 53) and prayed for the auspices. Comp. Brisson. De Form. I, 106. Of the rivers here named besides the Tiber the Almo is often mentioned; the Anio occurs much oftener, and some have proposed to substitute that name here; the other names are probably not found elsewhere.

152. 28. **qui theologi nominantur;** see note on c. 16, 42. This 21 53
passage shows that the theologi, so called, held the doctrine of Euhemerus referred to in the note on I, 42, 119; *i.e.* they held the same fundamental doctrine (in regard to the explanation of the belief in the gods); while they took independent views of the individual gods, the fables concerning them, and their explanation as applied to human beings and transactions. This Euhemerism especially suited the opponents of polytheism, and the

Christian apologists are very fond of making use of it in argument. Many passages might be cited from Clem. Alex. (Protrept.), from Arnobius, Lactantius and others, from L. Ampelius (*Liber Memorialis*), and Johannes Lydus (*De Mens.*), some of which support, others contradict the indications given by Cicero. The only point to be noticed here is that under all the names hereafter mentioned, even *Aether*, *Caelus*, *Sol* and the like, according to the doctrine of Euhemerus, we are to understand human beings of former ages who actually bore those names.

152. 33. **cuius . . . sepulcrum ostenditur.** Callimachus expresses indignation at this, Hymn. in Iov. v. 8: *Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψευσταί· καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο Κρῆτες ἐτεκτήναντο· σὺ δ' οὐ θάνες· ἐσσὶ γὰρ αἰεί.*

152. 35. **qui appellantur Anaces Athenis.** The name has the same meaning apparently as *Ἄνακτες*. Their temple at Athens, *τὸ Ἀνακεῖον*, is often mentioned; but they are not generally distinguished from the Tyndaridae. Cf. Plut. Thes. c. 33; Num. c. 13.

153. 1. [**Tritopatreus,** a son of Jupiter by Proserpine. Schoemann reads *Tritopatores*, [*Zagreus*], *Eubuleus*, *Dionysus*, with the following note:] *Tritopatores*, properly "ancestors" (Pollux III, 7). The name seems to have been applied in long-forgotten theogonies to certain deities to whom the origin of the human race was attributed. Cf. Lobeck Agl., pp. 754–765, according to whose opinion *Zagreus*, wanting in the Mss., is here inserted in the text. It is impossible to explain with certainty or to form an opinion upon the statements here made by Cotta on the authority of his theologi, as we have no knowledge of the data which formed the basis of their opinions. [See also Preller, Griech. Myth. I, 371.]

54 153. 12. **quae Heliopolis appellatur.** The Aegyptian name was *On*, at the same time the name of the god. According to Jablonski, Panth. Aeg. I, p. 137, it means "light."

153. 13. **quem Acantho Rhodi.** The name does not occur elsewhere; it is singular too that the father's name is not mentioned with the mother's; the passage is doubtless corrupt, and it is impossible to restore it.

22
55 153. 16. **Apollinem eum.** There is no verb here to govern the accusative; for the following *esse voluerunt* belongs only to the relative clause, which was itself the cause of the omission. It would have been very easy to supply it, as it must have been some word of the same meaning as *esse voluerunt*. A case of anacoluthia not unlike this is found in Brut. c. 27, 105: *Hunc qui audierant prudentes homines, in quibus familiaris noster L. Gellius, qui se illi contubernalem in consulatu fuisse narrabat, canorum oratorem et volubilem fuisse dicebat.* Here the predicate is wanting for *homines*. It would be *dicebant;* but the following

dicebat belongs only to the relative clause and its subject *L. Gellius;* and the authority of all the Mss. and the general connection of the passage forbid our changing it to *dicebant.*

153. 16. **cuius in tutela Athenas.** The allusion is to the Apollo worshipped by the Athenians as πατρῷος, their tutelary deity; he was afterwards identified with the Pythian Apollo, the son of Zeus and Leto or Latona, but originally was certainly different. See Schoem. Opusc. Ac. I, 324 and 347.

153. 20. **Memalio.** This name too is doubtless corrupt; but no certain emendation is possible. The islands afterwards mentioned are the Liparaean or Aeolian, north of Sicily. The name *Vulcaniae*, Greek Ἡφαιστιάδες, had perhaps fallen into disuse in Cicero's time; hence he says *nominabantur.*

153. 22. **Die matre.** This is the reading of the best and the greater 56
number of Mss., not *Dia.* Cicero certainly did not find the Latin name of an agrarian deity in the writings of the Greek theologi whom he here follows. Serv. note on Aen. I, 297; IV, 577, and Ampelius c. 9, agree on the reading *Die.* Cf. also below c. 23, 59. The remarks of Welcker, Griech. Götterlehre I, 329 in favor of *Dia* are not to the point.

153. 23. **Valentis.** Cicero apparently gives this as the translation of the Greek name Ἴσχυς. According to the fable he was an Arcadian hero, who won the favor of the Thessalian Coronis, which Apollo had enjoyed before him. But Ischys is nowhere else mentioned as the father of Trophonius. Cf. Müller, Orchom., p. 196.

153. 28. [**Aegyptum.** Lactantius and Baiter II write *in Aegyptum.*]

153. 29. **Hunc Aegyptii Theuth appellant.** Cf. Parthey on Plut. De Is. et Osir, p. 154 and R. Pietschmann, Hermes Trismegistus (Leipsic, 1875), pp. 29 and 38 sq.

153. 34. **Cynosuris.** The reference is probably either to the Arca- 57
dian mountain Κυνόσουρα, mentioned by Steph. Byz., or to a place in the district of the Cynuraei, mentioned by Pausanias VIII, 27, 3.

154. 3. **Corybantis filius.** Apollo is sometimes called son of Cory- 28
bas in other places; but his birth in Crete and his contest with Jupiter for the island are only mentioned here. As Corybas and the Corybantes originally belonged to the Phrygian mythology, and were from this adopted by the Greeks especially in Samothrace and Crete, so this second Apollo owes his existence doubtless to a combination of Phrygian and Greek fables; his quarrel with Jupiter may have had reference to the collisions of different systems of worship. Cf. Hoeck's Kreta III, p. 146.

154. 5. **ex Hyperboreis,** *i.e.* from the fabled Northern regions beyond Boreas, where the Delphians themselves were sometimes said to have originated. *Cf. Müller,* Dorier Bk. II, c. 4.

154. 7. **Νόμιον.** Apollo shares this surname with Hermes. Arist. Thesm. V. 977. It really means however not the lawgiver, as Cicero and others explain it, but the god of the pastures and flocks; and Ἀπόλλων νόμιος is properly, so far as the idea is concerned, the same with Aristaeus, mentioned in c. 18, 45 as the son of Apollo. Cf. Pind. Pyth. IX, 65 (115). The form *Nomionem* of the Mss. is only an error of the copyists.

58 154. 10. **Upis** as the name of a male deity only occurs here. It is often found as a surname of Diana, where it is regarded as a collateral form of ὄπις, ὦπις, and explained as referring to the oversight of the actions of men and to the punishment of their transgressions.

154. 12. **Dionysos multos.** It is extraordinary that just here the Dionysus of the common mythology, son of Zeus and Semele, is passed over. Those that are mentioned all belong either to the Orphic or other fables unknown to us. — On the **Trieterides** see Schoem. Griech. Alterth. II^3, p. 502.

59 154. 17. [**Elide.** *Eli* Mss. and Baiter II.]

154. 23. **orta Nilo.** The Aegyptian Neith is meant, commonly identified with Minerva; although others call her not the daughter of *Nilus*, but of Zeus (Diod. I, 13), or of Hermes (Plut. De Is. et Osir, c. 7). According however to Jablonski, Panth. A. I, p. 168, *Nilus* is just the same as Zeus.

154. 24. [**a Iove.** Schoemann omits the preposition.]

154. 25. **Coryphe** probably owes her origin to later mythologists, who explained the story of the birth of Minerva from the head (ἐκ κορυφῆς) of Zeus by substituting a nymph, *Coryphe*, for the head. Cf. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. II, p. 163. — For the following, daughter of **Pallas,** see Tzetz. on Lycophr. v. 355, and Müller Kl. Schr. II, p. 135.

60 154. 32. **quibus intellegis resistendum esse.** When Cotta in this passage, as also in c. 21, 53 speaks against Euhemerism, he does so solely in the interest of religion, of which in several passages I, 22, 61 and 62; III, 2, 5. 6 he has avowed himself a devoted adherent. He wishes therefore that the popular deities should be considered not only as men who have been wrongly deified, but as really gods. As an Academic he could attach no importance to this; he must on the contrary have considered the fables about the gods as reprehensible in so far as they were believed to be real histories of the gods; and Euhemerism, which took ground against this belief and considered them merely as accounts of the actions of men, must have rather seemed to him commendable. — Cotta might however blame the Stoics from both points of view, because instead of setting them aside they appeared by explaining them allegorically to bring them to a certain extent into credit again. — Instead of **aliaque eiusmodi** the Mss.

have *atque* or *et eiusmodi*, so that *eiusmodi* would stand for the subject, which is quite contrary to usage.

155. 2. **Nam mentem.** We must supply some phrase like: *idemque* 24 61
de reliquis dicendum est, to which *nam* relates, inasmuch as it clearly does not introduce the reason of the proposition immediately preceding. It is here rather a particle of transition; and the usage is in such cases to be explained by supplying an intermediate clause in conformity with the context. So above c. 6, 15; for further details see Hand Tursell. III, 147.

155. 4. **in nobismet insunt ipsis.** Cf. the explanation in II, 23, 61 and the note. In regard to **honos, salus** and **victoria** the Stoic might have offered an answer, and for **Fortuna** he would perhaps have said that what appeared to men as *inconstantia* and *temeritas* was not really such, but only an ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ ἄδηλος αἰτία, according to Plut. De Plac. Phil. I, 29 and Stobaeus Ecl. I, p. 218.

155. 15. **fuisse sapientes videantur.** Cf. I, 15, 41. 62

155. 16. **quod miserandum sit, laboratis** = *laborem, qui miserandus sit, suscipitis.*

155. 20. **Quid Veiovi facies?** Festus answers this, p. 379: *Ve syllabam rei parvae praeponebant, unde Veiovem parvum Iovem.* Of the correctness of the answer we will say nothing; but we see from Ovid Fast. III, 445 that by *Veiovis* many people understood a small, youthful Jupiter. — The etymology of **Volcanus** is found in Isidorus, p. 1026, 32 Goth.: *dictus Volcanus quasi volans candor, vel quasi volicanus, quod per aërem volet*, which is at the least no worse than the most of those given by Balbus II, 25–27, or than a recent one, which derives the name from the Greek, 'Ολκαῖος = "dragging the foot," because of his lameness. Comparative philology refers the name to a Sanscrit root *ulka, valka*, which means "burning."

155. 23. **natare visus es** = *fluctuare*, move hither and thither without sure footing, *titubare*, "to be all adrift." Cf. Horat. Sat. II, 7, 6: *Pars multa natat, modo recta capessens, interdum pravis obnoxia.*

155. 29. **figuras deorum:** divine forms, in which the gods are em- 63
bodied and live.

155. 30. **Qui tantus error fuit.** "The error of deifying natural ob- 25
jects went so far." — The deification of **Febris** Cicero mentions and disapproves in De Leg. I, 11, 28, but speaks only of an altar; so in regard to **Mala Fortuna. Orbona** is mentioned by Tertullian Ad. Nat. II, 15 as a goddess, *quae in orbitatem semina extinguat.* But in that passage the Mss. have *Orbana.*

64 156. 1. **Neptunum esse dicis animum** &c. This refers to II, 28, 71, where the language differs, but the sense is the same. The phrase **idem de Cerere** is only a passing hint, which the reader is expected to complete for himself.

156. 6. **qualis tu eos esse vis.** After these words something has evidently fallen out: *non esse scio*, or the like.

65 156. 15. After **Sed** there is a long break, comprising the whole third part of the argument, setting forth the objections against the divine providence, and a part of the fourth, against the particular care of the gods for men; all of which is lost.

26
66 156. 16. **Nequaquam istuc istac ibit** &c. From the Medea Exul of Ennius, corresponding to vv. 365 ff. of the tragedy of Euripides: *ἀλλ' οὔτι ταύτῃ ταῦτα, μὴ δοκεῖτέ πω. ἔτ' εἰσ' ἀγῶνες τοῖς νεωστὶ νυμφίοις, καὶ τοῖσι κηδεύσασιν οὐ σμικροὶ πόνοι. δοκεῖς γὰρ ἄν με τόνδε θωπεῦσαί ποτ' ἄν*; — The following **ille traversa mente** &c. come from the same source and correspond to vv. 371, 398–9 of Euripides, although the translation in both cases is not quite correct. The remaining verses in §§ 66 and 67 have no corresponding ones in the Medea of Euripides; but they may still have existed in that of Ennius, inasmuch as the plays of the Roman dramatists were not simple translations, but more or less free adaptations of the Greek originals.

68 157. 17. **maior mihi moles** &c. From the Atreus of Attius, cited also in De Orat. III, 58 and Tusc. IV, 36.

27 157. 21. This and the eight following verses are from the same tragedy of Attius. They are the words of Atreus, who complains of his brother Thyestes for having seduced his wife Aërope. *Illexe*, an old syncopated form for *illexisse*; so *despexe* Plaut. Mil. Glor. II, 6, 72, *surrexe* Hor. Sat. I, 9, 73, *divisse* II, 3, 169, and other similar examples in Lucretius. — The succeeding verses **Adde huc** &c. refer to another crime of Thyestes. Atreus had received from Hermes a ram with golden wool, on the possession of which the duration of his authority depended. Thyestes with the aid of Aërope stole it.

69 158. 1. **Videturne.** Occasionally a question is introduced by the simple enclitic *ne* where an affirmative answer is expected and *nonne* might be used in its place. Cf. De Offic. III, 17, 68: *suntne igitur insidiae, tendere plagas*, and the remarks of Heusinger and Beier. *Videsne? Videtisne?* are especially common. So in German *Siehst du wohl?* might often be used for *Siehst du nicht?* See II, 28 init., and below c. 34, 83; Tusc. II, 11, 26; 21, 50; 22, 53; Rosc. Am. c. 24, 66; Hand Tursell. *IV, p. 74.*

158. 3. **multo . . . paene maioribus.** The separation of *multo* from the comparative emphasizes the meaning. Cf. Tusc. V, 36, 104: *vir sapiens multo arte maiore praeditus.* Ad. Att. VII, 16, 2: *Cnaeus noster multo animi plus habet.*

158. 3. **Sentit . . . ut peccetur;** i.e. *quomodo* or *quantopere.* Cf. Pr. Rosc. Am. c. 24, 66: *Videtisne ut eos agitent Furiae?* — [**forum, curia, campus;** *i.e.* the courts, the legislature, the popular assemblies (*Campus martis*).]

158. 11. **motum istum celerem cogitationis.** Cf. 28, 71: *sine animi motu et cogitatione.* De Orat. I, 25, 113: *ingenii celeres quidam motus;* De Leg. II, 18, 46: *qui modo ingenio possit moveri;* Ad. Famil. XV, 21: *ingenium Calvi acute movebatur.*

158. 15. **idcirco consuluit;** a shorter turn for *idcirco consuluisse* 70
dicitur, i.e. *a vobis.*

158. 22. **uterentur;** *utantur* would have been more correct. But 28
comp. I, 22, 61 note.

158. 26. **Pheraeo Iasoni.** The story is told in Valer. Max. I, 8, 2, 6: *Divinae fortunae vulnus Pheraeo Iasoni quidam exitii eius cupidus intulit. Nam cum inter insidias gladio eum percussisset, vomicam, quae a nullo medicorum sanari potuerat, ita rupit, ut hominem pestifero malo liberaret.*

158. 34. **omnis opinio ratio est.** It is to be borne in mind that 71
ratio properly denotes only the act of thinking, and that the meaning "reason, faculty of thinking," is derived from the other.

159. 8. **levitates comicae,** i.e. *quales in comoediis proponuntur.* — 29 72
The following verses are just at the beginning of the Eunuchus of Terence.

159. 13. **in Synephebis.** See I, 6, 13 note.

159. 18. **studeat tui.** So Plautus uses *cupere* with the genitive, Mil. Glor. IV, 1, 17, and often besides; also *fastidire* Aul. II, 2, 67.

159. 21. **aliquod nomen;** some debt. — In the following verses **praestrigias praestrinxit** was necessary, even against the authority of the Mss. Cf. Bücheler in the Jahrb. f. Philol. CV, 109.

160. 4. **Cedo senem.** From Terence Phorm. II, 2, 7. 73

160. 7. **quid ut iudicetur.** For the position of *ut* after the interrog- 30 74
ative word see Or. pro Sest. § 84: *quid ut faceret?* Pro Tull. § 55: *quid ut proficeret?* Also Madvig. De Fin. II, 19, 61 note.

160. 7. **Qui tabularium incenderit.** In the Social war the archives of Heraclea in Lucania were set on fire and burned. Cic. pro Arch. c. 4, 8.

This is probably alluded to here. Of Q. Sosius nothing is known. The predicate *splendidus* applies not to the person, but to his position.

160. 9. **Qui transscripserit tabulas publicas.** *Transscribere* is also used of falsified copies of documents Pro Cluent. c. 14, 41: *testamentum in alias tabulas transscriptum signis adulterinis obsignavit.*

160. 10. [**sex primorum.** Schoemann writes:] *Sex primorum.* This name was applied at Rome to the highest of the *scribae quaestores* who consisted of three decuriæ. See Mommsen Röm. Staatsr. I, p. 273. These are more probably alluded tó here than, as I formerly thought, the chief officers of a curia of some *municipium,* who were also called after their number, as *Sex primi, Quinque primi* or *Decem primi.*

160. 12. **auri Tolossani.** Q. Servilius Cæpio, Consul in 648, took the Gallic town of Tolosa, plundered the temple of Apollo and appropriated the greater part of the booty to his own use. In the succeeding year he suffered defeat at the hands of the Cimbri, which was generally considered as a punishment for the sacrilege he had committed. He was deprived of the *imperium* and his fortune was confiscated. The phrase *Aurum Tolossanum* was therefore proverbially used of any possession which brought misfortune to the owner. Gell. III, 9, 7; Iustin. XXXII, 3, 9 seqq.

160. 12. **coniurationis Iugurthianae.** So also in Brut. c. 33, 127. The allusion is to the bargain of several Roman dignitaries with Jugurtha, who bribed them and induced them to prefer the advantage of their enemy to the honor and interest of the state. See Sall. Iug. c. 40.

160. 13. **Tubuli.** See I, 23, 63 note.

160. 14. **rogatione Peducaea.** The tribune of the people S. Peducæus in the year 640 proposed an inquiry *de incestu* against some Vestal virgins who had broken their vow of chastity. For further details see Asconius, Or. cont. Mil. § 32, p. 46 ed. Orell.

160. 14. **sicae, veneni, peculatus.** Among the so-called *quaestiones perpetuae, i.e.* the ordinary criminal procedures, there was one *inter sicarios et veneficos,* for murder and poisoning, and another for *peculatus,* embezzlement of public funds.

160. 15. **lege nova.** The reference is to the Lex Cornelia of the Dictator Sulla of the year 673 *de falso,* against fraud; it is also called *testamentaria* because one of the chapters was directed against forgeries of wills.

160. 16. **illa actio.** The form of indictment.

160. 17. **tot iudicia de fide mala.** This is the general term; the terms which follow denote actions brought for special offences falling under this *head; tutelae,* for unfaithfulness of a guardian to his ward; *pro socio,* for

breach of contract of partnership; *mandati*, for failure to perform a commission; *fiduciae*, for neglect to restore a pledge for debt after the debt had been paid. Cf. De Offic. III, 17, 70: *Q. Scaevola fidei bonae nomen existimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis, societatibus, fiduciis, mandatis, rebus emptis, venditis, conductis, locatis.*

160. 19. **lege Plaetoria,** for the protection of minors (under twenty-five years) against fraud in legal matters. The law allowed a criminal action in such cases, and this might be brought not only by the injured party, but by any third person; hence the term *iudicium publicum rei privatae.*

160. 21. **quod C. Aquillius . . . protulit;** perhaps in the edict which he issued as praetor in 688, when he held that office with Cicero. The following definition of *dolus* is also given in De Offic. III, 14, 60.

161. 7. **Contra deum . . . liberius;** because the sort of excuse which 31 76
physicians, pilots and the like might offer for the failure of their undertakings would be insufficient in the case of the gods.

161. 8. **dedisses** = *dare debuisses.* See I, 32, 89 note.

161. 13. **a Neptuno patre.** See c. 18, 45 note. When Theseus, deceived by the calumnies of Phædra against his son Hippolytus, prayed to Neptune to put him to death, Neptune fulfilled his desire, though he must have known the innocence of Hippolytus and have foreseen that Theseus would bitterly repent having offered the prayer. Cf. De Offic. I, 10, 32; III, 25, 94, where this example is used to show that it is sometimes better to break than to keep one's word. The well-known fable of Phaethon is found in Ovid. Metam. I, 751 sqq.

161. 17. **Aristo Chius.** See I, 14, 37 note. 77

161. 20. **prorsus, si, qui audierunt** &c. This is a second conditional protasis, *si verum est* &c. being the first, and repeats the same thought in another form. Cf. De Fin. I, 3, 7: *Quamquam si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut vertunt nostri poetae fabulas, non male mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem;* where Madvig gives other examples.

161. 30. [**eius nomen.** Schoemann reads *eius numen.*] The question is not of the name, but of the power and mode of action of the divine providence, so that *nomen providentiae* would be a useless circumlocution.

161. 32. **stultitia.** See I, 9, 23 note. 32 79

162. 5. **Telamo;** in the tragedy of Ennius of the same name. The verse is also cited De Div. II, 50, 104.

162. 5. **cur . . . neglegant;** an elliptical expression for *cur dicendi sint neglegere;* cf. the similar ellipsis with *ut*, and the note on I, 9, 21.

80 162. 11. **duo Sciplones.** The brothers P. and Cn., who both perished in Spain at short intervals in the second Punic war. Livy XXV, 33–36.

162. 12. **Maximus.** The renowned Q. Fabius Cunctator. Cf. De Senec. c. 4, 12.

162. 13. **Marcellum,** M. Claudium, the sword of the Romans against Hannibal; he fell in the year 546 in the battle near Venusia. Livy XXVII, 26, 27.

162. 14. **Paulum,** L. Aemilium. See Livy XXII, 49.

162. 15. **Reguli,** M. Atilii, who when proconsul in Africa in 499 was taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, and in 504 put to death. The story of the cruelties of the Carthaginians towards him is justly thought to be apochryphal. See Ruperti on Sil. Ital. VI, 539.

162. 15. **Africanum,** the conqueror of Carthage, P. Cornelius Scipio Æmilianus. He died suddenly in 625 during the Gracchian troubles; and his nearest relatives, even his wife Sempronia, sister of the Gracchi, were by some suspected of having poisoned him. See Appian. Civ. I, 20.

162. 18. **P. Rutilius** Rufus, because when quaestor in Asia he had defended the provincials against the extortions of the publicani, was unjustly convicted on a trial *pecuniarum repetundarum*, and afterwards lived in exile at Smyrna.

162. 19. **Drusus,** M. Livius, as tribune of the people treated the people's party and the optimates on an equality, and hoped to reconcile them; he incurred the ill will of both, and was assassinated at the instigation of Varius in 663. For Varius see c. 33, 81.

162. 20. **Q. Scaevola** with many others was put to death by the Marian party in 669. A. Preuner has recently expressed doubts about the *ante simulacrum Vestae*, Hestia-Vesta, p. 321. See also Preller Röm. Myth., p. 539, note 1.

162. 21. **a Cinna,** L. Corn., who was head of the party after the death of Marius, and consul in 669 with Cn. Papirius Carbo.

162. 22. **C. Marius, Q. Catulum** (Lutatium). After his return from Africa in 668 Marius put many of his opponents out of the way, and forced Catulus to commit suicide. See Plut. Marius, c. 44.

33
81 162. 30. **Q. Varius,** when tribune of the people in 663, had a *lex maiestatis* passed, in consequence of which investigations were instituted against those who had brought about the Social war, and many of the most prominent men were condemned. Two years later he himself was judged under his own law and died in exile, but it is not known in what way. On

the murder of his colleague Drusus see c. 32, 80. Nothing more is known of the poisoning of Metellus.

163. 1. **Phalaris,** tyrant of Agrigentum in Sicily about 550, of whose 82
cruelty many incredible stories are told, a part of which are evidently inventions. He was finally put to death by the citizens of Agrigentum who rose against him; the accounts vary as to the manner of his death. See Beier on De Offic. II, 7, 26. — **Apollodorus,** tyrant of Cassandrea, the ancient Potidaea, likewise notorious for his cruelty, was put to death after the taking of Cassandrea by Antigonus I. — **poenas sustulit,** the more unused expression, but used by Cicero also in Cat. II, 13, 28 (*poenam sui sceleris sufferat*) and Pro Font. c. 17, 39 (*victoriae poenas sufferre*). Cf. Nonius, p. 396.

163. 4. **Anaxarchus** of Abdera had once deeply offended the Cyprian tyrant Nicocreon in the presence of Alexander the Great; afterwards, when Nicocreon had him in his power, he put him to death.

163. 6. **Zenonem** of Elea (Velia). Cicero says of him in Tusc. II, 22: *perpessus est omnia potius, quam conscios delendae tyrannidis indicaret.* The tyrant's name was Nearchus.

163. 9. **Harpalum.** The allusion is apparently to the notorious pirate, 84 83
called by other authors Skirtalos or Skirpalos, into whose hands Diogenes himself had once fallen.

163. 17. **cum ad Peloponnesum classem appulisset.** This is evidently an error; nothing is known of an expedition of Dionysius to the Poloponnesus. The occasion of the error was the surname *Olympii,* which Cicero referred to Olympia in Elis. But there were temples of the Olympian Jupiter in many other places, even in Syracuse where this story is located by Aelian. V. H., I, 20.

163. 23. **Epidauri.** This is also an error, occasioned by the fact that the Epidaurian temple of Aesculapius was the most noted. Valer. Max. I, 1, 3, who agrees with Cicero, is no authority, as he only drew his information from Cicero. According to Athenaeus XV, 693 Dionysius also robbed the god of his table; the two stories are about equally probable.

164. 4. [**in [tyrannidis] rogum** is the reading of Baiter II. Schoe- 85 84
mann has *et impunitus rogo;* and Müller leaves the Mss. reading *in typanidis rogum* without attempting to amend, but thinks that Baiter is perhaps correct. The passage is hopelessly corrupt. The last emendation that we have seen is that of Hofmeister, Hermes XII, 516: *Tyndaride in rogum.* Schoemann has the following note:] **et impunitus rogo illatus est.** The sense is: as he was unpunished during his life and his death was quite a

natural one, so he passed unpunished to the funeral pile, inasmuch as his body was not maltreated nor was the honor of burial refused him as was customary in the case of criminals. — But *impunitus* is only a conjecture; the Mss. have *in Tympanidis rogum* or *rogo;* and it is possible that Tympanis was the name of the builder of the costly funeral pile on which according to the ancient authorities Dionysius was burnt. This is the opinion of Welcker, Rhein. Mus. N. F. VI, p. 399. — **atque** stands in the place of an adversative conjunction; a simple copula is often used where the connection of thought is plain of itself.

85 164. 9. **sine ulla divina ratione;** "without any divine order"; so immediately below, *ratione et disciplina*, rational order and constitution. The idea that the voice of conscience itself is only a mode of operation of the *divina ratio* is designedly left out of consideration by the Academic for purposes of the argument, although it might easily have suggested itself and was by no means ignored by the wisest of the ancients.

164. 10. **iacent omnia** = *omnia corruunt.* It is the conscience alone, Cotta means, that gives to life its solid basis, not the divine ordinance; for we are precluded from recognizing such divine government when we see that neither virtue is rewarded nor vice punished. Against this argument see among others Plato Repub. X, 612. 613; Simplic. on Epictet., p. 357 Schweigh.; and Sallust De Deis et Mund. c. 19.

164. 13. **mundi [in homines] moderatio.** The words in brackets are an addition of some interpolator and are not only superfluous, but violate good usage.

36
86 164. 23. **virtutem nemo umquam acceptam deo rettulit.** Here too the Academic in the heat of argument is betrayed into saying what is plainly untrue. Homer in Il. XIII, 730, and in other passages says that all human endowments, even a right mind (*νόος ἐσθλός*), come from Zeus. "God alone is good," says Simonides, "and no one attains to virtue without the help of the gods"; Sim. Fr., p. 16 and 45, Schneidewin. — "Zeus, from thee come the great virtues to men," says Pindar Isthm. III, 6. "Men are good and wise through the deity," Pind. Ol. IX, 30. "The greatest gift of the gods is to be not evil-minded"; Aeschylus Ag. 927. And Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus, p. 279 B prays to the gods to grant him, that he may be inwardly beautiful and that his outward circumstances may correspond, just as in several of the Homeric hymns the gods are invoked to grant virtue and well being. Cf. Spanh. on Callim. h. in Iov. 96. Utterances like these are found in any number (cf. Schoem. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 108); and although there are in abundance others which could be cited in support of Cotta's argument, yet if we should count and weigh the suf-

frages, we should arrive at the conclusion that the most and the best rather agreed with the Stoic (II, 66), and that the sort of self-confident reliance on one's own strength and goodness which thinks to get on without the help of the deity was an illusion that became more and more general after the time of the sophists, but was never the prevailing view of really classical antiquity. Of course it was understood that even the gods do not make a man virtuous without or against his will; he must meet them half way, he must desire their aid and have the will on his part to coöperate in the work of virtue. In this sense the poet says: *ἐν μέσῳ κεῖται κιχεῖν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δίκαν ὁσίαν* (in Clem. Alex. Strom. V, 12, 137); and this is the idea of Plato Rep. X. 617 E: *ἀρετὰ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἕξει· αἰτία ἑλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος*: a passage which has been wrongly cited by some commentators of Cicero as agreeing with the views of Cotta.

164. 33. **Herculi decumam vovit**; a reference to the oft-mentioned Roman custom of consecrating the tenth of one's gain to Hercules. See Heindorf on Horace Sat. II, 6, 10; Jahn on Persius II, 11. 88

164. 35. **Pythagoras.** The story is told of several persons; according to Diog. Laert. VIII, 12 the proposition discovered was the so-called problem of Pythagoras or *magister matheseos*. The doubt expressed by Cotta is solved according to some by assuming that the ox was only one of dough.

165. 5. **Quamvis licet.** Other examples of this easily-explained usage may be found in Kühner's Tusc. IV, 24, 53 note.

165. 9. **ut Diogenes dicebat.** A reference to the saying cited above c. 34, 83.

165. 12. **Diagoras.** See note on I, 23, 63. The same story is told of Diogenes the Cynic instead of Diagoras, Diog. L. VI, 59. 87 89

165. 13. **atque ei quidam amicus.** The omission of the *verbum dicendi* is not so violent as to prove the passage necessarily corrupt. Cf. F. A. Wolf Verm. Schr., pp. 159, 160. Tac. Hist. IV, 75: *ad ea Cerialis Civili et Classico nihil.* The verb for *nescio quid* is also wanting above c. 5.

165. 14. **ex tot tabulis pictis,** *i.e.* of votive tablets. Schol. Cruq. ad Horat. Sat. II, 1, 32: *Votiva tabula est, quae ex voto posita est in templo aut aliquo loco publico, in qua descripta h. e. depicta est fortuna alicuius. Ita solent naufragi suum naufragium in tabella depictum . . . in templis alicui deo consecratum suspendere.* The Samothracian deities especially were invoked by mariners.

165. 17. **inquit**; with reference to II, 66, 167; said not especially of Balbus, but of any opponent whatever; *inquit* is often so used. 90

88 165. 29. **expetantur eae poenae a liberis** &c. Hom. Il. IV, 160: *εἴπερ γάρ τε καὶ αὐτίκ' Ὀλύμπιος οὐκ ἐτέλεσσεν, ἔκ δὲ καὶ ὀψὲ τελεῖ, σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν σὺν σφῇσιν κεφαλῇσι γυναιξί τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν.* Cf. 1 Mos. 20, 5; and Plutarch De Sera Summi Numinis Vindicta.

165. 33. **Quinam Tantalidarum.** The verses are from Attius, as Charisius I, p. 70 shows: but it is uncertain from which play.

91 166. 3. **portenta et flagitia.** See I, 11, 28; 16, 43; 24, 66.

166. 4. **Hipponactis iambus;** Hipponax of Ephesus, about 540 B.C., inventor of the choliambus and writer of satirical poems against his personal enemies. Cicero says *iambus* because the choliambus is also an iambus, and the latter name is sometimes given to any satirical poem. — **Archilochus** mentioned afterward, of Paros about 700, was the reputed inventor of the iambus, and satirized his enemies in his poems with such bitterness that some of them are said to have committed suicide from vexation and shame.

166. 11. **ab Apolline potius,** for Lycurgus was said to have been called to lawgiving and instructed by the Delphian Apollo. Herod. I, 65; Plut. Lyc. c. 13; Plat. Leg. init.

166. 11. **Critolaus,** an Achaean general, unable to bear the presumption of the Romans who interfered in Graecian affairs especially between the Achaeans and the Lacedaemonians as judges and attempted to control them by no means impartially, brought on the outbreak of the war which ended in the destruction of Corinth.

166. 12. **Hasdrubal,** a Carthaginian general in the war against Masinissa of Numidia, the ally of the Romans; this war gave the Romans the pretext for the third Punic war.

89
92 166. 17. **ut enim hominum membra** &c. The same comparison occurs also De Div. I, 53, 120: *si animal omne ut vult ita utitur motu sui corporis prono, obliquo, supino, membraque quocunque vult flectit, contorquet, porrigit, contrahit, eaque ante efficit paene quam cogitat, quanto id deo est facilius, cuius numini parent omnia. Numen* very properly denotes the effective power of the gods; the same word is used by Lucretius III, 144 of the power of the soul over the body: *corpus paret et ad numen mentis nomenque movetur.* The proper meaning is = *nutus,* "nod," whence the derived meaning is easily explained; and *nutus mentis* in Lactantius De Opif. Dei, c. 7: *nervi quibus mens . . . minimo nutu totius corporis molem temperat ac flectit.*

166. 20. **materiam enim rerum** &c. For explanation of the passage cf. Cic. Acad. 1, 7, 27: *subiectam putant (Peripatetici et veteres Academici) omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni qualitate ma-*

teriam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint; quae tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte &c. Cf. Plat. Timae., p. 51 A. This primaeval matter, from which the so-called four elements and all other material things proceed but which is itself endowed with no definite quality, a ὕλη ἄποιος, is according to the Stoics too οὐσία τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων, ἡ πρώτη ὕλη. Diog. L. VII, 150, cf. 137.

166. 28. **non eas?** [So Baiter and Schoemann. Müller has ***non*** 93
[***modo***] *eas;* Madvig proposes *Si non eas* &c.]

166. 29. **contemnet.** The future indicates that this must be considered as necessarily following from what precedes.

166. 31. **iidem dicitis . . . iidem vultis** = *qui dicitis* or *quamquam dicitis . . . tamen vultis.* By the use of the pronoun of identity in both members the contrast is all the more emphasized between statements which are contradictory with each other and which are still both held by the same persons. Cf. Acad. II, 20, 63: *qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te comperisse diceres.* It is more usual in such oppositions to put the first member in the form of a relative clause which is equivalent to a concessive clause, and then in the second member to designate the person in question, who has been previously indicated by a demonstrative pronoun or by a substantive, by a demonstrative pronoun like *is* or *idem*, as I, 22, 61; 43, 121.

166. 32. **dispertiri . . . somnia.** Cf. De Div. I, c. 20 sqq.

167. 14. **cur non . . . praeficit?** The Stoics really maintained this; but Cotta thinks he has sufficiently shown that it is an error, and so with this idea asks: "Why is it not so?"

167. 9. **finem.** Cf. De Fin. IV, 1, 1: *quae cum dixisset, finem ille;* 40 94
II, 6, 17: *tum ille, finem, inquit, interrogandi, si videtur.*

167. 14. **pro aris et focis.** Both are often joined together; "for what is dearest and holiest."

167. 15. **quos . . . sanctos esse dicitis.** Plut. Qu. Röm., c. 27: πᾶν τεῖχος ἀβέβηλον καὶ ἱερὸν νομίζουσι. Injury done to the city walls was a capital crime; and removal of them to enlarge the boundaries of the city (*pomerium proferre*) was only allowed with the approval of the gods, ascertained by the *auspicia.*

APPENDIX.

Introduction, page 9. We are justified in ascribing personality to the original deity of the Stoics because he is endowed with consciousness, will and wisdom; and we cannot conceive these attributes as existing independently of a personal being. But the Stoic deity is not on the one hand simply immanent in the universe, like that of a one-sided pantheism; nor on the other a blind natural force, the uncomprehended force of atheism: he pervades the world, but is not lost in it and still remains exalted above it. Of course there is no question of an absolute personality in the case of this deity, partly above the world, partly immanent in it, in fact the two ideas of the personal and the absolute are irreconcilable; and the longer we meditate on the nature and attributes of the deity, the more surely shall we come to the conclusion of Arnobius whose words are cited in the note to III, 15, 38.

That the Stoics were unable to conceive of the deity as a purely immaterial being will perhaps not seem unpardonable even to those who hold the opposite opinion; and so much the less will they be blamed for conceiving of the matter of the divine being as ether, the source of light and heat, since they were neither the first to hold such a view, nor have there been wanting even in recent times men of the greatest honesty and religious feeling who thought as they did.

Introd., pp. 11, 12. In Book II, 6, 16 the Stoic says: *Etenim si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in eo enim solo est ratio, qua nihil potest esse praestantius. Esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet, desipientis adrogantiae est; ergo est aliquid melius; est igitur profecto deus.* The Stoics rightly thought it incredible that in this world emanated from the original deity man should be the only being endowed with reason except the heavenly bodies, the simple aspect of which seemed to show their etherial nature, and their wonderful and regular movements to prove their intelligence. They found in the popular religion a belief in the existence of other beings of a higher grade than man, although they could not assent to the conceptions

current in the mythology and the traditional worship. In their opinion those unseen beings must be of higher reason and wisdom than mankind; and hence having the duty and the power of taking part in the world as servants of the supreme God according to his will and law, and of aiding men, the nearest related beings, in their imperfection and necessities, thus earning their gratitude and reverence. These are the beings intended, when the *providentia deorum* is spoken of, as in II, 29, 73; and the expression denotes the participation in the government of the world which they exercise in conformity with the supreme will; hence it is unimportant whether we say *deorum* or *dei providentia*. Christian theologians, who recognized the substantial agreement of this view with the biblical doctrine of the angels, have found fault with the Stoics for giving the name of gods to those servants in the divine government; still, if one calls to mind the original meaning of the word θεός or *deus*, he will find nothing to criticize. It would rather be desirable to set aside a special and distinctive name for the supreme being, just as in fact Ζεύς is not seldom used, though having really the same meaning as the other.

Nor can the Stoics be reproached for not withdrawing from the traditional polytheistic public worship. They did not wish to give their fellow citizens unnecessary and useless offence; they did not neglect to oppose and correct the superstitious and unreasoning views of the people, although they were not very adroit or successful in it. The curious etymologies and generally forced allegorical explanations of the mythological fables, examples of which we find in Balbus's discourse and elsewhere, were evidently not very well adapted to gain acceptance with the people.

Nor should we wonder that the Stoics, in spite of their opposition to what was offensive in the mythological fables, found it impossible quite to avoid many ideas upon religious subjects which they found generally prevalent and in which they themselves had been brought up from childhood. To this class belongs the belief in soothsaying, in visible apparitions and exhibitions of power of divine beings, which Balbus appeals to and uses even as proofs of the existence of the gods. Nevertheless the Stoics, as time went on, divested themselves more and more of such remnants of ancient superstition, which in reality had no necessary connection with the real essence and the moral teaching of their system; and what Gellius XIX, 1, says of the doctrine of Epictetus cannot be denied, namely that it agreed substantially with that of Zeno and Chrysippus.

In Epictetus as well as in the ethical writings of Antoninus, of Seneca and others we find, besides the firm and living belief in one supreme God of the universe, the no less firm and living belief in those numerous supernatural beings which they call sometimes gods, sometimes demons; and

they seem to make no difference between these two, unless it be that the second denotes especially the beings nearest to man; just as man's reasonable soul is often called the demon that dwells in him. This whole class of subordinate beings appears in general to be employed in the service of the supreme being, filled with the divine Logos, and hence friendly disposed to men; men have a dimmer and less vivid consciousness of the divine Logos, which needs quickening and strengthening; and in this they are aided by these inferior beings, who act as mediators between them and the highest God, with whom direct communication seems to be hardly conceivable. In this sense Antoninus IX, 40 recommends men to pray to the gods for moral light and strength; Zeus, that is the supreme being, says Epictetus, Diss. I, 14, 12, has given to every man his demon to watch over him. Man, says he (III, 24, 60), must strive to be on friendly terms with the gods, he must be mindful that he is related to them (I, 9, 11 and 23), and hence must try to be like them. These teachings are really only another form of expression for the highest moral law *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*: for it is the higher nature of man that is here in question, which manifests itself as the divine Logos in the reason and conscience, and constitutes his relationship with the gods. *Τῷ λογικῷ ζώῳ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον.* Antonin. VII, 11.

The ethical doctrines of the Stoics have thus an essentially religious character, though not a theological one; the theological portion is limited to a very few simple propositions, which would rather recommend than injure them in the eyes of many. Not to enter more fully into the subject a single point may be mentioned, which has been noticed by Simplicius in his commentary to Epictetus, Enchir., p. 8. He says: *καὶ τοῦτο δ' ἄν τις τῶν λόγων τούτων θαυμάσειεν, ὅτι τοὺς πειθομένους καὶ ἐργαζομένους τὰ λεγόμενα μακαρίους ἀποτελοῦσι καὶ εὐδαίμονας, οὐδὲν δεηθέντες τὰς μετὰ θάνατον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀμοιβὰς ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, κἂν πάντως ἀκολουθῶσιν καὶ αὗται.* And so it really is; Epictetus never refers to a reward to be expected after death. Although the Stoics never denied the continuing existence of the soul after death, many of them having expressly professed their belief in it, yet they never presumed to speak of a future judgment, of punishment of the wicked and of rewards for the righteous. Of course they thus surrendered a motive for well doing, which may be the most powerful for the majority of people, and which for this reason cannot be abandoned in a catechetical instruction intended for the multitude.

Summary, p. 24. To complete the note on the law of Isonomy the remarks of Prof. Schoemann in the N. Jahrb. f. Philol. 1875, p. 690, are given here. The complete silence in regard to this doctrine of all other sources

of information justifies us in supposing that Cicero's Velleius was in error on this point, and that he ascribed to Epicurus something that came, not from him, but from some later follower of his; and which was rejected by the others, because they saw that the law itself needed first to be proved and that this could hardly be done in the Epicurean system of physiology. It was therefore allowed to drop; and thus we may explain the absence of any mention of it even where it would seem to be necessary. Who the Epicurean was who advanced it cannot of course be ascertained. Only thus much is clear that Cicero did not use the same source in this part of his book for c. 16–21 as for c. 8–16; and Chr. Petersen (Phaedr. fr. π. θεῶν, p. 45) has advanced the theory that for c. 16–21 he used a book of the Epicurean Zeno; and he finds a confirmation of this in § 59. This is certainly not impossible; but more cannot be said. If the theory of Petersen is correct, it would also follow that Cotta's refutation of Velleius in the second part of this book, which in § 109 treats especially of the Isonomy, was taken, not from Clitomachus, whom Cicero certainly used in the third book, but from some later Academic who had written against the Epicurean author whom Velleius has followed in c. 16–21. Further conjectures are useless.

I, 10, 24. It is generally acknowledged that *significetur* of the Mss. is a false reading; the emendation of Lachmann (note on Lucret., p. 351), *sic incitetur*, corresponds somewhat better to the traditional reading so far as the written characters are concerned than *sic afficiatur*, the reading proposed in the note; but it does not meet the requirements of the sense, as is shown in the note. Comp. also Opusc. Ac. III, p. 284 and 303.

I, 10, 25. The words, *mentem, menti autem cur aquam* are wanting in the Mss. It is hardly necessary to answer at length the opinion of the most recent translator, that it is enough to write *motu* for *mente* without attempting to supplement the text at all. Comp. Opusc. Ac. III, p. 285. Baiter, recognizing the break, writes: *si di possunt esse sine sensu et mente, mentem cur aquae adiunxit? menti autem cur aquam adiunxit, si ipsa mens const. pot. vac. corp.;* thus substantially agreeing with the emended text. Madvig prefers to erase the words *si di possunt esse sine sensu et mente* in this sentence, and to insert them as a parenthesis in the next sentence regarding Anaximander, after *nativos esse deos*.

I, 11, 28. A detailed discussion of this passage (by Schoemann) may *be found in the* Jahrb. f. Philol. 1875, Hft. 10, p. 685, the substance of *which is given he*[illegible] *omne* is meant the ἓν καὶ πᾶν, the

universe, and Karsten, Xenoph., p. 136 has observed that the *mente adiuncta* of Velleius is to be understood, not of an original immanence, but of a connection of the *mens* (the intelligence) with the *omne* that has come from without; and he considers it an error of Velleius.—The *praeterea* immediately following in the traditional punctuation, of which the commentators say nothing, has been, to say the least, misunderstood in the strangest manner by the translators. It is unnecessary to give again here the examples cited in the Jahrbuch. They all have this in common, that they construe *praeterea* with the preceding words *mente adiuncta omne*, which affords no adequate sense. Velleius must have only stated what Xenophanes had said in regard to the connection of the *omne* with *mens* besides the fact itself. This is of two sorts, namely, that it is limitless, and that it is God; or in other words that the predicate of infinity as well as that of deity may be made of it. It might occur to some one perhaps to take the words *quod esset infinitum* as an inserted relative clause; but such a clause would not follow, but rather precede, *praeterea*. The difficulty is best met by taking *quod*, not for a relative pronoun, but as a conjunction = "that." It is conceded that it has this function in the phrase *propterea quod;* and there appears to be no rational ground why it may not have the same force with *praeterea*. There are, it is true, no *exempla probantia* of the usage; but in Bünemann's note to Lactantius I. D. III, 8, 15 several examples are cited of *praeter quod* for *praeterquam quod*, two also of *praetereo quod*, which one might be inclined to regard as an error for *praeterea quod*.

I, 13, 34. *et modo mundum tum mentem divinam esse putat. tum mundum* would of course have been more elegant, as Baiter and others before him have written. But as *et tamen modo mundum* is found in the best Mss., it seemed unadvisable to reject the *modo*. The *tamen* may be considered a copyist's error for *tum*, and the *tum* an emendation, which had crept into the text from the margin, of some corrector who wished to remedy the inelegance. In regard to this, not at all an unusual one, consult Hand Tursell. III, p. 649; or notice the example in this very book, c. 12, 31: *et modo unum, tum autem plures deos*. Zumpt, in the Orations against Verres, p. 296, shows that *tum* and *tamen* are sometimes confounded.

I, 15, 39. *fatalem vim*, the reading of a single Mss., is doubtless only a conjecture, which I have adopted, not because I thought it the correct reading, but because it at least gives a better sense than *fatalem umbram* of the other Mss. For other emendations see Baiter's note and my Opusc.

Ac. III, p. 363.—That *ignem* in the succeeding clause is not to be understood of the common earthly as opposed to the etherial fire, as the most recent translator has it, would be evident, not only from the note to the passage and what is said in the summary of the second book, p. 73, but from the position alone of *ignem* in the phrase, which would be hard to explain if the common fire were really intended.

I, 19, 49. A. Brieger (Beitr. zur Kritik einig. phil. Schr. des Cicero, Posen, 1873) has rightly remarked that in the words *eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut non sensu sed mente cernatur* the phrase *mente cerni*, opposed to *sensu cerni*, can mean nothing but the *ψυχικὴ αἴσθησις*, *i.e.* the simple perception by the faculty which Lucretius calls the *mens animi*, and in which the feeling, perceiving and thinking capacity of the soul dwells. The same statement is therefore made here as in Lucret. V, 149, *tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota sensibus a nostris animi vix mente videtur*. But we must not neglect the difference of *vis et natura deorum* and *tenuis natura deum*. The latter, on account of the epithet *tenuis*, can only be understood of the divine *quasi corpus* which the mind perceives, because in virtue of its possessing the same *tenuitas* it is in immediate contact with and directly affected by it; the *vis et natura deorum* is something more than this quasi corporeality, and denotes the whole outer and inner constitution upon which the *vitae actio* and the *mentis agitatio* (§ 45 ff.), virtue, wisdom, happiness and immortality of the gods depend. If in the passage under discussion we are to understand simply the corporeality of the gods, of which we are cognizant by mere perception, Cicero could not have written *cernatur*, which would only admit *vis et natura* for its subject, but *cernantur*, sc. *di*, which I (Prof. Sch.) have therefore restored. The perceptible *tenuitas* of the gods, although not the same as their *vis et natura*, still is a part of it, is one side of their being, and may therefore as depending upon this be designated by *ut*; it lies in the nature of the gods that their corporeality as well should be perceivable only by the *mens*, and not by the senses. In the Greek original which Cicero used there was probably an infinitive depending on ὥστε, perhaps γιγνώσκεσθαι, which could be rendered in Latin by the singular as well as by the plural of the finite verb. Thus Cotta in his reply (§ 105) takes the proposition as applicable only to the corporeality and not to the collective being of the gods, and speaks of the *speciem dei* because this alone in the gods is what we immediately perceive, *quod mente cernitur*. When Cicero makes him say *percipi cogitatione* instead of the *mente cerni* of Velleius, we may regard it as the result of the same haste apparent in other passa[illegible] [illegible]ich caused him to overlook the difference betw[illegible]

In the last part of the passage the words *mentem intentam infixamque nostram intellegentiam capere* are evidently to be understood not of the simple contemplation or perception by the *mens*, but rather of the process of reasoning which follows, examines and searches for the true purport of our perceptions. Perception alone is only receptive and can naturally give only the *species deorum*, as Cotta (§ 107) rightly remarks; but a perception that is only receptive and passive is not enough for the human mind; it is thereby roused to an individual activity. This is again of two kinds: first, so to speak, a cursory one, and the ideas which come from it spontaneously are very properly called προλήψεις, *notiones anticipatae, anteceptae informationes* (§ 43). If they are sometimes called *intellegentiae*, this is hardly done without an epithet to denote their nature, such as *inchoatae, adumbratae, obscurae*, Cic. De Leg. I, 9, 25; 10, 30; 22, 59 (comp. on De Offic. III, 10, 76); in reality they are only *opiniones* (§ 45); they cannot become *intellegentia* but through more exact investigation and rational foundation which the mind aims at while it is busy with them. This is denoted by the Greek ἐπιβάλλειν, ἐπιβολή (Schneider ad Epicur. Physic., p. 65), and Cicero expresses it by *animus se iniciens et intendens*, or, as in our passage, *mens intenta infixaque*.

Now if the *intellegentia* thus gained is spoken of as one *quae sit et beata natura et aeterna* it is plainly nonsense; and this is generally acknowledged. The emendation I (Prof. Sch.) proposed in my Opusc. Acad. IV, 347 I called *paullo obscurior;* but it is not so obscure that it might not be understood with a little thought. Bake's *quam sit ea beata natura et aeterna* (Mnemosyn. II, p. 415) may be easier so far as the Mss. are concerned; but one of the defenders of this reading has not overlooked the fact that *quam* cannot possibly be taken of the measure or degree of happiness and immortality of the gods. He has recourse therefore to the assumption that the difficulty of the passage results from a rather stupid misunderstanding on the part of Cicero. He thinks Cicero found in the Greek original that he was translating ὡς, which there had the force of ὅτι corresponding to "that" introducing a sentence; and that he erroneously took this for the adverb equivalent to *quantum* or *quantopere*. If Cicero had found ὡς in the original, he would have translated it by *ut*, as he did in the phrase of Protagoras in c. 23, 63.

On the law of Isonomy cited by Velleius in § 50 as an argument for the happiness and immortality of the gods I have expressed my doubts on p. 24. If Epicurus and the greater part of his followers did not make use of this law, it remains to inquire what other argument they did advance. There are no express data on this point and we can only form conjectures. We read in Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. III, 4; V, 129 Fabr.: ἄφθαρτόν τι καὶ

μακάριον ἐννοήσας τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τοῦτο νόμιζε; imagine to thyself an immortal and happy being, and think that God is such a one. The ideas of immortality and happiness might or must have arisen in the mind as the natural opposites of misery and mortality, whether impressions came to it from the gods or not; but there is none among all the objects, from which impressions come, to which these ideas correspond, all of these are proved to be mortal and not happy with the single exception of the gods, perceived by means of their impressions always uniformly appearing. If then there are any immortal and happy beings, and there is no sufficient ground to deny it, the gods must be such. *De hoc argumentandi genere utcumque iudicabitur, hoc tamen fatendum erit, non infirmius esse, quam quo alios quoque theologos philosophantes in divinarum rerum quaestionibus usos esse hodieque uti videmus.*

I, 24, 66. Democritus derived the origin and further development of all things by necessity from the motion, the whirl (δίνη) of atoms, as Cicero himself says, De Fato, c. 10, 23: *Democritus, auctor atomorum, accipere maluit necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuis naturales motus avellere;* and Diog. L. IX, 45: πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀνάγκην λέγει. But since this necessity existed nowhere else than in the atoms themselves, and the δίνη was not caused by anything external to them, Cicero was right in saying *nulla cogente natura* and calling the concourse of the atoms fortuitous, just as Aristotle referring to the doctrine of Democritus and Leucippus says, Physic. II, 4: ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίγνεσθαι τὴν δίνην καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τὴν διακρίνασαν καὶ καταστήσασαν εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν τὸ πᾶν. For Democritus did not accept any sort of nature external to and working upon the atoms, or any regulation of their motions toward a given end. Comp. Bonitz on Aristot. Metaph., p. 76. There was no reason therefore to accuse Cicero of an error in the matter, as the most recent translator has done.

I, 25, 71. The proper sense of the phrase *concretio individuorum corporum* is given in the note. The misunderstanding of this has misled not only Lactantius, De Ira Dei, c. 10, 27, but some earlier writers on the history of philosophy, to the opinion that Epicurus either held the gods to be entirely incorporeal, or at least attributed to them bodies consisting not of atoms but of some indeterminable substance. More upon this subject may be found in Schoemann's Schediasma De Epicuri Theologia, Opusc. Ac. IV, 342.

I, 28, 79. The *naevus in articulo pueri* might seem too small a matter to be at all regarded by the lover. It has therefore been proposed to read *naevus in Lyco puero;* one Ms. has *in Pericle puero.*

I, 37, 103. The reading of the Mss., *superior aetheri, ignibus altissima ora reddatur*, retained by Baiter, seems to me plainly erroneous, and seems to have arisen from some one's explaining *ignibus*, which here as in c. 15, 39 (see note) means the *aether*, by *aetheri*, and by this note creeping into the text and taking the place of the proper reading *aëri*. If *aether* is sometimes used for *aër* (see Munro on Lucretius II, 1115), such a use would be incredible here, where the element opposed to the *ignibus* and situated below them is in question.

I, 37, 105. It seems proper here to discuss the passage of Diog. L. X, 139 which, as it is preserved in the Mss., partly coincides with what Cotta here and Velleius in c. 19, 49 give as the doctrine of Epicurus, but partly differs so much, that some have felt obliged to infer that Epicurus held a doctrine about the gods which is mentioned neither by Cicero nor by any-one else, while others hold the passage as corrupt and any restoration difficult or impossible. The passage runs thus in the Mss.: ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν (*i.e.* Ἐπίκουρος) τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιῤῥύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένων ἀνθρωποειδῶς. If the reading be correct, it is clear that two classes of gods are here distinguished; and hence several writers, Tennemann (Gesch. d. Phil. III, p. 416 f.), Heindorf (on Cic. D. N. I, 19, 50), Steinhart (article on Epicurus in the Allgem. Encyklop. d. Wissensch. u. Künste, I, 35, p. 477, note 64), Hegel (Vorles. ü. d. Gesch. d. Philos. published by Michelet, Werke Th. XIV, p. 507), have accepted such a distinction and attempted to explain it in their own way. In my essay De Epicuri Theologia, p. 352 ff. I have set forth the arguments against this in detail. I think I have shown that the distinction is quite inadmissible, and that in the passage of Diogenes the οὓς μέν . . . οὓς δέ must be necessarily regarded as corrupt. Gassendi and Meiners have already expressed the same opinion. The former proposed οὐ μέν, ὡς δέ, the latter (Verm. Philos. Schr. II, p. 121) οὐ μέν . . . ἀλλά. My own is perhaps a more probable emendation: οὐ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας [γνωστ]οὺς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδίαν &c. After γνωστοὺς was mutilated as I have indicated, and the remaining οὺς taken for οὓς, nothing was easier than to change the preceding οὐ μέν into οὓς μὲν, so that οὓς δὲ could be referred to it. The passage thus corrected agrees perfectly with what we know from other sources. The κατ' ἀριθμόν corresponds to *ad numerum*; the gods cannot be counted, not individually distinguished by us; but they are still perceivable in consequence of the similar nature of the impressions continually coming to us from them. It is clear that ἐπιῤῥύσεως and *transitione* mean the same thing; but it will hardly occur to any one to take them as meaning only

a passing by of the impressions. The ὁμοειδία or *similitudo* certainly denotes the similarity of the nature of the impressions to that of the mind of man, since both consist of the most minute atoms possible. Comp. Lucret. III, 244; Diog. L. X, 66; Stob. Ecl. 1, 52, p. 798. From this similarity of nature it comes that the impressions of the gods are perceived directly and not through the medium of the coarser senses, according to the familiar principle of the old physicists *similia similibus cognoscuntur;* comp. Trendelenburg on Aristot. De Anima, pp. 220, 228; or Bonitz on Aristot. Metaph., p. 161. Sext. Emp. Adv. Logic. I, 116 proves that Democritus taught this; comp. Papencordt De Atomicor. Doctr., p. 49; and doubtless Epicurus as well. — That γνωστούς is precisely the correct expression for the perception which results from the influence of the impressions may be seen from the letter of Epicurus to Herodotus, § 68, where those things which are perceived by the senses are called γνωστὰ κατ' αἴσθησιν; and in the letter to Menœcus § 123 the perception of the gods through the impressions is called γνῶσις ἐναργής, whereas the proper understanding of the nature of the gods can only be reached by reflection and reason, the gods are only λόγῳ θεωρητοί. — Finally the words ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένων certainly mean that the impressions all have the same effect (ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἀποτελοῦνται), the same thing that Cotta says c. 39, 109: *fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multis una videatur.*

II, 18, 47. *a medioque . . . quantum idem a summo.* In order to remove all the difficulty from this passage I formerly proposed an emendation, namely *a medioque ubique tantundem absit extremum,* striking out *quantum idem a summo,* which is only found in a single Ms. in the margin. I mention this here only to controvert a somewhat prevalent misconception. Because Cicero, Sallust and the older authors in general only use *ubique* in passages where a relative or interrogative pronoun precedes, *qui ubique* and the like, and because it very often seems as if *ubique* in such passages were equivalent to *et ubi,* Lachmann, Lucret. IV, 638, p. 251, has stated with his usual confidence that in the older language and even in Cicero's time *ubique* could nowhere be used in any other sense, and that it was a gross *imperitia* to suppose that it could as well be used in the same manner as the other words compounded with the indefinite *que, undique, usque, uterque* &c. (a usage which still occurs in Horace, *e.g.* Sat. II, 5, 23). The fact in regard to Cicero and the older writers had been observed by others long before Lachmann; cf. Duker De Latinit. Vett. I. Ctor., p. 415 (380 ed. Lips.). We may concede that in very many places where *ubique* occurs after a pronoun it may be perfectly well taken for *et ubi;* but that in any passage whatever it can be taken only in this way

cannot be granted at all. The indefinite sense, "in all places whatever," is always admissible; and there are passages where this is the only one possible, as *e.g.* Cic. Verrin. V, 67, 172: *Omnes hoc loco cives Romani, et qui adsunt et qui ubique sunt, vestram severitatem desiderant.* It seems therefore an error to conclude from those other passages that the indefinite meaning of *ubique* was an innovation adopted perhaps in the time of Horace; and this seems to me all the more improbable, since *utrobique* or *utrubique*, which also contains *ubi*, occurs in Cicero and his contemporaries as an indefinite quite in the same way and without a preceding pronoun, and since in general it is a mistake to conclude from the non-occurrence of an expression in the extant remains of these authors that they never made use of it. I might have proposed *ubivis* instead of *ubique*.

II, 23, 61. The *praenomen* (A) before Atilio, which is wanting in the Mss., is added at the well-founded suggestion of Fleckeisen. See his Kritische Miscellen in the Progr. des Vitzthumschen Gymnasiums, Dresden, 1864, p. 56.

II, 50, 126. Baiter reads, according to Madvig's proposal: *purgantes autem alvos ibes Aegyptiae curantur.* But inasmuch as, so far as I know, all the Mss. have the active *curant*, and *purgatione* is found at least in some although perhaps by way of conjecture only for *purgante* of others, and *purgantes* is found in none, I have not felt authorized to make the change.

II, 54, 136. *et terendo cibo et praeterea spiritu.* After the preceding *omne quod accepit* certainly *cibo* is an unnecessary and perhaps erroneous addition. Still I have not omitted it for the reason that, if one should strike out all such little irregularities which the best writer may be guilty of, he would easily run the risk of correcting the author instead of the copyist.

II, 55, 136. Madvig's conjecture, *intrante spiritu*, is certainly so far as regards diplomatic criticism entirely unobjectionable, and bears witness of the masterly skill in this department which has made him an authority, and explains how many have unquestioningly assented to him, as Baiter does in this passage. But since Cicero has reminded us above I, 5, 10, *non tam auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt*, we may be allowed here to look a little more closely for the reason of the thing. If Cicero had written *intrante spiritu*, we should have to assume

that by these ablatives he only intended to characterize the simultaneous occurrence of both these processes, *i.e.* the entrance of the air and the expansion of the lungs, without thinking of the actual relation of the two which we designate as a conditional or a causal one; the lung does not expand *if* or *because* the air enters, but the contrary, *if* or *since* the lung expands the air enters, as in a pair of bellows, with which indeed the breathing process is for this reason compared, *e.g.* by Aristotle De Resp. c. 21. Now it is quite possible that the matter was not quite clear to Cicero, or that he thought it unnecessary to describe it more definitely, which it would have been quite easy to do by writing, say *trahentes spiritum*. But as little as I should be inclined to grant this, no more can I regard Madvig's conjecture as free from objection. Moreover if the original text had read thus, such an easily understood expression would hardly have become so corrupted as the variations found in the Mss. show. But if the original text read *in respiratu*, the change to *respiritu* with or without *in* is explicable from the difficulty the correctors found in *respiratus*, just as for example in Cic. Attic. I, ep. 18, 3 and Liv. XXX, 15, 3 the Mss. waver between *suspiratus* and *suspiritus*. Orelli omitted *in* before *respiratu*; as it has sufficient warrant in the Mss. I have thought best to leave it, and so have not quite followed Lambinus.

II, 55, 137. *confectus iam coctusque* for *concoctusque*. See Opusc. Ac. III, p. 374.

II, 57, 143. *et somno coniventibus . . . utque tamquam involuti quiescerent.* O. Heine in the Philolog. XV, p. 685 assumes here a gap to be supplied perhaps by *tegumentum esset*. Perhaps [*tegumentum ess*]*et quo . . .* ?

II, 59, 147. [*et*] *qualis sit* (Schoemann for *qualis*que *sit*). As the copula is wanting in the Mss. it is not improbable that the words are nothing but a gloss to *quam vim habeat*. Hence Baiter has bracketed them, as also the preceding *idque ratione*, on the genuineness of which no one save the most recent translator will believe.

II, 66, 165. *Sin autem his consulunt.* Bouhier with some reason supposes that Cicero wrote *si autem*. At least *sin* would not be used here in the usual way, namely as introducing an assumption that contradicts or extends one that precedes, whether expressed or implied (see Opusc. Ac. III, p. 372, note 2). It is clear that neither of these is the case here, but only a further consequence is drawn from what precedes.

III, 3, 8. *et non altero coniveam* for the Mss. *contuear* is an emendation accepted also by Baiter after Madvig's confident recommendation. So in c. 4, 9 *cur coniveres* for *contueres* found in the best Mss., which others have changed into *contuerere*. The variations in Plinius, *e.g.* X, 75, 97, p. 215 Sillig, besides the examples cited by M., show how commonly the copyists confused these two verbs.

III, 9, 23. *Saepe dixti nihil fieri sine deo nec ullam vim esse naturae, ut sui dissimilia posset effingere.* The statement *nihil fieri sine deo* nowhere occurs, at least in this form, in the discourse of Balbus; and even supposing that here, where the Stoic doctrine of the divinity of the world is criticized, *sine deo* were equivalent to *sine mundo*, there can have been no probable reason why Cotta should not choose the expression which was evidently more fitting and liable to no mistake. One Ms., certainly not of the best, which Creuzer denotes by La, has *sine mundo;* but, as *mundus* has been mentioned just before, *sine eo* might appear sufficient and more probable, as it did to Creuzer. But even thus the expression does not seem definite and clear enough to designate what is here required. *fieri sine aliquo* may be said of everything which takes place without the coöperation of any one; but here, where the question is plainly of the origin of things, where the *mundus* is to be conceived as not only coöperating but as creating and producing, some other expression seems to be required. Heindorf saw this plainly and for *sine eo* conjectured *nisi ex eo*, just as we find shortly after *ex eo procreantur;* comp. II, 35, 88: *mundus ex quo oriuntur et fiunt omnia.* — In the next sentence *nec ullam vim esse naturae, ut sui dissimilia posset effingere* we must evidently understand by *natura* only nature in general (*natura mundi* II, 22, 58, ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις M. Aurel. VII, 75), *i.e.* the creative power of the universe, but not any natural existence in particular. Hence Walker rightly saw that we should read *illam* for *ullam*. It is further to be noticed that the expression *sui dissimilia*, which Cotta employs, does not quite correspond to the sense of what Balbus had said; for Balbus had not and could not say that the all-creating *natura* could create nothing *unlike* itself, but only that it could create nothing better and more perfect than itself; II, 33, 86: *ea quae efferant aliquid ex sese perfectiores habere naturas quam ea quae ex iis efferantur;* comp. II, 8, 21.

III, 14, 36. *intrinsecus* is the reading, undoubtedly correct, of Bouhier instead of the opposite *extrinsecus*, which is here impossible; formerly I adopted *et sentiens*, proposed by Wyttenbach in its place. Although there may be no other example of *intrinsecus animal*, the explanation given in the notes is not to be doubted.

III, 17, 43. There is certainly something wanting after *si di sunt*. Something should follow which could be regarded as an apparent reason for the divinity of such beings as the Nymphs, and then be refuted by Cotta as not valid proof; perhaps *si di sunt quibus sacra fiunt* or the like. On *ne nymphae quidem igitur* see Opusc. Ac. III, p. 380.

III, 19, 50. It seems to me nearly certain that *Leontidum* should be read for *Leonaticum* of the Mss. In regard to the name Leocorium, O. Müller, Ind. Schol. Gotting. 1840, supposes that it denoted properly a place appointed for the expiation of the sins of the people (λεωκόρος, after the analogy of νεωκόρος); Lobeck, Pathol. I, p. 550, says: Suspectus est Leos heros et omnis illa de filiabus eius fabula, sicut omnia quae de Graecorum sacrificiis humanis tradita sunt. Nomen Leocorion vel Leocori cuiusdam monumentum est vel populi curiam s. λήιτον significat.

III, 29, 72. Instead of the Mss. *parumne semper in ratione versantur* Baiter reads *parumne saepe* according to the conjecture of Madvig and older critics, which does not seem to me necessary. It is clear enough that *parum semper* cannot be united; but *parum* should be taken with the following *in ratione versantur*, which is required by *parumne subtiliter disputat* coming directly after. It need not surprise one that it is separated from it by *semper;* there is a good reason for the position. *Semper* points to the fact that the *levitates comicae* are not always committed, though they may often be so, without *ratio*, without a sort of reasoning to justify them.

III, 31, 77. *Et si verum est* &c. Baiter, after Madvig, reads *Ut si verum esset*. . ., brackets the words *si, qui audierunt* to *interpretarentur* as a spurious interpolation, and makes the apodosis to the protasis commencing with *ut* begin in § 78 with *sic, si homines*. . . There is no doubt that Cicero might have written thus, and that it might have been better had he done so; but it does not seem to me necessary for that reason to change the traditional reading of the Mss. What is best is not always genuine, and slight inaccuracies are easier to excuse in a treatise which evidently affects the freedom of an extemporary conversation. We may therefore excuse the repetition of the protasis in *si, qui audierunt* &c., and the separation of *prorsus* of the apodosis from its verb *tacere*. Madvig thought it necessary to change the *si verum est* to *si verum esset* because, according to his conjecture, only these words could form the protasis to *tacere praestaret;* with the common reading this is unnecessary because the protasis is contained in the clause *si . . . essent discessuri*. It is incredible that this clause merely repeats in hypothetical form the thought expressed at the beginning in more positive form by *si verum est* &c.?—I have

thought best to preserve the traditional reading; excepting the change at the end of the sentence of *philosophos* (after Lambinus) for *philosophis*, although the dative is defensible. [Müller has *philosophis.*]

VARIATIONS FROM THE TEXT OF MÜLLER.

40. 1 *sic afficiatur* for † *significetur* — 40. 9 *vetera sint* for † *est* — 47. 14 *cernatur; nec* for *cernatur nec* — l. 16 *appellat, sed* for *appellat; sed* — *perceptis, cum* for *perceptis cum* — l. 18 *adfluat; tum* for *adfluat cum* — 58. 21 *argumenta sententiae* for *argumento sententiam* — 62. 1 *nec ad speciem nec ad usum* for *nec specie nec usu* — 66. 35 *videamus* for *videmus* — 142. 6 *differemus;* for *differemus,* — 143. 18 *erit mundus* bracketed — 145. 5 *continerentur* and l. 6 *cohaerent permanent* for *contineretur cohaeret permanet* — 150. 27 *Eumenides, quarum* for *Eumenides? Quae si deae sunt, quarum* — l. 27 omit *Furiae* before *deae* — 164. 4 [*tyrannidis*] for † *typanidis* — 166. 28 *quidem. Non eas? ne nationes quidem* for *quidem; non modo* (*modo* in italics) *eas, ne nationes quidem* —.

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